`
`United States District Court
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`DALLASDIVISION
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`PHILLIP R. CRUTCHFIELD,
`Individually and on Behalf of All Others
`Similarly Situated
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`Vv.
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`MATCH GROUP, INC., AMANDA W.
`GINSBERG,and GARY SWIDLER
`
`CORCOR4ORCOR60?4GRCORKG
`
`ORDER
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`CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:19-CV-2356-S
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`This Order addresses Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint
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`(“Motion to Dismiss”) [ECF No. 54]. The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Class
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`Action Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws (“Second Amended Complaint”)
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`[ECF No. 51], the Motion to Dismiss and its accompanying exhibits [ECF No. 55], Plaintiffs’
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`Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 58], and Defendants’ Reply in Support of
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`Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint [ECF No. 62].
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`To defeat a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a
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`plaintiff must “plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.
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`Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
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`The Court must accept well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the
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`plaintiff. Sonnier v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 509 F.3d 673, 675 (Sth Cir. 2007). Because
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`the Second Amended Complaint alleges securities fraud, Plaintiffs must also “state with
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`particularity the circumstances constituting fraud,” FED. R. Crv. P. 9(b), and must comply with the
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`Case 3:19-cv-02356-S Document 63 Filed 11/19/21 Page 1 of 2 PageID 2080
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`strictures imposed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”), see 15 U.S.C. §
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`78u-4(b).
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`“The PSLRA has raised the pleading bar even higher and enhances Rule 9(b)’s
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`particularity requirement for pleading fraud in two ways.” Neiman v. Bulmahn, 854 F.3d 741, 746
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`
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`Case 3:19-cv-02356-S Document 63 Filed 11/19/21 Page2of2 PagelD 2081
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`(Sth Cir. 2017) (quoting Local 731 LB. of T. Excavators & Pavers Pension Tr. Fund v. Diodes,
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`Inc., 810 F.3d 951, 956 (Sth Cir. 2016)). “First, the plaintiff must specify each statement alleged
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`to have been misleading.” /d. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also 15 U.S.C.
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`§ 78u-4(b)(1). “Second, for each act or omission alleged to be false or misleading, plaintiffs must
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`state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
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`requisite state of mind.” Neiman, 854 F.3d at 746 (internal quotation marks andcitation omitted);
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`see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A).
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`The Court has carefully scrutinized all 164 pages of the Second Amended Complaint,
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`which contain extensive allegations addressing pleading deficiencies identified in the Court’s
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`Memorandum Opinion and Order [ECF No. 50]. Applying the standards of Twombly and Iqbal,
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`as well as the PSLRA’s heightened particularity requirement, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have
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`adequately specified at least some allegedly misleading statements or omissions. The Court further
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`finds that though Plaintiffs have pleaded the requisite inference of scienter for surviving a motion
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`to dismiss, the Court anticipates that it will revisit this issue at a later phase in the litigation after
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`discovery takes place.
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`Accordingly, dismissal
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`is not warranted at
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`this time and the Court DENIES the
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`Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint.
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`SO ORDERED.
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`SIGNED November19, 2021.
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`Case 3:19-cv-02356-S Document 63 Filed 11/19/21 Page 2 of 2 PageID 2081
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`
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`KAREN GREN SCHOLER
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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`