IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`HOUSTON DIVISION
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`MARANDA LYNN ODONNELL, et al., §
`on behalf of themselves and all others §
`similarly situated, §
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` Plaintiffs, §
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`VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. H-16-1414
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`HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS, et al., §
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` Defendants. §
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`MEMORANDUM AND OPINION
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` The Attorney General of the State of Texa s seeks to intervene and undo the parties’ 2019
`consent decree that settled a constitutional ch allenge to the Harris County bail system. The
`Attorney General seeks to do so almost a decade after the litigation began and six years after the
`consent decree went into effect. The results of the consent decree, reported and studied by
`independent court-appointed monitors, show no significant increases in recidivism; a multi-
`million-dollar savings to Harris County and some relief from its beyond-capacity jail population;
`and an improvement to the lives of many arrested for misdemeanor offenses. Despite this record
`of success, the Attorney General belatedly seeks to intervene to challenge the consent decree that
`achieved these results.
`The Attorney General bases his motion on th e Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision in Daves
`II,
`1 decided over two years ago. That decision, issued in a similar challenge to the Dallas County
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`1 Daves v. Dallas County (Daves II) , 64 F.4th 616 (5th Cir. 2023) (en banc), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 548
`(2024).
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`United States District Court
`Southern District of Texas
`ENTERED
`October 30, 2025
`Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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`bail system, held that the state defendants could assert Younger2 abstention against the plaintiffs’
`claims and that a new state law, Senate Bill 6, mooted the case. The Attorney General moves to
`intervene to argue that this court must also abstain under Younger and that Senate Bill 6 and Senate
`Bill 9, additional bail legislation passed after Daves II, moot this case.
`After a careful review of the motion to intervene and the opposition, the briefs, the parties’
`supplemental briefs, the record, and the applicable law, the court grants in part and denies in part
`the Attorney General’s motion to intervene. The court finds that the Attorney General may
`intervene to move to vacate or amend the consent decree based on Senate Bill 6 and Senate Bill 9,
`and to argue that these laws m oot the consent decree or otherwis e require its amendment. The
`Attorney General did not, however, timely intervene to assert Younger abstention, which he could
`have done beginning in 2018. The Attorney Gene ral has no right to intervene to raise Younger
`abstention and, by this point in the litigation, he has waived the Younger arguments that he outlines
`in his motion.
`I. The Litigation and Entry of the Consent Decree
`Close to a decade ago, Maranda Lynn ODonnell filed a class-action lawsuit challenging
`Harris County’s police and practice of jailing about 40% of people arrested for misdemeanor
`offenses for the duration of their cases solely because they could not pay money bail, without
`constitutionally adequate procedures to justify their c ontinued detention. ODonnell v. Harris
`County, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1058 (S.D. Tex. 2017), aff’d as modified, 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir.
`2018).
`The parties vigorously litigated the case before this court and the Fifth Circuit. Harris
`County, the County Criminal Court at Law Judges, the Criminal Law Hearing Officers, and the
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`2 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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`Sheriff moved to dismiss the complaint, in part based on Younger abstention. (Docket Entry No.
`80 at 25–31). The court denied the motion to abstain. (Docket Entry No. 125).
`In 2017, the court held an eight-day prelimin ary-injunction hearing. (Docket Entry Nos.
`222, 223, 228–30, 246, 247, 251). In advance of the he aring, several parties, including bail
`bondsmen whose financial interests supported the bail-bond system, moved to intervene. (Docket
`Entry No. 202). The Attorney Ge neral did not. The court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a
`preliminary injunction, finding that the County’s bail practices likely violated the Constitution’s
`Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause , (Docket Entry Nos. 302, 304), and granted the
`motion for class certification, (Docket Entry No. 303).
`The County and the Hearing Officers appealed, asserting again that the district court should
`have abstained under Younger. (Docket Entry Nos. 309, 310). The Attorney General did not
`intervene, but he did file an amicus brief. See Br. for State of Texas et al., ODonnell v. Harris
`County, No. 17-20333, 2017 WL 2861848 (5th Cir. June 26, 2017). The brief argued that the Fifth
`Circuit should vacate the preliminary injunction but did not raise Younger abstention. See id.
`The Fifth Circuit affirmed this court’s decision that Younger abstention was improper, that
`the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims, and that most of the preliminary
`injunction was proper. See generally ODonnell v. Harris County (ODonnell I), 892 F.3d 147 (5th
`Cir. 2018) (opinion on rehearing), overruled in part by Daves v. Dallas County (Daves I), 22 F.4th
`522 (5th Cir. 2022), and by Daves II, 64 F.4th 616. The Attorney General did not intervene in the
`appeal and did not seek additional re view from the Fifth Circuit en banc or from the Supreme
`Court.3 The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to this court.
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`3 The defendants only sought review from the Suprem e Court in the form of a stay pending appeal from
`the district court’s original preliminary injunction. See ODonnell v. Harris County , 260 F. Supp. 3d 810
`(S.D. Tex. 2017) (denying a stay pending appeal). Ju stice Thomas denied the defendants’ application for
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`On remand, the court entered a revised prel iminary injunction, (Doc ket Entry Nos. 426,
`427), which the County Judges appealed, (Docket Entry No. 434). The Attorney General again
`filed an amicus brief, arguing that the Fifth Circuit should vacate the preliminary injunction. Br.
`for State of Texas et al., ODonnell v. Goodhart, No. 18-20466, 2018 WL 4603243 (5th Cir. Sept.
`17, 2018). The Fifth Circuit stayed pending appeal portions of the new preliminary injunction.
`See generally ODonnell v. Goodhart (ODonnell II) , 900 F.3d 220 (5th Cir. 2018), overruled in
`part by Daves, 22 F.4th 522.
`The parties continued to litigate the case before this court while the County Judges’ appeal
`of the revised preliminary injunction was pend ing. The parties submit ted cross-motions for
`summary judgment, which included Younger arguments. ( See Docket Entry No. 432). Before
`those motions were decided, ne wly elected County Judges took of fice, withdrew the pending
`appeal, (See Docket Entry No. 551), and began settleme nt negotiations, (Docket Entry No. 532).
`The parties routinely updated the court on the status of the settlement negotiations. ( See, e.g.,
`Docket Entry Nos. 563, 590, 594). The Attorney General did not seek to intervene when the parties
`started negotiating settlement; after the district court denied without prejudice the County Judges’
`motion for summary judgment, which had asserted Younger abstention, (Docket Entry No. 540);
`after the parties notified the court of a new lo cal rule that would pr ovide a foundation for the
`proposed settlement, (Docket Entr y No. 557); after the court ordere d the defendants to comply
`with the new local rule, (Docket Entry Nos. 573, 575); or at any point during the work and public
`filings that led to the parties’ consent decree.
`After three years of litigation, including two appeals to the Fifth Circuit, the parties
`announced a settlement on July 25, 2019. (Docke t Entry Nos. 615, 617). The court permitted
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`a stay pending appeal. Harris County v. ODonnell, No. 16A1204, 2017 WL 11824167, at *1 (U.S. June 7,
`2017).
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`interested individuals an d entities to file amicus briefs in support of, or in opposition to, the
`proposed consent decree to aid in its considerat ion of the parties’ proposal. (Docket Entry No.
`643). The Attorney General submitted written testimony arguing that the proposed consent decree
`was contrary to Texas law, that it was against the public intere st because it endangered public
`safety, and, because the case was moot, that the c ourt lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter
`the consent decree. (Docket Entry No. 689). At the final hearing to determine the fairness of the
`proposed class settlement and consent decree, the court afforded the Attorney General time to
`argue his position. (Docket Entry Nos. 692, 700; see Docket Entry No. 704 at 58:13–64:5). The
`Attorney General did not assert Younger abstention, even though every other party in the case had
`abandoned the issue and submitted the constitutional issues to the court for a decision on the merits.
`On November 21, 2019, after considering the parties’ and amici’s submissions and
`arguments, the court entered the consent decree. (Docket Entry No. 708). In March 2020, the
`court appointed Professor Bra ndon Garrett of the Duke Univer sity Law School and Professor
`Sandra Guerra Thompson of the University of Houston Law Center, both well-regarded experts in
`criminal-justice law, as independe nt monitors to oversee the cons ent decree. (Docket Entry No.
`714). The monitors have publishe d reports over the past five years, collecting data on Harris
`County’s bail system and documenting the effects of the consent decree. (Docket Entry Nos. 722-
`1, 725-2, 726-1, 733-2, 734-1, 736-1, 737-1, 739-1). The monitors have consistently found that,
`under the consent decree, “Harri s County and [its] residents” have saved “many millions of
`dollars” and “the lives of tens of thousands of persons arrested fo r misdemeanors” have
`“improved,” with “no increase in new offenses by persons arrest ed for misdemeanors.” (Docket
`Entry No. 739-1 at 5 (Eighth Report of the Court- Appointed Monitor)). In short, the decree has
`responded to the constitutional violation of holding detainees, charged with misdemeanor offenses
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`but not convicted, who would have been released from jail but for their inability to post a cash
`bond, with no increase in new offenses.
` In March 2020, the Attorney General moved to intervene in another case before this court
`raising similar challenges to Harris County’s felony, as opposed to misdemeanor, bail system.
`(Russell v. Harris County , Case No. 4:19-cv-226 (S.D. Tex.), Docket Entry Nos. 38, 46). In
`August 2021, Texas enacted Senate Bill 6, wh ich altered the State’s bail laws. See S.B. 6, 87th
`Leg. (Tex. 2021). In January 2022, the Fifth Circuit remanded the Daves case to the district court
`with instructions to address Younger abstention and mootness. Daves I, 22 F.4th at 548. In July
`2022, the district court issued its post-remand opinion in Daves, concluding that Younger
`abstention was not required but that the case had been made moot by the Texas legislature’s
`enactment of Senate Bill 6. Daves v. Dallas County, No. 3:18-cv-154, 2022 WL 2473364, at *3,
`*6 (N.D. Tex. July 6, 2022).
`In January 2023, the Attorney Ge neral moved to dismiss the Russell case, arguing that
`Senate Bill 6 made the challenges to the Harris County bail system moot. (Russell Docket Entry
`Nos. 642, 669). Two months later, in March 2023, the Fifth Circuit issued Daves II, which held
`that Senate Bill 6 mooted the cas e and that the district court ha d to abstain from adjudicating the
`case under Younger. Daves II, 64 F.4th at 635; see Russell v. Harris County , No. H-19-cv-226,
`2023 WL 5658936, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2023) (discussing Daves II). The Attorney General
`did not move to intervene or to vacate the consent decree in ODonnell as these related cases
`developed.
` In June 2025, the Texas Legislature en acted Senate Bill 9, which expanded the bail-
`system amendments made in Senate Bill 6. See S.B. 9, 89th Leg. (Tex. 2025). In August 2025,
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`the Attorney General moved to intervene and to v acate the consent decree in this case. (Docket
`Entry Nos. 740, 742). Senate Bill 9 became effective on September 1, 2025.
`II. The Legal Standards
`The Attorney General moves to intervene as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
`24(a)(2) and moves in the alternative for permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(1).
`“Rule 24(a)(2) governs intervention of right based on an interest in the action.” St. Bernard
`Par. v. Lafarge N. Am., Inc., 914 F.3d 969, 974 (5th Cir. 2019). The Fifth Circuit has established
`a four-pronged test for intervention under Rule 24(a)(2):
`(1) the application for intervention must be timely; (2) the applicant must have an
`interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action; (3)
`the applicant must be so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a practical
`matter, impair his ability to protect that in terest; [and] (4) the applicant’s interest
`must be inadequately represented by the existing parties to the suit.
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`Id. (quoting Sommers v. Bank of Am., N.A., 835 F.3d 509, 512 (5th Cir. 2016)). “Failure to satisfy
`any one requirement precludes intervention of right.” Louisiana v. Burgum, 132 F.4th 918, 922
`(5th Cir. 2025) (quoting Haspel & Davis Milling & Planting Co. v. Bd. of Levee Comm’rs , 493
`F.3d 570, 578 (5th Cir. 2007)).
` Rule 24(b)(1) governs permissive interventi on. Under it, a “court may permit anyone to
`intervene who” files a “timely motion” and “has a claim or defense that shares with the main action
`a common question of law or fact.” F
`ED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(1)(B). “Permissive intervention under
`Rule 24(b) is ‘wholly discretionary’ and ‘may be denied even when the requirements of Rule 24(b)
`are satisfied.’” Burgum, 132 F.4th at 923 (quoting Turner v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 9 F.4th 300, 317
`(5th Cir. 2021)). Only in “extraordinary circumstances” will a district court abuse its discretion in
`denying permissive intervention. Edwards v. City of Houston , 78 F.3d 983, 995 (5th Cir. 1996)
`(en banc) (citation omitted).
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` Parties may not have the right to intervene to litigate every issue in a case. “[R]easonable
`conditions may be imposed even upon one who intervenes as of right.” Beauregard, Inc. v. Sword
`Servs. LLC, 107 F.3d 351, 352–53 (5th Cir. 1997); see FED. R. CIV. P. 24 advisory committee note
`to 1966 amendment (“An intervention of right . . . may be subject to a ppropriate conditions or
`restrictions responsive among othe r things to the re quirements of effi cient conduct of the
`proceedings.”). Courts may limit intervening parties to making certain motions or addressing
`specific issues. See, e.g., Swoboda v. Manders, 665 F. App’x 312, 313, 315 (5th Cir. 2016) (per
`curiam); Brumfield v. Dodd , 749 F.3d 339, 341, 346 (5th Cir. 2014); McDonald v. E. J. Lavino
`Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1073 (5th Cir. 1970); La. State Conf. of Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of
`Colored People v. Louisiana, No. 19-cv-479, 2022 WL 2663850, at *2 (M.D. La. July 11, 2022);
`Blue Spike, LLC v. Audible Magic Corp., No. 6:15-CV-584, 2016 WL 3870069, at *2 (E.D. Tex.
`Apr. 18, 2016); Swann v. City of Dallas, 172 F.R.D. 211, 213 (N.D. Tex. 1997); see also In re Fin.
`Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for Puerto Rico , 872 F.3d 57, 64 (1st Cir. 2017) (“Courts may further
`restrict intervention to . . . a particular set of issues” (citing Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 599
`(3d Cir. 1987)); United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. , 642 F.2d 1285, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
`(similar).
`III. Analysis
`The parties do not contest the Attorney Gene ral’s motion to intervene for the purpose of
`arguing about the effect of Senate Bill 9 on the consent decree. (Docket Entry No. 751 at 22–23;
`see generally Docket Entry No. 748 (not addressing Senate Bill 9 in particular )). The Attorney
`General moved to intervene two months after the Texas legislature passed Senate Bill 9 and before
`the law went into effect. This aspect of the Attorney General’s motion was “timely” and presents
`a “defense” that shares “a common question of law or fact” with “the main action.” FED. R. CIV.
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`P. 24(b)(1)(A). The court grants the Attorney General’s motion to intervene to extent he plans to
`argue that the consent decree conflicts with Senate Bill 9.
`The parties dispute whether the Attorney Gene ral may intervene, either as of right and
`permissively, to argue that the court must abstain under Younger and that Senate Bill 6 or Senate
`Bill 9 moots this case or requires amendment of the consent decree. (See generally Docket Entry
`Nos. 740, 748, 751, 752, 755, 760, 761). The court de nies the Attorney General’s motion to
`intervene to argue Younger abstention but grants the Attorney General’s motion to intervene to
`argue that the consent decree should be vacated or amended based on Senate Bill 6 and Senate Bill
`9.
`A. Intervention as of Right
`The Attorney General does not have a right to intervene to argue Younger abstention. But
`he does have the right to intervene to argue that the case is moot, or that the consent decree must
`be vacated or changed, based on post-judgment changes in state law.
`1. Younger Abstention
`The Attorney General does not have a right to intervene to raise Younger abstention, for
`two reasons. First, he has not shown that he has a right to intervene under the Fifth Circuit’s four-
`factor test implemen ting Rule 24(a)(2). Second, the Atto rney General’s motion to intervene to
`argue Younger abstention is futile. See Saavedra v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 930 F.2d 1104, 1109
`(5th Cir. 1991); In re Deepwater Horizon, 546 F. App’x 502, 504 (5th Cir. 2023) (per curiam).
`i. Rule 24(a)(2)
`The Attorney General moves to intervene as of right to vacate a consent decree that he
`argues conflicts with Texas law— Senate Bill 6 and Senate Bill 9—governing bail procedures. As
`a result, he can establish most of the factors warranting intervention as of right. “States possess a
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`legitimate interest in the continued enforcement of their own statutes.” Berger v. N.C. State Conf.
`of the NAACP, 597 U.S. 179, 191 (2022) (clean ed up). Texas charges its Attorney General with
`enforcing its laws and defending its interests in litigation. T EX. CONST. art. IV, § 22; see In re
`Fraser, 75 F. Supp. 2d 572, 584 (E.D. Tex. 1999). And the current parties in the litigation do not
`adequately represent the Attorney General’s in terests because they would prefer the consent
`decree, as opposed to the allegedly conflicting st ate law, to continue to govern Harris County’s
`bail practices. See Berger, 597 U.S. at 197 (explaining that unde r Rule 24(a)(2), federal courts
`must respect the contrasting interests of differe nt elected officials who may take opposing views
`on the constitutionality and enforcement of state laws); cf. Haspel & Davis , 493 F.3d at 579
`(concluding that local officials adequately represen ted state officials’ interests because they had
`the “same ultimate objective” of enforcing state law in the case).
`The Attorney General cannot, however, es tablish a right to intervene based on Younger
`abstention because he asserts this basis for intervention too late. Whether a motion to intervene is
`timely depends on four factors:
`(1) The length of time during which the would-be intervenor actually knew or
`reasonably should have known of its intere st in the case befo re it petitioned for
`leave to intervene; (2) the extent of the prejudice that the existing parties to the
`litigation may suffer as a result of the w ould-be intervenor’s failure to apply for
`intervention as soon as it knew or reasonably should have known of its interest in
`the case; (3) the extent of the prejudice th at the would-be intervenor may suffer if
`intervention is denied; and (4) the ex istence of unusual ci rcumstances militating
`either for or against a determination that the application is timely.
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`Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1205 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558
`F.2d 257, 264–66 (5th Cir. 1977)). “[A]bsolute measures of timeliness should be ignored” because
`the “analysis is contextual.” Id. The timeliness requirement serves to “guard against prejudicing
`the original parties by the failure to apply sooner.” Id. (citing McDonald, 430 F.2d at 1074). All
`these factors support finding that the Attorney General’s motion to intervene is untimely.
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`The Attorney General moved to intervene almost seven years after he “became aware that
`[his] interests would no longer be protected by the original parties.” Sierra Club, 18 F.3d at 1206
`(5th Cir. 1994) (citing Stallworth, 558 F.2d at 264). In November 2018, the parties started
`negotiating a potential consent decree. (Docket Entry Nos. 529, 532, 537). Around the same time,
`the County Judges abandoned their appeal of the revised preliminary injunction. (Docket Entry
`No. 551). The Attorney General was fully aware of the issues and interests in the case; he filed
`amicus briefs in this court and in the Fifth Circuit on appeal. The Attorney General knew that the
`County Judges had argued Younger abstention in the district court and on appeal. However, he
`did not move to in tervene to argue Younger abstention when the defenda nts declined to seek
`additional review after the Fifth Circuit ruled on this court’s firs t preliminary-injunction order.
`The Attorney General did not move to intervene during the settle ment negotiations or after the
`parties had filed a proposed consent decree with this court. Nor did he appeal this court’s approval
`of the consent decree. Although the Attorney General saw the defendants abandon their position
`that this court should have abstained under Younger and that the plaintiffs should not succeed on
`the merits of their claim, he chose not to intervene, either in this court or in the appeal. In short,
`the Attorney General took no steps to challenge as a party the entry of the consent decree or its
`implementation during the past six-and-a-half years.
`This court has not found a case in which a litigant so tard y has intervened as of right,
`especially when the motion to intervene is for the purpose of re-raising issues that were thoroughly
`litigated and then settled by the parties. The Attorney General has not cited such a case. The Fifth
`Circuit has held repeatedly that even much shor ter delays are untimely. In one case, the Fifth
`Circuit held that a litigant’s motion to intervene was untimely when it had “waited nearly 15 weeks
`after [a] district court entered [a] consent decree” and when the possibility of settlement “was well-
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`publicized for more than six months be fore the consent decree was entered.” United States v.
`Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist., 499 F.3d 464, 466 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). In another case, the
`Fifth Circuit held that the movants’ effort to intervene was untimely because they had “waited 18
`months” after learning that the parties in th e case would not protec t their interests. Rotstain v.
`Mendez, 986 F.3d 931, 938 (5th Cir. 2021). The trend in Fift h Circuit case law is that a movant
`timely intervenes when it seeks to do so within several months of learning that the parties are no
`longer protecting its interests but that, after close to a year, a mo tion to intervene will likely be
`untimely. Compare Sierra Club, 18 F.3d at 1206 (a delay of three weeks was timely); Edwards,
`78 F.3d at 1000 (delays of 37 and 47 days was timely); John Doe No. 1 v. Glickman, 256 F.3d 371,
`376 (5th Cir. 2001) (a delay of one month was timely), with United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum
`Industries, Inc., 553 F.2d 451, 453 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (a delay of seven and a half months
`was untimely); Engra, Inc. v. Gabel , 958 F.2d 643, 645 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (a delay of
`eight months was untimely); United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 548 F.2d 1232, 1235 (5th Cir. 1977)
`(a delay of almost a year was untimely); Corley v. Jackson Police Dep’t, 755 F.2d 1207, 1210 (5th
`Cir. 1985) (a delay of two years was untimely); Smith v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 615 F.2d 683, 684–
`85 (5th Cir. 1980) (same); United States v. Louisiana, 669 F.2d 314, 315 (5th Cir. 1982) (a delay
`of four years was untimely); Jones v. Caddo Par. Sch. Bd. , 735 F.2d 923, 925–27, 932–33, 932
`n.11 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (a delay of seven years was untimely).
`This trend is consistent across the courts of appeals. The Eleventh Circuit upheld a district
`court’s determination that a mova nt’s request to intervene one day before the court approved a
`consent decree was untimely, because the movant had known that th e litigants did not represent
`its interests for over three years. Hollywood Cmty. Synagogue, Inc. v. City of Hollywood , 254 F.
`App’x 769, 770–72 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); see also Reeves v. Harrell (Reeves II), 791 F.2d
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`1481, 1484 (11th Cir. 1986) (a delay of “two and a half years after the entry of the consent decree”
`was untimely); United States v. Jefferson County , 720 F.2d 1511, 1514–19 (11th Cir. 1983) (a
`delay of five years, until af ter the hearing on the proposed consent decree, was untimely); cf.
`Howard v. McLucas, 782 F.2d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1986) (a de lay of six weeks was timely). The
`Ninth Circuit upheld a district court’s denial of a motion to intervene when the movants sought to
`intervene about a year and a half after learning th at the parties began “ne gotiations” that “might
`[have] produce[d] a settlement decree to their detriment.” Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control
`v. Com. Realty Projs., Inc. , 309 F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2002); EEOC v. Activision Blizzard,
`Inc., No. 22-55515, 2023 WL 8908774, at *1–2 (9th Cir. Dec. 27, 2023) (mem.) (a delay of five
`months was untimely). The Seventh Circuit held that a motion to intervene filed towards the end
`of the parties’ negotiations on a consent decree, and nine months after the movant learned of the
`lawsuit, was untimely. Illinois v. City of Chicago, 912 F.3d 979, 983–86 (7th Cir. 2019). And the
`Third Circuit held that motions to intervene we re untimely when they were filed twenty and
`twenty-two months after the entry of a consent decree. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for
`Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 674 F.2d 970, 972, 974 (3d Cir. 1982).
`Courts do not consider motions to intervene t imely when they are filed months or years
`after the publicized start of negotiations over a c onsent decree or the entry of a consent decree.
`See, e.g., Alaniz v. Tillie Lewis Foods, 572 F.2d 657, 658–59 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Mich.
`Assoc. for Retarded Citizens v. Smith , 657 F.2d 102, 105 (6th Cir. 1981); Stotts v. Memphis Fire
`Dep’t., 679 F.2d 579, 585 & n.5 (6th Cir. 1982); Orange County v. Air Cal. , 799 F.2d 535, 538
`(9th Cir. 1986); In re Dep’t of Energy Stripper Well Exemption Litig., 864 F.2d 796, 801 (Temp.
`Emer. Ct. App. 1988); City of Bloomington v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 824 F.2d 531, 535–37
`(7th Cir. 1987); Farmland Dairies v. Comm’r of New York State Dep’t of Agric. & Markets, 847
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`F.2d 1038, 1044–45 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. City of Chicago, 908 F.2d 197, 199–200 (7th
`Cir. 1990); United States v. City of Chicago , 897 F.2d 243, 244 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v.
`Pitney Bowes, Inc., 25 F.3d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 1994); Afro-Am. Police Ass’n v. City of Memphis, 61
`F.3d 903 (6th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); United States v. BASF-Inmont Corp., 52 F.3d 326 (6th Cir.
`1995) (per curiam); see also Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 744 F.2d 963, 969–70 (3d Cir. 1984).
`The Attorney General waited so long to move to intervene that granting his motion could amount
`to an abuse of discretion. See Reeves v. Wilkes (Reeves I), 754 F.2d 965, 970, 972 (11th Cir. 1985)
`(concluding that the district court abused its di scretion by permitting intervention “two years and
`eight months after entry of the consent decree”).
`The Attorney General responds that he did not know the parties would not adequately
`protect his interests until the parties did not move to vacate the consent decree after Daves II.
`(Docket Entry No. 740-1 at 6–7). Neither the record nor the case law supports the Attorney
`General’s position. The defendants began worki ng to settle this case in 2018. They abandoned
`the arguments that the Attorney General now belatedly seeks to assert. By the Attorney General’s
`own benchmark—when “the defendan ts abandoned their duty to de fend against this action,” (Id.
`at 7)—he is late by almost seven years. There is no basis in the record to find that the Attorney
`General reasonably thought that th e parties adequately represented his interests until the parties
`did not seek to vacate the consent decree after Daves II was decided.
`Nor is there case law supporting the proposition that a litigant may delay intervention until
`it has affirmatively “realized that [its] interests were not being adequately represented.” (Docket
`Entry No. 752 at 11). In Covington County School District, the Fifth Circuit held that a party knew
`its interests were not being repres ented when the “possibility” that the parties “might settle was
`well-publicized.” 499 F.3d at 466. The panel rejected the movants’ arguments that “they believed
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`the United States would be pressing for their position,” explaining that there was “no evidence that
`the United States gave them any explicit assurances that it woul d not compromise to settle the
`case.” Id. The facts of this case are i ndistinguishable. The possibility of settlement in this case
`was apparent in November 2018, when the parties informed the court that they were beginning
`negotiations. (Docket Entry Nos. 529, 532, 537). The Attorney General has offered no evidence
`that any party assured him that they would preser ve or not compromise cer tain issues, including
`the issue of Younger abstention. To the contrary, the partie s’ settlement, which was filed on the
`publicly available court docket, (Docket Entry Nos. 615, 617), clearly compromised the Younger
`arguments that the Attorney General now asserts. The defendants did not “induce[]” the Attorney
`General to refrain from intervening. United States v. Alcan Aluminum, Inc., 25 F.3d 1174, 1182
`(3d Cir. 1994).
`Courts often start the intervention clock when movants learn that the parties are not likely
`to adequately represent the movants’ interests, even if there is a possibility that the parties will
`ultimately do so. See Covington Cnty., 499 F.3d at 466 (relying on the fact that the “possibility”
`that the parties “might settle was well-publicized”); Hollywood Cmty. Synagogue, 254 F. App’x at
`771 (explaining that “the Appellants were aware that the City may not represent their interests as
`early as February 2003”); Air Cal., 799 F.2d at 538 (“Irvine should have realized that the litigation
`might be resolved by negotiated settlement.”); Com. Realty Projs., 309 F.3d at 1120 (“While Cities
`were not certain that the consent decree would be adverse to their interests, they had reason to
`know that negotiations might produce a sett lement decree to their detriment.”); Illinois, 912 F.3d
`at 985 (“[W]e measure from when the applicant has reason to kno