Case 1:21-cv-00627-LY Document 1 Filed 07/15/21 Page 1 of 5
`
`
`CHASITY HART,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`v.
`
`CENTENE CORPORATION,
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`AUSTIN DIVISION
`
`
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`
`
`PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
`
`
`
`
`
`
` CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:21-cv-627
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`Plaintiff Chasity Hart (“Plaintiff”) files this Original Complaint against Defendant Centene
`
`Corporation (“Defendant”).
`
`SUMMARY
`
`1.
`
`Plaintiff was terminated in violation of her rights under the Family and Medical
`
`Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq.
`
`THE PARTIES
`
`2.
`
`Plaintiff Chasity Hart is a natural person residing within the confines of the Western
`
`District of Texas, Austin Division. Plaintiff has standing to file this lawsuit.
`
`3.
`
`Defendant Centene Corporation is a Delaware corporation conducting business in
`
`the Western District of Texas. Defendant can be served through its registered agent, CT
`
`Corporation System, at its registered address, 1999 Bryan Street, Suite 900, Dallas, Texas 75201.
`
`FACTUAL BACKGROUND
`
`4.
`
`Plaintiff worked for Defendant as an executive assistant to Irene Armendariz,
`
`Corporate Vice President Business Operations (“Ms. Armendariz”).
`
`

`

`Case 1:21-cv-00627-LY Document 1 Filed 07/15/21 Page 2 of 5
`
`5.
`
`In February 2019, Plaintiff took job-protected intermittent leave under the Family
`
`and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).
`
`6.
`
`In March 2019, Ms. Armendariz expressed a negative attitude towards Plaintiff’s
`
`leave, dismissing it as “white girl drama.” Ms. Armendariz also stated that Plaintiff “would be
`
`transferring or leaving all together” and that it “can’t get here soon enough!”
`
`7.
`
`Later in March 2019, Ms. Armendariz further dismissed Plaintiff’s need for leave,
`
`writing: “Sick leave????? Her fall or ‘major depression’ always something. So full of it.” The
`
`fall she referred to referenced an earlier incident in which Plaintiff fell at work and filed a worker’s
`
`compensation form.
`
`8.
`
`9.
`
`In April 2019, a new FMLA intermittent leave was approved for Plaintiff.
`
`When Plaintiff had doctors’ appointments in the morning, she was not allowed to
`
`take only one or two hours of leave to attend the appointments but rather was told by Ms.
`
`Armendariz to come in after lunch and was forced to take a half-day of leave.
`
`10.
`
`In July 2019, Plaintiff was terminated for unauthorized purchases on the company
`
`credit card. However, Plaintiff denies that any purchases were unauthorized or improper; rather,
`
`they were ordinary purchases that she made in the course of her job duties, including gift cards to
`
`reward employees and snacks and coffee for the break room. These purchases were approved by
`
`Ms. Armendariz herself.
`
`FMLA DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION
`
`11.
`
`Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if set forth
`
`verbatim.
`
`12.
`
`The Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et. seq., was
`
`enacted “to entitle employees to take reasonable leave for medical reasons, for the birth or adoption
`
`of a child, and for the care of a child, spouse, or parent who has a serious health condition.” 29
`
`-2-
`
`

`

`Case 1:21-cv-00627-LY Document 1 Filed 07/15/21 Page 3 of 5
`
`U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2). Congress enacted the FMLA in response to concern over “inadequate job
`
`security for employees who have serious health conditions that prevent them from working for
`
`temporary periods.” Miller v. AT & T Corp., 250 F.3d 820, 833 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations
`
`omitted).
`
`13.
`
`“The FMLA has two distinct sets of provisions, which together seek to meet the
`
`needs of families and employees and to accommodate the legitimate interests of employers.” Hunt
`
`v. Rapides Healthcare Sys., LLC, 277 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Nero v. Indus. Molding
`
`Corp., 167 F.3d 921, 927 (5th Cir.1999); Bocalbos v. Nat’l W. Life Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 379, 383
`
`(5th Cir.1998)). The first set of provisions are prescriptive: they create a series of substantive
`
`rights, namely, the right to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave under certain circumstances.
`
`Id. The second set of provisions are proscriptive: they bar employers from penalizing employees
`
`and other individuals for exercising their rights. Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)-(2); Chaffin
`
`v. John H. Carter Co., 179 F.3d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 1999); Bocalbos, 162 F.3d at 383 (“[T]he Act
`
`protects employees from interference with their leave as well as against discrimination or
`
`retaliation for exercising their rights.”) (citations omitted); Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc., 332 F.3d
`
`316, 320-22 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that there is a distinction between substantive FMLA rights
`
`and causes of action for retaliation designed to protect those rights).
`
`14.
`
`15.
`
`Defendant violated the proscriptive provisions of the FMLA.
`
`Under 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2), it is “unlawful for any employer to discharge or in
`
`any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by
`
`this subchapter.” To make out a prima facie case for discrimination or retaliation under §
`
`2615(a)(2), a plaintiff must show that: “(1) she was protected under the FMLA; (2) she suffered
`
`an adverse employment decision; and either (3a) that she was treated less favorably than an
`
`-3-
`
`

`

`Case 1:21-cv-00627-LY Document 1 Filed 07/15/21 Page 4 of 5
`
`employee who had not requested leave under the FMLA; or (3b) the adverse decision was made
`
`because she took FMLA leave.” Hunt, 277 F.3d at 768 (internal citation omitted).
`
`16.
`
`The plaintiff need not prove that the exercise of FMLA rights was the sole cause of
`
`the unfavorable treatment; “[t]he plaintiff is, however, required to show that the protected activity
`
`and the adverse employment action are not completely unrelated.” Mauder v. Metropolitan Transit
`
`Auth. of Harris County, Texas, 446 F.3d 574, 583 (5th Cir. 2006).
`
`17.
`
`Plaintiff took intermittent FMLA leave, suffered an adverse employment action
`
`while she was on this leave, and her termination was causally connected to her FMLA leave.
`
`Plaintiff has suffered economic and noneconomic damages as a result of this FMLA violation.
`
`JURY DEMAND
`
`18.
`
`Plaintiff requests a jury trial.
`
`DAMAGES AND PRAYER
`
`19.
`
`Plaintiff asks that she be awarded a judgment against Defendant for the following
`
`incurred damages:
`
`a.
`
`b.
`
`c.
`
`d.
`
`e.
`
`f.
`
`g.
`
`h.
`
`i.
`
`Actual damages in the amount of lost back pay, lost benefits, and other
`economic losses;
`
`Reinstatement or front-pay;
`
`Liquidated damages;
`
`Compensatory damages;
`
`Punitive damages;
`
`Prejudgment and post-judgment interest;
`
`Court costs;
`
`Attorney’s fees; and
`
`All other relief to which Plaintiff is justly entitled.
`
`
`
`-4-
`
`

`

`Case 1:21-cv-00627-LY Document 1 Filed 07/15/21 Page 5 of 5
`
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`
`
` /s/ Ahad Khan
`Ahad Khan
`Texas Bar No. 24092624
`Federal ID No. 2981398
`712 Main Street, Suite 900
`Houston, TX 77002
`(713) 401-3558 – Telephone
`ak@ahadkhanlaw.com – Email
`
`ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
`CHASITY HART
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`-5-
`
`