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`Case 3:21-cv-00065 Document 1 Filed on 03/17/21 in TXSD Page 1 of 46
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`GALVESTON DIVISION
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`Civ. Action No. _______________
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`STATE OF TEXAS; STATE OF
`MONTANA; STATE OF
`ALABAMA; STATE OF
`ARIZONA; STATE OF
`ARKANSAS; STATE OF
`GEORGIA; STATE OF KANSAS;
`STATE OF KENTUCKY; STATE
`OF INDIANA; STATE OF
`LOUISIANA; STATE OF
`MISSISSIPPI; STATE OF
`MISSOURI; STATE OF
`NEBRASKA; STATE OF NORTH
`DAKOTA; STATE OF OHIO;
`STATE OF OKLAHOMA; STATE
`OF SOUTH CAROLINA; STATE
`OF SOUTH DAKOTA; STATE OF
`UTAH; STATE OF WEST
`VIRGINIA; and STATE OF
`WYOMING,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., in his official
`capacity as President of the United
`States; ANTONY J. BLINKEN, in his
`official capacity as Secretary of the
`Department of State; MERRICK B.
`GARLAND, in his official capacity as
`Attorney General of the United States;
`ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, in his
`official capacity as Secretary of the
`Department of Homeland Security;
`SCOTT DE LA VEGA, in his official
`capacity as Acting Secretary of the
`Interior; JENNIFER GRANHOLM, in
`her official capacity as Secretary of the
`Department of Energy; JANE
`
` Plaintiffs,
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`

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`Case 3:21-cv-00065 Document 1 Filed on 03/17/21 in TXSD Page 2 of 46
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`NISHIDA, in her official capacity as
`Acting Administrator of the
`Environmental Protection Agency;
`PETE BUTTIGIEG, in his official
`capacity as Secretary of Transportation;
`and the UNITED STATES OF
`AMERICA,
`
`
`
`
`
` Defendants.
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`
`
`COMPLAINT
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`I. INTRODUCTION
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`
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`1. When the States ratified the Constitution, they ceded the power to regulate
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`inter-state and international commerce to Congress, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, which
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`must act through the process of bicameralism and presentment. Id. § 7. This process
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`may “often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable,” but was designed to protect
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`both the liberty and property of individuals and the prerogative of sovereign States.
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`See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958-59 (1983). The President has certain
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`prerogatives to act on behalf of the United States in foreign affairs. But as far as
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`domestic law is concerned, the President must work with and abide by the limits set
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`by Congress—whether he likes them or not.1
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`2. This Administration has sought to leverage its power regarding U.S. foreign
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`policy to unilaterally contradict Congress’s stated domestic policy regarding one of
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`1 For a discussion of the difference between the President’s ability to bind the
`United States as a matter of international law and as a matter of domestic law, see
`generally Bradford Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 9393 Va. L.
`Rev. 1574 (2007).
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`
`
`2
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`

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`Case 3:21-cv-00065 Document 1 Filed on 03/17/21 in TXSD Page 3 of 46
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`the most significant energy projects in a generation: the Keystone XL Pipeline. This
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`it may not do. On behalf of many of the States through which Keystone XL runs—
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`beginning within the United States in Montana in the north and terminating in Texas
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`in the south, the States of Montana and Texas bring this suit to prevent the
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`Administration from circumventing limits placed on it by the Constitution,
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`Administrative Procedure Act, and congressionally enacted national policy in this
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`critical energy matter.
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`3. Keystone XL is part of a larger system of pipelines, which was designed by
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`TC Energy Corporation to transport approximately 830,000 barrels of oil from where
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`it is produced in Canada and Montana to pre-existing refineries in Houston. Keystone
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`XL is that piece of the pipeline that cross the United States-Canadian border in
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`Philips County, Montana. The U.S. government has studied the safety,
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`environmental impact, and economic benefits of Keystone XL for years. It repeatedly
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`concluded that the pipeline would have a negligible impact on the climate but
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`significant impact on the economy and American energy independence.
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`4. In 2019, consistent with multiple acts of Congress, President Trump
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`approved the construction of the 1.2 mile stretch of Keystone XL that crosses the
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`border.2 That construction is now effectively complete.3
`
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`2 Presidential Permit of March 29, 2019 Authorizing TransCanada Keystone
`Pipeline, L.P., To Construct, Connect, Operate, and Maintain Pipeline Facilities at
`the International Boundary Between the United States and Canada, 84 Fed. Reg.
`13101 (April 3, 2019), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-04-03/pdf/2019-
`06654.pdf.
`3 Id.
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`3
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`Case 3:21-cv-00065 Document 1 Filed on 03/17/21 in TXSD Page 4 of 46
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`5. Within hours of taking office, President Biden issued an Executive Order
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`that purports to revoke the permit on the grounds that he has “an ambitious plan” to
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`“reduce harmful emissions and create good clean-energy jobs” and that this completed
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`pipeline would “not be consistent with [his] Administration’s economic and climate
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`imperatives.”4 The order itself relies on a permit provision that purports to allow such
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`revocation by agreement from the Company holding the permit. But it cites no
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`statutory or other authorization permitting the President to change energy policy as
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`set by Congress in this manner.
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`6. Revocation of the Keystone XL pipeline permit is a regulation of interstate
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`and international commerce, which can only be accomplished as any other statute
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`can: through the process of bicameralism and presentment. The President lacks the
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`power to enact his “ambitious plan” to reshape the economy in defiance of Congress’s
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`unwillingness to do so. To the extent that Congress had delegated such authority, it
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`would violate the non-delegation doctrine. But Congress has not delegated such
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`authority: It set specific rules regarding what actions the President can take about
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`Keystone XL and when. The President, together with various senior executive
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`officials, violated those rules. The action should be set aside as inconsistent with the
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`Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500, et seq.
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`II. PARTIES
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`6.
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`Plaintiffs are the States of Montana, Texas, Alabama, Arkansas,
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`Georgia, Kentucky, Indiana, Louisiana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
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`4 Exec. Ord. No. 13990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7037, 7041 (January 20, 2021).
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`4
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`Case 3:21-cv-00065 Document 1 Filed on 03/17/21 in TXSD Page 5 of 46
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`South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming (collectively, the “States”). They are sovereign
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`States of the United States of America, represented by their respective Attorneys
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`General, the States’ chief legal officers who bear the duty and authority to represent
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`the States in court.
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`7.
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`Defendant Joseph R. Biden, Jr. is named in his official capacity as
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`President of the United States. President Biden issued Executive Order 13990, which
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`purported to revoke the March 2019 Permit for Keystone XL.
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`8.
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`Defendant Antony J. Blinken is named in his official capacity as
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`Secretary of the Department of State. The Department of State communicates and
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`coordinates with the Canadian government regarding commercial issues affecting the
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`U.S.-Canada relationship. Pursuant to Executive Orders 13337 and 13867, the
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`Secretary of State has been responsible for assessing Keystone XL permit requests.
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`Based on information and belief, the Secretary is also responsible for implementing
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`Executive Order 13990. See, e.g., Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of
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`2011, Pub. L. No. 112-78, § 501(a), 125 Stat. 1280 (the “2011 Act”)Exec; Exec. Order
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`No. 13337, 69 Fed. Reg. 25299 (Apr. 30, 2004).
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`9.
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`Defendant Merrick B. Garland is named in his official capacity as
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`Attorney General of the United States. The Attorney General is the chief law
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`enforcement officer of the United States and directs litigation on its behalf.
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`10. Defendant Alejandro Mayorkas is named in his official capacity as
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`Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. The Department of Homeland
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`Security is the agency primarily responsible for law enforcement at the nation’s
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`5
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`Case 3:21-cv-00065 Document 1 Filed on 03/17/21 in TXSD Page 6 of 46
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`borders. The Department of Homeland Security oversees the two agencies devoted to
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`border concerns, U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Immigration and
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`Customs Enforcement.
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`11. Defendant Scott de la Vega is named in his official capacity as Acting
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`Secretary of the Department of the Interior. The Department of Interior oversees the
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`Bureau of Land Management, an agency that manages public lands in the United
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`States. Portions of the Keystone XL, including the border-crossing segment, would
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`traverse federal property.
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`12. Defendant Jennifer Granholm is named in her official capacity as
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`Secretary of the Department of Energy.
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`13. Defendant Jane Nishida is named in her official capacity as Acting
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`Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.
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`14. Defendant Pete Buttigieg is named in his official capacity as Secretary
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`of the Department of Transportation.
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`15. Defendants Garland, Mayorkas, De la Vega, Granholm, Nishida, and
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`Buttigieg, together with Secretary Blinken, will be referred as the “Cabinet
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`Defendants.” To the extent that Secretary Blinken asserts that enforcing Executive
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`Order No. 13990 falls outside his jurisdiction, that responsibility would fall within
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`the jurisdiction of one or more of the other Cabinet Defendants. See ExecExec. Order
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`No. 13337, 69 Fed. Reg. 25299.
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`16. Defendant United States of America includes all government agencies
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`and departments responsible for enforcement of the provisions in Executive Order
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`6
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`Case 3:21-cv-00065 Document 1 Filed on 03/17/21 in TXSD Page 7 of 46
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`13990 relating to the Keystone XL and is sued under 28 U.S.C. § 1346 and 5 U.S.C.
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`§§ 702–703.
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`III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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`17. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
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`1346, and 1361.
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`18. The Court is authorized to award the requested declaratory and
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`injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 2201–02.
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`19. Venue lies in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because Plaintiff
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`the State of Texas is a resident of this judicial district, and a substantial part of the
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`events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in this District.
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`20. The States have standing, both in their own rights, as sovereign, and in
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`a parens patriae capacity. The Plaintiff States expect that cancellation of Keystone
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`XL will lead to significant loss in tax revenue. As discussed in further detail below,
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`Keystone XL was expected to—indeed, already has—generated significant economic
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`value. For example, the larger pipeline of which Keystone XL is a small piece called
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`for the construction of living camps for workers along the route. These camps would
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`generate the equivalent of one full year of property-tax revenue, or about $4 million,
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`for their host counties. They would also generate short-term revenues from sales and
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`use taxes totaling approximately $66 million across the affected States. Construction
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`could last for up to two years. Though a significant amount of this construction was
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`completed before the President unilaterally canceled a key 1.2-mile segment of the
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`7
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`Case 3:21-cv-00065 Document 1 Filed on 03/17/21 in TXSD Page 8 of 46
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`system, substantial work remained to be done. As a result, substantial tax revenues
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`were lost.
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`21. The Plaintiff States have sovereign interests in stewarding and
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`preserving the territories within their borders. See Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S.
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`497, 519 (2007). Moreover, traditionally, decisions about the siting of oil pipelines,
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`even interstate oil pipelines, have been made by State governments if the State
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`governments choose to exercise a pipeline siting authority. See, e.g., S.D. Codified
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`Laws § 49-41B-4.1 (requiring a State permit and the approval of the State legislature
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`prior to construction of a “trans-state” transmission facility, defined to include
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`pipelines). The transnational portion of the pipeline over which the President
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`purports to exercise jurisdiction is only one tiny piece of a larger network of pipelines.
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`The unilateral decision to revoke the permit for that piece interferes with the States’
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`traditional authority to regulate pipelines within their borders.
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`22.
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`States also have parens patriae interests in the physical and economic
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`well-being of their residents in general, which will suffer because of the decision to
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`revoke the Keystone XL permit. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519; Alfred L. Snapp &
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`Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982). The Plaintiff States and their
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`residents are participants in foreign and international commerce and therefore have
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`quasi-sovereign interests in maintaining the constitutionally prescribed separation
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`of powers between Congress and the President as it relates to the regulation of foreign
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`and interstate commerce. Alfred L. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607–08. And more concretely,
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`Keystone XL was the hub of a system that was expected to create high-paying union
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`8
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`jobs across numerous States. Approximately 12,000 of the 42,100 total jobs needed to
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`construct and operate the Keystone XL, would be located in Montana, South Dakota,
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`Nebraska, and Kansas.
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`23. The Executive’s unilateral decision to revoke the Keystone XL permit is
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`contrary to the constitutional structure to which the States agreed at the time of
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`ratification. The Executive’s decision also encroaches upon the States’ abilities to
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`steward and control the lands within their borders. Once fully constructed and
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`operational, the Keystone XL would have provided tens of millions of property-tax
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`dollars to the Plaintiff States and their local governments.
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`24. The decision likewise harms the physical and economic well-being of the
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`States’ residents, communities, businesses, and workers. The States have standing
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`to seek a remedy for those harms and vindicate the substantial reliance interests
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`their constituencies have justifiably cultivated based on the previous government
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`decision to greenlight the Keystone XL project.
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`IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
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`A. The Keystone System and the Keystone XL Pipeline
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`25. TC Energy owns 2,687 miles of interconnected petroleum pipelines in
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`the United States and Canada (“Keystone System”). The primary pipeline artery, the
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`Keystone Pipeline (“Keystone I Pipeline”) originates in Alberta, Canada, travels
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`eastward into Manitoba, and enters the United States in North Dakota. From the
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`border, the Keystone I pipeline travels south, through South Dakota, and reaches a
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`junction at Steele City, Nebraska. From Steele City, Keystone I’s primary spur runs
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`9
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`east through Missouri to delivery and refining points in Illinois. The other spur from
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`Steele City—designed especially to freight Keystone XL oil—runs through Cushing,
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`Oklahoma and southward to state-of-the-art refineries on the Gulf Coast, including
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`refineries in Houston and Port Arthur, Texas. This portion of the Keystone System
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`has been operational for several years—but because the Keystone XL is not yet
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`online, the southernmost terminals and regional refineries are processing oil in
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`quantities far below capacity.
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`26. At issue here is the Keystone XL project, proposed by TC Energy in 2008.
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`Like the Keystone I Pipeline, the Keystone XL originates in Alberta, and, as proposed,
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`will travel through Montana, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, and Oklahoma to the
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`Gulf Coast, where it would terminate in Houston and Port Arthur, Texas. When
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`operational, the Keystone XL at full capacity would transport upwards of 830,000
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`barrels of Alberta and Montana crude oil per day to the United States interior and
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`Gulf Coast. Specific to this case is the government authorization TC Energy needs to
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`build Keystone XL facilities at the international border in northern Montana. The
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`area covered by the authorization extends from the border about 1.2 miles to and
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`including the first pipeline isolation valve in Montana. Though a tiny piece of the
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`larger Keystone project, it is the fulcrum around which XL turns.
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`27. Keystone XL was expected to transmit hundreds of thousands of barrels
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`of crude oil to a large refining hub near the Gulf Coast and supplement refining
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`capacity in Illinois, ensuring a reliable domestic and global energy source. Economic
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`modeling also reflected that Keystone XL’s construction and operation would create
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`10
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`Case 3:21-cv-00065 Document 1 Filed on 03/17/21 in TXSD Page 11 of 46
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`and sustain thousands of jobs, bolster U.S. energy independence and global
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`leadership, advance commercial relations with Canada, infuse high poverty areas
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`with much-needed tax revenues, and—as compared to transmitting the same oil via
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`rail, truck, or ship—reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
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`B. TC Energy’s Early Efforts to Obtain Federal Authorization Prove that
`Keystone Would Benefit the American Economy Without Harming the
`Environment.
`In 2004, the Bush Administration issued Executive Order No. 13337,
`28.
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`which purported to delegate to the Secretary of State the authority to “expedite
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`reviews of permits as necessary to accelerate the completion of energy production and
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`transmission products.”
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`29. TC Energy first applied for a permit from the Secretary of State to
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`construct and operate the cross-border facilities in 2008. For the next three years,
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`The State Department conducted an expansive and lengthy environmental review of
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`the proposed Keystone XL project, concluding three times in April 2010, April 2011,
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`and August 2011, that the Keystone XL would not materially affect greenhouse gas
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`emissions or alter the amount of extracted and combusted crude oil on the world
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`market.
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`30. During this process, TC Energy adopted dozens of State Department-
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`requested conditions for the design, construction, and operation of the Keystone XL.
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`Nonetheless, the State Department in November 2011 concluded it could not
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`authorize the cross-border Keystone XL facilities without additional information.
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`31.
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`In December 2011, Congress passed the 2011 Act, Pub. L. No. 112-78,
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`125 Stat. 1280. Section 501 of the 2011 Act required the President to grant TC
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`11
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`Energy’s application to construct and operate the Keystone XL cross-border facilities
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`or report to Congress why he believed the project disserved the national interest
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`within 60 days of the law’s enactment. If the President failed to grant the permit or
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`to make a negative national-interest determination within that time, the Act
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`provided that the Keystone XL permit “shall be in effect by operation of law.” 2011
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`Act, Pub. L. 112-78, § 501(b)(3), 125 Stat. at 1289-90.
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`32. On January 18, 2012, President Barack Obama—who had signed the
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`2011 Act only weeks earlier—issued a statement concurring with the State
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`Department’s recommended denial of the Keystone XL permit.5 As part of the
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`statement, despite years of study, President Obama decried “the rushed and arbitrary
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`deadline insisted on by Congressional Republicans [that] prevented a full assessment
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`of the pipeline’s impact, especially the health and safety of the American people, as
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`well as our environment.”6 The State Department issued an order denying the permit
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`on January 31, 2012. The President and State Department indicated that they would
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`consider a renewed permit application in the future. President Obama’s 2012 denial
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`was not based on the conclusion that Keystone XL disserved the national interest.
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`33.
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`In May 2012, TC Energy renewed its State Department application for
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`a Keystone XL cross-border permit.
`
`
`5 Press Release, President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on the
`Keystone XL Pipeline (Jan. 18, 2012), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
`press-office/2012/01/18/statement-president-keystone-xl-pipeline.
`6 Id.
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`12
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`34. The State Department twice more concluded that the proposed Keystone
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`XL would not materially affect greenhouse gas emissions or significantly impact the
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`rate of extraction or demand for crude oil.
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`35. The State Department also studied in detail the potential impact of
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`Keystone XL on the American economy. Its “analysis recognize[d] three distinct
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`components.” At the first level, “[d]irect economic activity associated with
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`construction includes all jobs and earnings at firms that are awarded contracts for
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`goods and services, including construction, directly by Keystone.”(emphasis added).7
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`Though substantial, these benefits were dwarfed by indirect and induced economic
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`activity. “Indirect economic activity includes all goods and services purchased by these
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`construction contractors in the conduct of their services,” including “the goods and
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`services purchased to produce inputs such as concrete, fuel, surveying, welding
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`materials, and earth-moving equipment.”(emphasis added).8 Finally, induced
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`economic activity “includes the spending of earnings received by employees working
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`for either the construction contractor or for any supplier of goods and services
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`required in the construction process. Examples of induced activities include spending
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`by access road construction crews, welders, employees of pipe manufacturers, and
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`ranchers providing beef for restaurants and construction camps.”
`
`
`7 See U.S. Department of State, Executive Summary: Final Supplemental
`Environmental Impact Statement for the Keystone XL Project, 19–20 (Jan.
`2014), https://2012-keystonepipeline-
`xl.state.gov/documents/organization/221135.pdf .
`8 Id.
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`13
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`36. The State Department concluded that the Keystone XL project would be
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`a boon to the pipeline States and non-pipeline States alike. As detailed by the U.S.
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`State Department’s January 2014 Final Supplemental Environmental Impact
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`Statement
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`(“2014 FSEIS”) and
`
`its December 2019 Final Supplemental
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`Environmental Impact Statement (“2019 FSEIS”), the construction and operation of
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`the Keystone XL would bring significant benefits to the Plaintiff States and their local
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`communities.9
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`37. During construction, the State Department concluded, proposed
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`Keystone XL spending would support approximately 42,100 jobs, and approximately
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`$2 billion in earnings throughout the United States. It would especially bring much
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`needed jobs to seventeen areas (census tracts or block groups) in the proposed
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`Keystone XL project area that were identified as minority and/or low-income
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`populations. 2014 FSEIS 4.10-5. For instance, five of the six Montana counties
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`through which Keystone XL would travel are designated high-poverty areas.
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`38. And, the State Department found, these benefits would not end with
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`construction. Once operational, Keystone XL would generate tens of millions of
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`dollars in tax revenue for Plaintiff States and their local communities, including
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`county governments and school districts as well as other taxing entities. Operation of
`
`
`9 See U.S. Department of State, Final Supplemental Environmental Impact
`Statement
`for
`the
`Keystone
`XL
`Project (Jan.
`2014),
`https://www.keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/finalseis/index.htm; U.S. Department of
`State, Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for the Keystone XL
`Project (Dec.
`2019), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Vol-I-
`Keystone-Final-SEIS-Cover-through-Chapter-11_508-December-2019.pdf.
`
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`14
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`the electrical power infrastructure would also increase the revenues of the members
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`of local electrical cooperatives in Montana, who would benefit by selling large
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`amounts of electrical power to the Keystone XL.
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`39.
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`Still unsatisfied, in 2015 the State Department sought the views of
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`several other Cabinet agencies as contemplated in Executive Order No. 13337.
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`40. On November 6, 2015, President Obama announced that his
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`Administration would again deny the renewed Keystone XL cross-border permit.10
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`Though the State Department had concluded that the Keystone XL would increase
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`national energy security, meaningfully benefit the economy, and promote a stronger
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`and more collaborative U.S.-Canada working relationship, the President determined
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`that approving the project would undercut the U.S.’s global leadership in fighting
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`climate change. At no time did he explain this conclusion given his Administration’s
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`repeated findings the Keystone XL would not materially increase greenhouse gas
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`emissions or the amount of extracted crude oil. To the contrary, the State Department
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`noted that the pipeline was an environmentally superior method of transporting oil
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`compared to alternatives like trucks, trains, and tankers.
`
`C. President Trump Approves Keystone XL, Which Is Substantially
`Completed During His Term in Office.
`41. Days after assuming office, President Donald Trump issued a
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`Presidential Memorandum inviting TC Energy to resubmit its application for the
`
`
`10 Press Release, President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on the
`Keystone XL Pipeline (Nov. 6, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
`press-office/2015/11/06/statement-president-keystone-xl-pipeline.
`
`
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`15
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`Case 3:21-cv-00065 Document 1 Filed on 03/17/21 in TXSD Page 16 of 46
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`cross-border permit and ordering his Administration to expedite consideration of the
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`application.11
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`42. On January 26, 2017, TC Energy once again renewed its application.
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`43. The State Department on March 23, 2017 granted the permit “to
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`construct, connect, operate, and maintain pipeline facilities at the international
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`border of the United States and Canada at Morgan, Montana, for the import of crude
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`oil from Canada to the United States.”12
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`44.
`
`In November 2018, a federal district court enjoined the permit, holding
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`that the State Department failed to adequately consider relevant information as
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`required by the Administrative Procedure Act and the National Environmental Policy
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`Act. See Indigenous Envtl. Network v. United States Dep’t of State, 347 F. Supp. 3d
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`561 (D. Mont. 2018).
`
`45. On March 29, 2019, the President issued a new Keystone XL cross-
`
`border permit. For clarity, the March 29, 2019 order revoked the March 23, 2017
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`State Department order.13
`
`
`11 Memorandum on Construction of the Keystone XL Pipeline, Jan. 24, 2017,
`82 Fed. Reg. 8663 (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-01-
`30/pdf/2017-02035.pdf.
`12 Notice of Issuance of a Presidential Permit to TransCanada Keystone
`Pipeline, L.P., Public Notice 9941, 82 Fed. Reg. 16467 (April 4, 2017),
`https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/04/04/2017-06646/notice-of-
`issuance-of-a-presidential-permit-to-transcanada-keystone-pipeline-lp.
`13 Presidential Permit Authorizing TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, 84 Fed.
`Reg. 13101 (Apr. 3, 2019).
`
`
`
`16
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`Case 3:21-cv-00065 Document 1 Filed on 03/17/21 in TXSD Page 17 of 46
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`46. On April 10, 2019, the President issued Executive Order No. 13867,
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`which modified and superseded Executive Order No. 13337. It instructed the
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`Secretary of State to adopt procedures that would allow for permits to be approved
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`within 60 Days of receipt. Based on a diligent search, it appears that Executive Order
`
`No. 13867 remains in effect.
`
`47. The portion of the Keystone XL pipeline that crosses the United States’
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`northern border with Canada was substantially completed before the end of 2020.
`
`D. President Biden Unilaterally Revokes the Keystone XL Cross-Border
`Permit After Construction of the Pipeline Segment Is Substantially
`Complete.
`48. Notwithstanding the significant reliance interests that had developed,
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`President Biden signed an Executive Order entitled “Protecting Public Health and
`
`the Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis” within hours of
`
`taking office.14 In Section 6, the President announced that he was revoking President
`
`Trump’s March 29, 2019 permit. The rationale supporting the decision was scant, and
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`is reproduced here in full:
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`(b) In 2015, following an exhaustive review, the Department of State and
`the President determined that approving the proposed Keystone XL
`pipeline would not serve the U.S. national interest. That analysis, in
`addition to concluding that the significance of the proposed pipeline for
`our energy security and economy is limited, stressed that the United
`States must prioritize the development of a clean energy economy, which
`will in turn create good jobs. The analysis further concluded that
`approval of the proposed pipeline would undermine U.S. climate
`leadership by undercutting the credibility and influence of the United
`States in urging other countries to take ambitious climate action.
`
`(c) Climate change has had a growing effect on the U.S. economy, with
`
`14 See Exec. Order 13990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7037 (January 20, 2021).
`
`
`
`17
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`

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`Case 3:21-cv-00065 Document 1 Filed on 03/17/21 in TXSD Page 18 of 46
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`climate-related costs increasing over the last 4 years. Extreme weather
`events and other climate-related effects have harmed the health, safety,
`and security of the American people and have increased the urgency for
`combatting climate change and accelerating the transition toward a
`clean energy economy. The world must be put on a sustainable climate
`pathway to protect Americans and the domestic economy from harmful
`climate impacts, and to create well-paying union jobs as part of the
`climate solution.
`
`(d) The Keystone XL pipeline disserves the U.S. national interest. The
`United States and the world face a climate crisis. That crisis must be
`met with action on a scale and at a speed commensurate with the need
`to avoid setting the world on a dangerous, potentially catastrophic,
`climate trajectory. At home, we will combat the crisis with an ambitious
`plan to build back better, designed to both reduce harmful emissions and
`create good clean-energy jobs. Our domestic efforts must go hand in
`hand with U.S. diplomatic engagement. Because most greenhouse gas
`emissions originate beyond our borders, such engagement is more
`necessary and urgent than ever. The United States must be in a position
`to exercise vigorous climate leadership in order to achieve a significant
`increase in global climate action and put the world on a sustainable
`climate pathway. Leaving the Keystone XL pipeline permit in place
`would not be consistent with my Administration’s economic and climate
`imperatives.
`
`49.
`
`Just a few years earlier, President Obama had bemoaned that 60 days
`
`was insufficient to fully determine whether Keystone XL served the national
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`interest—despite years of exhaustive environmental and economic reviews uniformly
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`concluding that (a) Keystone XL would not materially affect greenhouse gas
`
`emissions or increase the amount of crude oil on the world market, (b) Keystone XL
`
`would provide a safer and more environmentally sound method of transporting crude
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`oil, and (c) Keystone XL would positively affect the U.S. economy. Yet mere hours into
`
`his first day in office, President Biden affirmatively concluded that the Keystone XL
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`project disserved the national interest because it would send the “wrong message”
`
`about his Administration’s climate action trajectory.
`
`
`
`18
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`Case 3:21-cv-00065 Document 1 Filed on 03/17/21 in TXSD Page 19 of 46
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`E. The Plaintiff States’ Injuries from the President’s Unilateral Decision to
`Revoke the Keystone XL Permit
`50. President Biden did not consult with the Plaintiff States before making
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`this decision, nor did he consider the far-reaching consequences his decision would
`
`impose on Plaintiffs.
`
`51. The pipeline States, as well as their counties, local communities, and
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`school districts stood to gain tens of millions of dollars in tax revenue from the
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`construction and operation of the Keystone XL. The total estimated property tax from
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`the Keystone XL project in the first full year of operations would be approximately
`
`$55.6 million spread across 27 counties in