`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
`
`FLYPSI, INC., (D/B/A FLYP),
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`
` CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:22-cv-00031-ADA
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`Defendant.
`
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`
`DEFENDANT GOOGLE LLC’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF
`NON-INFRINGEMENT OF U.S. PATENT NOS. 9,667,770 AND 10,051,105
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`I.
`II.
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`V.
`
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 169 Filed 11/21/23 Page 2 of 23
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`FLYP CANNOT PROVE LITERAL INFRINGEMENT OF THE “BRIDGE
`
`INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ....................................................... 1
`RELEVANT BACKGROUND AND TECHNOLOGY .................................................... 1
`TELEPHONE NUMBER” LIMITATIONS ....................................................................... 5
`A.
`The Claimed “Bridge Telephone Number” Must Be a Telephone Number ........... 5
`B.
`Prosecution to Overcome Prior Art Rejections ....................................................... 6
`C.
`Call Information” Sent by Google Voice................................................................ 9
`EQUIVALENTS ............................................................................................................... 12
`A.
`for the ’770 Patent ................................................................................................. 12
`B.
`Claim 1 of the ’105 Patent .................................................................................... 14
`C.
`Equivalents Even if that Doctrine Were Available to Flyp .................................. 15
`
`Flyp Added the “Bridge Telephone Number” Claim Limitations During
`
`Flyp Offers No Evidence that a Bridge Telephone Number Is Included in “Pre-
`
`GOOGLE VOICE CANNOT INFRINGE UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF
`
`Prosecution History Estoppel Precludes Flyp’s Doctrine of Equivalents Defense
`
`Flyp Is Similarly Precluded from Relying on the Doctrine of Equivalents for
`
`A Bridge Telephone Number Does Not Infringe Under the Doctrine of
`
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 17
`
`i
`
`
`
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 169 Filed 11/21/23 Page 3 of 23
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Advanced Steel Recovery, LLC v. X-Body Equip., Inc.,
`808 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2015)................................................................................................15
`
`Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.,
`757 F.3d 1286, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2014)........................................................................................9
`
`Duramed Pharms., Inc. v. Paddock Labs., Inc.,
`644 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2011)................................................................................................13
`
`Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
`535 U.S. 722 (2002) .................................................................................................................13
`
`Maxell, Ltd. v. Amperex Tech. Ltd.,
`No. W-21-CV-00347-ADA, 2022 WL 16858824 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2022) .........................9
`
`In re McDonald,
`43 F.4th 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ................................................................................................14
`
`Merck & Co., Inc. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc.,
`19 F. Supp. 2d 334 (E.D. Penn. 1998) .......................................................................................9
`
`Pharma Tech Sols., Inc. v. LifeScan, Inc.,
`942 F.3d 1372 (Fed Cir. 2019).................................................................................................13
`
`Profoot, Inc. v. Merck & Co., Inc.,
`663 F. App’x 928 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ..........................................................................................14
`
`Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. AGA Med. Corp.,
`717 F.3d 929 (Fed Cir. 2013)...................................................................................................14
`
`Saunders Grp., Inc. v. Comfortrac, Inc.,
`492 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2007)................................................................................................14
`
`Tanabe Seiyaku Co. v. USITC,
`109 F.3d 726 (Fed. Cir. 1997)....................................................................................................9
`
`Traxcell Techs., LLC v. Cellco P’ship,
`No. 6:20-cv-01175-ADA, Dkt. 211 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2023) ...............................................14
`
`Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co.,
`520 U.S. 17 (1997) ...................................................................................................................15
`
`ii
`
`
`
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 169 Filed 11/21/23 Page 4 of 23
`
`
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
`792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015)..................................................................................................9
`
`Statutes
`
`35 U.S.C.A.
`§ 273(a) ......................................................................................................................................4
`§ 273(e)(3) .................................................................................................................................4
`
`35 U.S.C.
`§ 101...........................................................................................................................................4
`§ 102.......................................................................................................................................4, 6
`§ 103...........................................................................................................................................4
`§ 273...........................................................................................................................................4
`
`
`
`iii
`
`
`
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 169 Filed 11/21/23 Page 5 of 23
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
`
`This Court should grant summary judgment of non-infringement because Plaintiff Flypsi,
`
`Inc. (“Flyp” or “Plaintiff”) cannot prove that the accused system satisfies every limitation of the
`
`asserted claims of the “Incoming Call Patents,” U.S. Patent Nos. 9,667,770 (the “’770 patent”)
`
`(Ex. 1) and 10,051,105 (the “’105 patent”) (Ex. 2). Claim 1 of each patent requires transmitting
`
`and using a “bridge telephone number” to complete a call. Flyp cannot show that the accused
`
`Google Voice process for receiving a call incoming to a Google Voice subscriber uses a “bridge
`
`telephone number” in any way, for any purpose. For this reason, Flyp cannot establish literal
`
`infringement of the claims.
`
`Further, because Flyp amended its claims during prosecution to add the term “bridge
`
`telephone number” to overcome a rejection over prior art, Flyp is now precluded from asserting
`
`infringement of the bridge telephone number elements under the Doctrine of Equivalents (“DOE”).
`
`Even if Flyp were not precluded, Defendant Google LLC (“Google” or “Defendant”) cannot
`
`infringe the claims by equivalents because the information used by the
`
`
`
` of Google Voice operates in a substantially different way to achieve a substantially
`
`different result than the claimed manner of using a “bridge telephone number.”
`
`II.
`
`RELEVANT BACKGROUND AND TECHNOLOGY
`
`Flyp asserts five patents. Those patents all share the same specification and describe a
`
`telephone system that allows a “secondary telephone number” to be associated with a subscriber’s
`
`mobile telephone that has a “primary telephone number.” The asserted patents can generally be
`
`divided into two categories—patents directed to a process for handling incoming calls and patents
`
`directed to a process for handling outgoing calls. This motion concerns the two asserted patents
`
`1
`
`
`
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 169 Filed 11/21/23 Page 6 of 23
`
`
`relating to the incoming call process.1
`
`Claim 1 of each of the Incoming Call Patents describes a process whereby calls to the
`
`subscriber’s secondary telephone number are first directed to a switch, not directly to the
`
`subscriber’s device, i.e., a first call leg is established from the caller to the switch (“receiving an
`
`incoming call over at least one voice channel at a switch, the switch[,]” Ex. 1, 10:19–20; “said
`
`electronic indication of an incoming call being received from a switch[,]” Ex. 2, 10:10–12). The
`
`claims then require the system to send to the subscriber’s mobile telephone device “pre-call
`
`information” that specifically includes a “bridge telephone number” (“transmitting pre-call
`
`information to the handset over the at least one data channel the pre-call information including the
`
`bridge telephone number[,]” Ex. 1, 10:30–32 (emphasis added); “transmitting pre-call
`
`information via a data channel to the handset . . . including a bridge telephone number[,]” Ex. 2,
`
`10:21–23 (emphasis added)). The subscriber’s device must use the bridge telephone number to
`
`connect back to the switch, thus establishing the second call leg (“accepting the incoming call by
`
`connecting with the switch over the at least one voice channel using the bridge telephone
`
`number[,]” Ex. 1, 10:35–38 (emphasis added); “including a bridge telephone number for
`
`connecting the handset to the incoming call at the switch[,]” Ex. 2, 10:22–25 (emphasis added)).
`
`The switch then connects the two legs of the call so the caller and the subscriber (callee) can speak
`
`to each other.
`
`The accused Google Voice product provides for inbound calling to a subscriber’s mobile
`
`phone using a subscriber-assigned Google Voice number (the accused “secondary telephone
`
`number”).
`
`
`
`
`1 Google is filing concurrently herewith a Motion for Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement on
`the three patents concerning the outgoing call process, U.S. Patent Nos. 10,334,094; 10,125,554;
`and 11,218,585 (collectively, the “Outgoing Calling Patents”).
`
`2
`
`
`
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 169 Filed 11/21/23 Page 7 of 23
`
`Ex. 4 at 268:4—14: Ex. 3 §§ 77-78.
`
`Infra at. IV.C.
`
`2«PSTN”stands for Public Switched Telephone Network. Ex. 1, Fig. 3, element 310.
`
`3
`
`
`Ex. 11 at GOOG-FLYP-00012471-
`
`
`
`
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 169 Filed 11/21/23 Page 8 of 23
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 169 Filed 11/21/23 Page 8 of 23
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`Po AndFlyp wasrequiredto add the “bridge telephone number”
`
`limitations during prosecution to clarify its invention and overcomerejections based on prior art
`
`that expressly recognized the difference between “telephone numbers” and other types of
`
`addresses, such as a SIP URI. Jnfraat. IILB. Flyp is thus precluded from attempting to disregard
`
`the “bridge telephone number” limitations and from suggesting infringement of the multiple,
`
`express, “bridge telephone number” claim elements under the Doctrine of Equivalents. Jnfraat.
`
`IV.A and IV.B.
`
`Flyp deliberately does not accuse the PSTN implementation of Google Voice for incoming
`
`calls because that exact implementation was first launched by Google in 2009—more than four
`
`years before the first Flyp patent application was even filed; and that implementation has been
`
`offered by Google to users without any material change forthe entire period from 2009 until today.
`
`Thus, if Flyp were to accuse the PSTN implementation for incoming calls of practicing all of the
`
`claim elements, (a) its asserted claims would be rendered invalid by Google Voice, as the Google
`
`Voice product using PSTN undeniably constitutes prior art under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, and
`
`(b) Google would have to be found not to infringe under 35 U.S.C. § 273, which statutorily
`
`precludes infringement when an accused product was in commercial use at least one year before
`
`the effective filing date of the asserted patent. See 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 273(a), 273(e)(3).° Google filed
`
`concurrently herewith a Motion for Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement for the Outgoing
`
`Ex. 12 at FLYP0035059
`
`To be clear, as detailed in Google’s invalidity contentions, the expert report of Dr. Gottesman,
`and the contemporaneously filed Google Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Under 35 U.S.C.
`§ 101, even if the Asserted Claimsare applied only to
`Google Voice,
`the Asserted Claimsare invalid under Sections 101, 102, 103 and 112.
`
`
`
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 169 Filed 11/21/23 Page 9 of 23
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 169 Filed 11/21/23 Page 9 of 23
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`Calling Patents precisely because the accused PSTN outgoing calling process has been in
`
`continuous commercialuse since years before the priority date of the asserted patents and because
`
`Flyp has not accused anyforr—s—sSSY of infringement of the Outgoing
`
`Calling Patents.
`
`Il.
`
`FLYP CANNOT PROVE LITERAL INFRINGEMENT OF THE “BRIDGE
`
`TELEPHONE NUMBER”LIMITATIONS
`
`A.
`
`The Claimed “Bridge Telephone Number” Must Be a Telephone Number
`
`Each of the asserted claims of the Incoming Call Patents expressly requires the use of a
`
`“bridge telephone number” which requires a telephone number (e.g., in the U.S., a ten-digit
`
`numberidentifying a specific telephone device) that can be dialed from a telephone device and
`
`that can be used to dial into and contact a switch where two call legs can be connected or
`
`“bridged.” Neither party proposed any construction for the term “telephone number”or “bridge
`
`(clephone number”be
`
`a’ In the claims, as a result of dialing the claimed bridge telephone number,a call leg is
`
`established with the particular switch: “connecting with the switch over the at least one voice
`
`Ex. 4 at 51:19-52:13.
`
`
`
`Ex. 4 at 40:8—23; Ex. 5 at 49:8—22; Ex. 13 at 11.
`Ex. 4 at 40:4—
`7; Ex. 5 at 30:16—20. This conclusion1s reinforced by the claims’ reference to two other“telephone
`numbers”—the “primary telephone number” and the “secondary telephone number”—which are
`generally understood as ten-digit numbers in the U.S. (with slightly different digit counts and
`formats for other countries) that can be dialed from a telephone device. This Court ruled that
`“primary telephone number”and “secondary telephone number”both havetheir plain and ordinary
`meanings. Dkt. 78 at 2.
`
`
`
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 169 Filed 11/21/23 Page 10 of 23
`
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`channel using the bridge telephone number[,]” Ex. 1, claim 1; “a bridge telephone number for
`
`connecting the handset to the incoming call at the switch[,]” Ex. 2, claim 1.
`
`As the specification explains, establishing the second leg of an incoming call (between the
`
`switch and the callee) to the subscriber’s secondary telephone number requires sending a bridge
`
`telephone number to the subscriber’s handset so the handset can then automatically dial the bridge
`
`telephone number, thereby being connected to the service provider’s switch:
`
`[T]he Call Manager 104 may transmit pre-call notification information to the handset 340,
`which includes the assigned/looked up bridge telephone number, via the data channel
`connection, i.e., over the Internet 316 and the Mobile Data Network 348.
`
`Ex. 1, 6:33–37.
`
`If the call is accepted in step 414, however, the handset application may automatically
`cause the handset 340 to call the bridge telephone number in step 422 over a voice channel.
`The return call from the handset 340 to the bridge telephone number may be routed over
`the PSTN 310 to the switch 110 using a voice channel connection.
`
`Id., 6:62–7:2. The switch then bridges the second call leg from the callee subscriber to the switch
`
`(which was made using the bridge telephone number) with the first call leg from the caller to the
`
`switch:
`
`[O]nce the call to the bridge telephone number is received at the switch 110, the switch
`may “bridge” the incoming voice channel call to the bridge telephone number with the
`incoming voice channel call to the secondary telephone number to thereby connect the
`incoming call from the calling party to the handset 340 via a voice channel.
`
`Id., 6:67–7:6. Providing the bridge telephone number to the callee phone enables the service
`
`provider to bridge or relate the first call leg to the second call leg.
`
`B.
`
`Flyp Added the “Bridge Telephone Number” Claim Limitations During
`Prosecution to Overcome Prior Art Rejections
`
`The “bridge telephone number” limitations found in both asserted independent claims are
`
`key limitations that were the subject of extensive prosecution. During prosecution of the ’770
`
`patent, Flyp added the “bridge telephone number” limitations to overcome the patent examiner’s
`
`6
`
`
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`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 169 Filed 11/21/23 Page 11 of 23
`
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`Section 102 rejection of the pending claims over a specific prior art reference, US 2008/0008105
`
`to Black (Ex. 8). Black taught the use of “alias numbers’ or an “alias address,” as opposed to a
`
`telephone number, associated with a subscriber telephone. Upon receiving an incoming call to the
`
`subscriber, Black’s system would send a notification to the telephone to indicate with which of the
`
`subscriber’s alias numbers the incoming call was associated. See Ex. 8 ¶ 58. Black taught that a
`
`subscriber callee device address could be any kind of identifier, including a SIP URI (
`
`
`
`).
`
`Black distinguished SIP URIs from telephone numbers:
`
`Moreover, although the example is sometimes described herein in the context of
`communication via telephone numbers, it should be appreciated that the disclosed
`processes can readily be used with other types of addresses, such as a SIP URI, an instant
`message nickname, etc. that are assigned to the telecommunications devices.
`
`
`Id. ¶ 51 (emphases added).
`
`
`Throughout this disclosure, the network devices are sometimes described in the context of
`being telephones with one or more addresses comprised of telephone numbers. It should
`be appreciated, however, that the addresses of the communications devices are not limited
`to telephone numbers, but can include other types of addresses, such as, for example, a
`Session Initiated Protocol (SIP) Uniform Resource Identifier (URI), an instant message
`nickname, a shorthand descriptor of a group of other addresses, or any identifier that points
`to a location or node on the network where a communication link can be established.
`
`
`Id. ¶ 37 (emphases added). The examiner rejected Flyp’s pending claim because Black taught the
`
`“receiving,” “transmitting,” responsive to,” and “processing” limitations of the claim. Ex. 6, July
`
`13, 2016 Office Action at 6. In response, patentee amended the claim language (which ultimately
`
`issued as asserted ’770 Patent claim 1) to recite, for the first time, (1) using a “bridge telephone
`
`number,” (2) associating that bridge telephone number with the switch, (3) including the telephone
`
`bridge number in pre-call information used to connect the second leg of the call:
`
`7
`
`
`
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 169 Filed 11/21/23 Page 12 of 23
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Id., December 12, 2016 Response to Rejection at 7. Notably, the patentee did not require the
`
`transmission or use of a “bridge address”: it instead chose to require transmission and use of a
`
`particular kind of “telephone number,” specifically a “bridge telephone number.” In adding the
`
`“bridge telephone number” limitation, the patentee argued that the amended claim overcame Black
`
`because, although Black taught alias addresses, Black did not teach transmitting pre-call
`
`information that included a bridge telephone number used to connect with a switch:
`
`Applicant respectfully submits that Black merely describes an alias service provider (e.g.,
`an intermediate media proxy) that provides alias addresses for transmitting and receiving
`communications, and that Black fails to disclose or suggest all of the limitations now
`recited in claim 14, as amended herein. Black fails to disclose or suggest "receiving an
`incoming call over at least one voice channel at a switch, the switch being associated with
`a bridge telephone number such that calls directed to the bridge telephone number are
`automatically routed to the switch, the incoming call being directed to a handset associated
`telephone number, the handset-associated telephone number being the primary telephone
`number or the secondary telephone number,” let alone rejecting the incoming call based on
`primary or secondary call processing rules and/or “transmitting pre-call information to
`
`8
`
`
`
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 169 Filed 11/21/23 Page 13 of 23
`
`
`the handset over the at least one data channel, the pre-call information including the
`bridge telephone number and the handset-associated telephone number, such that the
`handset is capable of displaying the handset-associated telephone number to a user and,
`based on user input, accepting the incoming call by connecting with the switch over the
`at least one voice channel using the bridge telephone number,” as recited in claim 14, as
`amended herein.
`
`Id., December 12, 2016 Response to Rejection at 12–13 (emphasis added).8
`
`
`
`In short, adding the “bridge telephone number” limitation was critical to issuance of the
`
`claims. And, when adding those elements, the patentee made clear that the “bridge telephone
`
`number” must be an actual telephone number used to connect with a switch, rather than “other
`
`types of addresses, such as a SIP URI, an instant message nickname, etc. that are assigned to the
`
`telecommunications devices.” See Ex. 8 ¶ 51.
`
`C.
`
`Flyp Offers No Evidence that a Bridge Telephone Number Is Included in
`“Pre-Call Information” Sent by Google Voice
`
`
`
`
`8 Flyp made similar statements and amendments concerning the “bridge telephone number” when
`responding to the rejection of the same original claim based on Black in the corresponding
`European Patent Application to the ’770 Patent, EP3022891 (Ex. 9). See Ex. 10 at 3 (“Thus, there
`is no disclosure in D2 or any of the other cited prior art documents of ‘the pre-call information
`transmitted from the server to the telephone handset allow[ing] the telephone handset to accept the
`incoming call to the secondary telephone number by calling the first bridge telephone number
`over a voice channel including the PSTN to connect the incoming call to the telephone handset
`via the switch.” (emphasis added)).
`Representations made to foreign patent offices may be considered in determining the
`applicability of prosecution history estoppel. See Maxell, Ltd. v. Amperex Tech. Ltd., No. W-21-
`CV-00347-ADA, 2022 WL 16858824 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2022) (“An applicant’s statements
`during the PCT prosecution may also indicate the scope of the invention.”) (citing Caterpillar
`Tractor Co. v. Berco, S.p.A., 714 F.2d 1110, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[R]epresentation[s] to foreign
`patent offices should be considered . . . when [they] comprise relevant evidence . . . .”)). A court
`will consider statements made in foreign prosecution when the statement was made in an official
`proceeding where the patentee had every incentive to exercise care in characterizing the scope of
`its invention, the patents are related and/or share an identical claim, and the statement was not
`related to unique aspects of foreign patent law. Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1312
`(Fed. Cir. 2014), overruled on other grounds, Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339
`(Fed. Cir. 2015). See also Tanabe Seiyaku Co. v. USITC, 109 F.3d 726 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Merck &
`Co., Inc. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 19 F. Supp. 2d 334 (E.D. Penn. 1998).
`
`9
`
`
`
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 169 Filed 11/21/23 Page 14 of 23
`
`Ex. 4 at 268:4-14.
`
`Id. at 168:12—169:25.
`
`A SIP INVITE1s a well-known and long-standing data structure that can be used to request
`
`
`° Ex. 14 at 259
`221: Ex. 4 at 143:23-144:10.
`
`10
`
`
`
`
`4 at 169:14—25.
`
`Ex. 14 at 322-323 4 337, citing GOOG-FLYP-00004610; Ex.
`
`10
`
`
`
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 169 Filed 11/21/23 Page 15 of 23
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`Ex. 14 at 326 ¥ 349; Ex. 4 at 187:8-190:3.
`
`Id. at 188:7-10.
`
`Ex. 4 at 173:13—174:5, 175:8-14, 196:24—197:4.
`
`11
`
`
`
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 169 Filed 11/21/23 Page 16 of 23
`
`
`
`Ex. 4 at 177:22-178:12)
`
`Ex. 14 at 327 Ff 351-352.
`
`Ex. 14 at 324 99 341, 342.
`
`Ex. 4 at 268:4-14.
`
`2 GOOGLE VOICE CANNOT INFRINGE UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF
`EQUIVALENTS
`
`A.
`
`Prosecution History Estoppel Precludes Flyp’s Doctrine of Equivalents
`Defense for the 770 Patent
`
`
`
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 169 Filed 11/21/23 Page 17 of 23
`
`
`As discussed above, Flyp amended claim 1 to recite a “bridge telephone number,” rather
`
`than a “bridge address” or “bridge number,” to overcome Black’s teaching of pre-call information
`
`in the form of an alias address using SIP URIs to establish a VoIP calling path. The amendment
`
`precludes Flyp from asserting infringement of the ’770 Patent claims under the Doctrine of
`
`Equivalents. Prosecution history estoppel prevents a patentee from using the Doctrine of
`
`Equivalents to recapture subject matter surrendered from the literal scope of a claim during
`
`prosecution. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 740 (2002);
`
`Pharma Tech Sols., Inc. v. LifeScan, Inc., 942 F.3d 1372, 1380–81 (Fed Cir. 2019); Duramed
`
`Pharms., Inc. v. Paddock Labs., Inc., 644 F.3d 1376, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
`
`Here, the claim term “bridge telephone number” appeared nowhere in the original versions
`
`of the Asserted Claims. Nor did the claims require associating a bridge telephone number with the
`
`switch or providing pre-call information including bridge telephone number to a handset. As
`
`explained above, the patentee added the “bridge telephone number” elements to the issued claims
`
`during prosecution to overcome rejections based on the Black reference. Prosecution history
`
`estoppel thus presumptively applies. Supra at III.B.
`
`Flyp has no defense to this presumed estoppel. The amendments were not just tangentially
`
`related to the accused equivalent.
`
`
`
` The original claim required
`
`only transmission of pre-call information based on pre-set processing rules, while Flyp’s
`
`amendment required that the pre-call information include a “bridge telephone number.” Flyp did
`
`not recite a “bridge address,” “alias address,” or other VoIP-related term in its amendment because
`
`doing so would have left the claim within the scope of Black’s disclosure. Flyp amended the claim
`
`to recite the very thing that is missing for literal infringement here, and
`
`
`
`13
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`
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`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 169 Filed 11/21/23 Page 18 of 23
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`
`
`
`
`
`B.
`
`Flyp Is Similarly Precluded from Relying on the Doctrine of Equivalents for
`Claim 1 of the ’105 Patent
`
`Prosecution history estoppel also applies regarding claim 1 of the ’105 patent because that
`
`claim includes the same claim limitation (“bridge telephone number”) that was added to secure
`
`allowance of claim 1 in the ’770 patent. Prosecution history estoppel resulting from arguments and
`
`amendments regarding one claim may be applied to limit the scope of other claims not only in the
`
`same patent but also in related patents. In re McDonald, 43 F.4th 1340, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2022)
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`(“[T]his court reviews a patent family’s entire prosecution history when applying both the rule
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`against recapture and prosecution history estoppel.” (citation omitted)); Profoot, Inc. v. Merck &
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`Co., Inc., 663 F. App’x 928, 933 n. 2 (Fed. Cir. 2016). For example, amendments and disclaimers
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`may bind continuation or continuation-in-part applications if they involve the same claim
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`limitation. Id.; Traxcell Techs., LLC v. Cellco P’ship, No. 6:20-cv-01175-ADA, Dkt. 211 (W.D.
`
`Tex. Mar. 8, 2023) (citing Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1333 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2003) (“As long as the same claim limitation is at issue, prosecution disclaimer made on the same
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`limitation in an ancestor application will attach.”)); Saunders Grp., Inc. v. Comfortrac, Inc., 492
`
`F.3d 1326, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. AGA Med. Corp., 717 F.3d 929,
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`943 (Fed Cir. 2013).
`
`Claim 1 of the ’105 patent was rejected for non-statutory double patenting over claim 1 of
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`the ’770 patent in combination with U.S. Published Patent Application 2013/0102298. Ex. 7,
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`January 25, 2018 Office Action at 4. Patentee filed a terminal disclaimer over the ’770 patent to
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`secure allowance. Id., April 11, 2018 Reply to Office Action at 15. Claim 1 was thereafter allowed.
`
`Id., May 25, 2018 Notice of Allowance. Claim 1 of the ’105 patent has the same claim language
`
`14
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`
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`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 169 Filed 11/21/23 Page 19 of 23
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`
`as recited in claim 1 of the ’770 patent regarding the “bridge telephone number” and the bridge
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`telephone number connecting to an associated switch:
`
`’770 Patent, Claim 1
`
`’105 Patent, Claim 1
`
`transmitting pre-call information via a data
`channel to the handset under the control of the
`server , said pre-call information including a
`bridge telephone number for connecting the
`handset to the incoming call at the switch
`
`transmitting pre-call information to the handset
`over the at least one data channel the pre-call
`information including the bridge telephone
`number and the handset associated telephone
`number, such that the handset is
`capable of displaying the handset-associated
`telephone number to a user and, based on user
`input, accepting
`the
`incoming call by
`connecting with the switch over the at least one
`voice channel using the bridge telephone
`number.
`
`
`The prosecution history estoppel that applies to “bridge telephone number” for the ’770 patent
`
`therefore applies equally to the recitation of “bridge telephone number” in claim 1 of the ’105
`
`patent. Flyp is precluded from asserting infringement of claim 1 of the ’105 patent by equivalents.
`
`C.
`
`A Bridge Telephone Number Does Not Infringe Under the Doctrine of
`Equivalents Even if that Doctrine Were Available to Flyp
`
`
`
`
`
` Google Voice cannot, therefore, infringe the asserted claims under the DOE. See Warner-
`
`Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997); Advanced Steel Recovery, LLC v.
`
`X-Body Equip., Inc., 808 F.3d 1313, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (dismissing on summary judgment
`
`DOE because Plaintiff failed to satisfy the “way” portion of the function-way-result test).
`
`
`
`
`
`15
`
`
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`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 169 Filed 11/21/23 Page 20 of 23
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`93-95. That theoryfails as a matterof law.
`
`Ex. 3,
`
`Ex. 12 at FLYP035059 CT
`
`Ex. 4 at 202:4-205:2.
`
` 15:19-16:11, cited by Dr. Nettles in Nettles Tech. Appendix, § 26 (Ex. 14).
`
`16
`
`
`
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 169 Filed 11/21/23 Page 21 of 23
`
`
`Ex. 15 at 26:9–27:25 (
`
` See Ex. 4 at 203:14–21 (
`
`(
`
`).
`
`
`
` See
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`) and 205:17–25
`
`).
`
`Therefore, even if Flyp were permitted to rely on the DOE for the “pre-call information”
`
`limitations in claim 1 of the ’105 patent and claim 1 of ’770 patent (despite the patentee’s
`
`amendments), the very different way Google Voice operates and the very different results it
`
`achieves
`
` both preclude infringement.
`
`V.
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`The Court should grant summary judgment of non-infringement of the Incoming Call
`
`Patents.
`
`
`
`17
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`
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`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 169 Filed 11/21/23 Page 22 of 23
`
`
`DATED: November 14, 2023
`
`
`
`
`Respectfully Submitted,
`
`/s/ Robert W. Unikel
`Robert W. Unikel (Pro Hac Vice)
`robertunikel@paulhastings.com
`John A. Cotiguala (Pro Hac Vice)
`johncotiguala@paulhastings.com
`Daniel J. Blake (Pro Hac Vice)
`danielblake@paulhastings.com
`Grayson S. Cornwell (Pro Hac Vice)
`graysoncornwell@paulhastings.com
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`71 South Wacker Drive, Suite 4500
`Chicago, IL 60606
`Telephone: (312) 499-6000
`Facsimile: (312) 499-6100
`
`Elizabeth Brann (Pro Hac Vice)
`elizabethbrann@paulhastings.com
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`4655 Executive Drive, Suite 350
`San Diego, CA 92121
`Telephone: (858) 458-3000
`Facsimile: (858) 458-3005
`
`Robert R. Laurenzi (Pro Hac Vice)
`robertlaurenzi@paulhastings.com
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`200 Park Avenue
`New York, NY 10166
`Telephone: (212) 318-6000
`Facsimile: (212) 319-4090
`
`Joshua Yin (Pro Hac Vice)
`joshuayin@paulhastings.com
`David M. Fox (Pro Hac Vice)
`davidfox@paulhastings.com
`PAUL HASTINGS LLP
`1117 S. California Avenue
`Palo Alto, CA 94304
`Telephone: (650) 320-1800
`Facsimile: (650) 320-1900
`
`Paige Arnette Amstutz
`State Bar No.: 00796136
`pamstutz@scottdoug.com
`
`18
`
`
`
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 169 Filed 11/21/23 Page 23 of 23
`
`
`SCOTT, DOUGLASS & MCCONNICO, LLP
`303 Colorado Street, Suite 2400
`A