NO. PD-1067-15
`
`PD-1067-15
`COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
`AUSTIN, TEXAS
`Transmitted 10/21/2015 9:09:44 PM
`Accepted 10/22/2015 8:12:16 AM
`ABEL ACOSTA
`CLERK
`
`IN THE
`COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS
`
`EX PARTE JAMES RICHARD “RICK” PERRY,
`Appellant
`
`________________________________________________________
`
`On Appeal from the 390th Judicial District Court,
`Travis County, Texas, Cause No. D-1-DC-14-100139
`________________________________________________________
`
`APPELLANT’S BRIEF ON THE MERITS ADDRESSING
`THE STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
`________________________________________________________
`
`BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.
`Thomas R. Phillips
`State Bar No. 00000102
`98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500
`Austin, Texas 78701-4078
`tom.phillips@bakerbotts.com
`Telephone: 512-322-2565
`Facsimile: 512-322-8363
`
`
`
`THE BUZBEE LAW FIRM
`Anthony G. Buzbee
`State Bar No. 24001820
`JPMorgan Chase Tower
`600 Travis Street, Suite 7300
`Houston, Texas 77002
`Tbuzbee@txattorneys.com
`Telephone: 713-223-5393
`Facsimile: 713-223-5909
`
`BOTSFORD & ROARK
`David L. Botsford
`State Bar No. 02687950
`1307 West Ave.
`Austin, Texas 78701
`dbotsford@aol.com
`Telephone: 512-479-8030
`Facsimile: 512-479-8040
`
`ORAL ARGUMENT PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED BY THE COURT
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`Identity of Judge, Parties, and Counsel
`
`The following is a complete list of the names and addresses of all parties and
`counsel in this case.
`
`Trial Judge: Honorable Bert Richardson, sitting by appointment;
`Court of Criminal Appeals, Supreme Court Building, 201 West 14th
`Street, Austin, Texas, 78701.
`
`Appellant: Former Governor James Richard “Rick” Perry, c/o
`Anthony G. Buzbee, JPMorgan Chase Tower, 600 Travis Street, Suite
`7300, Houston, Texas 77002.
`
`Appellant’s Counsel: Anthony G. Buzbee, JPMorgan Chase Tower,
`600 Travis Street, Suite 7300, Houston, Texas 77002; Thomas R.
`Phillips, 98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500, Austin, Texas 78701-4078;
`and David L. Botsford, 1307 West Avenue, Austin, Texas, 78701
`(Lead Counsel on Appeal).
`
`State of Texas: Attorney Pro Tem Michael McCrum, 700 N. Saint
`Mary’s Street, Suite 1900, San Antonio, Texas 78205; Assistant
`Attorney Pro Tem David Gonzalez, 206 East 9th Street, Suite 1511,
`Austin, Texas, 78701.
`
`i
`
`

`
`
`
`Table of Contents
`
`Identity of Judge, Parties, and Counsel ...................................................................... i 
`
`Index of Authorities ................................................................................................. iv 
`
`Statement of the Case ................................................................................................. 1 
`
`Grounds for Review ................................................................................................... 3 
`
`Statement of the Facts ................................................................................................ 4 
`
`A. 
`
`B. 
`
`Proceedings in the district court ............................................................ 4 
`
`B. Proceedings in the court of appeals .................................................. 6 
`
`Summary of the Argument ....................................................................................... 10 
`
`Argument.................................................................................................................. 12 
`
`A. 
`
`B. 
`
`Introduction ......................................................................................... 12 
`
`The court of appeals opinion correctly analyzed and decided
`Governor Perry’s First Amendment challenges .................................. 13 
`
`1. 
`
`2. 
`
`3. 
`
`4. 
`
`5. 
`
`First Amendment Principles ..................................................... 13 
`
`The Statutory Framework ......................................................... 15 
`
`The court of appeals was faithful to this Court’s binding
`precedents .................................................................................. 18 
`
`Section 36.03(a)(1), as it incorporates the definition of
`“coercion” from Section 1.07(a)(9)(F), implicates the
`First Amendment....................................................................... 20 
`
`The State’s arguments that the statutes do not implicate
`the First Amendment are without merit .................................... 20 
`
`a. 
`
`b. 
`
`The State’s cases are distinguishable ............................. 21 
`
`The court of appeals was correct that Governor
`Perry did not lose his First Amendment rights by
`holding public office ....................................................... 25 
`
`ii
`
`

`
`
`
`6. 
`
`7. 
`
`Section 36.03(a)(1), as it incorporates the definition of
`“coercion” from Section 1.07(a)(9)(F), is a content-based
`restriction on speech.................................................................. 31 
`
`Section 36.03(a)(1), as it incorporates the definition of
`“coercion” from Section 1.07(a)(9)(F), fails to satisfy
`“strict scrutiny” ......................................................................... 33 
`
`C. 
`
`Even if the court of appeals erred in its reasoning, its judgment
`was correct for other reasons. .............................................................. 35 
`
`1. 
`
`2. 
`
`Section 36.03(a)(1), as it incorporates the definition of
`“coercion” from Section 1.07(a)(9)(F), is overbroad ............... 35 
`
`The statutory scheme is facially void for vagueness ................ 46 
`
`Prayer for Relief ....................................................................................................... 52 
`
`Certificate of Compliance ........................................................................................ 54 
`
`Certificate of Service ............................................................................................... 54 
`
`iii
`
`

`
`Index of Authorities
`
`Page(s)
`
`
`
`
`
`CASES
`
`All. to End Repression v. City of Chicago,
`742 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir. 1984) .................................................................................................37
`
`Ashcroft v. A.C.L.U.,
`535 U.S. 564 (2002) .................................................................................................................32
`
`Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union,
`542 U.S. 656 (2004) ...........................................................................................................14, 15
`
`Bd. v. State,
`No. 03-96-00024-CR, 1998 WL 271043 (Tex. App.—Austin May 29, 1998,
`pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) ..............................................................................22
`
`Bond v. Floyd,
`385 U.S. 116 (1966) .................................................................................................................27
`
`Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
`413 U.S. 601 (1973) ...........................................................................................................43, 44
`
`Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n,
`131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) .......................................................................................................13, 33
`
`Carey v. Brown,
`447 U.S. 455 (1980) .................................................................................................................24
`
`City of Seattle v. Ivan,
`856 P.2d 1116 (Wash. App. 1993) ...........................................................................................38
`
`Colautti v. Franklin,
`439 U.S. 379 (1979) .................................................................................................................49
`
`Collection Consultants, Inc. v. State,
`556 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).................................................................................42
`
`Connick v. Myers,
`461 U.S. 138 (1983) .................................................................................................................26
`
`Crouch v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of Tex. City,
`459 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, writ ref’d n.r.e.) ....................50
`
`iv
`
`

`
`
`
`Duncantell v. State,
`230 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) ...............................22, 23
`
`Ely v. State,
`582 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).................................................................................47
`
`Ex parte Lo,
`424 S.W.3d 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)........................................................................... passim
`
`Ex parte Thompson,
`442 S.W.3d 325 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)......................................................................... passim
`
`Garcetti v. Ceballos,
`547 U.S. 410 (2006) .................................................................................................................26
`
`Garrison v. La.,
`379 U.S. 64 (1964) ...................................................................................................................41
`
`Gooding v. Wilson,
`405 U.S. 518 (1972) .................................................................................................................48
`
`Grayned v. Rockford,
`408 U.S. 104 (1972) .................................................................................................................47
`
`Jenevein v. Willing,
`493 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2007) ...................................................................................................27
`
`Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n,
`544 U.S. 550 (2005) ...........................................................................................................28, 29
`
`Kramer v. Price,
`712 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1983) ...................................................................................................47
`
`Long v. State,
`931 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).....................................................................47, 48, 49
`
`McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n,
`514 U.S. 334 (1995) .................................................................................................................13
`
`Meyer v. Grant,
`486 U.S. 414 (1988) ...........................................................................................................13, 41
`
`N.A.A.C.P v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,
`458 U.S. 886 (1982) .....................................................................................................23, 24, 37
`
`N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,
`376 U.S. 254 (1964) .................................................................................................................13
`
`v
`
`

`
`
`
`Olivas v. State,
`203 S.W.3d 341 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)...........................................................................20, 50
`
`Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe,
`402 U.S. 415 (1971) ...........................................................................................................24, 30
`
`Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,
`405 U.S. 156 (1971) .................................................................................................................47
`
`People v. Iboa,
`207 Cal. App. 4th 111 (2012) ..................................................................................................39
`
`Phillips v. State,
`401 S.W.3d 282 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. ref’d) ............................................30, 40
`
`Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,
`555 U.S. 460 (2009) ...........................................................................................................28, 29
`
`Puckett v. State,
`801 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref’d) .........................21, 22, 42
`
`R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
`505 U.S. 377 (1992) .....................................................................................................13, 19, 33
`
`Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz.,
`135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) .............................................................................................................32
`
`Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union,
`521 U.S. 844 (1997) .................................................................................................................15
`
`Roberts v. State,
`278 S.W.3d 778 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, pet. ref’d) ............................................42, 51
`
`Sanchez v. State,
`995 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)...............................................................24, 25, 36, 42
`
`Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,
`444 U.S. 620 (1980) .................................................................................................................43
`
`Sorrell v. IMS Health,
`131 S.Ct. 2653 (2011) ........................................................................................................13, 33
`
`State v. Hanson,
`793 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. App.—Waco 1990, no pet.) .........................................37, 45, 46, 48, 51
`
`State v. Johnson,
`___ S.W.3d ___, No. PD-0228-14, 2015 WL 5853115 (Tex. Crim. App.
`October 7, 2015) ................................................................................................................18, 19
`
`vi
`
`

`
`
`
`State v. Pauling,
`69 P.3d 331 (Wash. 2003)........................................................................................................39
`
`State v. Robertson,
`649 P.2d 569 (Or. 1982) ..........................................................................................................38
`
`State v. Strong,
`272 P.3d 281 (Wash. App. 2012) .............................................................................................36
`
`State v. Weinstein,
`898 P.2d 513 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) ...................................................................................37, 38
`
`Tobias v. State,
`884 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994, pet. ref’d) ..................................30, 34, 42, 51
`
`U.S. ex rel. Holder v. Circuit Court of 17th Judicial Circuit,
`624 F. Supp. 68 (N.D. Ill. 1985) ........................................................................................36, 38
`
`United States v. Coss,
`677 F.3d 278 (6th Cir. 2012) ...................................................................................................36
`
`United States v. Jackson,
`180 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1999).................................................................................................37, 39
`
`United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc.,
`529 U.S. 803 (2000) ...........................................................................................................13, 33
`
`United States v. Stevens,
`559 U.S. 460 (2010) ...............................................................................................14, 20, 44, 45
`
`United States v. Velasquez,
`772 F.2d 1348 (7th Cir. 1985) .................................................................................................37
`
`United States v. Williams,
`553 U.S. 285 (2008) ...........................................................................................................14, 26
`
`Van Arsdel v. Tex. A&M Univ.,
`628 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1980) ...................................................................................................50
`
`Virginia v. Black,
`538 U.S. 343 (2003) .....................................................................................................13, 23, 36
`
`Virginia v. Hicks,
`539 U.S. 113 (2003) .................................................................................................................43
`
`Walker v. Tex. Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.,
`135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015) .............................................................................................................28
`
`vii
`
`

`
`
`
`Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party,
`552 U.S. 442 (2008) .................................................................................................................14
`
`Watts v. United States,
`394 U.S. 705 (1969) .....................................................................................................20, 23, 36
`
`Whimbush v. People,
`869 P.2d 1245 (Colo. 1994) .....................................................................................................38
`
`Willborn v. Deans,
`240 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1951, writ ref’d n.r.e.) ..........................................50
`
`Wood v. Georgia,
`370 U.S. 375 (1962) .................................................................................................................27
`
`Wurtz v. Risley,
`719 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1983) ...........................................................................................36, 38
`
`STATUTES
`
`Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(9)(F) ............................................................................................ passim
`
`Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(41) .......................................................................................................17
`
`Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(48) .....................................................................................21, 39, 43, 51
`
`Tex. Penal Code § 36.03(a)(1) ............................................................................................... passim
`
`Tex. Penal Code § 36.03(c) ............................................................................................................18
`
`Tex. Penal Code § 36.06(a) ............................................................................................... 39, 42, 52
`
`Tex. Penal Code § 42.07(a)(2) .......................................................................................................42
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`
`Tex. R. App. P. 47.7.......................................................................................................................22
`
`LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-32 (2d ed. 1988) ..........................14
`
`U.S. Const. amend. I ......................................................................................................................13
`
`
`
`viii
`
`

`
`
`
`TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS:
`
`COMES NOW Appellant, James Richard “Rick” Perry (Governor Perry),
`
`and pursuant to the Court’s Order of October 7, 2015, presents his brief on the
`
`merits addressing the State’s petition for review, and would respectfully show this
`
`Honorable Court the following:
`
`Statement of the Case
`
`In August 2014, a two-count indictment was returned against Governor
`
`Perry for violating Sections 36.03(a)(1), 1.07(a)(9)(F) (Count II, coercion of public
`
`servant), and 39.02(a)(2) (Count I, abuse of official capacity) of the Texas Penal
`
`Code by threatening to exercise, and then actually exercising, the authority to veto
`
`appropriations vested in the Governor by the Texas Constitution. CR4-5. Ten
`
`days after the indictment, Governor Perry filed an application for pretrial writ of
`
`habeas corpus contesting the legality of his restraint and seeking to bar his
`
`prosecution on both counts, primarily on constitutional grounds. CR11-70.
`
`After the district court denied relief, CR464-84, Perry appealed to the Third
`
`Court of Appeals, which ordered expedited briefing and denied the State’s request
`
`for oral argument. In a published opinion, that court held that all nine constitutional
`
`challenges to Count I and seven constitutional challenges to Count II were not
`
`cognizable because they were not “facial,” merely “as applied.” Slip Op. at 10-32.
`
`The court then granted relief on Count II because the statute was facially invalid
`
`1
`
`

`
`
`
`under the First Amendment. Id. at 32-97. The court thus found it unnecessary to
`
`address Perry’s cognizable, facial vagueness challenge to the statute. Id. at 97.
`
`Governor Perry filed his petition for discretionary review on August 18,
`
`2015, presenting four grounds challenging the decision that Count I was not
`
`cognizable on pretrial habeas. Two weeks later, the State Prosecuting Attorney
`
`filed her petition for discretionary review attacking the court of appeals’ decision
`
`that Count II was facially invalid under the First Amendment. On October 7, 2015,
`
`this Court granted both petitions, set an expedited briefing schedule, and ordered
`
`separate arguments on each petition.
`
`2
`
`

`
`
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`Grounds for Review
`
`Did the court of appeals incorrectly conflate the tests for First Amendment
`overbreadth and traditional First Amendment facial unconstitutionality?
`
`Applying the definition of “coercion” from Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(9)(F),
`does the Coercion of a Public Servant statute ban a substantial amount of
`constitutionally protected speech relative to its plainly legitimate sweep?
`
`3
`
`

`
`
`
`Statement of Facts
`
`Proceedings in the district court
`
`A.
`On August 15, 2014, a Travis County grand jury returned a two-count
`
`indictment against then-Governor James Richard “Rick” Perry alleging that
`
`Governor Perry broke the law by threatening to veto an item of appropriations and
`
`subsequently issuing a veto. CR4-5.1
`
`Count II, alleging that Governor Perry committed Coercion of a Public
`
`Servant under Sections 36.03(a)(1) and 1.07(a)(9)(F) of the Texas Penal Code,
`
`states:
`
`Beginning on or about June 10, 2013, and continuing through June 14,
`2013, in the County of Travis, Texas, by means of coercion, to wit:
`threatening to veto legislation that had been approved and authorized
`by the Legislature of the State of Texas to provide funding for the
`continued operation of the Public Integrity Unit of the Travis County
`District Attorney’s Office unless Travis County District Attorney
`Rosemary Lehmberg resigned from her official position as elected
`District Attorney, James Richard “Rick” Perry, intentionally or
`knowingly influenced or attempted to influence Rosemary Lehmberg,
`a public servant, namely, the elected District Attorney for Travis
`County, Texas, in the specific performance of her official duty, to wit:
`the duty to continue to carry out her responsibilities as the elected
`District Attorney for the county of Travis, Texas through the
`completion of her elected term of office, and the defendant and
`Rosemary Lehmberg were not members of the same governing body
`of a governmental entity, such offense having been committed by
`defendant, a public servant, while acting in such an official capacity
`
`1
`Count I, which is not implicated by either of the grounds for review in the State’s petition
`for discretionary review, alleges that Governor Perry committed Abuse of Official Capacity
`under Section 39.02(a) of the Texas Penal Code. CR4-5. The gist of this count is that Governor
`Perry “misused” government property by vetoing funding for the Travis County Public Integrity
`Unit (“PIU”). CR4-5.
`
`4
`
`

`
`
`
`as a public servant.
`
`CR5. The gist of this charge is that he attempted to “influence” Travis County
`
`District Attorney Rosemary Lehmberg by threatening to veto funding for the PIU.
`
`Id.2
`
`On August 19, 2014, Governor Perry was processed by the Travis County
`
`Sheriff and released on bond pending trial. CR8-10.
`
`On August 25, 2014, Governor Perry filed an Application for Pretrial Writ
`
`of Habeas Corpus (the “Application”). He challenged the legality of his restraint
`
`and specifically sought “to bar the prosecution” on both counts. CR11, 49. The
`
`Application presented eleven constitutional claims as to Count II, CR17-19.3
`
`The district court gave the State almost three months to respond, which it did
`
`on November 7, 2014. CR274. Governor Perry filed a reply on November 17,
`
`2014. CR391.
`
`Fourteen nationally-known constitutional scholars filed an amicus curiae
`
`brief in support of Governor Perry’s Application. CR367-90. The amici supported
`
`Governor Perry’s prayer for dismissal of Count II on the ground that the statutory
`
`provisions, read together, criminalize speech protected by the First Amendment
`
`
`2
`In April 2015, the State conceded that the threat of the veto was “not a true threat.” See
`April 27, 2015 Supplemental Clerk’s Record at 88. Furthermore, the district court has interpreted
`Count II as alleging a Class A misdemeanor offense, as opposed to a third degree felony as
`contended by the State. CR441.
`3
`These eleven claims are also set forth in the court of appeals opinion at 7-8.
`
`5
`
`

`
`
`
`and are facially invalid. CR384-89.
`
`On January 27, 2015, the district court denied the Application without a
`
`hearing. CR464-84. The court rejected Governor Perry’s facial challenges to
`
`Section 36.03(a)(1), as it incorporates the definition of “coercion” contained in
`
`Section 1.07(a)(9)(F).4 The district court, “in an abundance of precaution,” CR475,
`
`applied a strict scrutiny analysis because of the “presumption of invalidity”
`
`associated with a content based restriction on speech, citing Ex parte Lo, 424
`
`S.W.3d 10, 14-18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). CR475. Despite this heightened
`
`standard, the court held that the provisions were not facially unconstitutional under
`
`the First Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment. CR474-84.5
`
`Proceedings in the court of appeals
`
`B.
`Governor Perry timely appealed to the Third Court of Appeals. The
`
`constitutional scholars (with some additions) who had filed an amicus curiae brief
`
`in the district court renewed their support of Governor Perry’s prayer for dismissal
`
`of Count II. Amici urged the same two grounds as it had in the district court. On
`
`
`4
`These challenges were Governor Perry’s claims 1-4 as to Count II.
`5
`The court ruled that the remainder of Governor Perry’s constitutional challenges to both
`counts were not cognizable in a pretrial habeas proceeding because they supposedly raised
`merely as-applied, rather than facial, constitutional challenges. CR468-73. While the court
`acknowledged that these arguments were “compelling” and “may be relevant at a later time,” it
`declined to reach their merits on the mistaken belief that “the court’s hands are tied” under
`existing case law regarding cognizability. CR472-73. Furthermore, the district court held that
`Governor Perry’s one statutory challenge to Count II was not cognizable in a pretrial habeas
`proceeding, CR482, but the district court sustained this same statutory challenge in ruling on
`Governor Perry’s motion to quash. CR459-62 (sustaining challenge to Count II for failing to
`
`6
`
`

`
`
`
`July 24, 2015, the court of appeals issued an opinion and judgment.
`
`The court of appeals began its analysis by construing the challenged statutes,
`
`noting that “it is impossible to determine whether a statute reaches too far without
`
`first knowing what the statute covers.” Slip Op. at 39. The court’s extensive
`
`analysis, id. at 39-61, led it to conclude that Section 36.03(a)(1) was a far more
`
`expansive criminal prohibition on speech than the district court had believed. Id. at
`
`60. It also concluded that “it is this vast breadth that causes section 36.03(a)(1), as it
`
`incorporates paragraph (F), to impinge upon substantial amounts of First
`
`Amendment-protected speech among Texas’s public servants.” Id. at 60-61.
`
`Then, the court considered whether the speech prohibited by the statutory
`
`scheme was in fact protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 61 et seq. Applying
`
`recognized First Amendment case law, it concluded that the statutory scheme
`
`criminalized “core political speech,” which includes “speech by public servants
`
`regarding their official actions that is aimed at prompting other public servants to
`
`undertake official action.” Id. at 62. Because the First Amendment’s protections
`
`are at their “zenith” for such speech, id., the court rejected the State’s arguments
`
`that public servants like Governor Perry have either no First Amendment rights at
`
`all or limited rights that can be restricted by law. Id. at 63-71. The court also
`
`concluded that none of the historical exceptions to First Amendment protections,
`
`
`negate statutory exception and granting State leave to amend).
`
`7
`
`

`
`
`
`such as the exception for speech that is integral to criminal conduct, apply here.
`
`Id. at 71-85.6
`
`Next, the court addressed whether the statutory scheme’s “impingement” on
`
`First Amendment rights “can be justified.” Id. at 85. Because Section 36.03(a)(1)
`
`“targets speech having a specified content (communicated intent to inflict one of
`
`the six categories of harms enumerated in the ‘coercion’ definition) based on the
`
`communicative impact the threat has or is intended to have (bringing about certain
`
`specified conduct of a public servant),” the court concluded that it “must be
`
`classified as a ‘content-based’ speech prohibition—on its face.” Id. at 85-86. Thus,
`
`the State bore the burden to rebut the presumption of invalidity by showing that the
`
`statutory scheme satisfies the applicable “strict scrutiny” standard. Id. at 86.
`
`Accordingly, the State had to prove that the statutory scheme “[is]
`
`(1) necessary to serve (2) a compelling state interest and (3) [is] narrowly drawn
`
`(i.e., that it employ[s] the least restrictive means to achieve its goal and there [is] a
`
`close nexus between the government’s compelling interest and the restriction).”
`
`Id. Although the court “assum[ed] without deciding” that the State’s “asserted
`
`interests would rise to the level of ‘compelling,’“ it concluded that “section
`
`
`6
`The court concluded that “[t]hese kinds of threats are ‘speech incident to criminal
`conduct’ only if the basic workings of government are considered criminal conduct, a
`proposition we cannot sanction.” Slip Op. at 82. The court noted that the State’s attempt to
`characterize “these threats as ‘coercive’“ so as to “displace them from the First Amendment
`protections” ran afoul of Supreme Court precedent that “‘offensive’ and ‘coercive’ speech [is]
`nevertheless protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at 82 & n.269.
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`8
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`36.03(a)(1), as it incorporates paragraph (F)” is not “‘narrowly drawn’ to achieve
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`those objectives.” Id. at 87. The court reasoned that it “begins to strain even
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`rational-basis scrutiny to conclude that a statute that goes as far as to criminalize a
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`public servant’s threat merely to lawfully exercise his delegated powers as a
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`related consequence of another public servant’s failure or refusal to comply with a
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`lawful demand for action would protect ‘the integrity’ of government or prevent
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`‘interference’ with public servants’ performance of their delegated functions.” Id.
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`at 87-88. Indeed, “[i]f anything, the effect of the statutes in those circumstances
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`would be to undermine these interests by criminalizing much of the ordinary day-
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`to-day workings of government. And to the extent the unique circumstances of the
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`judicial process might justify the prosecution as it would apply in that context,” the
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`statutory “proscription extends far more broadly.” Id. at 88.
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`The court also concluded that Section 36.03(a)(1), as it incorporates
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`1.07(a)(9)(F), was not “necessary” to effectuate the State’s interests. Id. Noting
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`Governor Perry’s comparisons to this Court’s opinion in Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d
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`10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013), the court “agree[d] that while some applications of
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`section 36.03(a)(1) and paragraph (F) may be permissible or justified under the
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`First Amendment, Lo’s rationale would be an additional reason for invalidating the
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`statute as to other applications.” Id. at 88-89.
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`The court then addressed whether the “‘alarming’ breadth” of the statutory
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`9
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`scheme, “reaching even a public servant’s declared intention to take or withhold
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`action lawfully, aimed at bringing about another public servant’s lawful action that
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`the first public servant could lawfully demand or require,” id. at 88, could be saved
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`by any “reasonable narrowing construction.” Id. at 91. Finding a plausible
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`narrowing construction to be legally untenable, id. at 89-96, the court held that
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`“section 36.03(a)(1), as it incorporates paragraph (F) of the Penal Code’s
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`‘coercion’ definition, is facially invalid under the First Amendment and is thus
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`unenforceable.” Id. at 97. And “[b]ecause this holding entitles Perry to habeas
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`relief with respect to Court II of the indictment,” the court decided that it “need not
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`address his remaining arguments.” Id.
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`Summary of the Argument
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`The court of appeals correctly analyzed and decided Governor Perry’s First
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`Amendment challenges to Section 36.03(a)(1), as it incorporates the definition of
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`“coercion” in Section 1.07(a)(9)(F): a “threat, however