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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`FORT WORTH DIVISION
`
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`
`
`SID MILLER, et al.,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`TOM VILSACK, in his official capacity as
`SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE,
`
`
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`)
`)
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`)
`)
`)
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`
`
`Civil Action No. 4:21-cv-595-O
`
`
`
`
`BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS
`
`

`

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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1
`
`BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 2
`
`ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 4
`
`I.
`
`Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue most of their claims. ....................................................... 5
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`No Plaintiff has standing to challenge non-§ 1005 USDA programs. .................... 6
`
`Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring their second claim for relief. .................... 9
`
`Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge what they concede is a non-existent
` policy.................................................................................................................... 10
`
`II.
`
`Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because
`Title VI does not apply to federal agencies. ..................................................................... 11
`
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 13
`
`
`
`
`
`i
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`

`

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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`
`Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
`515 U.S. 200 (1995) .................................................................................................................... 8
`
`
`Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) .................................................................................................................. 11
`
`
`Bolling v. Sharpe,
`347 U.S. 497 (1954) .................................................................................................................... 4
`
`
`California v. Texas,
`No. 19-840, 2021 WL 2459255 (U.S. June 17, 2021) .................................................. 5, 7, 9, 11
`
`
`Cannon v. Univ. of Chi.,
`441 U.S. 677 (1979) .................................................................................................................. 13
`
`
`Carney v. Adams,
`141 S. Ct. 493 (2020) ......................................................................................................... passim
`
`
`Casillas v. Madison Avenue Assocs., Inc.,
`926 F. 3d 329 (7th Cir. 2019) ...................................................................................................... 8
`
`
`Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,
`133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) ................................................................................................................ 6
`
`
`Cleveland v. Hunton,
`No. 1:16-cv-01732, 2017 WL 1153011 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2017), report and
`recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 1491006 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2017) ................................ 12
`
`
`Cuvillier v. Taylor,
`503 F.3d 397 (5th Cir. 2007) ..................................................................................................... 11
`
`
`DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,
`547 U.S. 332 (2006) .................................................................................................................... 5
`
`
`Fagan v. Small Bus. Admin.,
`783 F. Supp. 1455 (D.D.C.), aff’d, 19 F.3d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ...................................... 12, 13
`
`
`Flowers v. Brown,
`No. 1:17-cv-460, 2021 WL 1143783 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2021), report and
`recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 1134272 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 23, 2021) ............................... 12
`
`ii
`
`

`

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`George v. Farmers Elec. Coop., Inc.,
`715 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1983) ....................................................................................................... 7
`
`
`Halim v. Donovan,
`951 F. Supp. 2d 201 (D.D.C. 2013) .......................................................................................... 12
`
`
`Hollingsworth v. Perry,
`570 U.S. 693 (2013) .................................................................................................................... 5
`
`
`Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass’n v. Glendening,
`174 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 1999) ..................................................................................................... 13
`
`
`Jones v. Greninger,
`188 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 1999) ..................................................................................................... 11
`
`
`Lewis v. Casey,
`518 U.S. 343 (1996) .................................................................................................................... 5
`
`
`Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp.,
`494 U.S. 472 (1990) .................................................................................................................. 10
`
`
`Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
`504 U.S. 555 (1992) ................................................................................................................ 5, 6
`
`
`Marsaw v. Trailblazer Health Enters., L.L.C.,
`192 F. Supp. 2d 737 (S.D. Tex. 2002) ...................................................................................... 12
`
`
`NAACP v. Kyle,
`626 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 2010) ....................................................................................................... 5
`
`
`NAACP v. Med. Ctr., Inc.,
`599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979) .................................................................................................... 13
`
`
`Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Emps. v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio,
`40 F.3d 698 (5th Cir. 1994) ....................................................................................................... 12
`
`
`Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. ATF,
`700 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2012) ................................................................................................... 5, 6
`
`
`Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
`438 U.S. 265 (1978) .................................................................................................................. 12
`
`
`
`iii
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`

`

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`Sims v. City of Dallas,
`No. CIV. A. 3:95-CV-177, 1996 WL 722052 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 1996) .................................... 7
`
`
`Soberal-Perez v. Heckler,
`717 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1983) ........................................................................................................ 12
`
`
`Summers v. Earth Island Inst.,
`555 U.S. 488 (2009) .................................................................................................................... 6
`
`
`TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,
`No. 20-297 (U.S. June 25, 2021)....................................................................................... 6, 8, 11
`
`
`United States v. Kennedy,
`No. 17-0396, 2017 WL 4837473 (W.D. La. Oct. 5, 2017), report and recommendation
`adopted, 2017 WL 4817892 (W.D. La. Oct. 25, 2017) ............................................................ 12
`
`
`Williams v. Glickman,
`936 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996) ................................................................................................... 12
`
`
`Wise v. Glickman,
`257 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D.D.C. 2003) .......................................................................................... 12
`
`
`Women’s Equity Action League v. Cavazos,
`906 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1990) .................................................................................................. 13
`
`Constitutional Provisions
`
`U.S. Const. amend. V...................................................................................................................... 4
`
`U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2 ................................................................................................................. 11
`
`Statutes
`
`7 U.S.C. § 1627c ..................................................................................................................... 1, 3, 7
`
` 7
`
` 7
`
` 7
`
` U.S.C. § 1985 ........................................................................................................................... 3, 7
`
` U.S.C. § 2003 ............................................................................................................................... 1
`
` U.S.C. § 2204i .............................................................................................................................. 3
`
` 7
`
` U.S.C. § 2279 ...................................................................................................................... passim
`
`
`42 U.S.C. § 2000d ............................................................................................................... 4, 11, 13
`
`iv
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`42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 ..................................................................................................................... 13
`
`42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 ..................................................................................................................... 12
`
`42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4 ..................................................................................................................... 12
`
`American Rescue Plan Act, ("ARPA"), Pub. L. No. 117-2, 134 Stat. 4 (2021) ......................... 1, 2
`
`Regulations
`
`66 Fed. Reg. 21,617-01 (Apr. 30, 2001) ......................................................................................... 3
`
`74 Fed. Reg. 31,567 (July 2, 2009) ................................................................................................. 3
`
`75 Fed. Reg. 27,165 (May 14, 2010) .............................................................................................. 3
`
`86 Fed. Reg. 28,329 (May 26, 2021) ........................................................................................ 3, 10
`
`Other Authorities
`
`H.R. Rep. No. 117-7 (2021) ............................................................................................................ 2
`
`Zach Ducheneaux, American Rescue Plan Socially Disadvantaged Farmer Debt Payments,
`USDA (Mar. 26, 2021), https://www.farmers.gov/connect/blog/loans-and-grants/american-
`rescue-plan-socially-disadvantaged-farmer-debt-payments ...................................................... 10
`
`
`
`
`v
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`

`

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`INTRODUCTION
`
`As one part of a broad economic stimulus bill enacted in the midst of a global pandemic,
`Congress authorized the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to provide debt relief to “socially
`disadvantaged farmer[s] and rancher[s].” American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) § 1005, 134 Stat. 4,
`12-13 (2021). Some Plaintiffs allege that they are excluded from the benefits of this provision
`solely because of their race, and that this exclusion violates both the Constitution and federal civil
`rights laws.
`But Plaintiffs’ claims go well beyond challenging the administration of the program that
`they contend unlawfully excludes them. The statutory terms “socially disadvantaged farmer or
`rancher” (SDFR) and “socially disadvantaged group” (SDG), 7 U.S.C. § 2279(a), are used in a
`wide range of programs administered by USDA.1 Plaintiffs make no allegation that they are in any
`way injured by the use of these defined terms in these other programs, but they nonetheless seek
`to foreclose the use of those terms in those programs. Article III precludes such claims and denies
`this Court the power to adjudicate them. Plaintiffs cannot establish standing to raise such claims
`because they cannot establish that they have been or will be injured by the challenged conduct, or
`that they are “able and ready” to seek any benefit under any particular program other than § 1005.
`Carney v. Adams, 141 S. Ct. 493, 500 (2020).
`Plaintiffs also argue, in the alternative, that the statutory term “socially disadvantaged
`farmer or rancher” must be read in specific ways. But the only Plaintiff for whom these alternative
`forms of relief could apply has not alleged any injury that would be redressed by that relief. And
`Plaintiffs concede that, for one of their claims, USDA has not adopted the interpretation Plaintiffs
`contend is unlawful. Because Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged standing to pursue these
`claims, they must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
`Finally, Plaintiffs’ claims under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 must be dismissed
`
`
`1 Plaintiffs appear to also challenge the similar but distinct statutory definitions set forth in 7 U.S.C.
`§ 2003(e)(1,2). See FAC ¶ 10 (referencing 7 U.S.C. § 1627c, which incorporates the SDFR
`definition set out in § 2003(e), see 7 U.S.C. § 1627c(a)(11)).
`
`1
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`

`

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`for failure to state a claim because it is well-established that Title VI does not apply to a federal
`agency administering its own program.2
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`In March 2021, Congress passed ARPA, which provides widespread pandemic relief to the
`American people, including farmers. See Pub. L. No. 117-2 (2021). ARPA “takes a multipronged
`approach to tackle the public health and economic crises resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic.”
`American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, H.R. Rep. No. 117-7, at 3 (2021). The House Report
`accompanying the bill shows that Congress was focused on the “most vulnerable communities . . .
`forced to bear the brunt of” the pandemic and resultant economic crisis “as underlying health and
`economic inequities grow worse.” Id. at 2. Among those communities were minority farmers who
`generally could not obtain credit in the private market and had “received a disproportionately small
`share of the farm loans and payments administered by USDA as a result of . . . longstanding and
`widespread discrimination.” Id. at 12.
`Thus, as part of ARPA, Congress passed § 1005, which authorizes funds to pay up to 120
`percent of certain direct or guaranteed USDA farm loans held by “socially disadvantaged farmers
`or ranchers” and outstanding as of January 1, 2021. See § 1005. For purposes of § 1005, Congress
`gave the term “socially disadvantaged farmer or rancher” the same meaning as in § 2501(a) of the
`Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2279(a). See id.
`§ 1005(b)(3). That provision defines a “socially disadvantaged farmer or rancher” as “a farmer or
`rancher who is a member of a socially disadvantaged group,” 7 U.S.C. § 2279(a)(5), which is
`further defined as “a group whose members have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice
`because of their identity as members of a group without regard to their individual qualities,” id.
`§ 2279(a)(6).
`
`
`2 Defendants do not contest, at this motion to dismiss stage, that at least one plaintiff has standing
`to challenge the administration of the § 1005 debt relief program. Nor do Defendants seek to
`dismiss such a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Concurrent with this motion, Defendants have filed a
`Partial Answer.
`
`2
`
`

`

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`Many of the programs USDA administers incorporate, to one degree or another,
`consideration of the statutory terms “socially disadvantaged group” or “socially disadvantaged
`farmer or rancher.” See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2204i(a) (requiring the Secretary of Agriculture to produce
`a report that includes information on socially disadvantaged farmers and ranchers); 7 U.S.C.
`§ 2279(c)(4) (grants program); 7 U.S.C. § 1627c(d) (grant program); 7 U.S.C. § 1985 (land sale
`program). USDA has long interpreted “socially disadvantaged group[s]” to include the following
`five groups: American Indians or Alaskan Natives; Asians; Blacks or African Americans;
`Hispanics or Latinos; and Native Hawaiians or other Pacific Islanders. See, e.g., Outreach &
`Assistance for Socially Disadvantaged Farmers & Ranchers Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 21,617-01,
`21,617 (Apr. 30, 2001) (interpreting 7 U.S.C. § 2279 to include those groups for purposes of
`Outreach and Assistance for SDFRs Program); Livestock Indemnity Program and General
`Provisions for Supplemental Agricultural Disaster Assistance Programs, 74 Fed. Reg. 31,567,
`31,571 (July 2, 2009) (same for Risk Management Purchase Waiver); Conservation Reserve
`Program and Transition Incentives Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 27,165 (May 14, 2010) (same for
`Conservation Reserve Program). For debt relief under the § 1005 program, USDA confirmed in a
`Notice of Funds Availability that SDGs would continue to “include, but are not limited to,” those
`same five groups, while others could be considered for inclusion on a case-by-case basis by the
`Secretary in response to a written request with a supporting explanation. See Notice of Funds
`Availability, American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 Section 1005 Loan Payment (ARPA), 86 Fed.
`Reg. 28,329, 28,330 (May 26, 2021). For purposes of § 1005, membership in an SDG is based on
`the borrower’s self-certified identity. Id. at 28,330.
`On April 26, 2021, Plaintiff Sid Miller, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,
`filed a putative class action challenging USDA’s implementation of § 1005. Compl., ECF No. 1.
`On June 2, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint adding four additional Plaintiffs. Am. Compl.
`(FAC), ECF No. 11. All Plaintiffs are farmers or ranchers who self-identify as “white,” id. ¶¶ 19-
`23; Plaintiff Miller alleges that he is “primarily Scotch-Irish” and “also has approximately 2%
`black ancestry,” id. ¶ 19. Four Plaintiffs—but not Mr. Miller—allege that they hold FSA direct
`
`3
`
`

`

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`and guaranteed loans. Id. ¶¶ 19-23.
`Plaintiffs bring numerous and broad claims. Most narrowly, Plaintiffs challenge the
`consideration of race or ethnicity in determining eligibility for § 1005 debt relief. Plaintiffs contend
`that this violates Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, and the equal protection component of the Fifth
`Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. V; see Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). More broadly,
`Plaintiffs contend that USDA violates both the Fifth Amendment and Title VI when it uses any
`statutory SDG designation for any USDA program. See, e.g., FAC ¶ 29-30 (targeting “any statute”
`and USDA’s “programs” without limitation). Plaintiffs also contend, in the alternative, that the
`statutory definition of SDG must be interpreted to include additional groups beyond those already
`recognized by USDA, FAC ¶¶ 31-33, and to prohibit the hypothetical use of a “blood-quantum
`threshold” to determine SDG membership, FAC ¶¶ 34-39.
`Also on June 2, Plaintiffs moved for class certification, ECF No. 13, and a preliminary
`injunction, ECF No. 18 (PI Mot.). The motion for a preliminary injunction addresses only
`Plaintiffs’ challenge to § 1005 and not their broader challenge to all USDA interpretations of
`“socially disadvantaged farmer or rancher”; their Title VI allegations; or any other allegations in
`their Amended Complaint. See generally PI Mot.
`Defendants now move under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) to dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ claims
`except their claim that § 1005 violates the Fifth Amendment.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`Defendants seek partial dismissal under both Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction and
`under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge programs other
`than the § 1005 debt relief program, and they also lack standing to pursue their hypothetical
`challenges in Claim 2 and Claim 3. In addition, Plaintiffs’ challenge to the § 1005 program under
`Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Claim 1 must be dismissed for failure to state a claim
`because Title VI does not apply to federal agencies.
`
`4
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`

`

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`I.
`
`Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue most of their claims.
`
`As the Supreme Court has explained repeatedly, the “judicial power” with which federal
`courts are endowed is inherently limited to resolving true “cases or controversies.” This limitation,
`the Court just recently reiterated, is necessary to preserve the separation of powers and to deny
`“unelected judges a general authority to conduct oversight of decisions of the elected branches of
`Government.” California v. Texas, No. 19-840 (U.S. June 17, 2021), slip op. at 9, 2021 WL
`2459255. “The doctrine of standing implements this requirement by insisting that a litigant ‘prove
`that he has suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged
`conduct, and is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.’” Carney v. Adams, 141 S.
`Ct. 493, 498 (2020) (quoting Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 704 (2013)); see Lujan v. Defs.
`of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). “The parties seeking access to federal court bear the
`burden of establishing their standing.” Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. ATF, 700 F.3d 185, 190 (5th Cir. 2012).
`“Article III standing is a jurisdictional requirement,” NAACP v. Kyle, 626 F.3d 233, 237 (5th Cir.
`2010), and “[w]ithout jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.” Id. (citation
`omitted) (emphasis in original). These principles preclude jurisdiction over most of Plaintiffs’
`complaint in this case.
`The requirement that Plaintiffs have standing encompasses three elements, all of which
`must be satisfied for each claim and for each form of relief. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 190
`(citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560); see DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) (“a
`plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim . . . [and] separately for each form of relief
`sought”); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 n.6 (1996) (“Standing is not dispensed in gross.”).
`The first required element of standing is “an ‘injury in fact,’ which is a ‘concrete and particularized
`. . . invasion of a legally protected interest.’” Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 190-91 (quoting Lujan,
`504 U.S. at 560) (omission by Fifth Circuit). “The second is that ‘there must be a causal connection
`between the injury and the conduct complained of,’” that is, the injury must be “‘fairly . . .
`trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant.’” Id. at 191 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560)
`(omission and alteration by Fifth Circuit). “Third, ‘it must be likely, as opposed to merely
`
`5
`
`

`

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`speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.’” Id. (quoting Lujan, 504
`U.S. at 560).
`The Supreme Court has “repeatedly reiterated that threatened injury must be certainly
`impending to constitute injury in fact and that allegations of possible future injury are not
`sufficient.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (emphases in original;
`internal citation omitted). These requirements assure “that there is a real need to exercise the power
`of judicial review in order to protect the interests of the complaining party.” Summers v. Earth
`Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (citation omitted). “Where that need does not exist, allowing
`courts to oversee legislative or executive action would significantly alter the allocation of power
`away from a democratic form of government.” Id. (internal alternations and citation omitted); see
`also TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, No. 20-297, slip op. at 7–8 (U.S. June 25, 2021).
`
`A.
`
`No Plaintiff has standing to challenge non-§ 1005 USDA programs.
`
`Plaintiffs attempt to challenge USDA’s use of the SDG and SDFR designations in a wide
`number of programs. But Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge these programs because they do not
`allege either that they are injured by the administration of these programs or that any injury would
`be redressed by an injunction restraining USDA from using the SDG or SDFR designation in those
`programs. Plaintiffs cannot simply challenge the use of the SDG or SDFR designations in the
`administration of programs that Plaintiffs themselves are not eligible for, or “able and ready” to
`apply for. Carney, 141 S. Ct. at 500. Rather, Plaintiffs must show that “at the time [they] filed
`suit,” the use of such designations in those programs “caused [them] a concrete, particularized
`‘injury in fact’ over and above the abstract generalized grievance suffered by all citizens” from the
`existence of an allegedly unlawful program. Id. at 499. Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts
`to establish that they are injured by the manner in which these non-§ 1005 programs are
`administered.
`Many such programs, for example, are not open to individuals at all. E.g., 7 U.S.C.
`§ 2279(c)(4) (authorizing grants to certain educational institutions or organizations). Others are
`
`6
`
`

`

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`open only to certain types of farmers or ranchers. E.g., id. § 1627c(d) (authorizing grants to
`“independent producer[s]” of “a value-added agricultural product”). Others are open only under
`specified circumstances in specific locations. E.g., id. § 1985 (authorizing the acquisition and sale
`of property under specified circumstances). To challenge any aspect of these programs, Plaintiffs
`must plead (and later prove) not only that they have suffered a concrete injury, but also that this
`injury was actually caused by the allegedly illegal conduct. If a plaintiff would suffer the same
`alleged injury (such as denial of a benefit) for reasons other than the challenged conduct (such as
`ineligibility or failure to pursue the benefit), he cannot establish standing. See, e.g., California, No.
`19-840, slip op. at 14-16 (states lacked standing to challenge constitutionality of ACA’s individual
`mandate based on financial costs that were traceable only to other, unchallenged ACA provisions);
`George v. Farmers Elec. Coop., Inc., 715 F.2d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff “could in no way
`show that she was injured” where she independently would have been terminated under seniority-
`based provision of anti-nepotism policy); see also Sims v. City of Dallas, No. CIV. A. 3:95-CV-
`177, 1996 WL 722052, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 1996) (denying motion for temporary restraining
`order due to lack of injury where plaintiffs challenged promotion exam but were not eligible for
`promotion).
`The Supreme Court’s decision in Carney is particularly instructive. There, a lawyer in
`Delaware brought a constitutional challenge to his state’s mechanism for appointing judges to
`certain courts. See 141 S. Ct. at 497. Because the plaintiff had not actually applied for, or been
`denied, a position as judge, the Supreme Court asked whether he “was ‘able and ready’ to apply
`for a judgeship in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at 501. The Court concluded that the
`plaintiff “did not show the necessary ‘injury in fact,’” but instead had suffered only a “generalized
`grievance” insufficient to confer standing, id. at 499, because (among other reasons) he had never
`previously applied for any judgeship and made no specific “preparations or investigations” to
`apply for one in the reasonably foreseeable future, id. at 501.
`Similarly here, Plaintiffs have not alleged any injury-in-fact from USDA’s administration
`of non-§ 1005 programs. “If ‘the plaintiff does not claim to have suffered an injury that the
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`defendant caused and the court can remedy, there is no case or controversy for the federal court to
`resolve.’” TransUnion LLC, No. 20-297, slip op. at 7 (quoting Casillas v. Madison Avenue Assocs.,
`Inc., 926 F. 3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 2019)). Plaintiffs have not alleged that they have previously
`applied for benefits under such programs, that they satisfy the necessary qualifications such that
`they would be eligible but-for their SDG status, or that they are otherwise “able and ready” to seek
`such benefits in the future. Cf., e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 212 (1995)
`(finding standing to challenge bid rules when plaintiff had bid on every project and such projects
`were put out to bid at least once a year). Indeed, just as the plaintiff in Carney had failed to make
`“efforts to determine likely openings” or perform other “preparations or investigations,” 141 S. Ct.
`at 501, it is evident that these Plaintiffs have not made even a rudimentary examination of their
`eligibility for the programs they challenge, much less demonstrated that they are able and ready to
`pursue benefits under those programs.
`Plaintiffs have not alleged that they are otherwise eligible for any of these programs, that
`they have made any inquiry or investigation into the availability of any benefits under these
`programs, that they have prepared applications for these programs, or that they have applied to,
`and been rejected from, such programs in the past. Plaintiffs have not alleged even the “general
`intent” to seek benefits under these programs that was inadequate to establish standing in Carney.
`Rather, it is apparent that Plaintiffs merely seek to “vindicate [their] view of the law”—a desire
`patently inadequate to satisfy Article III. Carney, 141 S. Ct. at 501. To permit these Plaintiffs to
`challenge programs for which they have alleged no specific intention to pursue benefits would, as
`in Carney, “significantly weaken the longstanding legal doctrine preventing this Court from
`providing advisory opinions at the request of one who, without other concrete injury, believes that
`the government is not following the law.” Id. Plaintiffs lack standing to raise, and this Court
`accordingly lacks jurisdiction to consider, challenges to programs other than the debt relief
`program established by ARPA § 1005.
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`B.
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`Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring their second claim for relief.
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`In their second claim, Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the statutory terms SDG and SDFR
`“unambiguous[ly]” include “white ethnic groups that have been subjected to racial and ethnic
`prejudice” and an injunction prohibiting USDA “from excluding Irish, Italians, Germans, Jews,
`eastern Europeans, and any other ethnic group that has suffered racial and ethnic prejudice,” from
`those definitions. FAC ¶ 33. But Plaintiffs have not alleged facts that would support standing for
`this claim, because they have not alleged an injury that would be redressed by the remedy th