FILED
`DALLAS COUNTY
`1/3/2020 4:44 PM
`FELICIA PITRE
`DISTRICT CLERK
`
`CAUSE NO. DC-19-08429
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`Treva Parker-Ayodele
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`KIRK LAUNIUS,
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`IN THE DISTRICT COURT
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`Contestant,
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`V.
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`DIANA FLORES, IN HER OFFICIAL
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`CAPACITY AS PRESIDING OFFICER,
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`CHAIR OF TRUSTEES, OF DALLAS
`COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE
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`DISTRICT,
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`Contestee.
`
`womcmcmcmcmwoomcmcmcmwo
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`OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
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`298TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
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`CONTESTEE’S RESPONSE TO CONTESTANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION BY NON-
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`PARTY ELECTION SYSTEMS & SOFTWARE LLC
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`TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF THE COURT:
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`Contestee, Diana Flores, in her official capacity as Chair of the Board of Trustees of the
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`Dallas County Community College District (“DCCCD”), files this Response to Contestant’s
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`Motion to Compel Production by Non-Party Election Systems & Software, LLC, and in support
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`would respectfully Show this Court the following:
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`I.
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`Summary of Response
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`In early May 2019, Dallas County voters overwhelmingly approved DCCCD’s $1.1 billion
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`bond measure by over 71% of the vote out of more than 120,000 votes cast (a greater-than 50,000
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`vote margin). On June 13, 2019, Contestant Kirk Launius filed this election contest arguing that
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`the vote should be invalidated because of alleged potential anomalies in the voting results that to
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`this day have not been proven to be true. Voting was administered by the Dallas County Elections
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`Department utilizing an electronic voting system purchased from and supported by Election
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`Systems & Software, LLC (“ES&S”), the non—party subject to Contestant’s subpoena and this
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`motion.
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`CONTESTEE’S RESPONSE TO CONTESTANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION BY ES&S
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`DCCCD’S opposition to Contestant’s motion to compel ES&S (the “‘Motion”) is two—fold.
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`First, Contestant has failed to demonstrate how the information sought is actually relevant as is
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`required under Rule 192.3. Contestant’s case can essentially be summarized as follows: (I)
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`volunteer poll watchers allegedly saw what they believed were multiple procedural and technical
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`errors in the tabulation of votes in the Dallas County Central Counting Station; (2) Dr. Laura
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`Pressley, Contestant’s alleged expert, says alleged potential discrepancies in the voting data and
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`audit
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`logs suggest votes were miscounted. Although Contestant makes no argument as to
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`relevance, presumably his position is that assuming (1) and (2) are true, then the DCCCD bond
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`election results must have been hacked and evidence of such a hacking can be found in the
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`materials and information sought by Contestant through this Motion. However, Contestant’s
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`efforts to compel ES&S put the cart before the horse because the real issues in this case are whether
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`any of the alleged anomalies witnessed by the poll watchers are in fact proof that illegal votes were
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`counted or legal votes were not counted or whether Dr. Pressley’s biased and self—serving opinions
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`regarding potential discrepancies are in fact correct.
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`Second, and as DCCCD explained in its November 27, 2019, Motion for Protection
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`regarding Contestant’s subpoena to ES&S, Contestant is asking for the Court to compel production
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`of highly confidential and sensitive electronic election materials and information but has failed to
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`provide a means for maintaining the security and integrity of the materials and information such
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`that the evidence is not spoliated and remains reliable and uncompromised. For these reasons, the
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`Court should deny Contestant’s Motion.
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`[1.
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`Applicable Law.
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`In general, a party may only obtain discovery regarding non—privileged and relevant
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`matters. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3. Under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 176.6 and 192.6, a party
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`affected by a subpoena to a person commanded to appear at a deposition, or to produce documents,
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`CONTESTEE’S RESPONSE TO CONTESTANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION BY ES&S
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`may serve objections or move for an order protecting that person from the discovery sought within
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`the time period permitted for response to the discovery request. TEX. R. CIV. P. 176.6, 192.6(a).
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`Rule 192.6(b) authorizes courts to enter an order “[t]o protect the movant from undue burden,
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`unnecessary expense, harassment, annoyance, or invasion of personal, constitutional, or property
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`rights.” Under this rule, courts may order that the discovery (1) not be sought in whole or in part;
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`(2) be limited by extent or subject matter; (3) not be undertaken at the time or place specified; (4)
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`be taken only by the method or terms and conditions or time and place directed by the court; or (5)
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`be sealed or otherwise protected subject to Rule 76a. Through a protective order, a court may limit
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`or prevent discovery even regarding otherwise-relevant matters in appropriate circumstances. See
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`Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. 1990) (“Thus the trial court has discretion
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`to narrow the scope of discovery on a case by case basis with a protective order.”); see also Eurecat
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`US, Inc. v. Marklund, 527 S.W.3d 367, 378 (Tex. Appiflouston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.)
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`(finding authority in TEX. R. CrV. P. 192.4, 192.6 for trial courts to limit or prevent discovery
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`regarding otherwise-relevant matters in appropriate circumstances).
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`In assessing whether a
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`protective order is appropriate, a trial court balances the parties’ competing interests. Eurecat US,
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`527 S.W.3d at 379. Because DCCCD has already filed a Motion for Protection regarding the
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`subpoena that is the subject of Contestant’s Motion, DCCCD not only opposes the Motion on the
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`grounds stated in this Response, but also through the argument previously raised in its Motion for
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`Protection.
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`III.
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`Contestant’s Motion Fails to Show How the Information Sought Is Relevant
`to the Question of Whether There Are in Fact Actual Discrepancies in the
`Voting Data.
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`Contestant spends fifteen of its twenty-three-page Motion explaining election code
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`provisions and summarizing the allegations in his First Amended Petition. Notably absent from
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`the Motion, however,
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`is any argument whatsoever regarding the purported relevance of the
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`CONTESTEE’S RESPONSE TO CONTESTANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION BY ES&S
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`information sought from ES&S except for a perfunctory statement that the requests in the subpoena
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`were crafted to seek “only information relevant to the subject matter of this suit,” and a single
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`argument regarding the specific relevance of the “list of software versions and respective release
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`notes for [ERM] Software supplied to Dallas County from 1999 through the present.” Motion at
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`16, 18.1 On the contrary, Contestant makes no effort to explain the relevance of any of the other
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`information or material it seeks to compel from ES&S. This is because the information and
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`materials sought are not relevant to the real issue in the case of whether the potential discrepancies
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`in the voting data described by Dr. Pressley reflect actual vote counting errors.
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`A.
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`There is reason to question the validity of Dr. Pressley’s opinions regarding
`potential discrepancies in the voting data.
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`As an initial matter, there is reason to question Dr. Pressley’s opinions that there are
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`discrepancies in the voting data that might call the legitimacy of the vote into question. Dr. Pressley
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`is not a qualified, unbiased, or independent elections expert retained by Contestant to assist with
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`his case. Rather, Dr. Pressley appears to have orchestrated the filing of this lawsuit and the efforts
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`of Contestant and the other poll watchers to benefit her own personal interests. Dr. Pressley’s
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`education and work history is in the field of Chemistry and semiconductors, not elections.2 It was
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`not until 2014, when she ran for a city council position in Austin and lost that she appears to have
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`become interested in election security issues. And it was not until 2018 that she founded her
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`company True Texas Elections, LLC, and self-identified as a “[c]omputer systems and statistical
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`data mining technology consultant for electronic voting election security.”3 Based on her CV, it
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`1 The Motion itself does not contain page numbers, so the page number references here are to the page numbers in the
`.pdf file for each associated page.
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`2 See Curriculum Vitae of Dr. Laura Pressley included in the Declaration of Laura Pressley in Lieu of Affidavit
`attached hereto as Exhibit A.
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`3 Id. ; see also Billion Dollar Dallas Community College Bond Election Contested in Court, THE TEXAN, July 30, 2019
`at http_s://thetexan.news/billion-dollar-dallas-community-college-bond-election-contested-in-court/ (last visited Dec.
`30, 2019) (“The organization behind the data in the lawsuit is True Texas Elections, LLC, headed by Dr. Laura
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`CONTESTEE’S RESPONSE TO CONTESTANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION BY ES&S
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`appears that this is the first time Dr. Pressley has served as a purported expert witness in an
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`elections contest. According to her CV, her only other experience in election litigation has been as
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`a party in two lawsuits: (1) her election contest challenging her Austin city council loss, and (2)
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`her effort to force Harris County to release election records.4 Significantly, Dr. Pressley’s case
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`involving her own failed Austin city council election was dismissed by the trial court on summary
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`judgment with an award of sanctions against Dr. Pressley for her frivolous filing, although the
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`Supreme Court later reversed the award of sanctions while denying her petition as moot.
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`As to the election at issue, Dr. Pressley is the proverbial puppet-master who set out to
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`challenge the DCCCD bond election results before the election was even held. Weeks before the
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`election, she coordinated the formation of Specific Purpose Political Action Committees (“PAC”),
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`whose stated specific purpose was to oppose the DCCCD bond measure. Dr. Pressley’s PACs were
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`necessary to allow the appointment of poll watchers who would go out for herisince she is not a
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`Dallas County voter and was therefore ineligible to serve as a poll watcher in this election—to
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`observe the activities in the Central Counting Station and look for evidence to justify the filing of
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`this lawsuit and her retention as an expert. For example, Contestant Kirk Launius was appointed
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`to serve as a poll watcher in this election by the “Keep Texas in the Black Political Action
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`Committee.”5 According to documents produced (but not bates labelled) by Contestant, the Keep
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`the Texas in the Black PAC was formed by Dr. Pressley for the express purpose of opposing the
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`DCCCD bond measure and appointing poll watchers to gather evidence to support this lawsuit.6
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`Pressley. Pressley ran against current Austin City Councilman Gregorio Casar in 2014 and lost. She then filed a
`complaint alleging vote tampering during that election”).
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`4 See Exhibit A.
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`5 Launius 6, included within Exhibit B hereto, which is a compilation of documents produced by Contestant in this
`case under the “Launius” bates label.
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`6 See non-bates-labelled documents attached hereto as Exhibit C reflecting Dr. Pressley organizing the Keep Texas in
`the Black PAC, whose stated purpose was to oppose the DCCCD bond measure. See also the April 23, 2019 email
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`Dr. Pressley further coordinated training meetings for the purpose of training individuals to be
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`appointed as poll watchers by her PACs.7 Dr. Pressley further provided affidavit forms to the poll
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`watchers she had appointed and coordinated the preparation of the affidavits attached to the First
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`Amended Petition and submitted in support of this lawsuit.8 She also appears to have assisted in
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`drafting lawsuit itself9 as well as press releases promoting the lawsuit and her involvement
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`therewith. 10 In short, Dr. Pressley is the architect behind this case and has a personal interest in its
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`success, and as a result, there is good reason to question whether her analysis has merit.
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`B.
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`the
`Even assuming Dr. Pressley’s analysis should be taken seriously,
`information and materials sought from ES&S are irrelevant to determining
`whether her analysis is in fact correct, and Dr. Pressley knows this.
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`Based on Dr. Pressley’s as-yet unverified and potentially biased analysis, Contestant now
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`seeks to compel ES&S, the non-party vendor providing certified election systems and support to
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`Dallas County and dozens of other Texas counties, to produce the proprietary source code to its
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`election systems and software, computer logs, phone records,
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`laptops, and other sensitive
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`electronic media and information for inspection by his other purported expert, Harri Hursti. Mr.
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`Hursti is a self—described “hacker,”11 who Contestant would have this Court believe will evaluate
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`
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`from Dr. Pressley to Paul Zimmermann asking him if he is “still willing to be my Treasurer ofmy [Keep Texas in the
`Black] PAC?”
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`7 See, e. g., KB 758 attached hereto as Exhibit D (April 5, 2019 email from Dr. Pressley to Wesley Bowen—a poll
`watcher appointed by Dr. Pressley Whose affidavit is an exhibit to the First Amended Petition—advising him that she
`is “training for watcher [sic] in Central Counting for the May elections. We had discussed you might have some IT
`professionals that might be interested. Kristen Bickham will be training for Dallas in the next few weeks or so. We’d
`love to have you at Central Counting if you are up for it”).
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`8 See, e.g., “affidavits” email (Launius v. Flores_RFP Answers 1, 2, 3, 4 Page 30 of 93) attached hereto as Exhibit E
`(June 6, 2019 email from Contestant to Dr. Pressley forwarding discussion between Wesley Bowen, Mike Slaton
`(another poll watcher), Contestant, and Kristen Bickham (another poll watcher) about how it was “time to finish
`affidavits” and how “[Dr. Pressley]’s asking that we get her our affidavits no later than 6/9/19 (a Sunday)”).
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`9 Ex. B at Launius 87 (April 28, 2019 email from Dr. Pressley to Contestant asking for his unique voter ID and address
`because she is “working on the filing”).
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`10 True Texas Elections, LLC Press Release, July 1 l, 2019, at https://www.pmewswire.com/news-releases/results-of—
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`dallas-countys- l - l -billion-bond-election-is-under-intensc—scrutiny-according-lo-court-documents-3008832l 5 .html
`(last visited Dec. 30, 2019).
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`” Motion at page 45 of the 45-page document.
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`the information and materials produced by ES&S for the purpose of determining whether the
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`alleged discrepancies raised by Dr. Pressley are the result of malicious hacking of the election.
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`Contestant should not, however, be allowed to go on a fishing expedition through ES&S’s
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`confidential and proprietary information without proof that the alleged discrepancies outlined by
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`Dr. Pressley are in fact correct.
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`Dr. Pressley is well aware of this. After filing this lawsuit, Dr. Pressley set about to find an
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`“electronic voting security expert” who could “do reverse engineering, examining ES&S source
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`code
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`to determine if the true will of the voters can be determined.”12 She contacted Dr. Dan
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`Wallach, a professor of Computer Science at Rice University and legitimate election security
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`expert,13 to gauge his interest in performing such an analysis. Dr. Wallach’s response, however,
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`after reviewing Contestant’s Petition,
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`including Dr. Pressley’s analysis and the supporting
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`affidavits and exhibits, was as follows:
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`Basically, your allegation is that a wide variety of procedural errors occurred, and
`as a result, the election results are invalid. To really get a handle on this, you’re
`going to need to basically retabulate [recount] the election, which means doing all
`the work that’s normally done on election night and in the canvass period afterward,
`and that’s if you get a suitable order from the judge to do it. If you request that and
`you succeed, then you don’t need the kind of work that I can do (e.g., analyze
`software or do forensic analysis of the computer servers). If you fail to gain a
`judicial order for a recount, then you ’re not going to be able to get onefor a more
`technical analysis. ‘4
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`Dr. Wallach’s opinion could not have been clearer: Contestant needs to request a recount and does
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`not need and should have great difficulty compelling the types of information and materials it now
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`seeks from ES&S.
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`‘2 See Ex. B at Launius 188, 190.
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`13 Dr. Wallach’s biography is available at https://www.cs.rice.edu/~dwallach/. According to his official biography, he
`has testified before the Texas Senate Special Committee on Election Security, he has testified before the United States
`Congressional Space, Science & Technology Committee on Voting Security, and has been involved in several voting
`system risk-assessments sponsored by the California Secretary of State
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`14 Ex. B at Launius 222.
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`For reasons unknown, Dr. Pressley and Contestant did not heed Dr. Wallach’s expert
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`advice and request a recount. Most likely, their failure to do so was because the deadline to petition
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`for a recount had long-since passed by the time they received Dr. Wallach’s advice (July 3,
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`2019).15 Thus, without the ability to petition a recount, Dr. Pressley and Contestant had no choice
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`but to proceed with this lawsuit. Regardless, as Dr. Wallach no doubt understood, the information
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`and materials Contestant seeks from ES&S are not relevant to the specific allegations of
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`discrepancies raised by Dr. Pressley. Paragraphs 16 and 23 of the First Amended Petition reference
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`two tables containing Dr. Pressley’s alleged analysis of potential discrepancies in early and
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`election day voting data. These same tables (referred to as Table 1 and Table 2) are included in the
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`Declaration of Laura Pressley in Lieu of Affidavit containing Dr. Pressley’s opinions in this matter
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`attached hereto as Exhibit A. With respect to her alleged analysis of the early voting data and
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`election day voting data, Dr. Pressley lists a number ofpotential discrepancies that generally fall
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`into four categories: (1) potential differences between the number of voters on early voter “rolls”
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`and “rosters”; (2) audit log error messages potentially reflecting miscounted or missing votes; (3)
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`potential differences between the numbers of voters registered on the audit logs and the number of
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`voters reported as voting on Dallas County’s voter rolls; and (4) technological issues potentially
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`requiring reformatting or reprogramming of flash cards.
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`None of the information Contestant seeks from ES&S is necessary to determine whether
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`these categories of potential discrepancies in fact demonstrate that actual discrepancies exist in
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`the voting data and results. There is nothing in the source code for the election system software
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`(RFP 1), lists of software versions and release notes (RFP 2), the laptop for Nicholas Mevellec16
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`15 See TEX. ELEC. CODE § 212.028 (establishing a deadline offive days following election day or two days following
`the completion of canvassing by the canvassing authority to petition for a recount).
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`16 Nicholas Mevellec is an ES&S employee who provides support services to Dallas County Elections Officials with
`respect to operation of the election voting equipment and software.
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`(RFP 3), Mevellec’s communications related to the election (RFP 4), Steve Pearson’sl7
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`communications related to the election (RFP 5), Pearson’s call logs (RFP 6), Mevellec’s call logs
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`(RFP 7), Mevellec’s handwritten notes related to the election (RFP 9), logs of hot spot devices
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`used by Mevellec (RFP 10), Windows logs of Mevellec’s laptop (RFP 11), internal Omni Prof
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`Drive logs (RFP 12), or any electronic media drives used by Mevellec in the contested election
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`(RFP 13), that will shed any light on whether there are actual differences between the number of
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`voters on rolls and rosters or whether the audit log error messages actually reflect miscounted or
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`missing votes. The only information Contestant seeks that is arguably relevant or helpful to
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`resolving the potential discrepancies raised by Dr. Pressley are the current ES&S manuals (RFPs
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`8 and 14), which may shed light on what the audit log error messages mean and how they were to
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`be resolved or addressed by election officials. Beyond this, however, the Court should deny
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`Contestant’s Motion because the information and materials it seeks is irrelevant to this lawsuit.
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`IV.
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`Production and Inspection of the Election Data and Equipment Requested
`Will Be Expensive, Time Consuming, and Could Compromise the Very
`Evidence Contestant Contends Is Necessary for the Court to Determine the
`Outcome of this Case.
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`The subpoena to ES&S calls for the production of confidential and sensitive elections code,
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`equipment, and software. DCCCD has grave concerns that by requiring ES&S to produce the
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`sensitive elections code, equipment, and software to Contestant for review by Contestant and his
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`experts, Contestant and his experts may (even if unintentionally) jeopardize, undermine, or
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`compromise the integrity of such code, equipment, and software and render them unreliable and
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`unusable in any trial in this case.
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`For example, Contestant seeks to compel ES&S to produce for expert inspection, inter alia:
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`17 Steve Pearson is ES&S’s Senior Vice President of Certification.
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`o
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`0
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`the Election Reporting Manager (ERM) Software Source Code for all accumulator
`computers used in the contested election;
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`the laptop used by Nicolas Mevellec, an ES&S employee, in the Dallas County
`Central Counting Station; and
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`o All the flash drives/flash cards/USB drives used by Nicolas Mevellec in the election
`at issue in this case.
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`Based on Contestant’s recent disclosure of “security researcher and hacker” Harri Hursti
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`as a testifying expert and the emails previously referenced between Dr. Pressley and Dr. Wallach,
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`it would appear that Contestant intends to have Mr. Hursti obtain access to the code, equipment,
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`and software to purportedly “reverse-engineer” them and determine whether there is electronic
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`evidence of tampering that would undermine the election results. To allow Contestant’s purported
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`expert to unilaterally examine and “hack” this code, equipment, and software runs the risk of
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`compromising the very evidence Contestant contends the Court might rely on in determining the
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`outcome of this lawsuit. Moreover, even if unintentional, unfettered and unilateral access to these
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`items by Contestant’s purported expert may render any attempts by DCCCD to have its own
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`experts examine the same items useless. As such, DCCCD is materially affected by the subpoena.
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`The situation at issue is similar to situations arising in patent litigation where a plaintiff’ 5
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`expert is hired to review and analyze a defendant’s technology for the purpose of providing an
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`opinion as to whether infringement has occurred. In those types of cases, courts balance the
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`plaintiff’ s alleged need to have access to the confidential technology “to enable plaintiff to conduct
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`a proper infringement analysis
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`against the [defendant’s] claim that grant of such access would
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`harm [its] business interests
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`.” See Hitkansut LLC v. United States, 111 Fed. Cl. 228, 239 (Fed.
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`Cl. May 28, 2013) (finding that terms of a protective order would not allow access by plaintiff’ 5
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`expert to proprietary technical information belonging to government’s contractor). The Texas
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`Supreme Court has likewise held that it can be an abuse of discretion to allow expert access to
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`sensitive electronic data where the party seeking access fails “to demonstrate the particular
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`characteristics of the electronic storage devices involved, the familiarity of its experts with those
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`characteristics, or a reasonably likelihood that the proposed search methodology would yield the
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`information sought
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`.” In re Weekly Homes, L.P., 295 S.W.3d 309, 317 (Tex. 2009). Here,
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`Contestant has made no showing at this stage that he or his expert are familiar with the
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`characteristics of the election code, equipment, or software sought, nor whether their “reverse-
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`engineering” methodology will yield the information sought and not compromise the very code,
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`equipment, or software they seek to inspect.
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`The potential for compromising the election equipment and data utilized to capture the will
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`of the voters in the election at issue seems even more consequential than the business interests
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`courts strive to protect in civil
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`litigation. Moreover, Texas courts have previously protected
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`sensitive election equipment and data from production in Dr. Pressley’s own litigation challenging
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`her failed candidacy for Austin city council. See Pressley v. Casar, 567 S.W.3d 28, 38739 (Tex.
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`App—Austin 2016, pet. granted, reversed as to award of sanctions, dismissed in part on mootness
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`grounds, Pressley v. Casar, 567 S.W.3d 327 (Tex. 2019)) (holding that plaintiff failed to preserve
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`error on question of trial court’s failure to compel production of “various pieces of [election
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`systems] equipment” for examination to determine if they were functioning properly).
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`For these reasons, DCCCD respectfully requests that the Court prevent production of any
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`and all election code, equipment, or software to Contestant and his experts without first (1)
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`establishing a protocol agreed to by all parties and their experts for evaluation of such code,
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`equipment, and software to include secure access to the code, equipment, and software and
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`assurances that the evaluation will not compromise the evidence or any other party’s ability to
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`independently evaluate the same evidence; (2) determining whether Contestant’s experts are
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`indeed qualified to perform the kind of analysis they purport to need; and (3) understanding how
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`such access may compromise the equipment and data and jeopardize its reliability for use in the
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`case going forward. It is DCCCD’s understanding that assuring the evidence will not be tampered
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`with or inadvertently destroyed or altered will be an expensive and time consuming endeavor,
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`likely requiring the involvement of a third-party digital forensics firm that can host the code,
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`equipment, and software, ensure it is secure and only accessed by those approved by the Court and
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`the parties, and provide the necessary backups to verify that the evidence is not altered in any way.
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`Moreover, Contestant should bear the costs associated with any such endeavor. See TEX. ELEC.
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`CODE § 233.003(c) (“The costs of an election contest may not be assessed against a contestee
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`specified by this section or against the governmental or political entity the contestee represents”).
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`WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Contestee, Diana Flores, in her official
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`capacity as Chair of the Board of Trustees of the Dallas County Community College District, prays
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`that the Court deny Contestant’s Motion, and award DCCCD any and all other relief to which it
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`may be entitled.
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`
`/s/
`Adam Rothey
`CARLOS G. LOPEZ
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`clopez@thompsonhorton.com
`State Bar NO. 12562953
`
`K. ADAM ROTHEY
`
`arothey@thompsonhorton.com
`State Bar No. 24051274
`
`ASHLEY L. WHITE
`
`awhite@thompsonhorton.com
`State Bar No. 24079647
`
`THOMPSON & HORTON LLP
`
`500 North Akard Street, Suite 3150
`
`Dallas, Texas 75201
`
`(972) 853-5115 — Telephone
`(972) 692-8334 7 Facsimile
`
`Attorneysfor Contestee, Diana Flores, in her
`Ofiicial Capacity as Chair ofBoard of Trustees of
`Dallas County Community College District
`
`CONTESTEE’S RESPONSE TO CONTESTANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION BY ES&S
`
`PAGE 12
`
`

`

`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of this document has been
`served upon the following Via eFile Texas and/or email on this 3rd day of January 2020.
`
`Jose Luzarraga
`Frank G. Dobrovolny
`Butler Snow, LLP
`The Dobrovolny Law Firm, PC.
`5430 Lyndon B. Johnson Frwy, Suite 1200
`217 South Ragsdale
`Jacksonville, Texas 75766
`Dallas, Texas 75240
`
`DobrovolnyLaWFirm@gmail.com
`jose.luzanaga@butlersnow.com
`
`J erad N ajvar
`Najvar Law Firrn, PLLC
`2180 N. Loop W., Ste. 255
`Houston, Texas 77018
`
`jerad@najvarlaw.com
`
`Counselfor Contestant
`
`Counselfor ES&S
`
`/s/ Adam Rothey
`K. Adam Rothey
`
`CONTESTEE’S RESPONSE TO CONTESTANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION BY ES&S
`
`PAGE 13
`
`

`

`Exhibit A
`
`

`

`The State of Texas
`
`County of Travis
`
`WWW)
`
`DECLARATION OF LAURA PRESSLEY IN LIEU OF AFFIDAVIT
`
`My name is Dr. Laura Pressley, Ph.D,
`
`I am expert witness retained by the
`
`Contestant in case number DC-19-08429. I do declare under penalty of perjury that
`
`the attached document titled "Mental Impressions" is a true and correct summary of
`
`my expert witness opinion.
`
`Executed this 9th day of October, 2019.
`
`3%,
`
`Laura Pressley, Ph.D,
`
`Founder and Managing Member
`
`True Texas Elections, LLC
`
`

`

`Mental Impressions
`
`Election Data and Audit Log Analysis in Launius V. Flores
`
`May 2019 Dallas County Community College District Bond Election Contest
`
`Laura Pressley, Ph.D., Expert Witness
`Laura-Pressle_
`
`These are my mental impressions of the election data audit analysis in the 2019
`
`Dallas County Community College District Bond election that occurred on May 4,
`2019.
`
`1. A summary of election data sets that I reviewed in the Dallas County precinct by
`
`precinct election data audit analysis are as follows:
`
`0 Dallas County Elections May 20 19 Vote Canvass Report
`
`0 Dallas County Elections May 2019 Central Accumulator Audit Logs
`
`0 Dallas County Elections May 2019 Early Voting Daily Report/Roster from
`
`polling locations for Early Voting in Person for April 22 — April 30, 2019
`
`0 Dallas County Elections May 2019 Precinct
`
`level Early Voter rolls
`
`(retrieved from Dallas County Elections website on 5/5/2019)
`
`0 Dallas County Elections May 2019 Precinct
`
`level Early Voter
`
`rolls
`
`(retrieved from Dallas County Elections website on 6/10/2019)
`
`0 Dallas County May 2019 Precinct level Election Day rolls
`
`2. A summary of the additional information that I reviewed in the Dallas County
`Bond Election are as follows:
`
`0 Affidavit of Kristen Bickham
`
`o Affidavit of Sammy Bickham, Jr.
`0 Affidavit of Wes Bowen
`
`0 Affidavit of Mike Slaton
`
`o Affidavit of Kirk Launius
`
`o ES&S Election Reporting Manager Systems Operations Procedures
`
`Versions Release 7.5.7.0, September 3, 2010
`
`3. Early Voting Impressions — Early Voting Precinct by precinct vote results
`
`reported by Dallas County in the May 2019 Vote Canvass Report, and the
`
`votes/ballots cast by voters during Early Voting as documented by the County in
`
`other official election record reports, are mathematically inconsistent and show very
`
`large discrepancies on the order of thousands to tens of thousands of votes.
`
`See Table 1 below for an election audit analysis summary of the May 2019 Dallas
`
`

`

`Community College Bond Election Early Voting — analyzed precinct by precinct.
`
`- Column 1 contains the election data sets that were used in the precinct by
`
`precinct election data audit analysis and the details of the values audited.
`
`0 Column 2 contains the number of votes that are discrepant between the data
`sets.
`
`0 Column 3 contains the potential impact on the Early Voting results for each
`line item.
`
`Table 1. Early Voting Data Set Audit Analysis
`
`Dal" Community Colaga District Bond Election
`Ballot Dhcropancy Details
`
`Early Voting
`Ballot Counting
`Discrepancies
`and luuaa
`
`Potential Impact
`on EV Vote Results
`
`Ev voter rolls retrelved on 5/5/ 19 (68,989) show significantly less voters (and
`ballots cast) than those reported on the EV Roster on 4/30/ 19 (74,430)
`
`EV voter rolls retreived on 6/6/19 (71,343) are significantly less than those
`reported on the EV Roster on 4/30/19 (74,430)
`
`EV voter rolls retrelved on 6/19! 19 (11343) were modified from the original EV
`rolls retreived on 5/5/19 168,989) and showed more early voting voters and
`ballots cast
`
`7 lvotronlc Early Voting memory cards from Friendship, Cedar Hill, Lancaster Lib.,
`Lockwood Ubrary, Reverchon Rec. Center, Richland College polling locations had
`tabulation errors at Central Counting
`
`6 lvotronic Early Voting memory card doMoads and tabulations are missing from
`Audit toss from-EV polling locations of Bethany, Disciple, Hlshflnd Hills, Oak Cliff
`5. and Ridtlend College
`
`131 EV Precincts - EV Ballots registered on the Audit Loss exceed the number of
`EV voters reported as voting on the county's voter rolls on 5/5/19 {discrepancy of
`1 or more ballots)
`
`11 EV Precincts - EV Ballots registered on the Audit Logs exc