throbber
Case 6:20-cv-00810-ADA Document 25 Filed 11/30/20 Page 1 of 27
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
`
`10TALES, INC.,
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
` v.
`
`TIKTOK INC.,
`
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:20-CV-810-ADA
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`TIKTOK INC.’S
`MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER FEDERAL RULES 12(b)(3) AND 12(b)(6)
`OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TRANSFER UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1404
`
`REDACTED VERSION
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00810-ADA Document 25 Filed 11/30/20 Page 2 of 27
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1 
`BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................2 
`A.
`The ’030 Patent And Asserted Claim ......................................................................2 
`B.
`TTI’s Business Operations .......................................................................................2 
`LEGAL STANDARD ..........................................................................................................3 
`A.
`Failure To State a Claim ..........................................................................................3 
`B.
`Improper Venue And Transfer of Venue .................................................................4 
`ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................5 
`A.
`Plaintiff’s Partial
`Infringement Allegation Fails To Meet The
`Iqbal/Twombly Plausibility Standard and Should Be Dismissed .............................5 
`Plaintiff’s Infringement Allegation Relies Upon Activities of Multiple
`Actors Without Allegations that Support Joint Infringement ..................................9 
`This District is an Improper Venue, and the Case Should be Transferred ............11 
`1.
`This District is an Improper Venue for TTI ...............................................11 
`2.
`This Case Can be Transferred to the Northern District of California ........13 
`Alternatively, This Case Should Be Transferred to the Northern District of
`California For Convenience ...................................................................................13 
`1.
`All Private Interest Factors Heavily Favor Transfer to California ............14 
`a.
`Cost of Attendance and Convenience of the Witnesses .................14 
`b.
`Relative Ease of Access to Sources of Proof Factor Favors
`Transfer ..........................................................................................17 
`Availability of Compulsory Process Factor Favors Transfer ........18 
`c.
`Practical Problems also Favor Transfer .........................................19 
`d.
`All Public Interest Factors Heavily Favor Transfer to California ..............19 
`a.
`The Local Interest Factor Strongly Favors Transfer ......................19 
`b.
`The Remaining Factors are Neutral ...............................................20 
`CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................20 
`
`D.
`
`2.
`
`I.
`II.
`
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`V.
`
`-i-
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`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00810-ADA Document 25 Filed 11/30/20 Page 3 of 27
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`In re Acer Am. Corp.
`626 F.3d 1252 (Fed. Cir. 2010)................................................................................................19
`
`In re Adobe Inc.
`No. 2020-126, 2020 WL 4308164 (Fed. Cir. July 28, 2020) .............................................17, 20
`
`In re Apple, Inc.
`581 F.App’x. 886 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ..........................................................................................18
`
`In re Apple Inc.
`No. 2020-135, 2020 WL 6554063 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 9, 2020) .................................15, 16, 19, 20
`
`Artrip v. Ball Corp.
`735 Fed. Appx. 708 (Fed. Cir. 2018) .....................................................................................5, 8
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) .......................................................................................................1, 3, 5, 6
`
`Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) ...........................................................................................................1, 3, 5
`
`In re Cray Inc.
`871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017)..................................................................................................4
`
`DataQuill, Ltd. v. Apple Inc.
`No. A-13-CA-706-SS, 2014 WL 2722201 (W.D. Tex. June 13, 2014) ..................................20
`
`De La Vega v. Microsoft Corp.
`No. W-19-CV-00612-ADA, 2020 WL 3528411 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2020)..................4, 8, 10
`
`Diem LLC v. BigCommerce, Inc.
`No. 6:17-CV-186 .......................................................................................................................4
`
`Fintiv, Inc. v. Apple, Inc.
`No. 6:18-cv-00372-ADA, 2019 WL 4743678 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2019) ............................18
`
`Freshub, Inc. v. Amazon.com Inc.
`No. W-19-CV-00388-ADA, 2019 WL 10856832 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2019) ........................14
`
`In re Genentech, Inc.
`566 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009)..........................................................................................17, 19
`
`Int’l Bus. Machines Corp. v. Booking Holdings Inc.
`775 F. App’x 674 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ............................................................................................5
`
`
`
`
`
`
`-ii-
`
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00810-ADA Document 25 Filed 11/30/20 Page 4 of 27
`
`
`
`Lee v. Verizon Communs., Inc.
`837 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2016) .....................................................................................................4
`
`Lyda v. CBS Corp.
`838 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2016)............................................................................................9, 10
`
`Metricolor LLC v. L’Oreal S.A.
`791 F. App’x 183 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ............................................................................................4
`
`Moskowitz Family LLC v. Globus Med., Inc.
`No. 6:19-cv-00672-ADA, 2020 WL 4577710 (W.D. Tex. Jul. 2, 2020) .....................18, 19, 20
`
`Nat’l Steel Car v. The Greenbrier
`6:19-cv-00721-ADA, 2020 WL 4289388 (W.D. Tex. Jul. 27, 2020)..................................5, 12
`
`OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.
`788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015)..................................................................................................3
`
`Optic153 LLC v. Thorlabs Inc.
`6:19-cv-00667-ADA, 2020 WL 3403076 (W.D. Tex. June 19, 2020) ..........................4, 11, 12
`
`Parus Holdings Inc., v. LG Elecs. Inc. et al.
`6:19-cv-00432-ADA, 2020 WL 4905809 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2020) .............................16, 20
`
`Raz Imps., Inc. v. Luminara Worldwide, LLC
`No. 15-cv-02223-M, 2015 WL 6692107 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2015) ........................................17
`
`Soar Tools, LLC v. Mesquite Oil Tools, Inc.
`No. 5:19-CV-243-H, 2020 WL 5500238 (N.D. Tex. Sep. 11, 2020) ....................................4, 8
`
`In re Volkswagen of Am. Inc.
`545 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2008) ........................................................................................... passim
`
`XY, LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics, LC
`2017 WL 5505340 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2017)..........................................................................17
`
`In re ZTE (USA) Inc.
`890 F.3d 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2018)..................................................................................................4
`
`Statutes
`
`15 Pa.C.S. § 413(a)(4)....................................................................................................................15
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1400 ..............................................................................................................................1
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) ...................................................................................................................4, 13
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) .........................................................................................................................5
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) ...................................................................................................................5, 13
`
`
`
`
`
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`-iii-
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`

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`Case 6:20-cv-00810-ADA Document 25 Filed 11/30/20 Page 5 of 27
`
`
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) ..........................................................................................3
`
`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ....................................................................................3, 4
`
`U.S. Patent No. 8,856,030...................................................................................................... passim
`
`
`
`
`
`
`-iv-
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`

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`Case 6:20-cv-00810-ADA Document 25 Filed 11/30/20 Page 6 of 27
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`
`
`
`Plaintiff 10Tales, Inc.’s vague infringement allegation against TikTok Inc. (“TTI”) fails to
`
`put TTI on notice of how its system purportedly infringes claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 8,856,030
`
`(“the ’030 patent”). Dkt. 1-1, Compl. ¶¶ 26-29. Claim 1 recites a system with a server and
`
`memory, and programming instructions for performing nine different method steps. Yet,
`
`Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege that the claimed components or method steps are present in
`
`or practiced by the TikTok system. Nor does the complaint support an inference that the TikTok
`
`system practices these method steps. Moreover, the ’030 patent specification teaches that third
`
`party actors may be necessary to assert infringement of claim 1. If so, then Plaintiff’s complaint
`
`fails because it does not allege joint infringement or that TTI has any control over the relevant
`
`third parties. For at least these reasons, Plaintiff’s infringement allegation lacks sufficient
`
`specificity necessary to state a claim that satisfies the “plausibility” standard set forth in Iqbal and
`
`Twombly and, accordingly, should be dismissed. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell
`
`Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
`
`Furthermore, Plaintiff filed this case in the wrong venue.
`
`
`
` Plaintiff is a Delaware corporation, TTI is a
`
`California corporation, and
`
`. Indeed,
`
`
`
`
`
`Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1400, venue is improper, and this case should be dismissed
`
`or, in the alternative, pursuant to §1406, transferred to the Northern District of California where
`
`venue is proper for both Plaintiff and Defendant. Moreover, even if venue is proper (it is not), this
`
`case should be transferred to the Northern District of California pursuant to §1404 because it is a
`
`far more convenient venue for TTI and other non-party witnesses to litigate this case than Texas.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`-1-
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`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00810-ADA Document 25 Filed 11/30/20 Page 7 of 27
`
`
`
`
`II.
`
`BACKGROUND
`A.
`
`The ’030 Patent And Asserted Claim
`
`Plaintiff asserts that the TikTok system infringes claim 1 of the ’030 patent, entitled
`
`“Method, System and Software for Associating Attributes Within Digital Media Presentation”:
`
`1. A system for associating user attributes with digital media asset attributes and creating a
`user specific composite digital media display, the system comprising:
`a) a server;
`b) a computer-readable storage medium operably connected;
`c) wherein the computer-readable storage medium contains one or more programming
`instructions for performing a method of associating user attributes with digital media asset
`attributes and creating a user specific composite digital media display, the method
`comprising:
`identifying a first set of digital media assets stored on the computer-readable storage
`medium,
`creating, from the first set of digital media assets, a first composite digital media display,
`presenting to the user via a display server, the first composite digital media display;
`retrieving user social network information from at least one source external to the
`presented first composite digital media display, wherein the user social network
`information contains one or more user attributes;
`selecting, based on the user attributes in the social network information, a second set of
`digital media assets, wherein the second set of digital media assets is associated with
`one or more user attributes found in the user social network information;
`monitoring the first composite digital media display for the presence of a trigger,
`wherein the trigger indicates a personalization opportunity in the first set of digital
`media assets;
`performing a rule based substitution of one or more of the digital media assets from the
`first set of digital media assets with one or more of the digital media assets from the
`second set of digital media assets to create a user specific set of digital media assets;
`creating, from the user specific digital media assets, a user specific composite digital
`media display; and
`presenting to the user via the display server, the second composite digital media display.
`(’030 patent, cl. 1.)
`
`B.
`
`TTI’s Business Operations
`
`TikTok is a software application (“TikTok app”), a brand, and a trademark. See Ex. A,
`
`Declaration of Nicola Raghavan, ¶ 3. TTI is a California corporation with its headquarters in
`
`
`
`
`
`
`-2-
`
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00810-ADA Document 25 Filed 11/30/20 Page 8 of 27
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`
`
`Culver City, California. Id. ¶ 4. It is also a subsidiary corporation, and its ultimate parent is
`
`Bytedance Ltd. (“BDL”). Id. ¶ 9. BDL owns a number of subsidiaries, including Bytedance Inc.
`
`(“BDI”),
`
`. Id. ¶¶ 3, 9. However, TTI is neither a parent
`
`nor a subsidiary company of BDI. Id. ¶ 9. TTI and
`
`. Id. ¶ 10.
`
`Nicola Raghavan leads TTI’s human resources department, and
`
`
`
` Id. ¶ 10.
`
` Id. ¶¶ 2, 10.
`
`
`
`
`
` Id. ¶¶ 6, 11, 12. TTI’s
`
`
`
`technical team in Mountain View, California,
`
` Id. ¶¶ 13–16. Relevant third party witnesses, such as Apple, Google, Facebook, Twitter,
`
`Instagram
`
`are also located in or around Mountain View or San Francisco, California.
`
`III. LEGAL STANDARD
`A.
`
`Failure To State a Claim
`
`To avoid “a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
`
`as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Twombly, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
`
`Iqbal, 550 U.S. at 570). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint provide
`
`a defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds relied upon. This obligation requires
`
`more than conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action. Id., at 555
`
`(citations omitted). “On a motion to dismiss, courts are not bound to accept as true a legal
`
`conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
`
`of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678.
`
`In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, regional circuit law applies. OIP Techs.,
`
`Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In the Fifth Circuit, courts apply
`
`
`
`
`
`
`-3-
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`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00810-ADA Document 25 Filed 11/30/20 Page 9 of 27
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`
`
`the Twombly-plausibility standard, and “may dismiss a direct-infringement claim under Rule
`
`12(b)(6) where the plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege the manner of the defendant’s infringement
`
`with specificity.” Soar Tools, LLC v. Mesquite Oil Tools, Inc., No. 5:19-CV-243-H, 2020 WL
`
`5500238, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Sep. 11, 2020); see also Lee v. Verizon Communs., Inc., 837 F.3d 523,
`
`533 (5th Cir. 2016). Conclusory or partial allegations of infringement are insufficient. To survive
`
`dismissal, a plaintiff must “provid[e] facts sufficient to create a plausible inference that each
`
`element of the claim is infringed by the accused products.” Diem LLC v. BigCommerce, Inc., No.
`
`6:17-CV-186 JRG-JDL, 2017 WL 9935521, at *2 (E.D. Tex. May 11, 2017).
`
`Failure to address a limitation is an appropriate ground for dismissal. See Metricolor LLC
`
`v. L’Oreal S.A., 791 F. App’x 183, 188 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (The complaint was dismissed for failing
`
`to sufficiently show that the accused products contain each element of the independent claims.);
`
`see also De La Vega v. Microsoft Corp., No. W-19-CV-00612-ADA, 2020 WL 3528411, at *6
`
`(W.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2020) (Holding the complaint failed where the plaintiff did not “include even
`
`a short written description of how the accused instrumentalities meet the ‘coupling’ limitation.”).
`
`B.
`
`Improper Venue And Transfer of Venue
`
`A patent infringement action must be brought where the alleged infringer resides or where
`
`the alleged infringement occurred and the defendant has a regular and established place of
`
`business. 28 U.S.C. §1400(b). To satisfy the latter requirement, “(1) there must be a physical place
`
`in the district; (2) it must be a regular and established place of business; and (3) it must be the
`
`place of the defendant.” In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Venue is not proper
`
`if one of these requirements is not met, id., and plaintiff bears the burden of establishing venue is
`
`proper. In re ZTE (USA) Inc., 890 F.3d 1008, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2018). This Court’s recent rulings
`
`in Optic153 and National Steel Car provide a thorough examination of this analysis, which need
`
`not be repeated here. See Optic153 LLC v. Thorlabs Inc., 6:19-cv-00667-ADA, 2020 WL 3403076
`
`
`
`
`
`
`-4-
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`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00810-ADA Document 25 Filed 11/30/20 Page 10 of 27
`
`
`
`(W.D. Tex. June 19, 2020); see also Nat’l Steel Car v. The Greenbrier, 6:19-cv-00721-ADA, 2020
`
`WL 4289388 (W.D. Tex. Jul. 27, 2020).
`
`If venue is improper, the Court may transfer the case “to any district or division in which
`
`it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. §1406(a). Alternatively, if venue is proper, the Court may
`
`transfer the case for convenience. See 28 U.S.C. §1404(a). Convenience is determined by
`
`weighing whether eight private and public factors favor transfer. These factors are:
`
`(1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory
`process to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing
`witnesses; (4) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious
`and inexpensive[;] … [(5)] the administrative difficulties flowing from court
`congestion; [(6)] the local interest in having localized interests decided at home;
`[(7)] the familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and [(8)]
`the avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws [or in] the application of
`foreign law.
`
`In re Volkswagen of Am. Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 312, 315 (5th Cir. 2008). Here, five factors weigh
`
`in favor of transfer to the Northern District of California, and three factors are neutral. No
`
`factors favor keeping this case in Texas.
`
`IV. ARGUMENT
`A.
`
`Plaintiff’s Partial Infringement Allegation Fails To Meet The Iqbal/Twombly
`Plausibility Standard and Should Be Dismissed
`
`Plaintiff’s factual allegations are very sparse. The alleged facts do not expressly or
`
`inferentially support a plausible claim for direct infringement, and thus, the complaint should be
`
`dismissed. See Artrip v. Ball Corp., 735 Fed. Appx. 708, 714 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Iqbal, 556 U.S.
`
`at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Direct infringement “requires that all the steps of a claimed
`
`method be performed by or attributable to a single entity.” Int’l Bus. Machines Corp. v. Booking
`
`Holdings Inc., 775 F. App’x 674, 677 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). The complaint’s
`
`paragraphs 26 through 29 set out the entire explanation for how the TikTok system purportedly
`
`infringes. Even when read in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, it is so lacking in specificity that
`
`
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`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00810-ADA Document 25 Filed 11/30/20 Page 11 of 27
`
`
`
`one cannot infer the manner in which the TikTok system allegedly infringes claim 1.
`
`Claim 1 requires far more than creating user specific content—that has been done for years
`
`prior to the patent application. Indeed, claim 1 also recites a “system for associating user attributes
`
`with digital media asset attributes,” and several method steps for creating multiple sets of digital
`
`media assets, and multiple digital media composite displays. (’030 patent, claim 1.) Instead of
`
`providing specific facts to support its infringement claim, Plaintiff merely relies on the general and
`
`conclusory allegation that the “‘For You’ feed does precisely what is claimed by the system of the
`
`’030 patent and constitutes an act of direct infringement of at least Claim 1.” Compl. ¶ 26. A
`
`patent infringement claim cannot stand on such a conclusory and threadbare allegation. See Iqbal,
`
`556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff’s allegation fails to identify at least the following claim limitations in the
`
`TikTok system, and they cannot be inferred from the complaint.
`
`“Server” and “Display Server.” Claim 1 requires “a server” (limitation “(a)”) and “a
`
`display server” that presents the first and second composite digital media display. However, the
`
`complaint does not mention either. It is impossible to infer from the alleged facts if the TikTok
`
`system must include two separate servers, or one server that allegedly reads on both the “server”
`
`and the “display server”.1
`
`“Composite Digital Media Display” — “First,” “Second,” and “User Specific.” Claim
`
`1 requires creating “a first composite digital media display” (second method limitation), creating
`
`a “user specific composite digital media display” (eighth method limitation), and displaying “a
`
`second composite digital media display” (ninth method limitation). Rather than point out where
`
`
`1 The complaint likewise fails to identify in the TikTok system which computer-readable storage
`medium is relevant, and whether a single storage medium stores the instructions for performing
`the methods and the digital media assets, or if they are separate—as provided for in the
`specification. See Claim 1.
`
`
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`-6-
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`

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`Case 6:20-cv-00810-ADA Document 25 Filed 11/30/20 Page 12 of 27
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`
`
`each of these limitations purportedly resides in the TikTok system, the complaint merely alleges
`
`that the “‘recommendation system’ uses these user attributes collected from the social media
`
`services in rule based algorithms to select the video clips to include in the user’s ‘For You’ feed.”
`
`Compl. ¶ 29. Plaintiff fails to tie the For You Feed to any or all of the three claimed composite
`
`displays, and has failed to plead facts sufficient to infer the manner in which the TikTok system
`
`displays the first and second composite displays, or creates the user specific display.
`
`“Substitution” of “Assets.” Claim 1 requires “performing a rule based substitution of
`
`one or more of the digital media assets from the first set of digital media assets with one or more
`
`of the digital media assets from the second set of digital media assets to create a user specific set
`
`of digital media assets.” Plaintiff’s complaint fails to associate anything within the TikTok system
`
`to (1) “a first set of digital media assets,” (2) “a second set of digital media assets,” and/or (3) “a
`
`user specific set of digital media assets.” Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegation does not identify “digital
`
`media asset attributes” (recited in the preamble and element (c)) within the TikTok system; nor
`
`does it explain if they differ from the various sets of “digital media assets.” Likewise, the
`
`complaint fails to explain which “assets” are substituted or when they are substituted. Instead,
`
`Plaintiff vaguely alleges that the “recommendation system . . . select[s] specific video clips (user
`
`specific digital media assets).” Compl. ¶ 28. Under a reading favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff may
`
`argue its allegation implies some (undefined) relationship between “specific video clips” and “user
`
`specific digital media assets.” However, under a plain reading of the claim, the first, second, and
`
`user specific set of digital media assets are three separate limitations, and should all be addressed,
`
`but they were not. Logically, since Plaintiff failed to identify these limitations within the TikTok
`
`system, it is impossible to infer what “substitution” allegedly occurs, or where it occurs. In fact,
`
`Plaintiff fails to allege that the For You Feed substitutes “assets” at all. Compl. ¶ 28.
`
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`Case 6:20-cv-00810-ADA Document 25 Filed 11/30/20 Page 13 of 27
`
`
`
`“Trigger.” Claim 1 requires triggers within the video content indicating where
`
`personalization (or substitution of assets) may occur. Under a plain and ordinary reading, the claim
`
`limitation “monitoring the first composite digital media display for the presence of a trigger” infers
`
`that the first composite digital media display must comprise a trigger. The specification, however,
`
`only discloses a person, or “creative director,” that creates the default or first composite display
`
`with triggers—and never discloses how a computer would perform this function:
`
`Trigger points 320 can be placed at various points in the digital media content,
`based on determinations of the creative director 110/distributor 102. For example,
`the creative director 110/distributor 102 may decide to place trigger points 320 in
`the digital media content 300 so that they occur at various points in time, when a
`certain character appears on the screen, when certain text is displayed, when words
`are spoken or sung, or based on other features of the digital presentation.
`
`’030 patent, col. 10, ll. 3-11 (emphasis added). Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts, let alone
`
`specific facts related to the manner in which the TikTok system allegedly creates a first composite
`
`digital media display with triggers.
`
`By failing to even mention a majority of the claim terms in the complaint, Plaintiff
`
`necessarily “does not identify [all limitations] in the context of the accused instrumentality and/or
`
`describe how each operates. Because Plaintiff does not include even a short written description of
`
`how the accused instrumentalities meet [these] limitation[s], his [C]omplaint fails to state a claim
`
`upon which relief can be granted.” See De La Vega, 2020 WL 3528411, at *6. Moreover, the
`
`facts alleged, even when read in Plaintiff’s favor, are insufficient to infer that the TikTok system
`
`practices each and every limitation in claim 1. Plaintiff has failed to put TTI on notice of the
`
`manner for which TTI’s system purportedly infringes and, accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint
`
`should be dismissed. See Soar Tools, LLC, 2020 WL 5500238, at *5; Artrip, 735 Fed. Appx. at
`
`714.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`-8-
`
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00810-ADA Document 25 Filed 11/30/20 Page 14 of 27
`
`
`
`Plaintiff’s Infringement Allegation Relies Upon Activities of Multiple Actors
`Without Allegations that Support Joint Infringement
`
`B.
`
`Plaintiff’s complaint should also be dismissed for failing to include any plausible allegation
`
`that a single actor performs the steps of claim 1 or, in the alternative, any basis for a finding of
`
`joint infringement. In order to plead joint infringement, the complaint must plead “facts sufficient
`
`to allow a reasonable inference that all steps of the claimed method are performed and either (1)
`
`one party exercises the requisite ‘direction and control’ over the other’s performance or (2) the
`
`actors form a joint enterprise such that performance of every step is attributable to the controlling
`
`party.” Lyda v. CBS Corp., 838 F.3d 1331, 1339-40 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (dismissing a complaint that
`
`failed to adequately allege that one entity directed or controlled others). Where there are no
`
`allegations that could “form the basis of a reasonable inference that each claim step was performed
`
`by or attributable to defendants,” dismissal is proper. Id. Here, Plaintiff’s infringement allegation
`
`demonstrates that no single actor performs all the steps of claim 1. Moreover, the factual
`
`allegations included in the complaint are insufficient to support a claim for joint infringement.
`
`Given the limited and threadbare nature of Plaintiff’s infringement allegation, and what is
`
`disclosed in the specification, Plaintiff’s infringement reading appears to rely upon the acts of
`
`multiple actors: TTI, content creators, and users.2 As mentioned above, Plaintiff alleges that
`
`“TikTok’s ‘recommendation system’ uses . . . rule based algorithms to select the video clips.” But
`
`the video clips are created by content creators. Compl. ¶ 29. Further, as discussed supra, the ’030
`
`
`2 Content creators create content to share on the TikTok app, which is also referred to as user
`generated content. See Compl. Ex. E at pp. 1 (“making it easy to find content and creators you
`love”), 2 (“User interactions such as the videos you like or share, accounts you follow, comments
`you post, and content you create”), and 3 (“suggesting content that’s relevant to you while also
`helping you find content and creators that encourage you to explore experiences you might not
`otherwise see.”); see Compl. Ex. F (“you and other users to share, download, and otherwise interact
`with User Content posted through the Platform.”)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`-9-
`
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00810-ADA Document 25 Filed 11/30/20 Page 15 of 27
`
`
`
`patent discloses that the predecessor step of creating this first composite digital display must be
`
`done by a “creative director” and/or the “distributor.” Thus, the claim necessarily requires some
`
`third-party, be it a Content Creator, “creative director,” or “distributor” to provide content to the
`
`TikTok system in order to infringe.
`
`As to the users, Plaintiff alleges the claim requires “user attributes from a social network
`
`system, such as information about content that the user shares with others, accounts the user
`
`follows, [] comments the user posts,” and “when a user chooses to link or sign up for TikTok
`
`using that user’s social network . . . .” Compl. ¶ 28-29 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the
`
`complaint implies the users’ activity, such as linking or signing up for the TikTok app, or
`
`interacting with posts or on a social network, are required to practice claim 1.
`
`Thus, if claim 1 allegedly requires human action by a third party (content creators, users,
`
`“creative directors,” or “distributors”), in addition to a computer system, to perform some of the
`
`methods, the complaint must also allege facts to support joint infringement. Yet, the complaint
`
`fails to even suggest that one party exercises the requisite direction or control over another, or that
`
`the actors form a joint enterprise. See Lyda, 838 F.3d at 1339. Indeed, nowhere does the complaint
`
`allege that TTI directs or controls the content creators, or a user sharing, following other users, or
`
`posting. Rather, the user is described as having his/her own choice to use the social network.
`
`Compl. ¶ 29 (“when a user chooses to link or sign up for TikTok using that user’s social network”)
`
`(emphasis added). Despite implicating multiple entities to perform claim 1, the complaint alleges
`
`no facts—not even a conclusory allegation—to support a joint infringement claim. Thus, the
`
`complaint should be dismissed. See, De La Vega, 2020 WL 3528411, at *5.
`
`
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`-10-
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`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00810-ADA Document 25 Filed 11/30/20 Page 16 of 27
`
`C.
`
`
`
`This District is an Improper Venue, and the Case Should be Transferred
`1.
`
`This District is an Improper Venue for TTI
`
`The entirety of Plaintiff’s venue allegations rest on a misunderstanding of the law and facts.
`
`Plaintiff alleges venue is proper under a “regularly established place of business” theory because
`
`(1) “TikTok is registered to do business in the State of Texas . . . and conducts business in this
`
`District,” (2) TTI has “offices in Austin, Texas,” and (3) “TikTok has hired and continues to hire
`
`numerous employees within this District.” Compl. ¶¶ 12, 16.
`
`
`
`The first basis, that TTI is registered in Texas, is legally insufficient to establish venue.
`
`See Optic153, 2020 WL 3403076 at *2 (“The mere fact that Defendant is registered and earns
`
`revenue in Texas has no bearing on the Court’s venue analysis”). Plaintiff’s second and third bases
`
`for
`
`is
`
` The office in Austin
`
`. Ex. A ¶ 11. As of the date of filing this complaint,
`
`
`
` Id. ¶ 6. Further, the job postings in Exhibit C
`
`of the complaint

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