Case 3:16-cv-00012 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 1 of 19
`United States District Court
`Southern District of Texas
`ENTERED
`August 17, 2016
`David J. Bradley, Clerk
`
`

`
`Case 3:16-cv-00012 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 2 of 19
`Case 3:16—cv—OOO12 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 2 of 19
`
`proper in this Court because Grit regularly conducts business and a substantial part of the
`
`events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred within the Southern District of
`
`Texas. Id 1] 12.
`
`The Sandbox plaintiffs are Texas limited liability companies whose principal
`
`places of business are in Houston, Texas. Id W 3, 4. Grit is a Montana limited liability
`
`company with apprincipal place of business in Montana. Id 11 5. Sandbox alleges Grit
`
`committed acts of patent infringement in this District by selling or offering to sell
`
`products and services that infringe on the asserted patents. Id. W 3, 4. Grit has not filed
`
`an Answer, but instead filed a motion to dismiss the misappropriation and fraud claims
`
`and to transfer venue to the Houston Division of the Southern District of Texas. Dkt. 8.
`
`Grit contends that transfer to Houston is warranted because the Houston Division
`
`would be a more convenient forum for the resolution of this litigation. See id. Based on
`
`the pleadings, applicable law, and for the reasons stated below, the motion for an intra-
`
`district transfer is DENIED.
`
`STANDARD FOR CONVENIENCE TRANSFERS
`
`Change of venue is governed by 28 U.S.C § l404(a). The venue transfer statute
`
`provides: “For the convenience of parties and witnesses,
`
`in the interest of justice, a
`
`district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might
`
`have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.” 28
`
`

`
`Case 3:16-cv-00012 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 3 of 19
`Case 3:16—cv—OOO12 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 3 of 19
`
`U.S.C. § 1404(a). The § 1404(a) factors apply as much to transfers between divisions of
`
`the same district as to transfers from one district to another.'
`
`This is a patent lawsuit, and the Federal Circuit applies the law of the Fifth Circuit
`
`to evaluate transfer of venue motions that arise in this Court. See In re TS Tech USA
`
`Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2008). First, the Court must ask whether this suit
`
`might have been brought in the transferee venue of the Houston Division of the Southern
`
`District of Texas. In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 312 (5th Cir. 2008) (en
`
`banc) (In re Volkswagen 11). If the transferee venue is proper, it then is Grit’s burden to
`
`demonstrate that the Houston Division of the Southern District of Texas is clearly more
`
`convenient than the venue chosen by the plaintiff, ie, the Galveston Division of the
`
`Southern District of Texas. Id. at 315.
`
`To determine whether Grit has met this burden, the Court must analyze a set of
`
`private and public interest factors, none of which are given dispositive weight. See id. In
`
`other words, motion to transfer venue pursuant to § 1404(a) should be granted if “the
`
`movant demonstrates that the transferee venue is clearly more convenient,” taking into
`
`consideration private and public interest factors. Id. The private-interest factors are: “(1)
`
`the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process
`
`to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and
`
`(4) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and
`
`' See generally 17 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE §
`l11.21[2], at 111-154 to 111-155 (3d ed. 2013) (“[A] transfer to another division in the same
`district will be granted if it is more convenient for the parties and witnesses and is in the interest
`of justice”) (citing,
`inter alia, Weber v. Coney, 642 F.2d 91, 93 (5th Cir. Unit A March 1981)
`(per curiam)).
`
`

`
`Case 3:16-cv-00012 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 4 of 19
`Case 3:16—cv—OOO12 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 4 of 19
`
`inexpensive.” In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 2004) (In re Volkswagen
`
`1). The public-interest factors are: “(1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court
`
`congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the
`
`familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of
`
`unnecessary problems of conflict of laws [or in] the application of foreign law.” Id. The
`
`Court must “weigh the relevant factors and decide whether, on balance, a transfer would
`
`serve ‘the convenience of parties and witnesses’ and otherwise promote ‘the interest of
`
`justice.’” Atl. Marine Construction C0,, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court for the Western
`
`Dist. ofTexas, + U.S. ——, ——, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581, 187 L. Ed. 2d 487 (2013).
`
`The plaintiffs choice of venue is not a separate factor in this analysis. In re
`
`Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 314-15. Rather, the plaintiffs choice of forum contributes to
`
`the defendant’s burden in showing good cause for the transfer. Id. at 315 (the party
`
`seeking the transfer ‘mustlshow good cause’ for the transfer). To show good cause, the
`
`moving party must demonstrate that the transferee venue is “clearly more convenient”
`
`than the transferor venue. Id.; see also In re Radmax, Ltd., 720 F .3d 285, 288 (5th Cir.
`
`2013) (“A motion to transfer venue pursuant to § 1404(a) should be granted if ‘the
`
`movant demonstrates that
`
`the transferee venue is clearly more convenient
`
`[.]’”).
`
`Ultimately, it is within the Court’s “broad discretion” whether to order a transfer. In re
`
`Volkswagen 11, 545 F .3d at 311. If the movant “demonstrates that the transferee venue is
`
`clearly more convenient” than the plaintiff’ s chosen venue, the district court should grant
`
`4
`
`

`
`Case 3:16-cv-00012 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 5 of 19
`Case 3:16—cv—OOO12 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 5 of 19
`
`l
`
`the transfer. Id. at 315. 2 “Thus, when the transferee venue is not clearly more convenient
`
`than the venue chosen by the plaintiff, the plaintiffs choice should be respected.” See id.
`
`ANALYSIS
`
`As an initial matter, it is undisputed that SandBox’s claims could have originally
`
`been filed in the Houston Division. SandBox is a resident of the Houston Division (Dkt. 1
`
`at 111] 2-4), and Grit’s alleged contacts with the Southern District of Texas are all alleged
`
`by SandBox to have occurred in the Houston Division (Id. at 111] 9-10). Accordingly, this
`
`action could have been brought in the Houston Division. The venue statute, 28 U.S.C. §
`
`1391, is based on districts, not divisions. If venue is proper in Galveston, it is also proper
`
`in Houston. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)-(d), 1400(b).
`
`The Court next turns to analyze the relevant private and public interest factors.
`
`While no single factor is dispositive, the Court is mindful that the Federal Circuit has
`
`given some guidance on the balancing of particular factors. See, e. g., In re Nintendo Co.,
`
`2 The plaintiffs choice of venue is not a distinct factor in the § 1404(a) analysis, instead, the
`Fifth Circuit has stated that, “when the transferee venue is not clearly more convenient than the
`venue chosen by the plaintiff, the plaintiffs choice should be respected.” In re Volkswagen 11,
`545 F.3d at 315. Thus, by requiring that a movant show the transferee venue is “clearly more
`convenient,” “[a] plaintiffs choice of
`[venue]
`is given ‘some’—significant but non-
`determinative—weight.” Weber v. PACPT XPP Technologies, AG, 811 F.3d 758, 767 (5th Cir.
`2016) (citing Atl. Marine, 134 S.Ct. at 581 n.6.). “In Radmax, the Fifth Circuit noted conflicting
`authority on whether a plaintiffs choice of forum is given more or less deference when an intra-
`district transfer is sought, but declined to ‘announce a general standard governing intra-district
`transfers in all situations.’ Radmax, 720 F.3d at 289 (noting Eastern District of Texas cases
`affording plaintiffs’ choice greater deference for intra-district transfers but also citing a leading
`civil procedure treatise that concludes the deference should be less in this context (citations
`omitted)). Given Radmax’s general thrust that intra-district transfers are governed by the same
`standards that apply to inter-district transfers, this Court will apply the ‘clearly more convenient’
`standard that Volkswagen announced for inter-district transfers. Cf id. at 288 (noting that courts
`should consider the same factors considered for inter-district transfers when analyzing intra-
`district transfers)” Hebert v. Wade, No. 3:13-CV-00076, 2013 WL 5551037, at *2, n.2 (S.D.
`Tex. Oct. 7, 2013).
`
`

`
`Case 3:16-cv-00012 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 6 of 19
`Case 3:16—cv—OOO12 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 6 of 19
`
`Ltd., 589 F.3d 1194, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (applying Fifth Circuit law) (“[I]n a case
`
`featuring most witnesses and evidence closer to the transferee venue with few or no
`
`convenience factors favoring the venue chosen by the plaintiff, the trial court should
`
`grant a motion to transfer”). However, as the Fifth Circuit has noted, balancing these
`
`factors involves more than “a raw counting of the factors in each side, weighing each the
`
`same and deciding transfer on the resulting score.” In re Radmax, 720 F.3d at 290 n.8.
`
`As discussed below, the Court finds that two factors favor transfer to Houston, two
`
`favor retaining the case in Galveston, and four are neutral or not implicated. On balance,
`
`the factors do not completely favor or disfavor transferring this case to the Houston
`
`Division. Sandbox filed in his own District. See Dkt. 1. Unlike to Radmax, 720 F.3d 285
`
`(5th Cir. 2013), Grit here fails to meet its burden of showing that the Houston Division is
`
`“clearly more convenient”.3
`
`A. The Private-Interest Factors
`
`1. Relative Ease of Access to Sources of Proof
`
`The first factor favors transfer to Houston. Sandbox argues that the “sources of
`
`proof are not more easily accessible in Houston than they are in Galveston” because of
`
`Grit’s “travel preferences.” Dkt. 17 at 7-8. The Court disagrees. The source of proof
`
`3 Grit cites Sivertson v. Clinton, No. 11-00836, 2011 WL 4100958, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 14,
`2011), for the proposition that Sandbox’s venue should not be “accorded deference” because its
`“home forum is the Houston Division, not Galveston”. However, the Court finds that argument
`inapplicable because Sivertson was an inter-district transfer not an intra-district transfer. 2011
`WL 4100958 at *4 (“[Plaintiff’s] choice of the Northern District of Texas is not entitled to
`significant weight because she filed suit outside of her home forum: the Southern District of
`Texas”). See also Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Balentine, 693 F. Supp. 2d 681, 690 (S.D.
`Tex. 2010) (inter-district transfer).
`
`
`
`

`
`Case 3:16-cv-00012 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 7 of 19
`Case 3:16—cv—OOO12 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 7 of 19
`
`factor here weighs in favor of intra-district transfer where, all of the evidence is in the
`
`transferee location. See, e.g., Radmax, 720 F.3d at 288 (“[B]ecause [a]ll of the documents
`
`and physical evidence are located in the [transferee] Division, this factor weigh[s] in
`
`favor of transfer.”) (internal quotations omitted).
`
`In Radmax,
`
`the Fifth Circuit clarified that
`
`the inconvenience of transporting
`
`documents sixty-two miles to the Marshall Division from Radmax’s place of business in
`
`the Tyler Division “may well be slight, but
`
`the question is of relative ease of access,
`
`not absolute ease of access.” Id. at 288 (emphasis in original). The Court then found that
`
`the relative ease of access to sources of proof weighed in favor of transfer “because all of
`
`the documents and physical evidence are located in the Tyler Division.” Id. (quotations
`
`and alterations omitted). Grit argues that “any sources of proof
`
`will be located in
`
`Houston.” Dkt. 8 at 19. The Court here, however,
`
`is unable to determine the exact
`
`number of miles from this courthouse to Grit’s place of business, since neither party has
`
`identified any potential sources of proof in the Galveston Division. However, the Court
`
`presumes that the Houston Division will provide relatively easier access to potential
`
`documentary evidence favors transfer. Even if some or a majority of the documentary
`
`evidence is stored electronically, “this does not negate the significance of having trial
`
`closer to where [Grit’s] physical documents and employee notebooks are located,”
`
`because “the critical inquiry is relative ease of access, not absolute ease of access.” In re
`
`Toa Technologies, 543 Fed. App’x 1006, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (noting, “Since no party
`
`is headquartered in the Eastern District of Texas, and the existence of physical sources of
`
`proof in the Northern District of Ohio makes that venue more convenient for trial, this
`
`7
`
`

`
`Case 3:16-cv-00012 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 8 of 19
`Case 3:16—cv—OOO12 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 8 of 19
`
`factor should have been weighed in favor of transfer.”); see also In re Volkswagen II, 545
`
`F.3d at 316 (noting, “All of the documents and physical evidence relating to the accident
`
`are located in the Dallas Division, as is the collision site.”).
`
`Additionally, “[i]n patent infringement cases, the bulk of the relevant evidence
`
`usually comes from the accused infringer,” and this factor weighs in favor of transfer to
`
`the location where Grit’s documents are kept which Grit states is in Houston, although
`
`the Court
`
`is not told exactly where in the City of Houston it might be. See In re
`
`Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (applying Fifth Circuit law,
`
`granting mandamus relief for the district court’s denial of a motion to transfer venue to
`
`the Northern District of California); see also Standard Innovation Corp. v. Leloi AB, No.
`
`11-04172, 2015 WL 6396057 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2015). Therefore, Court finds that this
`
`factor weighs in transfer to the Houston division.
`
`2. Availability of Compulsory Process to Secure Attendance of Witnesses
`
`The second private interest factor instructs the Court to consider the availability of
`
`compulsory process to secure the attendance of unwilling witnesses by a court order. See
`
`In re Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 316; All. Marine Const. Co., Inc. v. US. Dist. Court for
`
`W. Dist. of Texas, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581 n.6, 187 L. Ed. 2d 487 (2013). This factor is ,
`
`neutral or not implicated by these facts. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
`
`district court may enforce a subpoena issued to any witness for trial, hearing or
`
`deposition within 100 miles of the place in which that witness resides, works, or regularly
`
`transacts business in person, or for a trial, anywhere within the state in which the witness
`
`works, resides, or regularly transacts business in person, provided that witness does not
`
`8
`
`

`
`Case 3:16-cv-00012 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 9 of 19
`Case 3:16—cv—OOO12 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 9 of 19
`
`incur substantial expense. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(1)(A)-(B).
`
`In compiling the list of
`
`potential witnesses to review the availability of compulsory process,
`
`the Court has
`
`reviewed the motion to transfer and related briefing, as well as the parties’ filings and the
`
`Certificates of Interested Parties. See, e.g., In re Apple Inc., 581 Fed. App’x 886, 888
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding district court should have considered all prospective witnesses
`
`identified in the record, including those identified in reply briefs and initial disclosures.).
`
`Some courts in this District have noted that witnesses who are employed by one
`
`party to the litigation are often required by their employers to attend and testify at trial,
`
`even if they are not within the subpoena power of the Court. See, e.g., JPT Group, LLC.
`
`v. Steven Madden Retail, Inc., CV H-15-3264, 2016 WL 3523878, at *3-*4 (S.D. Tex.
`
`June 28, 2016); Pension Advisory Grp., Ltd. v. Country Life Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp. 2d
`
`680, 711 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (finding that a “motion to transfer under 28 U.S.C. § l404(a)
`
`may be denied when the witnesses are employees of the defendant and their presence can
`
`be obtained by the party”)). The Court notes that the Federal Circuit has not adopted this
`
`approach—4even in cases arising within the Fifth Circuit.
`
`Instead, the Federal Circuit evaluates the availability of compulsory process for
`
`unwilling witnesses without regard to their status as employees of a party. See, e.g., In re
`
`Toa Technologies, 543 Fed. App’x 1006, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Moreover, because
`
`party witnesses and three former chief financial officers of TOA were identified as
`
`residing within 100 miles of the Northern District of Ohio, transfer ensures that these
`
`individuals could be compelled to appear for both deposition and trial.”); In re Acer
`
`America Corp., 626 F.3d 1252, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (comparing the subpoena power of
`
`9
`
`

`
`Case 3:16-cv-00012 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 10 of 19
`Case 3:16—cv—OOO12 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 10 of 19
`
`the Eastern District of Texas with that of the Northern District of California without
`
`regard to whether witnesses were employees or party witnesses). Neither Sandbox nor
`
`Grit has identified specific addresses detailing exactly where any witness of their may be
`
`located. Grit merely argues
`
`that, “[w]ith the Galveston Division being located
`
`approximately fifty miles from downtown Houston, this appears to be a non-factor.”
`
`Accordingly, the Court finds that Grit has not met its burden because the Court cannot
`
`determine whether any of the witnesses may be outside of its subpoena power. It is
`
`equally likely that any witness within the subpoena power of the Galveston Division can
`
`also be compelled to appear in Houston. Accordingly, the Court finds that this factor is
`
`neutral.
`
`3. Cost of Attendance for Willing Witnesses
`
`As with the other factors, the Court notes that Grits’ submissions on this issue are
`
`wholly deficient. This factor considers the cost of attendance for those witnesses that are
`
`more than 100 miles away from the court. “When the distance between an existing venue
`
`for trial of a matter and a proposed venue under § l404(a) is more than 100 miles, the
`
`factor of inconvenience to witnesses increases in direct relationship to the additional
`
`distance to be traveled.” In re Volkswagen 1, 371 F.3d at 204-05. The Federal Circuit has
`
`described this factor as “probably the single most
`
`important factor in the transfer
`
`analysis.” In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d at 1343. The inconvenience to witnesses
`
`increases with the additional distance to be traveled, including additional travel time,
`
`meal, lodging expenses, and time away from their regular employment. In re Volkswagen
`
`1, 371 F.3d at 205. The Court must also consider the personal costs associated with being
`
`10
`
`

`
`Case 3:16-cv-00012 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 11 of 19
`Case 3:16—cv—OOO12 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 11 of 19
`
`away from work, family, and community. In re Acer America Corp., 626 F.3d 1252,
`
`1255 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 1002, 131 S. Ct. 2447, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1235
`
`(2011) (citing In re Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 317).
`
`Courts in this circuit often give greater weight to the relative convenience of key
`
`witnesses and key non-party witnesses in its analysis, and “the convenience of one key
`
`witness may outweigh the convenience of numerous less important witnesses.” Mid-
`
`Continent Cas. Co. v. Petroleum Solutions, Inc., 629 F.Supp.2d 759, 762-63 (S.D. Tex.
`
`2009). Nevertheless, “although quite important, the convenience of witnesses does not
`
`stand alone and must be weighed against the other relevant factors that typically are
`
`considered.” 15 Wright et al., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3851.
`
`Grit argues that this factor weighs in favor of transfer because attending trial in
`
`Galveston would be costly and inconvenient to “potential third party witness.” Dkt. 8 at
`
`20-21. Particularly, Grit argues that Sandbox’s “identification of events in the Houston
`
`Division indicate that it will be more convenient for potential third party witnesses to
`
`attend a trial in Houston, rather than travel fifty miles to the Galveston Division.” Id. at
`
`20. With respect to party witnesses, Grit states that “SandBox is located in the Houston
`
`Division north of downtown, so its willing witnesses would be traveling further to
`
`Galveston for no apparent reason.” Id. at 21. Grit does not provide any information as to
`
`the addresses considering the “north of downtown” witnesses. Finally, Grit argues that
`
`for any employees and any third party witnesses it would be “more convenient and cost
`
`effective to fly into Houston’s large airports, located in the Houston Division, rather than
`
`travel further to the Galveston Division.” Id.
`
`11
`
`
`
`

`
`Case 3:16-cv-00012 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 12 of 19
`Case 3:16—cv—OOO12 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 12 of 19
`
`First, in the Fifth Circuit, “[w]hen the distance between an existing venue for trial
`
`of a matter and a proposed venue
`
`is more than 100 miles, the factor of inconvenience
`
`to witnesses increases in direct relationship to the additional distance to be traveled.” In
`
`re Volkswagen 11, 545 F.3d at 317 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
`
`However, this l00—mile threshold does not mean that “transfer within 100 miles does not
`
`impose costs on witnesses or that such costs should not be factored into the venue-
`
`transfer analysis, but only that this factor has greater significance when the distance is
`
`greater than 100 miles.” Radmax, 720 F.3d at 289 (emphasis in original). Second,
`
`in
`
`Radmax, the Fifih Circuit found a distance of approximately 60 miles to be sufficient to
`
`weigh in favor of transfer. See id. at 289-290. The 50-mile distance from Galveston to
`
`Houston is similar.
`
`However, this factor does not weigh heavily because Grit does not identify any
`
`witnesses and the majority of the party witnesses are located somewhere in Houston. The
`convenience of the witnesses and the parties is generally a primary concern of this Court
`
`when considering transfer motions. But, vague statements about the convenience of
`
`unknown and unnamed witnesses are insufficient
`
`to convince this Court
`
`that
`
`the
`
`convenience of the witnesses and the parties would be best served by an intra-district
`
`transfer of venue. See Dupre v. Spanier Marine Corp, 810 F. Supp. 823, 825 (S.D. Tex.
`
`1993) (to support a transfer of venue, the moving party cannot merely allege that certain
`
`key witnesses are not available or are inconveniently located, but must specifically
`
`identify the key witnesses and outline the substance of their testimony). Because neither
`
`party has identified its key witnesses or explained the relevance of their testimony, the
`
`12
`
`

`
`l l
`
`Case 3:16-cv-00012 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 13 of 19
`Case 3:16—cv—OOO12 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 13 of 19
`
`Court cannot determine whether any witness will be inconvenienced by transfer. The
`
`Court therefore concludes that this factor weighs against transfer. See id.; cf Sivertson,
`
`2011 WL 4100958, at *6 (finding this factor to be neutral when it was unclear whether
`
`the witnesses identified by the plaintiff would provide any relevant testimony).
`
`Given the particular geography and locations of the Houston Division,
`
`the
`
`Galveston Division, and their courthouses, to hold that a 50-mile ride from Galveston to
`
`Houston weighs in favor of transfer would gut “the importance that we must give to the
`
`plaintiff’ s choice [of forum].” See In re Volkswagen 11, 545 F.3d at 314 n.10; see also Atl.
`
`Marine, 134 S.Ct. at 581 n.6 (“The [c]ourt must also give some weight to the plaintiff [’s]
`
`choice of forum.”). Such importance is manifested by placing “a significant burden on
`
`the movant to show good cause for the transfer,” requiring the movant to demonstrate
`
`that the transferee forum is “clearly more convenient.” Id. While the 50-mile difference
`
`between courthouses is “clear,” any purported “convenience” gained here is not. The
`
`Court finds that Grit’s desire to avoid traveling approximately 50 miles further, does not
`
`demonstrate that the Houston Division is “clearlyimore convenient” than the Galveston
`
`Division. Accordingly, the Court finds that this factor weighs against transfer.
`
`4. All Other Practical Problems That Make Trial of a Case Easy, Expeditions,
`and Inexpensive
`
`While Grit asserts arguments based in “judicial economy”, the Court finds that
`
`here this factor is not relevant and therefore neutral. See Dkt. 8, p. 21. The delay
`
`associated with transfer may be relevant “in rare and special circumstances,” such as
`
`where a transfer of venue would cause yet another delay in protracted litigation. Radmax,
`
`13
`
`

`
`Case 3:16-cv-00012 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 14 of 19
`Case 3:16—cv—OOO12 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 14 of 19
`
`Ltd., 720 F.3d at 289. Additionally, the courts consider the efficiency of the court system
`
`in handling several related lawsuits in the same district. Acad., Ltd. v. A & J Mfg., LLC,
`
`No. H-14-2043, 2014 WL 6679260, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2014) (granting a motion
`
`to transfer venue where there was pending litigation concerning the same patents in the
`
`proposed venue, reasoning that “it will be more efficient for the court system if the same
`
`court determines” the issue of infringement).
`
`However “garden-variety delay associated with transfer is not to be taken into
`
`consideration when ruling on a § 1404(a) motion to transfer. Were it, delay would
`
`militate against transfer in every case.” Radmax, 720 F.3d at 289. Here, the Court finds
`
`that there is no evidence or “rare and special circumstances” establishing that retaining
`
`and trying this case would cause significant delay or prejudice to any of the parties.
`
`Further, the Court notes that this case is still in its early stages.
`
`This factor is neutral.
`
`B. Public—Interest Factors
`
`1. Administrative Difficulties Flowing from Court Congestion
`
`This factor weighs against
`
`transfer. “To the extent
`
`that court congestion is
`
`relevant, the speed with which a case can come to trial and be resolved may be a factor.”
`
`Genentech, 566 F.3d at 1347. The focus of the first public-interest factor is “ ‘not
`
`whether [transfer] will reduce a court’s congestion but whether a trial may be speedier in
`
`another court because of its less crowded docket.’” Rosemond, WL 1338690, at *4
`
`(quoting Siragusa v. Arnold, No. 3:12—cv—04497—M, 2013 WL 5462286, at *7 (N.D.
`
`Tex. Sept. 16, 2013)). In analyzing this factor courts often consider the median time
`
`14
`
`

`
`Case 3:16-cv-00012 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 15 of 19
`Case 3:16—cv—OOO12 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 15 of 19
`
`interval from case filing to disposition. ExpressJet Airlines, Inc. v. RBC Capital Markets
`
`Corp., No. CIV A H-09-992, 2009 WL 2244468, at *12 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 27, 2009).
`
`In the 12-month period ending in March 2016, the Southern District of Texas had
`
`over 6,000 civil filings—354 cases for each of the 17 sitting Article III judges. Median
`
`time from filing to disposition of civil cases was 7.3 months, and median time from filing
`
`to trial for civil cases was 23.1 months.
`
`In support of its motion to transfer, Grit crafts a
`
`“statistical chart” that states, “[i]or 2014 and 2015, the average disposition time is 18.5
`
`months in the Galveston Division for patent cases and 9 months in the Houston
`
`Division.” See Dkt. 8, pg. 22, Exhibit D, Legal Metric Custom Report Texas Southern
`
`Patent Cases in Galveston and Houston Divisions 2000 to 2016 (comparing patent filings
`
`in the Houston and Galveston Divisions of the Southern District of Texas). However, the
`
`Federal Circuit has noted that the court congestion factor “appears to be the most
`
`speculative” and that “case-disposition statistics may not always tell the whole story.”
`
`Genentech, 566 F.3d at 1347.4
`
`In this case, Galveston Division’s lighter criminal docket allows it to resolve civil
`
`matters more quickly. Although Galveston has a larger civil docket than Houston on a per
`
`judge basis, criminal cases typically pose a greater impediment to prompt civil trial
`
`settings. See Mid—Continent Cas. Co. v. Petroleum Solutions, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 2d 759,
`
`767 (S.D. Tex. 2009); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (Speedy Trial Act for criminal cases); see
`
`4 Indeed the Court notes that Grit’s “statistical chart” is unhelpful in determining the current
`disposition rate of patent cases in the Galveston Division because during the time frame
`referenced in the chart, 2014-2015,
`there was no full-time district judge assigned to the
`Galveston-Victoria Division.
`
`/ 1
`
`5
`
`

`
`Case 3:16-cv-00012 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 16 of 19
`Case 3:16—cv—OOO12 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 16 of 19
`
`also Perry v. Autocraft Investments, Inc., No. 4:13-CV-01959, 2013 WL 3338580, at *3
`
`(S.D. Tex. July 2, 2013); TechRadium Inc. v. FirstCall Network, Inc., No. 3:13-CV-78,
`
`2013 WL 4511326, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2013). Thus, this factor favors retaining the
`
`case.
`
`2. Local Interest in Having Localized Interests Decided at Home
`
`The third factor that favors transfer is the interest in having localized interests
`
`decided at home. The local interest factor analyzes the “factual connection” that a case
`
`has with both the transferee and transferor venues. In re Volkswagen 1, 371 F.3d at 206.
`
`The Sandbox Plaintiffs reside in Houston and some key events occurred “in Houston""——
`
`most importantly, the acts that allegedly gave rise to this action occurred in Houston. In
`
`contrast, no party resides in Galveston and no events transpired in this Division.
`
`However, because of the physical
`
`location of the alleged infringement,
`
`the
`
`Houston Division has only the very slightest of a greater interest than does the Galveston
`
`Division. As with the preceding analysis of the sources of proof and cost of attendance
`
`factors, the differences between the Houston and Galveston communities of interest in
`
`this case are so small that there really is no difference. Accordingly, the Court concludes
`
`that this factor only slightly favors transfer.
`
`This factor is in a practical sense slightly in favor of transferring the case to the
`
`Houston Division. Therefore, the Court determines that the Houston Division has only a
`
`slight stronger local interest in hearing this case.
`
`16
`
`

`
`Case 3:16-cv-00012 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 17 of 19
`Case 3:16—cv—OOO12 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 17 of 19
`
`3. Familiarity of the Forum with the Law that Will Govern the Case
`
`Neither this Court nor Houston Division is more or less familiar with the law that
`
`will govern this case. This case will be governed by patent law that is applied by all
`
`federal courts, regardless of the state in which they sit. Therefore, this factor is neutral.
`
`4. Avoidance of Unnecessary Problems of Conflict of Laws or in Application
`of Foreign Law
`
`The last factor—the possible conflicts of law arising from the application of
`
`foreign law—does not affect the analysis. Because there are no conflict of laws issues
`
`that would make this case better suited for either this Court or the Houston Division, this
`
`factor cannot weigh either for or against transfer.
`
`Accordingly, this factor is neutral.
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`The Court recognizes that this suit has mere connection to the Galveston Division
`
`and virtually all of the events and witnesses regarding the case are located somewhere in
`
`or by Houston Division “area”, but this does not “obviously” compel transfer. But see
`
`Radmax, 720 F.3d at 290 & n.l2 (suggesting that transfer is “obviously compelled”
`
`where “only the plaintiffs choice weighs in favor of denying transfer and where the case
`
`has no connection to the transferor forum and virtually all of the events and witnesses
`
`regarding the case
`
`are in the transferee forum”) (citing La Day v. City ofLumberton,
`
`Tex., No. 2:11-cv-237, 2012 WL 928352, at *6—*12 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2012)).
`
`Indeed, the Court’s duty in analyzing the Gilbert factors is not merely an exercise
`
`in determining the division in which the events occurred and the witnesses reside. Such a
`
`17
`
`

`
`Case 3:16-cv-00012 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 18 of 19
`Case 3:16—cv—OOO12 Document 36 Filed in TXSD on 08/17/16 Page 18 of 19
`
`simplistic abstraction of the fact