Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 124 Filed 07/10/23 Page 1 of 17
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
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`FLYPSI, INC., (D/B/A FLYP),
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`GOOGLE LLC,
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`Defendant.
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`
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`CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:22-cv-00031-ADA
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
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`DEFENDANT GOOGLE LLC’S OPPOSITION TO FLYPSI, INC.’S OPPOSED MOTION
`TO STRIKE DEFENDANT’S ANSWER TO SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR
`PATENT INFRINGEMENT OR TO DISMISS DEFENDANT’S INEQUITABLE
`CONDUCT DEFENSE
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`

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`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 124 Filed 07/10/23 Page 2 of 17
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
`FACTS ............................................................................................................................... 2
`LEGAL STANDARD ........................................................................................................ 3
`ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................... 4
`A.
`Google pleaded inequitable conduct with sufficient particularity. ........................ 4
`1.
`Flyp does not dispute that Google sufficiently pleaded the “who”
`and “when” elements. ................................................................................ 5
`Google sufficiently pleaded the “how,” “what,” and “where”
`elements as well as materiality. ................................................................. 5
`Google sufficiently pleaded intent to deceive the PTO. ............................ 9
`3.
`Flyp’s motion to strike should be denied. ............................................................ 11
`B.
`In the alternative, Google should be granted leave to amend. ............................. 12
`C.
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 12
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`2.
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`I.
`II.
`III.
`IV.
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`V.
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`i
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`

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`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 124 Filed 07/10/23 Page 3 of 17
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Page(s)
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`Cases
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`1st Media, LLC v. Elec. Arts, Inc.,
`694 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012)................................................................................................10
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`Applied Biokinetics LLC v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.,
`No. 6:21-CV-555-ADA, 2022 WL 1192467 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2022) .................................7
`
`Data Scape, Ltd. v. Dell Technologies, Inc.,
`No. 1:19-cv-00605-ADA, 2019 WL 5275533 (W.D. Tex. June 17, 2019) .........................9, 10
`
`Eon Corp. IP Holdings, LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,
`No. 10-CV-00379, 2011 WL 13134896 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2011) ........................................10
`
`Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
`575 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2009)........................................................................................ passim
`
`Flypsi, Inc. (d/b/a/ Flyp) v. Dialpad, Inc.,
`No. 6:21-cv-00642-ADA, 2022 WL 3593132 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2022) ..............................8
`
`Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,
`649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011)..................................................................................................4
`
`TransWeb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Props. Co.,
`812 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2016)............................................................................................9, 10
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`Other Authorities
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`37 C.F.R. §§ 1.56 .............................................................................................................................4
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ..........................................................................................................................3
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)....................................................................................................................2
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`MPEP 2001.01 .................................................................................................................................4
`
`ii
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`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 124 Filed 07/10/23 Page 4 of 17
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`
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`The accused product in this case, Google Voice, was undisputedly in public use years
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`before the asserted patents’ alleged priority date. Compare Dkt. 103 ¶¶ 17-18 (“Google Voice
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`was launched in 2009”) with Ex. 1 at 3-4 (asserting July 17, 2013 priority date). In fact, the
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`inventors
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`118-1 at 5. The inventors further conducted
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`. Dkt.
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`,
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` Dkt. 118-2 at 17, 20-22.
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`the product was deliberately omitted from the prosecution of the asserted patents. But Plaintiff
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`Flypsi, Inc. (“Flyp”) now seeks to prevent Defendant Google LLC (“Google”) from raising the
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`defense and conducting further discovery into it.
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`Flyp argues untimeliness and prejudice, Mot. at 5, but obscures a key fact: It has known
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`about Google’s inequitable conduct defense for months. Google timely set forth, in detail, its
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`inequitable conduct defense in its Final Invalidity Contentions in a section titled “Inequitable
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`Conduct.” Ex. 2 at 78-80. The fact that Flyp has known Google’s inequitable conduct defense for
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`months undermines its arguments on untimeliness and prejudice.
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`Flyp’s Motion puts form over substance by focusing on the formal pleading of the
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`inequitable conduct defense. But Flyp overlooks the critical fact that Flyp, itself, waited until the
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`last day to amend pleadings to file a Second Amended Complaint, Dkt. 103, and Google’s
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`motion to dismiss that Second Amended Complaint is still pending, Dkt. 108. Google only filed
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`its Answer to Flyp’s Second Amended Complaint before a ruling on the pending motion to
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`dismiss because Flyp otherwise refused to allow discovery into Google’s inequitable conduct
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`1
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`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 124 Filed 07/10/23 Page 5 of 17
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`defense. Specifically, Flyp has refused to allow the depositions of the patent prosecutors, even
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`though fact discovery closes in about a month and a half. See Ex. 3. Flyp’s Motion should be
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`denied.
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`II.
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`FACTS
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`On January 10, 2022, Plaintiff filed its original complaint against Google alleging
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`infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 9,667,770 (the “’770 Patent”); 10,051,105 (the “’105 Patent”);
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`10,334,094 (the “’094 Patent”); 11,012,554 (the “’554 Patent”); and 11,218,585 (the “’585
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`Patent”) (collectively, “the Asserted Patents”). Dkt. 1. Specifically, Plaintiff accused Google
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`Voice of infringing the Asserted Patents. See Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 30, 42, 54, 69, and 83.
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`Plaintiff asserts a priority date of July 17, 2013. Ex. 1 at 3-4. Plaintiff admits that Google
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`Voice was launched in 2009, about four years before its priority date. See Dkt. 103 ¶¶ 17-18.
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`On April 11, 2022, Google filed its first motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims of indirect
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`and willful infringement under Rule 12(b)(6). Dkt. 24. On August 22, 2022, the Court granted-
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`in-part and denied-in-part Google’s motion. Dkt. 48. On September 6, 2022, Plaintiff filed a First
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`Amended Complaint. Dkt. 50. On September 20, 2022, Google filed its Answer to Plaintiff’s
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`First Amended Complaint. Dkt. 55.
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`On March 6, 2023, the Court entered an amended scheduling order setting March 21,
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`2023 as the deadline to serve Final Infringement and Invalidity Contentions, and March 22, 2023
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`as the deadline to amend pleadings. See Dkt. 102. See also Dkts. 107, 112. On March 21, 2023,
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`Google served its Final Invalidity Contentions, which included a section titled “Inequitable
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`Conduct” and set forth Google’s inequitable conduct defense in detail. Ex. 2 at 78-80. On March
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`22, 2023, Plaintiff filed its Second Amended Complaint. Dkt. 103. On April 12, 2023, Google
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`2
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`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 124 Filed 07/10/23 Page 6 of 17
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`filed its motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s pre-suit indirect and willful infringement claims, which is
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`currently pending before the Court. Dkt. 108.
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`On March 29, 2023, Google served a subpoena on patent prosecution attorney Stuart
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`West. Exs. 4 and 5. On May 2, 2023, counsel for Flyp and Mr. West declared their intent to file a
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`motion to quash this subpoena as calling for attorney-client privileged information and because
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`the subpoena was “an undue burden on Mr. West by, among other things, seeking information
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`related to a defense of inequitable conduct that Google has not pleaded.” Ex. 3. On May 8, 2023,
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`to avoid unnecessary motion practice, Google agreed to “withdraw the subpoena to Mr. West
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`without prejudice to re-serving it after Google pleads its inequitable conduct defense.” Id. On
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`June 5, 2023, Google filed its Answer to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint. Dkt. 118.
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`III. LEGAL STANDARD
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`“‘[I]nequitable conduct, while a broader concept than fraud, must be pled with
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`particularity’ under Rule 9(b).” Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1326
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`(Fed. Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “Whether inequitable conduct has been pleaded with
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`particularity under Rule 9(b) is a question governed by Federal Circuit law.” Id. at 1318. To
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`plead inequitable conduct, “the pleading must identify the specific who, what, when, where, and
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`how of the material misrepresentation or omission committed before the PTO.” Id. at 1328. At
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`the pleading stage the proponent of the inequitable conduct theory need only plead facts
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`supporting a reasonable inference that a specific individual knew of the misrepresentation and
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`had the specific intent to deceive the PTO. Id. at 1328-29. “A reasonable inference is one that is
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`plausible and that flows logically from the facts alleged . . . .” Id. at 1329 n.5.
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`Individuals with a duty to disclose information material to patentability include “[e]ach
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`inventor named in the application” and “[e]ach attorney or agent who prepares or prosecutes the
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`3
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`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 124 Filed 07/10/23 Page 7 of 17
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`application.” 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.56. See also MPEP 2001.01. “[T]he materiality required to establish
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`inequitable conduct is but-for materiality. When an applicant fails to disclose prior art to the
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`PTO, that prior art is but-for material if the PTO would not have allowed a claim had it been
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`aware of the undisclosed prior art.” Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276,
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`1291 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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`IV. ARGUMENT
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`A.
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`Google pleaded inequitable conduct with sufficient particularity.
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`The accused product, Google Voice, was undisputedly in public use since before the
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`alleged July 17, 2013 priority date of the Asserted Patents. Compare Dkt. 103 ¶¶ 17-18 (“Google
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`Voice was launched in 2009”) with Ex. 1 at 3-4 (asserting July 17, 2013 priority date).1 Plaintiff
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`further admits that:
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`118-1 at 5.
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`25 ¶ 38.
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` Dkt.
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` See Dkt. 118 at 23 ¶ 20 to
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`Flyp argues that Google has failed to address the “how,” “what,” and “where” elements
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`under Exergen, but does not dispute that Google had sufficiently pleaded the “who” and “when”
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`1 Google has repeatedly demanded that Flyp articulate what exactly it contends has changed from
`the prior art version of Google Voice (i.e., the version of Google Voice in public use before the
`alleged July 17, 2013 priority date) and how that change is related to specific claim limitations.
`Flyp has failed to articulate any difference pertinent to the asserted claims.
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`4
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`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 124 Filed 07/10/23 Page 8 of 17
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`elements. Mot. at 6-9. But Flyp’s arguments are without merit: Google has sufficiently pleaded
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`inequitable conduct under the Exergen standard.
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`1.
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`Flyp does not dispute that Google sufficiently pleaded the “who” and
`“when” elements.
`Flyp does not dispute that Google has sufficiently pleaded the “who” element. Google
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`identified the inventors Peter Rinfret, Ivan Zhidov, and Sunir Kochhar, as well as the patent
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`prosecutors. See Dkt. 118 at 22 ¶ 13.
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`Flyp does not dispute that Google has sufficiently pleaded the “when” element.
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` See Dkt. 118 at 22 ¶¶ 15-16.
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` See id. at 23 ¶ 20 to 25 ¶ 38.
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`¶¶ 41-43.
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` See id. at 26
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` See id. at 22 ¶ 15 to 30 ¶ 65.
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`2.
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`Google sufficiently pleaded the “how,” “what,” and “where” elements
`as well as materiality.
`Flyp’s arguments about “what” is the omission loses sight of the forest for the trees. This
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`is not a case where the inventors were familiar with some lengthy prior art reference and failed to
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`disclose it. Rather, this is a case where the inventors were aware of the very product accused
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`here, including by
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`, and failed to timely disclose it to the PTO as potential prior art.
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`. See Dkt. 118 at 22 ¶ 15-16.
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`5
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`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 124 Filed 07/10/23 Page 9 of 17
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 124 Filed 07/10/23 Page 9 of 17
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`ee 250520-71
`=
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`
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`1d 923 §RRs
`22<2
`2 215 32.
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`explained in Google’s Final Invalidity Contentions:
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` , Flyp failed
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`to disclose Google Voice as potential priorart.
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`Ex. 2 at 80. Yet, the inventors did not timely disclose any aspect of Google Voice to the PTO.
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`Flyp argues for the need fora limitation-by-limitation analysis, apparently contesting
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`materiality. As explained in Google’s Final Invalidity Contentions:
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`While Google does not agree with all of Flyp’s interpretations of the claim limitations of
`the Asserted Patents, if Google Voice meets the limitations of any claim of the Asserted
`Patents, the same Google Voice system that predates the asserted priority date invalidates
`that claim. As a result, Flyp cannot contest materiality.
`Ex. 2 at 78-80. But even ifFlyp could contest materiality, the materiality is abundantly clear. |
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`See, e.g., Mot. at 1 (“solutions that provide for maintaining caller identification integrity when
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`calls originate from a secondary telephone number”); Dkt. 103 § 11 (“there wasa particular need
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`for a device that would maintain calleridentification (‘caller ID’) and properly identify a call as
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`originating from the secondary phone numberofthe caller with multiple numbers, rather than a
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`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 124 Filed 07/10/23 Page 10 of 17
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`conference line number or a randomly generated number.”); ¶ 12 (“Flyp’s patented systems and
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`methods enable a particular way for mobile-phone users to create and own multiple phone
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`numbers on a single mobile device while maintaining the integrity of caller-identification
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`functions.”); ¶ 13 (“In these [previous] solutions, caller ID was not maintained, and the recipient
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`caller ID would appear to the one receiving the call as a conference line number or randomly
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`generated number—rather than properly identifying the call as originating from the secondary
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`phone number of the caller with multiple numbers.” (emphasis added)).
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`Although Flyp cites Applied Biokinetics LLC v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. 6:21-CV-555-
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`ADA, 2022 WL 1192467 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2022), it is unavailing. In Applied Biokinetics, the
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`defendant argued: “Mr. Bushby was aware of the materiality of prior art kinesiology tape like
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`Kinesio Tex® tape and its relevant properties.” Id. at *2. The Court explained that: “The Court
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`can discern from the Answer and Amended Answer a theory that Mr. Bushby withheld
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`something related to stretch properties of prior art tape, but the Answer and Amended Answer do
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`not make clear ‘what’ this something is.” Id. The Court concluded that defendant “almost”
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`adequately pleaded the elements required by Exergen, and granted plaintiff’s motion to dismiss
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`while granting defendant leave to amend. Id. This case is distinguishable. Flyp did not fail to
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`timely disclose some properties of the prior art Google Voice, but rather the Google Voice prior
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`art itself. Further, the materiality of Google Voice cannot reasonably be disputed given that it is
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`the very accused product. Finally, Google included detailed allegations in its inequitable conduct
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`defense, including Flyp’s failure to disclose Google Voice technology and feature set,
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` See
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`Dkt. 118 at 23 ¶ 25 to 25 ¶ 38.
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`7
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`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 124 Filed 07/10/23 Page 11 of 17
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`Flypsi, Inc. (d/b/a/ Flyp) v. Dialpad, Inc., No. 6:21-cv-00642-ADA, 2022 WL 3593132
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`(W.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2022) (“Dialpad”) is likewise distinguishable. In Dialpad, the defendant’s
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`theory of inequitable conduct was predicated on Flyp’s disclosure of prior art references to the
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`PTO without the corresponding invalidity claim charts. But that is not Google’s theory here.
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`Rather, Google’s inequitable conduct theory is based on the fact that
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`. Yet the inventors failed to timely disclose Google Voice to the PTO. See Dkt. 118 at 22
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`¶ 15-16; 23 ¶ 20 to 25 ¶ 38.
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`Google does not concede that a limitation-by-limitation analysis is required as a matter of
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`law where, as here, the prior art forming the basis of Google’s inequitable conduct defense is the
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`product now accused. That said, to the extent the Court holds that such a limitation-by-limitation
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`analysis is required as a matter of law under Exergen, it can clearly be met.
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` Dkt. 118 at 24 ¶ 32. This information would be material to at least
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`Claim 1 of the ’554 Patent:
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`1. A method of providing telephone service, comprising:
`. . .
`[b] automatically transmitting information that indicates an access telephone number to
`the mobile device via a data channel;
`[c] automatically associating the telephone access number with a switch associated with
`the server;
`[d] receiving, at the switch associated with the server, an outgoing call from the mobile
`device to the access telephone number via a second channel;
`[e] receiving, at the server, information from the switch indicating the outgoing call is
`being made to the access telephone number from the primary telephone number . . .
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`8
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`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 124 Filed 07/10/23 Page 12 of 17
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`(emphasis added).2 The information would similarly be material to at least Claim 1 of the ’094
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`and ’585 Patents.
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`3.
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`Google sufficiently pleaded intent to deceive the PTO.
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`Flyp argues the legal insufficiency of “an allegation that Flyp knew about Google Voice
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`from invalidity contentions in the Dialpad case, but ‘intentionally waited’ before disclosing
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`Google Voice to the USPTO.” Mot. at 9. As a starting point, Flyp misapprehends Google’s legal
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`theory, which is not predicated solely on the Dialpad invalidity contentions, but rather on the fact
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`that
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` but failed to timely disclose Google Voice to the PTO.
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`See Dkt. 118 at 22 ¶ 15-16; 23 ¶ 20 to 25 ¶ 38.
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`Further, defendants can plead circumstantial rather than direct evidence of specific intent.
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`See TransWeb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Props. Co., 812 F.3d 1295, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing
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`Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290) (“A court ‘may infer intent from indirect and circumstantial
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`evidence’ because ‘direct evidence of deceptive intent is rare.’”). And Google has pleaded more
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`than adequate circumstantial evidence of specific intent to deceive the PTO. The inventors were
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`not just vaguely aware of the Google Voice prior art, but had
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`.
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` Dkt. 118-1 at 5. As this Court explained in Data Scape,
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`Ltd. v. Dell Technologies, Inc.:
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`The Court is certainly aware that the Court should require more at trial to establish
`scienter than the mere “non-disclosure of a reference solely because that reference was
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`2 Google does not concede that any number in the Google Voice system meets the term
`“telephone access number” or “access telephone number” in the Asserted Patents, and reserves
`all rights with respect to noninfringement.
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`9
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`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 124 Filed 07/10/23 Page 13 of 17
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`
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`known and material.” 1st Media, LLC v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 694 F.3d 1367, 1372-73 (Fed.
`Cir. 2012). But this case is at the pleading stage. See Eon Corp. IP Holdings, LLC v. T-
`Mobile USA, Inc., No. 10-CV-00379, 2011 WL 13134896, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 13,
`2011). This Court finds that the Defendants have more than adequately pleaded a claim
`of inequitable conduct.
`No. 1:19-cv-00605-ADA, 2019 WL 5275533, at *4 (W.D. Tex. June 17, 2019). Similar to Data
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`Scape, Google anticipates additional scienter evidence from the deposition of the prosecutors,
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`but this case is still at the pleading stage, and Google has adequately pleaded a claim of
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`inequitable conduct such that discovery into inequitable conduct should be permitted.
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`Flyp does not clearly challenge Google’s “intentionally waited” theory as a basis for
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`inequitable conduct, but any such challenge would fail in view of recent Federal Circuit
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`precedent. Mot. at 9. Specifically, in TransWeb, the Federal Circuit upheld an inequitable
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`conduct finding where the named inventor and prosecutor were “very much aware” of the prior
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`art, and strategically delayed for years before disclosing the reference at “the last possible
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`moment.” 812 F.3d at 1306. TransWeb involved prior art filter materials that were handed out at
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`a filtration industry exposition in 1997. Id. at 1300. The inventor of the asserted patents was
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`“very much aware” of the prior art distributed at the expo. Id. at 1304. The patent prosecutor, Mr.
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`Hanson, “waited several years between learning of the potential TransWeb prior art and
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`informing the patent office.” Id. at 1306. Indeed, the prosecutor “waited until the last possible
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`moment, when a notice of allowance had already been mailed, to submit the TransWeb material
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`in a request for continued prosecution.” Id. The district court concluded that the named inventor
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`and prosecutor “strategically delayed in disclosing the TransWeb prior art and then intentionally
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`made an inaccurate disclosure of that material.” Id. On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
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`district court’s finding of inequitable conduct. Id. As in TransWeb, the inventors here were
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`likewise very much aware of the Google Voice prior art, having
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`10
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`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 124 Filed 07/10/23 Page 14 of 17
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`. Despite the fact that
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`, the
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`inventors did not disclose Google Voice to the PTO when they filed the parent application of the
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`patents-in-suit on July 17, 2013. Nor did the inventors disclose Google Voice to the PTO at any
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`point during the prosecution of the Asserted Patents until November 9, 2021, after four of five of
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`the Asserted Patents had issued and a Notice of Allowance had issued for the fifth patent. Dkt.
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`118 at 27 ¶ 51 to 28 ¶ 58.
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`B.
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`Flyp’s motion to strike should be denied.
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`Google’s inequitable conduct defense is neither untimely nor prejudicial to Flyp. On
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`March 21, 2023, Google timely served its Final Invalidity Contentions, which included a section
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`entitled “Inequitable Conduct” setting forth the facts and law of Google’s defense in detail. Ex. 2
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`at 78-80. Flyp made no attempt to strike Google’s Final Invalidity Contentions as untimely, and
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`in fact, Flyp fails to even mention the fact that it has been on notice of Google’s inequitable
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`conduct defense since March 21, 2023 in its Motion.
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`The issue of timeliness is further complicated by the fact that the pleadings are not yet
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`closed. Flyp waited until the last day to amend pleadings to file its Second Amended Complaint,
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`Dkt. 103, and Google’s motion to dismiss that Second Amended Complaint is currently pending
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`before the Court, Dkt. 108. Therefore, Google’s answer to the Second Amended Complaint has
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`not yet come due; Google merely filed it to address Flyp’s objections to Google’s proposed
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`deposition of Flyp’s patent prosecution counsel.
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`Flyp’s prejudice argument boils down to the argument that because some discovery has
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`been conducted in this case, allowing the inequitable conduct defense would be prejudicial. Mot.
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`11
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`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 124 Filed 07/10/23 Page 15 of 17
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`at 6. This, of course, makes no sense, and would prevent an inequitable conduct defense in any
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`case where, as here, the evidence of inequitable conduct is discovered during the litigation.
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`Indeed, Flyp’s discovery-based prejudice argument is particularly curious given that Flyp
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`has refused to allow further discovery into Google’s inequitable conduct defense–specifically,
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`Flyp is refusing to allow the depositions of the prosecutors. See Ex. 3. It is not clear how Flyp
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`can both refuse to allow discovery into inequitable conduct and also be prejudiced by such
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`discovery.
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`C.
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`In the alternative, Google should be granted leave to amend.
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`If the Court is inclined to grant Flyp’s Motion, it should grant Google leave to amend to
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`add the inequitable conduct defense. Flyp has not demonstrated prejudice, which it concedes is
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`the “touchstone” of the analysis of leave to amend. Mot. at 5. Thus, if the Court is inclined to
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`take the severe measure of granting Flyp’s Motion, the Court should grant Google leave to
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`amend to permit Google to take discovery into this defense that Flyp has refused to allow. See
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`also IV.A.2.
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`V. CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, Flyp’s Motion should be denied.
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`12
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`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 124 Filed 07/10/23 Page 16 of 17
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`DATED: July 5, 2023
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`Respectfully Submitted,
`
`/s/ Robert W. Unikel
`Robert W. Unikel (Pro Hac Vice)
`robertunikel@paulhastings.com
`John A. Cotiguala (Pro Hac Vice)
`johncotiguala@paulhastings.com
`Daniel J. Blake (Pro Hac Vice)
`danielblake@paulhastings.com
`Grayson S. Cornwell (Pro Hac Vice)
`graysoncornwell@paulhastings.com
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`71 South Wacker Drive, Suite 4500
`Chicago, IL 60606
`Telephone: (312) 499-6000
`Facsimile: (312) 499-6100
`
`Robert R. Laurenzi (Pro Hac Vice)
`robertlaurenzi@paulhastings.com
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`200 Park Avenue
`New York, NY 10166
`Telephone: (212) 318-6000
`Facsimile: (212) 319-4090
`
`Elizabeth Brann (Pro Hac Vice)
`elizabethbrann@paulhastings.com
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`4747 Executive Drive, 12th Floor
`San Diego, CA 92121
`Telephone: (858) 458-3000
`Facsimile: (858) 458-3005
`
`Joshua Yin (Pro Hac Vice)
`joshuayin@paulhastings.com
`David M. Fox (Pro Hac Vice)
`davidfox@paulhastings.com
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`1117 S. California Avenue
`Palo Alto, CA 94304
`Telephone: (650) 320-1800
`Facsimile: (650) 320-1900
`
`Paige Arnette Amstutz
`State Bar No.: 00796136
`pamstutz@scottdoug.com
`
`13
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`

`

`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 124 Filed 07/10/23 Page 17 of 17
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`
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`SCOTT, DOUGLASS & MCCONNICO, LLP
`303 Colorado Street, Suite 2400
`Austin, TX 78701
`Telephone: (512) 495-6300
`Facsimile: (512) 495-6399
`
`Attorneys for Defendant Google LLC
`
`
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I hereby certify that on the 5th day of July, 2023, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
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`document was filed electronically with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system. As of this
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`date, all counsel of record have consented to electronic service and are being served with a copy
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`of this document through the Court’s CM/ECF system and by email.
`
`/s/ Robert W. Unikel
`Robert W. Unikel
`
`
`
`14
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`