FILED
`22-0179
`12/29/2022 4:37 PM
`tex-71372257
`SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
`BLAKE A. HAWTHORNE, CLERK
`
`No. 22-0179
`In the Supreme Court of Texas
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center – El Paso,
` Petitioner
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`,
`v.
`Dr. Lindsey Niehay,
` Respondent.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`On Petition for Review
`from the Eighth Court of Appeals, El Paso
`
`PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF ON THE MERITS
`
`
`Ken Paxton
`Attorney General of Texas
`
`Brent Webster
`First Assistant Attorney General
`
`Office of the Attorney General
`P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059)
`Austin, Texas 78711-2548
`Tel.: (512) 936-1700
`Fax: (512) 474-2697
`
`Judd E. Stone II
`Solicitor General
`
`Ari Cuenin
`Deputy Solicitor General
`State Bar No. 24078385
`Ari.Cuenin@oag.texas.gov
`
`Justin W. Manchester
`Assistant Attorney General
`
`Counsel for Petitioner
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Table of Contents
`
`Page
`Index of Authorities ................................................................................................. ii
`Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1 
`Argument ................................................................................................................. 2 
`I.  The TCHRA Required Proof That an Underlying Physiological
`Disorder Caused Niehay’s Morbid Obesity. ............................................... 2 
`A.  This case presents a clean legal issue on an important
`question that has divided courts and is ripe for resolution. .................. 2 
`B.  Consistent with analogous federal appellate precedent,
`morbid obesity is an impairment only if a physiological
`disorder caused it. ................................................................................ 3 
`1.  Under the TCHRA, Niehay’s claim failed absent an
`impairment. ................................................................................... 4 
`2.  Niehay’s argument contradicts the overwhelming body of
`authority construing impairment under analogous federal
`protections. ................................................................................... 5 
`C.  Niehay’s counterarguments fail. .......................................................... 9 
`1.  This Court construes statutory text as written, not based on
`asserted evolutions in medical opinions. ....................................... 9 
`2.  Niehay misunderstands related federal-law protections. ............. 12 
`3.  Accepting Niehay’s arguments would disrupt disability
`discrimination law. ....................................................................... 16 
`D.  Niehay’s purported expert report is not evidence of an
`underlying physiological disorder. ..................................................... 20 
`II.  Independently, This Court Must Reverse Because Niehay’s
`Asserted Direct Evidence of Discrimination Was Privileged and
`the Eighth Court Did Not Reach Her Meritless Circumstantial-
`Evidence Case. ......................................................................................... 22 
`A.  Niehay’s direct evidence of alleged discrimination is
`inadmissible based on attorney-client privilege. ................................. 22 
`B.  Niehay’s alternative circumstantial-evidence theory poses no
`obstacle to review and is meritless. .................................................... 24 
`
`i
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`

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`1.  Niehay failed to establish a prima facie case that her
`dismissal was because of the alleged perceived disability. ........... 25 
`2.  Niehay failed to meet her burden to show pretext as to
`Texas Tech’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the
`dismissal. ..................................................................................... 28 
`Prayer ..................................................................................................................... 30 
`Certificate of Service ............................................................................................... 31 
`Certificate of Compliance ....................................................................................... 31 
`
`
`
`Index of Authorities
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases:
`Andrews v. Ohio,
`104 F.3d 803 (6th Cir. 1997) ................................................................ 4, 14, 16, 17
`AutoZone, Inc. v. Reyes,
`272 S.W.3d 588 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam) ........................................................ 26
`Brewer v. Coll. of the Mainland,
`441 S.W.3d 723 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) ...................... 29
`Chandler v. CSC Applied Tech., LLC,
`376 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) ............... 28
`Chiarello v. S. Jersey Transp. Auth.,
`No. A-0410-14T2, 2016 WL 3525212 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
`June 29, 2016) (per curiam) ................................................................................ 8
`Cook. Nedder v. Rivier Coll.,
`944 F. Supp. 111 (D.N.H. 1996) .......................................................................... 7
`Cook v. R.I. Dep’t of Mental Health, Retardation & Hosp.,
`10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993) ................................................................................ 7, 16
`Delaporte v. Preston Square, Inc.,
`680 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.) ............................. 22
`EEOC v. Res. For Human Dev.,
`827 F. Supp. 2d 688 (E.D. La. 2011) ................................................................... 5
`EEOC v. Tex. Bus Lines,
`923 F. Supp. 965 (S.D. Tex. 1996) ................................................................... 5-6
`
`ii
`
`
`
`

`

`EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
`306 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2002) ............................................................................... 5
`EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc.,
`463 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2006) ............................................................... 3, 12, 15, 16
`Francis v. City of Meriden,
`129 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 1997) .................................................................... 3, 5, 7, 14
`Greene v. Seminole Elec. Coop., Inc.,
`701 So. 2d 646 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) ............................................................ 8
`Hedberg v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co.,
`47 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1995)................................................................................ 25
`Kolb v. Scarbrough,
`No. 01–14–00671–CV, 2015 WL 1408780 (Tex. App.—Houston
`[1st Dist.] Mar. 26, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) ................................................... 20
`Lorillard v. Pons,
`434 U.S. 575 (1978) ............................................................................................ 15
`Lowe v. Am. Eurocopter,
`LLC, No. 1:10-cv-24, 2010 WL 5232523 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 16, 2010) ................. 6
`McCarron v. British Telecom,
`No. CIV.A. 00-CV-6123, 2002 WL 1832843 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 2002) ................ 8
`McCollum v. Livingston,
`No. 4:14-CV-3253, 2017 WL 608665 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2017) ........................... 6
`McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
`411 U.S. 792 (1973) ........................................................................................... 25
`Melson v. Chetofield,
`No. 2:08-cv-3683, 2009 WL 537457 (E.D. La. Mar. 4, 2009) ............................. 6
`Mission Consol. ISD v. Garcia,
`372 S.W.3d 629 (Tex. 2012) ........................................................................ 24, 25
`Morrison v. Pinkerton Inc.,
`7 S.W.3d 851 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) ............................ 5
`Morriss v. BNSF Ry. Co.,
`817 F.3d 1104 (8th Cir. 2016) ...................................................................... passim
`Motto v. City of Union City,
`No. CIV. A. 95-5678, 1997 WL 816509 (D.N.J. Aug. 27, 1997) ........................... 8
`Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Garcia,
`729 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.) ........................... 21
`
`iii
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`

`

`Paxton v. City of Dallas,
`509 S.W.3d 247 (Tex. 2017) .............................................................................. 23
`Perrigon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp.,
`77 F.R.D. 455 (N.D. Cal. 1978) ......................................................................... 22
`Powell v. Gentiva Health Servs., Inc.,
`No. CIV.A. 13-0007-WS-C, 2014 WL 554155 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 12, 2014).......... 8-9
`Quantum Chem. Corp. v. Toennies,
`47 S.W.3d 473 (Tex. 2001)................................................................................ 25
`Redd v. Rubin,
`34 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1998) ........................................................................... 8
`Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,
`530 U.S. 133 (2000) .......................................................................................... 28
`Richardson v. Chi. Transit Auth.,
`926 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2019) ....................................................................... passim
`Rodriguez v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
`820 F.3d 759 (5th Cir. 2016) ............................................................................. 29
`Rollins. v. Tex. Coll.,
`515 S.W.3d 364 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2016, pet. denied) ..................................... 21
`Rowe Int’l Corp. v. Ecast, Inc.,
`241 F.R.D. 296 (N.D. Ill. 2007) .................................................................. 22, 23
`St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
`509 U.S. 502 (1993) ........................................................................................... 28
`Staub v. Proctor Hosp.,
`562 U.S. 411 (2011) ........................................................................................... 26
`Taylor v. Burlington N. R.R. Holdings,
`444 P.3d 606 (Wash. 2019) ................................................................................. 8
`Tenaska Energy, Inc. v. Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC,
`437 S.W.3d 518 (Tex. 2014) ................................................................................ 4
`Tex. Bd. of Chiropractic Examr’s v. Tex. Med. Ass’n,
`616 S.W.3d 558 (Tex. 2021) ....................................................................... 5, 9, 11
`Tex. Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr.–El Paso v. Niehay,
`641 S.W.3d 761 (Tex. App.—El Paso, 2022, pet. filed) (per curiam) ......... passim
`Tramp v. Associated Underwriters, Inc.,
`768 F.3d 793 (8th Cir. 2014) ............................................................................. 25
`Valtierra v. Medtronic Inc.,
`232 F. Supp. 3d 1117 (D. Ariz. 2017) ................................................................... 8
`
`iv
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`

`

`VIA Metro. Transit v. Meck,
`620 S.W.3d 356 (Tex. 2020) ............................................................................... 9
`VingCard A.S. v. Merrimac Hosp. Sys., Inc.,
`59 S.W.3d 847. (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied) ............................ 21
`Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Canchola,
`121 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam) ......................................................... 28
`West v. Solito,
`563 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1978) ......................................................................... 23-24
`Williams v. Tarrant Cnty. Coll. Dist.,
`717 F. App’x 440 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) .................................................. 17
`Ysleta ISD v. Monarrez,
`177 S.W.3d 915 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) ......................................................... 27
`Statutes and Rules:
`29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) . ...................................................................................... 14, 15
`29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) .............................................................................. 10, 16, 17
`29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) .............................................................................................. 14
`42 U.S.C. § 12101 note ............................................................................................ 15
`42 U.S.C. § 12102 ................................................................................................... 17
`42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) ......................................................................................... 15
`Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
`Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 ............................................................... passim
`Tex. Lab. Code:
` § 21.002(6) .......................................................................................................... 4
` ch. 21 ........................................................................................................... passim
`Tex. R. Civ. P. :
`
`166a ................................................................................................................... 21
`
`166a(f) ............................................................................................................... 20
`
`193.3 .................................................................................................................. 24
`
`194.2(f) .............................................................................................................. 20
`
`195.5(a) ............................................................................................................. 20
`
`195.5(a)(1)-(3) ................................................................................................... 20
`
`199.5(e) ............................................................................................................. 23
`
`199.5(f) .............................................................................................................. 24
`Tex. R. Evid.:
`
`801 .................................................................................................................... 21
`
`802 .................................................................................................................... 21
`803(4) ............................................................................................................... 21
`
`v
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`

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`Other Authorities:
`Amelia Lake & Tim Townshend, Obesogenic Environments: Exploring the Built
`and Food Environments, J. Royal Soc. Promotion Health (Nov. 2006) ............... 19
`Ass’n for Size Diversity and Health, Abolish the BMI Coalition ............................ 19
`Barry M. Popkin et al., Now and Then: The Global Nutrition Transition, 70
`Nutr. Rev. 3 (Jan. 2012) .................................................................................... 19
`Br. of Amici Curiae Obesity Action Coal., Richardson v. Chi. Transit Auth. ........... 18
`Sven Bulterijs et al., It Is Time to Classify Biological Aging as a Disease,
`Frontiers in Genetics (June 18, 2015) ................................................................ 18
`Chuck Dinerstein, Is Aging a Disease?, Am. Council on Sci. & Health
`(July 11, 2018) ................................................................................................... 18
`Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Obesity and Overweight
`(last updated Sept. 6, 2022) .............................................................................. 10
`Eliza Barclay et al., It’s Easy to Become Obese in America,
`Vox (Aug. 9, 2018) ............................................................................................. 19
`Jim Watson, Frustrated American Medical Association Adopts Sweeping Policies
`Aimed at Gun Violence, NBC News (June 13, 2018) ................................................. 18
`J.P. Rey-Lopez et al., The Prevalence of Metabolically Healthy Obesity,
`Obesity Rev. (Oct. 2014) .................................................................................... 19
`Laura Perez-Campos Mayoral, et al., Obesity Subtypes, Related Biomarkers
`& Heterogeneity, 151 Indian J. Med. Res. 11 (Jan. 2020) ..................................... 11
`Tex. Sup. Ct. Order, Misc. Docket No. 20-9153 (Dec. 23, 2020) .......................... 20
`U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, Weight Loss to Prevent Obesity-Related
`Morbidity and Mortality in Adults: Behavioral Interventions (Sept. 18, 2018) ....... 19
`World Health Org., Inclusion of “Gaming Disorder” in ICD-11
`(Sept. 14, 2018) ................................................................................................. 18
`
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`vi
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`To the Honorable Supreme Court of Texas:
`
`Whether morbid obesity constitutes a protected physical impairment for pur-
`
`poses of a “regarded as” claim under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act,
`
`Tex. Lab. Code ch. 21 (“TCHRA”), is a question of first impression affecting em-
`
`ployers statewide. Niehay urges this Court to endorse the Eighth Court’s misinter-
`
`pretation of the TCHRA based on changes in federal EEOC positions and medical
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`opinions about obesity, which are not Texas law and contradict the views of four
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`federal circuit courts. This Court’s intervention is needed to maintain the uniform
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`application of the TCHRA.
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`In the alternative, Niehay relies on a physician’s letter that adds nothing to the
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`relevant question: whether the Legislature considers morbid obesity an impairment.
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`The letter merely associates Niehay’s morbid obesity with certain medical condi-
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`tions. It does not identify any physiological disorder that caused Niehay’s morbid
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`obesity. Moreover, the trial court correctly rejected the letter because Niehay failed
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`to comply with rules governing experts.
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`Independently, the Eighth Court erroneously relied on inadmissible privileged
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`attorney-client communications disclosed by a disgruntled low-level Texas Tech ad-
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`ministrative employee at a pre-suit deposition. Even though the employee was not
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`authorized to waive Texas Tech’s privilege, the employee’s personal counsel never-
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`theless instructed her to disclose privileged information over the objection of Texas
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`Tech’s counsel. Niehay reasons that Texas Tech’s counsel was required to protect
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`the privilege by physically stopping the employee from speaking or invoking proce-
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`dural mechanisms to claw back inadvertently produced written discovery. But this
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`

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`Court distinguishes an involuntary disclosure like the one here from an inadvertent
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`disclosure that might waive privilege. Regardless, Texas Tech took appropriate cu-
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`rative measures by moving to strike the evidence.
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`Finally, Niehay offers circumstantial evidence allegedly supporting her claim of
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`discrimination. The decision below rested on the determination that Niehay had ad-
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`duced direct evidence of disability discrimination. Niehay’s alternative argument thus
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`poses no obstacle to review of whether Niehay’s morbid obesity constituted an im-
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`pairment. In all events, Niehay’s circumstantial evidence is unavailing.
`
`Argument
`I. The TCHRA Required Proof That an Underlying Physiological
`Disorder Caused Niehay’s Morbid Obesity.
`A. This case presents a clean legal issue on an important question that
`has divided courts and is ripe for resolution.
`
`As Niehay acknowledges (at 19-20), the parties disagree about whether morbid
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`obesity alone is an impairment for purposes of claiming that Texas Tech regarded
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`her as disabled. Compare Pet.BOM.14-37, with Resp.BOM.23-48. The Eighth Court
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`was the first Texas appellate court to hold that morbid obesity itself constitutes a
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`protected impairment. And no one disputes that the federal circuit courts have
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`reached a contrary conclusion. Moreover, Niehay does not dispute that similar ques-
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`tions have been certified to two state supreme courts or that this issue implicates
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`state sovereign immunity for employers like Texas Tech. Pet.BOM.33-35. Only this
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`Court can prevent confusion concerning the proper interpretation of the TCHRA.
`
`2
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`
`
`

`

`It is hard to take seriously Niehay’s characterization (at 46) of the morbid-obe-
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`sity issue as one recurring too infrequently. Niehay relies on nearly two dozen cases
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`to shore up her analysis of morbid obesity and four federal circuits have taken a view
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`of obesity directly contrary to the Eighth Court’s. If Texas cases are “infrequent,”
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`Resp.BOM.46, that underscores that the Eighth Court’s approach is an outlier, not
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`that the issue is unimportant. Niehay identifies nothing “extremely rare” about this
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`case. Id.
`B. Consistent with analogous federal appellate precedent, morbid
`obesity is an impairment only if a physiological disorder caused it.
`
`As the court of appeals explained, Niehay does not proceed under the theory
`
`that Texas Tech discriminated against her based on actual disability. Tex. Tech Univ.
`
`Health Scis. Ctr.–El Paso v. Niehay, 641 S.W.3d 761, 777 & n.10 (Tex. App.—El Paso,
`
`2022, pet. filed) (per curiam). Instead, Niehay needed to show that she was regarded
`
`as disabled by Texas Tech based on a physical impairment. Pet.BOM.14. As con-
`
`firmed by all four federal courts of appeals to decide the issue under analogous fed-
`
`eral law, Niehay’s obesity would not constitute physical impairment unless caused
`
`by a physiological disorder. See Richardson v. Chi. Transit Auth., 926 F.3d 881, 891
`
`(7th Cir. 2019); Morriss v. BNSF Ry. Co., 817 F.3d 1104, 1108 (8th Cir. 2016); EEOC
`
`v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d 436, 442-43 (6th Cir. 2006); Francis v. City of
`
`Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 1997).
`
`As Niehay acknowledges (at 23-24), Texas courts look to the federal ADA in
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`analyzing the TCHRA. Niehay needed “to show that [the employer] perceived h[er]
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`obesity to be a condition that met the definition of ‘physical impairment.’”
`
`3
`
`
`
`

`

`Richardson, 926 F.3d at 892. Otherwise, morbid obesity is merely a “physical char-
`
`acteristic.” Morriss, 817 F.3d at 1108-09. Put differently, morbid obesity must con-
`
`stitute a protected impairment to support a claim that one’s employer regarded her
`
`as disabled. Id. at 1113. “[P]hysical characteristics that are ‘not the result of a physi-
`
`ological disorder’ are not considered ‘impairments’ for the purposes of determining
`
`either actual or perceived disability.” Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 808 (6th Cir.
`
`1997). The court of appeals’ analysis conflicts with that standard.
`1. Under the TCHRA, Niehay’s claim failed absent an impairment.
`Contrary to Niehay’s suggestion (at 30-32), unless morbid obesity constituted a
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`physical impairment as a matter of law, there was no alternative path to a viable
`
`claim. “[I]n determining what the law is and applying the law to the facts, a trial court
`
`has no discretion.” Tenaska Energy, Inc. v. Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC, 437 S.W.3d
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`518, 523 (Tex. 2014).
`
`Niehay could not allege merely that her employer “perceived” morbid obesity
`
`as an impairment. Resp.BOM.30. That argument conflates “regarded as” with the
`legal requirement of an impairment. See Tex. Lab. Code § 21.002(6). To be “re-
`
`garded” as disabled means being “regarded” as having a protected impairment.
`
`Pet.BOM.34-35 (citing Richardson, 926 F.3d at 892 (explaining the plaintiff’s burden
`
`to prove an adverse employment action that was “based on the belief that his condi-
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`tion was an impairment—as the ADA defines that term”)). Niehay argues that if
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`Texas Tech thought morbid obesity was protected and took adverse employment ac-
`
`tion anyway, then Texas Tech should be liable. But that perception cannot create
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`liability. That is a pure question of statutory interpretation under the TCHRA. See
`
`4
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`

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`Tex. Bd. of Chiropractic Examr’s v. Tex. Med. Ass’n, 616 S.W.3d 558, 568 (Tex. 2021)
`
`(determining the meaning of undefined statutory term is a pure question of law). And
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`federal courts have rejected similar arguments under the ADA. See, e.g., EEOC v.
`
`United Parcel Serv., Inc., 306 F.3d 794, 805 (9th Cir. 2002); Francis, 129 F.3d at 285.
`2. Niehay’s argument contradicts the overwhelming body of
`authority construing
`impairment under analogous
`federal
`protections.
`
`Niehay cannot dispute the conflict of authority on the physiological-cause re-
`
`quirement. Resp.BOM.33. Niehay acknowledges (at 32-35) there is no binding prec-
`
`edent on this question. And the Eighth Court’s view flouts contrary rulings of mul-
`
`tiple courts across various jurisdictions (as outlined by Morriss and Richardson).
`
`For instance, Niehay (at 32-33) cites Morrison v. Pinkerton Inc., 7 S.W.3d 851,
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`856 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.). In Morrison, however, the court
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`did not deem the plaintiff’s obesity a per se physical impairment to establish a re-
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`garded-as claim. The court said that “[e]ven assuming Morrison is morbidly obese,
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`that alone will not suffice to raise a fact issue to overcome a motion for no-evidence
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`summary judgment.” Id. at 855. Per Niehay, Morrison “lost because he could not
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`prove that he was substantially limited in a major life activity.” Resp.BOM.33 n.17.
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`But she cannot avoid the conflict between Morrison and federal precedent.
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`Niehay also invokes various nonprecedential federal trial-court opinions. For in-
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`stance, she cites EEOC v. Resources for Human Development, Inc., which found that
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`“severe obesity” was an “impairment” based on a version of an EEOC ADA com-
`
`pliance manual. 827 F. Supp. 2d 688, 694 (E.D. La. 2011). Another case, EEOC v.
`
`5
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`

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`Texas Bus Lines, took a similarly erroneous view of obesity, despite noting that
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`“courts as well as the ADA have consistently rejected obesity as a disability pro-
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`tected by the ADA.” 923 F. Supp. 965, 975 (S.D. Tex. 1996). As the Eighth Circuit
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`later explained in Morriss, taking a broad view of obesity like the EEOC manual “di-
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`rectly contradicts the plain language” of the ADA “as well as the EEOC’s own reg-
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`ulations and interpretative guidance,” which “all define ‘physical impairment’ to
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`require an underlying physiological disorder or condition.” 817 F.3d at 1112.
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`McCollum v. Livingston, another case that Niehay cites for the proposition that mor-
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`bid obesity alone could qualify an individual under the ADA, was a prisoner-rights
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`case and not a “regarded as” employment-discrimination case. No. 4:14-CV-3253,
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`2017 WL 608665, *33-35 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2017). Moreover, that court specifically
`
`noted that “[c]ourts are split as to whether obesity, on its own, can qualify as a disa-
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`bility under the ADA.” Id. at *35.
`
`Niehay also cites Lowe v. American Eurocopter, LLC, No. 1:10-cv-24, 2010 WL
`
`5232523 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 16, 2010), and Melson v. Chetofield, No. 2:08-cv-3683,
`
`2009 WL 537457 (E.D. La. Mar. 4, 2009), two non-precedential trial-court decisions
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`indicating that weight might plausibly support a disability-discrimination claim.
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`Likewise, in Lumar v. Monsanto Co., the district court merely assumed that morbid
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`obesity constituted an impairment under the ADA and determined that “Lumar has
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`not set forth a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA where he has not
`
`established that he has a disability.” 395 F. Supp. 3d 762, 780 (E.D. La. 2019). At
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`best, these rulings reflect conflict with Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuit
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`precedent—underscoring the need for review.
`
`6
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`

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`Niehay misstates the degree to which her position is “consistent with other fed-
`
`eral circuits and state courts.” Resp.BOM.40. The First Circuit’s decision in Cook
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`v. Rhode Island Department of Mental Health, Retardation & Hospitals, 10 F.3d 17, 25
`
`(1st Cir. 1993), does not support Niehay. Cook identified evidence that would be suf-
`
`ficient under Richardson: the plaintiff presented evidence “concerning the physio-
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`logical roots of morbid obesity,” so “the jury certainly could have concluded that the
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`metabolic dysfunction and failed appetite-suppressing neural signals” were an un-
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`derlying cause of the plaintiff’s obesity. Id. at 24. Indeed, Niehay’s own authority
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`states that ordinarily a “plaintiff would have to show that her obesity is of physiolog-
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`ical origin and that it impairs a body system” to establish an impairment under Cook.
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`Nedder v. Rivier Coll., 944 F. Supp. 111, 115 n.6 (D.N.H. 1996).
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`The Second Circuit’s decision in Francis supports Texas Tech, not Niehay. See
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`Francis, 129 F.3d at 286. Niehay relies on dicta that “a cause of action may lie against
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`an employer who discriminates against an employee on the basis of the perception
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`that the employee is morbidly obese.” Resp.BOM.40-41 (emphasis added). But the
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`Second Circuit explained that “obesity, except in special cases where the obesity relates
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`to a physiological disorder, is not a ‘physical impairment’ within the meaning of the
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`statutes.” Francis, 129 F.3d at 286 (emphasis added). The Second Circuit affirmed
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`the dismissal of the claim because the plaintiff had alleged that he was discriminated
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`against for “failing to meet a weight standard,” not that he was perceived “as suf-
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`fering from a physiological weight-related disorder.” Id. at 287.
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`And while Niehay cites nonprecedential opinions of federal district courts in the
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`Ninth Circuit, that circuit has not directly decided the issue—indeed, some district
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`courts in the circuit have followed the Second, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits. E.g.,
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`Valtierra v. Medtronic Inc., 232 F. Supp. 3d 1117, 1123 (D. Ariz. 2017). Rather, the
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`two cases cited by Niehay are among the “small number” of outlier decisions, as the
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`Seventh Circuit has recognized. Richardson, 926 F.3d at 887.
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`Nor does Niehay confront differences between state and federal law. For in-
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`stance, Niehay relies on the Washington Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor, but
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`that case was decided under more-expansive Washington law and that court ex-
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`pressly “decline[d] to use federal interpretations of the ADA.” Pet.BOM.34 (quot-
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`ing Taylor v. Burlington N. R.R. Holdings, 444 P.3d 606, 609 (Wash. 2019)). That
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`case contravenes the approach this Court takes when interpreting chapter 21. See id.
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`Niehay’s other citations to state intermediary courts and other federal district
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`courts likewise fail. Niehay cites the factual discussion in Redd v. Rubin, which de-
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`scribed the plaintiff’s allegations without deciding whether morbid obesity was an
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`impairment. See 34 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1998). Niehay likewise cites the sum-
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`mary of the trial court’s ruling in Chiarello v. South Jersey Transportation Authority,
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`No. A-0410-14T2, 2016 WL 3525212, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 29, 2016)
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`(per curiam). Greene v. Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc., 701 So. 2d 646, 647 (Fla.
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`Dist. Ct. App. 1997), and Motto v. City of Union City, No. CIV. A. 95-5678, 1997 WL
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`816509, at *10 (D.N.J. Aug. 27, 1997), are also unpersuasive; their analysis is cursory
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`and without the benefit of recent federal circuit precedent. The court in McCarron v.
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`British Telecom noted that the issue “remains open” and denied summary judgment
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`in light of expert testimony. No. CIV.A. 00-CV-6123, 2002 WL 1832843, at *9 (E.D.
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`Pa. Aug. 7, 2002). And Powell v. Gentiva Health Services, Inc., actually granted
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`summary judgment for the defendant. No. CIV.A. 13-0007-WS-C, 2014 WL 554155,
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`at *8 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 12, 2014). At best, Niehay’s citations demonstrate why lower
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`courts need clear guidance.
`C. Niehay’s counterarguments fail.
`1. This Court construes statutory text as written, not based on
`asserted evolutions in medical opinions.
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`Niehay contends (at 24-29) that her position reflects “current medical science,”
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`citing medical manuals and dictionary definitions of morbid obesity. Texas courts
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`apply statutory text as enacted by the Legislature, not based on shifting medical opin-
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`ions. See Tex. Bd. of Chiropractic Examr’s, 616 S.W.3d at 571 (“Judges are experts in
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`statutory analysis, not in healthcare.”). A statutory term bears its “original public
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`meaning,” which is fixed at the time of enactment. VIA Metro. Transit v. Meck, 620
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`S.W.3d 356, 369 & n.15 (Tex. 2020). That fact alone forecloses Niehay’s argument.
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`Niehay states (at 26) that “for any one individual, a separate, underlying physi-
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`ological disorder may not be identifiable.” Niehay thus sides with decisions holding
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`that weight can be an impairment when it falls outside normal ranges or occurs as the
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`result of a physiological disorder. Resp.BOM.33. But federal appellate courts have
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`rejected that argument, holding that abnormal weight can be an impairment only if a
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`physiological disorder caused it. Pet.BOM.24-25. Under Niehay’s theory, there is
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`no practical way to discern characteristics from disorders: all obesity would
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`constitute a qualifying impairment. That interpretation could entitle almost half of
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`the United States to bring weight-based discrimination claims.1
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`Textually, Niehay relies (at 24-28) on definitions of “physiology,” asserting that
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`obesity is a “condition” under the TCHRA because it is a physiological process and
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`obesity is considered a medical disorder. But this Court does not read single words
`like “condi