FILED
`3/28/2024 4:05 PM
`JOHN F. WARREN
`COUNTY CLERK
`DALLAS COUNTY
`
`CAUSE NO. CC-23-00854-C
`
`
`ANALI DELACRUZ, PEDRO
`HERRERA, and ALEIDA
`RODRIGUEZ
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`Plaintiffs,
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`V.
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`CARRY-ON FREIGHT SERVICES,
`LLC, VERNICE TRUCKING, LLC,
`YOSIEL MARRERO, AND DIRECT
`CONNECT LOGISTIX, INC.
`
`Defendants.
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`§
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`IN THE COUNTY COURT
`
`AT LAW NO. 3
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`DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
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`PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT’S DIRECT CONNECT LOGISTIC, INC’S
`MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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`Plaintiffs Anali Delacruz, Pedro Herrera, and Aleida Rodriguez (collectively,
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`
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`“Plaintiffs”) file their response to Direct Connect Logistix, Inc.’s (“DCL”) motion for summary
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`judgment. For the reasons laid out below, DCL’s motion should be denied. Accordingly,
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`Plaintiffs will show the Court as follows:
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`INTRODUCTION
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`
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`On or about July 18, 2020, Defendant Yosiel Marrero (“Marrero”) was operating a
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`tractor-trailer on I-45 in Dallas, Texas. Marrero was operating the tractor-trailer within the
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`course and scope of his employment with Defendants Carry-On Freight Services, LLC (“Carry-
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`On”) and Vernice Trucking, LLC (“Vernice”). Marrero crashed into Plaintiffs vehicle. As a
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`result, Plaintiffs suffered multiple serious injuries. DCL brokered the shipment Marrero was
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`hauling at the time of the incident.
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`1
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`DCL argues that the negligence claims against it are completely preempted under the
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`Federal Aviation Authorization Act (“FAAAA”), 49 U.S.C. § 14501. DCL’s motion fails for
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`several reasons. To start, DCL’s argument that all tort claims against freight brokers are
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`preempted is wrong. DCL’s argument largely hinges on two cases: Chatelaine, Inc. v. Twin
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`Modal, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 2d 638 (N.D. Tex. 2010) and Gillum v. High Standard, LLC, No. SA-
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`19-CV-1378-XR, 2020 WL 444371 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2020). Notably, DCL egregiously fails
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`to discuss, let alone mention, that multiple courts have rejected the holdings in Chatelaine and
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`Gillum. Instead, DCL opted to present its argument without properly notifying the Court that
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`these cases have been criticized and disavowed in multiple jurisdictions, including the Northern
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`District of Texas. As will be shown in greater detail below, the Gillum decision is premised on a
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`misreading of the applicable caselaw. Similarly, the Chatelaine decision relies on a
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`misunderstanding of the applicable case law. Further, the Chatelaine decision is completely
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`distinguishable from this dispute. As a result, the Gillum and Chatelaine decisions have no
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`precedential value here.
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`Alternatively, to the extent that this Court finds that the FAAAA’s preemption provision
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`applies, Plaintiffs’ negligence claims fall under the FAAAA’s preemption exception. As a result,
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`the negligence claims against DCL are permissible under this exception.
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`DCL’s argument is incorrect. The FAAAA is a statute designed to limit state economic
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`regulation and not to restrict the preexisting and traditional state police power over “safety
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`regulations,” including ones that govern motor carriers of property. City of Columbus v. Ours
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`Garage and Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 439 (2002). Nothing in the FAAAA’s
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`legislative history suggests that Congress sought to immunize freight brokers from common law
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`negligence actions in the personal injury context.
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`DCL’s suggested outcome would lead to grotesque results and would effectively bar any
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`all negligence against freight brokers under any circumstances. In fact, any state action that
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`vaguely or tangentially relates to any aspect of broker services would be effectively barred. This
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`result goes far beyond what Congress intended and would leave thousands of plaintiffs without
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`any recourse to pursue legitimate negligence claims against freight brokers. Without a doubt, if
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`Congress intended to fully immunize brokers from all lawsuits it would have stated as much
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`when the FAAAA was passed. As noted by Judge Simon in Wardingley v. Ecovyst Catalyst
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`Techs., LLC, 639 F. Supp. 3d 803, 810 (N.D. Ind. 2022):
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`“Simply put, I remain dubious that Congress, in its mission to
`unencumber the interstate trucking industry from a patchwork of
`state tariffs, price controls, and similar economic regulations, also
`aimed to completely unyoke trucking companies and freight
`brokers from commonsense standards of care enforced through
`private tort actions. […] It goes without saying that the law of
`negligence is not specific to the trucking industry.”
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`Texas’ common-law duty of ordinary care does not mention, let alone target, freight
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`
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`broker’s prices, routes, or services. Rather, tort law applies across industries and walks of life.
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`Where the law of negligence applies, compliance is simple —just act reasonably. See id.
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`STANDARD
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`When a defendant submits a traditional summary judgment motion, the defendant has the
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`burden to show there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
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`as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). A defendant is entitled to summary judgment if it
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`conclusively negates at least one element of the plaintiff's claim. Painter v. Amerimex Drilling I,
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`Ltd., 561 S.W.3d 125, 130 (Tex. 2018) (citation omitted). A court must grant a summary
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`judgment motion if the evidence shows there is not genuine issue as to any material fact and the
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`moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Draughon v. Johnson, 631 S.W.3d 81,
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`87 (Tex. 2021). In reviewing a summary judgment motion, courts view the evidence “in the light
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`most favorable to the nonmovant, crediting evidence a reasonable jury could credit and
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`disregarding contrary evidence and inferences unless a reasonable jury could not.” Painter, 561
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`S.W.3d at 130. (citations and quotations omitted).
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`ARGUMENT
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`A.
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`The FAAAA Does Not Preempt Negligence Claims
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`As noted above, DCL’s sole argument is that it cannot be sued for its negligence because
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`§ 14501 preempts all common law state actions against brokers. DCL’s argument is largely
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`premised on the Chatelaine decision. However, DCL fails to mention that other decisions have
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`explicitly decided that the FAAAA’s preemption prohibition does not bar negligence actions.
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`When considering whether federal preemption applies, the analysis “start[s] with the
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`assumption that the historic police powers of the states were not to be superseded by the Federal
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`Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Ours Garage and Wrecker
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`Srvc., Inc., 536 U.S. at 426. It is worth noting that the FAAAA does not mention personal
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`injuries nor does it provide a substitute for common law negligence actions.
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`Lopez v. Amazon Logistics, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 3d 505, 512-13 (N.D. Tex. 2020) is
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`instructive. In Lopez, the plaintiff sued due to a fatal vehicle accident in which a carrier rear
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`ended the plaintiff. At the time of the incident, the carrier was transporting and delivering items
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`sold by Amazon. The plaintiff also sued the broker. The broker removed the case to federal court
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`and sought to dismiss the claims against it because it claimed that the FAAAA preemption
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`provision insulated it from suit.
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`The Lopez court began its analysis by acknowledging the sharp division amongst the
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`courts that have addressed this question, as well as the fact that the Supreme Court has not yet
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`ruled on whether or not the FAAAA preemption clause extends to negligence or negligent hiring
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`claims against brokers in personal injury disputes. The Lopez court emphasized that the district
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`courts that have addressed this issue are split on both outcome and rationale. Id. (citing Gillum,
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`2020 WL 444371, at *3–*5).
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`
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`Contrary to DCL’s assertions, preemption does not lead to automatic dismissal of claims.
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`Rather, courts are tasked with identifying what is expressly preempted. Lopez, 458 F. Supp. 3d at
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`513 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). To accomplish such a task, “courts must focus first on
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`the statutory language …” Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted).
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`In this case, the key question is “whether section 14501(c)(1)’s text — preempting state
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`laws that ‘relate to’ a broker's ‘services’ ‘with respect to transportation’— encompasses
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`Plaintiffs’ common law negligence claim.” Id. Crucially, the Supreme Court has held that the
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`term “related to” “does not mean the sky is the limit.” Dan's City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569
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`U.S. 251, 261 (2013). More specifically, the Supreme Court held, in the motor carrier context,
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`that the FAAAA, § 14501(c)(1), does not preempt state laws if they only “relate to” services “in
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`only a tenuous, remote, or peripheral ... manner.” Id.; see also Lopez, 458 F. Supp. 3d at 513
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`(concluding that tort actions against a broker are not preempted if the claims only “relate to”
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`broker services in a tenuous, remote, or peripheral manner).
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`In other words, the FAAAA does not preempt state laws and actions that “relate to”
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`broker services in a tenuous, remote, or peripheral manner.
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`The Lopez court held that the negligence claims were not preempted because the factual
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`allegations underlying the negligence claim were almost entirely based on the driver’s operation
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`of the vehicle and personal injuries caused by the driver’s negligent operation. Id. The Lopez
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`court concluded that “[b]rokers, however, do not operate vehicles or control vehicle operations.”
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`Id. According to the FAAAA’s definition, broker services entail the “arrangement of
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`transportation.” Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 13102(2) (stating that the “term ‘broker’ means a person,
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`other than a motor carrier or an employee or agent of a motor carrier, that as a principal or agent
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`sells, offers for sale, negotiates for, or holds itself out by solicitation, advertisement, or otherwise
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`as selling, providing, or arranging for, transportation by motor carrier for compensation.”).
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`Because brokers do not operate vehicles or control vehicle operations, a tort suit premised
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`on the driver’s operation of the vehicle and the personal injuries caused by the driver’s negligent
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`operation of said vehicle are not preempted under the FAAAA.
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`Just like the facts in the Lopez case, the factual allegations underlying the negligence
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`claims here are almost entirely based on the driver’s operation of the vehicle and the personal
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`injuries caused by that operation. “Plaintiffs’ negligence claim in this case implicates the
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`operation and maintenance of the vehicle and the training and management of the driver, which
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`are at best remotely related to the brokers’ proffered service: arranging for transportation.”
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`Lopez, 458 F. Supp. 3d at 513-14.
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`B.
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`Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Protected Under The FAAAA’s Preemption Exception
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`DCL’s motion fails to address that the FAAA’s preemption clause also has a preemption
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`exception, commonly referred to as the safety regulation exception. See 49 U.S.C. §
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`14501(c)(2). The preemption exception states that:
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`Paragraph (1) shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a
`State with respect to motor vehicles, the authority of a State to
`impose highway route controls or limitations based on the size or
`weight of the motor vehicle or the hazardous nature of the cargo,
`or the authority of a State to regulate motor carriers with regard to
`minimum amounts of financial responsibility relating to insurance
`requirements and self-insurance authorization.
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`
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`49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2).
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`
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`The Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Cout have both held that the safety regulation
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`exception should be broadly construed. Ours Garage and Wrecker Srvc., Inc., 536 U.S. at 426
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`(“Preemption analysis starts with the assumption that the historic police powers of the states
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`were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
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`Congress.”) (internal quotation omitted); VRC LLC v. City of Dallas, 460 F.3d 607, 612 (5th Cir.
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`2006) (“Case law both predating and applying the principles discussed in Ours Garage has on
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`the whole given a broad construction to the safety regulation exception.”).
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`In order for the exception to apply, courts must determine that: (1) the common law
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`claims constitute an exercise of a state’s “safety regulatory authority” and (2) that a negligent
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`hiring claim asserted against a broker is “with respect to motor vehicles.” Lopez, 458 F. Supp. 3d
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`at 515. The Lopez court declined to limit the term “safety regulatory authority” as only
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`encompassing state regulations. Id. (disapproving of the decision in Gillum confining “safety
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`regulatory authority” to state regulations). The Lopez court emphasized that the exception refers
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`to “safety regulatory authority” not “regulations.” Lopez, 458 F. Supp. 3d at 515. The Lopez
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`court also drew from Supreme Court precedent stating that “regulatory authority” can encompass
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`more than “regulations” including “other provisions having the force and effect of law, which
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`includes common law claims.” Id. (citing Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, CA,
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`569 U.S. 641, 650–51 (2013) (“The ‘force and effect of law’ language in 14501(c)(1) ... targets
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`the State acting as a State, not as any market actor — or otherwise said, the State acting in a
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`regulatory rather than proprietary mode”) (internal quotations omitted). The Lopez court also
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`disagreed with other courts who determined that state regulatory authority cannot include a
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`private right of action because state common law claims exist by force of state authority. Thus,
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`the Lopez court concluded that common law claims constitute an exercise of state “safety
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`regulatory authority.” See generally Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85, 86 (2d Cir.
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`2006) (“Historically, common law liability has formed the bedrock of state regulation, and
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`common law tort claims have been described as a critical component of the States’ traditional
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`ability to protect the health and safety of their citizens.”).
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`Similarly, the Lopez court found that negligent hiring claims in a personal injury suit
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`satisfied the preemption exception because such claims constitute an exercise of regulatory
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`authority “with respect to motor vehicles.” The FAAAA defines motor vehicles as “a vehicle,
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`machine, tractor, trailer, or semitrailer propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used on a
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`highway in transportation.” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(16). Based on this definition, the Lopez court
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`concluded that a personal injury claim against a broker for negligently placing an unsafe carrier
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`on the highways is a claim that concerns motor vehicles and their safe operation. In reaching that
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`conclusion, the Lopez court again rejected the notion, espoused in Gillum, that in order for the
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`exception to apply the broker must have control over the regulated motor vehicle. In doing so,
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`the Lopez court highlighted that the preemption exemption makes no mention of “control,” nor
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`does it confine its scope to parties that typically control motor vehicles, such as carriers.
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`In reaching its conclusion, the Lopez court noted that “Congress’ clear purpose in §
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`14501(c)(2)(A) is to ensure that its preemption of States’ economic authority over motor carriers
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`of property, § 14501(c)(1), ‘not restrict’ the preexisting and traditional state police power over
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`safety.” (citing Ours Garage and Wrecker Srvc., Inc., 536 U.S. at 439.)
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`C.
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`The Lopez Decision Is Not An Outlier
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`There is ample case law supporting and following the Lopez decision. Many other courts
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`have similarly concluded that the FAAAA does not preempt common law negligence claims. See
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`Vitek v. Freightquote.com, Inc., No. JKB-20-274, 2020 WL 1986427, at *2-4 (D. Md. Apr. 27,
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`2020) (personal injury negligence claims not preempted because not “related to” broker
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`services); Gilley v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., No. 1:18-cv-00536, 2019 WL 1410902, at
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`*3-5 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 28, 2019) (broker negligent selection claims stemming from personal
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`injury not preempted because not “related to” broker services, and under safety exception); Mann
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`v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., No. 7:16-cv-00102, 2017 WL 3191516, at *5-8 (W.D. Va.
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`July 27, 2017) (negligent hiring claims against broker were not preempted because not “related
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`to” broker services, and under safety exception); Ciotola v. Star Trans. & Trucking, LLC, 481 F.
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`Supp. 3d 375, 387–88 (M.D. Pa. 2020) (negligent hiring and related claims not preempted);
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`Nyswaner v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 3d 892, 896 (D. Ariz. 2019)
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`(negligent hiring claims not preempted); Scott v. Milosevic, 372 F. Supp. 3d 758, 769–70 (N.D.
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`Iowa 2019) (personal injury claims not preempted against broker).
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`Similarly, other courts have concluded that the FAAAA does not preempt negligent
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`selection claims under the safety exception. See Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 976
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`F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2020) (abrogated on other grounds) (holding that negligent brokering claims
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`are not preempted under safety exception); Taylor v. Sethmar Transportation, Inc., No. 2:19-CV-
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`00770, 2021 WL 4751419, at *16 (S.D.W. Va. Oct. 12, 2021) (negligent selection claims not
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`preempted under safety exception); Grant v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., LLC, No. 5:20-02278-MGL,
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`2021 WL 288372, at *3-4 (D.S.C. Jan. 28, 2021) (negligent entrustment and negligent selection
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`claims not preempted under safety exception); Montgomery v. Caribe Transp. II, LLC, No. 19-
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`CV-1300-SMY, 2021 WL 4129327, at *2–3 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2021) (negligent hiring claims not
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`preempted under safety exception); Finley v. Dyer, No. 3:18-CV-78-DMB-JMV, 2018 WL
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`5284616, at *6 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 24, 2018) (negligent hiring and selection claims are not
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`preempted under safety exception).
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`The Fifth Circuit has also rejected an expansive reading of similar statutes and
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`preemption provisions. In doing so, the Fifth Circuit has held that the Airline Deregulation Act,
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`commonly referred to as “ADA,” does not displace state tort actions for personal physical
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`injuries or property damage caused by the operation and maintenance of aircraft. Dnow, L.P. v.
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`Paladin Freight Solutions, Inc., 2018 WL 398235, at *2, *4 (S.D. Tex. 2018) (citing Hodges v.
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`Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (addressing the application of the
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`ADA and holding that the ADA does not displace state tort law). “Notably, Congress copied the
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`preemption language of [the FAAAA] verbatim” from the ADA. Vitek, 2020 WL 1986427, at
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`*2-4 (citing Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364, 370 (2008)).
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`D.
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`The Chatelaine Decision is Distinguishable And The Gillum Decision
` Misapplies Fifth Circuit’s Preemption Rubric
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`As noted above, DCL’s motion is predominantly premised on the Gillum and Chatelaine
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`decisions. However, these cases are distinguishable. In Chatelaine, the dispute was about the
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`safe delivery of wine, which arrived in a damaged condition. In other words, the Chatelaine
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`decision is really about damaged goods. As a result, that court concluded that the suit was
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`preempted because it related to the broker’s “services” in the coordination of transportation of
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`said wine. See Dnow, L.P. 2018 WL 398235 (distinguishing Chatelaine from negligence cases
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`that allege that a driver caused damages by failing to operate his vehicle safely and concluding
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`that the claims in Chatelaine may be preempted but claims due to the driver’s negligence remain
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`with the scope of state tort law.).
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`In this case, Plaintiffs’ advance negligence claims stemming from the driver’s negligent
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`operation of a vehicle. This distinction is critical because, even if Chatelaine were correctly
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`decided, the instant suit still would not trespass into preempted territory. In other words,
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`Plaintiffs’ claims are not preempted in this case because they only affect broker services in a
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`tenuous, remote, and peripheral manner, which was not the case in Chatelaine.
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`
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`DCL’s reliance on the Gillum decision is equally misplaced. In fact, the weight of
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`authority runs counter to Gillum’s holding. Vegas Fab & Finish v. AMG Freight LLC, No.
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`223CV01336MMDNJK, 2024 WL 166759 at *fn. 4 (D. Nev. Jan. 16, 2024). Courts have widely
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`rejected Gillum’s holding because it misapplied the Fifth Circuit’s complete preemption analysis.
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`That is, the Gillum court failed to distinguish between complete preemption and ordinary
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`preemption. Complete preemption is a jurisdictional doctrine that posits that all claims of a
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`specific topic arise under federal law. In contrast, ordinary preemption simply declares the
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`primacy of federal law. See Est. of Wray by & through Wray v. Kennedy Bros. Logistics, Inc.,
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`No. 5:22-CV-70-FL, 2022 WL 16550315 at *4 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 31, 2022). However, the Gillum
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`court relies on ordinary preemption and precedent in its conclusion that complete preemption
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`applies. Id.; see also Est. of Mergl by & through Mergl v. Lee, 638 F. Supp. 3d 545 (E.D.N.C.
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`2022); Gulley v. Hansen & Adkins Auto Transp., Inc., No. 2:23-CV-90-ECM, 2023 WL 4494186
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`(M.D. Ala. July 12, 2023) (concluding Gillum and its progeny are unpersuasive because Gillum
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`failed to consider the distinction between ordinary and complete preemption and concluding that
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`the Gillum court’s decision was not the correct ruling); Dunnavant v. Hansen & Adkins Auto
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`Transp., Inc., No. 2:23-CV-103-ECM, 2023 WL 4494188 (M.D. Ala. July 12, 2023) (same);
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`Malone v. Russell, No. 3:23-CV-0001-S, 2023 WL 3854265 (N.D. Tex. June 6, 2023) (noting the
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`Gillum court did not undertake the Fifth Circuit’s complete preemption analysis and instead
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`appeared to evaluate ordinary preemption).
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`CONCLUSION
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`In sum, DCL’s motion fails for several reasons: (1) the two core cases cited by DCL are
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`distinguishable or misapply the proper preemption analysis; (2) the FAAAA does not preempt
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`common law negligence claims for personal injuries; (3) even if this Court were to conclude that
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`the FAAAA preempts Plaintiffs’ negligence claims, Plaintiffs’ claims are permissible under the
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`FAAAA’s safety exception; and (4) DCL’s proposed outcome ignores the purpose of the
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`FAAAA resulting in an absurd outcome. As has been noted above, the FAAAA was drafted to
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`limit state economic regulation of the trucking industry. In simpler terms, the FAAAA was
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`designed to limit state regulation on tariffs and price controls. The FAAAA makes no mention of
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`personal injury claims. As a result, there is no possible scenario where Congress sought to
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`preempt common law negligence actions. The absence of such an intent is only solidified by the
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`fact that the FAAAA’s legislative history makes no mention of curbing common law actions.
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`More importantly, DCL’s proposed outcome would leave Plaintiffs, as well as countless others,
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`without any recourse to pursue legal action against freight brokers who carelessly hire
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`incompetent carriers. Such an outcome would contradict ample precedent regarding the scope of
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`the FAAAA’s preemption provision and statutory interpretation. Moreover, such an outcome
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`would run counter to common sense.
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`Accordingly, Plaintiffs urge this Court to deny DCL’s motion for summary and to grant
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`any other relief that the Court may see fit.
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`WILLIAMS HART & BOUNDAS, LLP
`
`By: /s/ Alejandro J. Salicrup
`Alejandro J. Salicrup
`State Bar No. 24138723
`Cesar Tavares
`State Bar No. 24093726
`Alma J. Reyes
`State Bar No. 24064392
`Michael Samaniego
`State Bar No. 24115715
`8441 Gulf Frwy, Suite 600
`Houston, Texas 77017-5001
`(713) 230-2200- Telephone
`(713) 643-6226- Facsimile
`tavareslitteam@whlaw.com - E-Service Email
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`ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`This is to certify that, pursuant to the provisions of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21a, a
`true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been forwarded to all counsel of record on
`this 28th day of March 2024.
`
`
`
`/s/ Alejandro J. Salicrup
`Alejandro J. Salicrup
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`Automated Certificate of eService
`This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
`The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
`on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
`certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
`certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
`Cesar Tavares on behalf of Cesar Tavares
`Bar No. 24093726
`Tavareslitteam@whlaw.com
`Envelope ID: 86085501
`Filing Code Description: Ody - Response
`Filing Description: RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT’S DIRECT CONNECT
`LOGISTIC, INC’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`Status as of 3/29/2024 9:46 AM CST
`
`Associated Case Party: CARRY-ON FREIGHT SERVICES, LLC
`
`Name
`David Sargent
`Ross Miracle
`
`BarNumber Email
`david.sargent@sargentlawtx.com
`ross.miracle@sargentlawtx.com
`
`TimestampSubmitted
`3/28/2024 4:05:22 PM
`3/28/2024 4:05:22 PM
`
`Status
`SENT
`SENT
`
`Associated Case Party: VERNICE TRUCKING LLC
`
`Name
`J. KevinKindred
`Service @ Resnick & Louis
`Brittany Crites
`Holly Polson
`
`BarNumber Email
`kkindred@rlattorneys.com
`mail@rlattorneys.com
`bcrites@rlattorneys.com
`hpolson@rlattorneys.com
`
`TimestampSubmitted
`3/28/2024 4:05:22 PM
`3/28/2024 4:05:22 PM
`3/28/2024 4:05:22 PM
`3/28/2024 4:05:22 PM
`
`Status
`SENT
`SENT
`SENT
`SENT
`
`Associated Case Party: YOSIEL MARRERO
`
`Name
`David Sargent
`Ross Miracle
`
`BarNumber Email
`david.sargent@sargentlawtx.com
`ross.miracle@sargentlawtx.com
`
`TimestampSubmitted
`3/28/2024 4:05:22 PM
`3/28/2024 4:05:22 PM
`
`Status
`SENT
`SENT
`
`Associated Case Party: DIRECT CONNECT LOGISTIX INC.
`
`Name
`Zach Mayer
`Samantha Johnson
`
`BarNumber Email
`zmayer@mayerllp.com
`sjohnson@mayerllp.com
`
`TimestampSubmitted
`3/28/2024 4:05:22 PM
`3/28/2024 4:05:22 PM
`
`Status
`SENT
`SENT
`
`Case Contacts
`
`

`

`Automated Certificate of eService
`This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
`The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
`on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
`certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
`certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
`Cesar Tavares on behalf of Cesar Tavares
`Bar No. 24093726
`Tavareslitteam@whlaw.com
`Envelope ID: 86085501
`Filing Code Description: Ody - Response
`Filing Description: RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT’S DIRECT CONNECT
`LOGISTIC, INC’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`Status as of 3/29/2024 9:46 AM CST
`
`Case Contacts
`
`Name
`Elsa Killebrew
`Cesar Tavares
`Rikki Clough
`Traci Tuffin
`
`BarNumber Email
`elsa.killebrew@sargentlawtx.com
`TavaresLitTeam@whlaw.com
`rikki.clough@sargentlawtx.com
`ttuffin@mayerllp.com
`
`TimestampSubmitted
`3/28/2024 4:05:22 PM
`3/28/2024 4:05:22 PM
`3/28/2024 4:05:22 PM
`3/28/2024 4:05:22 PM
`
`Status
`SENT
`SENT
`SENT
`SENT
`
`Associated Case Party: RAY GREEN
`
`Name
`Ray EGreen
`
`BarNumber Email
`ray@raygreenlawfirm.com
`
`TimestampSubmitted
`3/28/2024 4:05:22 PM
`
`Status
`SENT
`
`