Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 1 of 20
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 1 of 20
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`
`WACO DIVISION
`
`FLYPSI, INC. (D/B/A FLYP),
`
`Civil Action No. 6:22-cv-31-ADA
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`vs.
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`FLYPSI, INC.’S OPPOSITION TO GOOGLE LLC’S MOTION
`FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF NON-INFRINGEMENT
`OF U.S. PATENT NOS.9,667,770 AND 10,051,105 (ECF NO. 145)
`
`

`

`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 2 of 20
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 2 of 20
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARYOF THE ARGUMENT....0....c.ccccceeeeceseceseeeeeteeeeseeeeees 1
`
`TE ARGUMENT 200 oeeecceeecccccececescseseescseseesesescnecscseeesacacsceassesarasesecaesesesasacseseseaesacseseseeaeseeenecseseeatareeeees 1
`
`A.—Google is mistaken—the examiner neverrejected, and Flyp never amended nor
`responded, based on whether Black disclosed a bridge telephone numbet......................::::0000++ 1
`
`The Court should deny partial summary judgmentregardingliteral noninfringementof
`B.
`the Inbound Patents. 2... ceceecceeececeeseeseseeeeesescecscseececseseeesesecacscecscseseseseeeeeeeeecsceceeeeeeeeseseseeteeseaneees 5
`
`Google’s Motion is improperly premised on untimely and incorrect claim
`1.
`constructions of “bridge telephone number” and “telephone number.”....................::::ceeeee+5
`2.
`Google’s untimely construction of “bridge telephone number”as a numberthat can
`be dialed on a telephone is inconsistent with the understanding ofa person ofordinary skill
`in the art and the intrinsic Evidence. 2.2... cece eeeeececeseseeseseseeeseseseesescscneseseeecseseacsesceetecseeeacseeees 8
`
`Google’s arguments that Dr. Nettles is wrong about whether Google Voice’s inbound
`3.
`VoIP calling includes a bridge telephone numberis a factual dispute appropriate for the jury
`tO MeCAMe. oes eeeeeeeeeeeeceeeceeeeeceseseeesescscecscecscseseseeesaacscececececeeseseneeeecavececaceseeseseseeeetetsneeeeeceeeneeesees 11
`
`The Court should deny partial summary judgmentregarding noninfringementof the
`C.
`InboundPatents underthe doctrine of equivalents becausethere is no clear disclaimer of claim
`scope in the prosecution History. ............eceeeecececeececesceseeseseeecsceseseeseeeesceaceccaeeacscescsecsteecseeatseeaeeeeaeees 13
`
`TH.
`
`CONCLUSION 2000..cccccccccecccecceceeceecesceseeseeeeesceaceacsaceacsaceacsaesacsecsassecsecsecseseessateseseateneaeeeseasees 14
`
`il
`
`

`

`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 3 of 20
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 3 of 20
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`CASES
`
`Ancora Techs., Inc. v. LG Elecs. Inc.,
`2020 WL 4825716 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2020) ....ececeeecececeeccececeseeseeseseeeeseeseecseeeseeseseeseeeesees 7
`
`Andersonv. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
`ATT US. 242 (U.S. 1986) oooccccceccccccccccececesceseseesesseseeatsesessasacsesscsasecsesesessssascsesatassteasseeaeeesseeess 13
`
`CFMT, Inc. v. Steag Microtech, Inc.,
`194 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ooo.ccccccccccccccescesessescesesessesesscsevscsecscsecscsecsacseacseesssesaeeeseeseseeeees 11
`
`Conoco, Inc. v. Energy & Env't Int'l, L.C.,
`460 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir, 2006) o......ccccccecccceccscecesceseccecseesesassesecsesesescseseessesesseeasseeesseeasesaeeees 13
`
`Elliott v. DFW Communications, Inc..,
`2015 WL 8207506 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2015) ...ceccecceccccccececesceseseeseseeseesesceecseeseecseeeeseeaceesaeeees 13
`
`Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd.,
`535 U.S. 722 (2002)... ccccccccccecccescceseseesessesesscsessesessesacsesseseseessesesacsecsesacsesacsecseeesseseeeesseeesaeeates 13
`
`Finalrod IP, LLC v. John Crane, Inc.,
`2019 WL 4061703 (W.D. Tex. May 30, 2019)......0.cccceccccececcecescesceceseeseeceeeeeeseeecseeeacesesatseeeteees 5
`
`Int'l Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg. Co., Inc.,
`991 F.2d 768 (Fed. Cir. 1993) oo.cccccccccecceccecccesescescesessesessesseavsesasesscsevassassesseseeassasseescseesteacateateees 6
`
`Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,
`358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir, 2004) oo..ccccccccceccccccccsceccseescecessssesesacseessessesesesaesacseeaseeatsasstseeseeatsnteceaees 6
`
`Maxell, Ltd. v. Amperex Tech. Ltd.,
`2022 WL 16858824 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2022) .o...cccecececcccecccescseesseseeceseseesseaestescsteseeateeeateees 6
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir, 2005) oo..ccccccccccccccccescecescesessesessestesesesacsesscscscseceassesecseesssecscseeacassteteees 8
`
`VLSI Tech. LLC v. Intel Corp.,
`2022 WL 1477724 (W.D. Tex. May 10, 2022) .......cccccccecceccecesceecsceseeseseeseseeseseestseeeteeeaee 13, 14
`
`STATUTES
`
`35 U.S.C. § LOZ (a)(L) eee cececeecccccccececececescseeesesesessescsesevacsesesessesesassesessesesesevassesenesscsceasacseacseeeeecacateatecataees 2
`
`ill
`
`

`

`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 4 of 20
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 4 of 20
`
`TABLEOF EXHIBITS!
`
`Description
`
`
`Dr. Scott Nettles — Technical Appendix (Sep. 12, 2023)
`
`Oded Gottesman Deposition Transcript (Oct. 30, 2023)
`
`1 The undersigned herebystates that true and correct copies of the exhibits noted here are
`attached to this Motion.
`
`iv
`
`

`

`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 5 of 20
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 5 of 20
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARYOF THE ARGUMENT
`
`Google’s Motion should be denied. Asto literal infringement, it is premised entirely on
`
`new claim construction arguments about “bridge telephone number” that Googleis raising for the
`
`first time at summary judgment. The Court should deem those arguments untimely and waived.
`
`They are also wrong. Google’s claim-construction arguments are based on improperly reading
`
`disclaimers into the prosecution history that do not exist there and reading limitations from
`
`preferred embodimentsinto the claimsthat likewise do not exist there. Google’s Motion onliteral
`
`infringementis ultimately an attempt to forestall resolving a factual dispute about whether Google
`
`Voice includes a bridge telephone numberPe
`a. The Court should deny Google’s Motion and reservethat dispute for the jury.
`
`The sameis true for Google’s Motionasit relates to prosecution history estoppel. Google
`
`relies on amendments and statements from the applicant that are unrelated (or at most tangentially
`
`related) to the bridge telephone numberto argue that Flyp should be precluded from asserting
`
`equivalents where the bridge telephone numberis an address, such as a URI. None of the
`
`amendments that Google identifies address the form of the bridge telephone number. Nor do any
`
`of the applicant’s statements that it cites from the prosecution history. Summary judgment on
`
`prosecution history estoppel is accordingly not warranted, and Google’s Motion should be denied.
`
`Il.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`A.
`
`Google is mistaken—the examiner never rejected, and Flyp never amended
`nor responded, based on whether Black disclosed a bridge telephone number.
`
`Google misstates the prosecution history for the *770 patent in its Motion. Whether a
`
`“bridge telephone number” could encompass a SIP URI wasnevera topic of discussion during
`
`prosecution, and Flyp never amendedanyclaimsto distinguish the bridge telephone numberin the
`
`

`

`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 6 of 20
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 6 of 20
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`claims from SIP URIs in 2008/0008105 (“Black”). This is evident from the examiner’s rejection
`
`that Google cites, as set forth below:
`
`Claims 14-17, 27, and 28 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as
`being anticipated by Blacket al. (US 2008/0008105).
`
`Regarding claim 14, Black teaches a method of providing telephone
`service, comprising:
`
`associating a telephone handset (telephone) with primary and
`secondary telephone numbers(first and second alias telephone
`numbers) in a database (telephoneis associated with alias telephone
`numbersin the alias service provider) [paragraphs 52-53];
`
`receiving, from the telephone handset via a data channel, digital
`information indicating primary call processing rules(filters/rules for
`a first alias telephone number) for handling calls to the primary
`telephone number(filters are received for handling incoming calls
`to a first alias telephone number) [paragraphs 61, 64];
`
`storing the primary call processing rules digitally (filters/rules are
`stored for the first alias telephone number inafilter database)
`[paragraph 64];
`
`receiving, from the telephone handset via the data channel, digital
`information indicating secondary call processing rules(filters/rules
`for a second alias telephone number) for handling calls to the
`secondary telephone number(filters/rules are received for handling
`incoming calls to a first alias telephone number) [paragraphs 61,
`64];
`
`storing the secondary call processing rules digitally (filters/rules are
`stored for the second alias telephone numberin a filter database)
`[paragraph 64];
`
`receiving a call request to the secondary telephone number(alias
`service provider may receive call
`to a second alias telephone
`number) [paragraph 54];
`
`transmitting pre-call information (notification) to the telephone
`handsetvia the data channel responsiveto receipt of the call request,
`wherein said pre-call information is based on the secondary call
`processing rules
`(telephone
`receives notification based on
`filters/rules for processing inboundcalls) [paragraphs 58, 61];
`
`

`

`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 7 of 20
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 7 of 20
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`receiving information
`information,
`responsive to the pre-call
`indicative of a user input to the telephone handset over the data
`channel (user may take the inboundcall) [paragraph 58]; and
`
`processing the call based on the stored secondary call processing
`rules and user
`input
`to the telephone handset, wherein said
`processing includes an option of connecting the call over a voice
`channel (inboundcall is processed accordingto filters/rules and user
`input which mayresult in taking the call which means connecting
`the call over a voice channel) [paragraphs 58, 61].
`
`(ECF No. 146-3 at 7-8 (emphasis added).) There is no mention in this rejection of SIP URIs, or of
`
`any purported distinction between telephone numbers and addresses, as Google contends. Rather,
`
`as Google admits, the alias addresses in Black (which the examiner applied above as the primary
`
`and secondary telephone numbers) were addresses, not 10-digit PSTN telephone numbers. (See
`
`Mot.at 7 (“Black taught the use of “alias numbers’ or an “alias address,” as opposedto a telephone
`
`number, associated with a subscriber telephone.”).) The examiner thus well understood the term
`
`“telephone number”to be broader than a U.S. ten-digit number, as Google argues now.
`
`In response, Flyp amendedthe claimsto clarify, among other things, that its invention
`
`includes transmitting pre-call information overthe at least one data channelthat includes the bridge
`
`telephone numberand the handset-associated telephone number, such that the handset can display
`
`the handset-associated telephone numberto a user. (See ECF No. 146-3 at 17.) Nowhere in this
`
`amendmentor the remarks accompanyingit did Flyp dispute the examiner’s application of Black’s
`
`addresses as telephone numbers. Nor did Flyp’s amendment limit bridge telephone numbers to
`
`exclude addresseslike those used in Black, such as by stating “a 10-digit, U.S. telephone number,”
`
`as Google now proposes.
`
`Flyp’s remarksinstead simply confirmedthat its amendment wasdirected to differentiating
`
`Black based on how the relevant
`
`telephone numbers are used (e.g.,
`
`transmitting pre-call
`
`information to the handset that includes the bridge telephone numberand the handset-associated
`
`

`

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`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 8 of 20
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`number), without distinguishing the telephone numbers in the claims in any way from the alias
`
`addresses that the examineridentified as telephone numbers in Black:
`
`Without conceding that Black discloses or suggests any limitation,
`Applicant respectfully submits that Black merely describes an alias
`service provider (e.g., an intermediate media proxy) that provides
`alias addresses for transmitting and receiving communications, and
`that Black fails to disclose or suggest all of the limitations now
`recited in claim 14, as amended herein.
`
`In particular, Black fails to disclose or suggest "receiving an
`incoming call over at least one voice channel at a switch, the switch
`being associated with a bridge telephone numbersuch that calls
`directed to the bridge telephone numberare automatically routed to
`the switch, the incoming call being directed to a handset-associated
`telephone number, the handset-associated telephone numberbeing
`the primary telephone numberor the secondary telephone number,"
`let alone rejecting the incoming call based on primary or secondary
`call processing rules and/or “transmitting pre-call informationto the
`handset overthe at least one data channel, the pre-call information
`including the bridge telephone numberand the handset-associated
`telephone number, suchthat the handsetis capable of displaying the
`handset-associated telephone number to a user and, based on user
`input, accepting the incoming call by connecting with the switch
`over the at least one voice channel using the bridge telephone
`number,” as recited in claim 14, as amended herein.
`
`(ECF No. 146-3 at 22-23.) Absent in these remarks is any suggestion that Flyp’s amendment was
`
`narrowing the meaning of telephone numberin a way that would exclude the addresses in Black.
`
`Moreover, Google’s extensive citations to Black’s disclosures (most of which were never
`
`substantively discussed during prosecution) are contrary to its position. Google admits that the
`
`alias addresses in Black can be SIP URIs: “Black taught that a subscriber callee device address
`
`could be any kind ofidentifier, including a SIP URIPe
`ES0: 1:7) sssited above
`
`the examiner applied Black’s addresses (e.g., SIP URIs) as telephone numbers in forming the
`
`relevant rejection. (ECF No. 146-3 at 7-8.) Flyp never challenged that application of addresses as
`
`telephone numbers. It is accordingly evident from the prosecution history and Black that both the
`
`4
`
`

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`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 9 of 20
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`examiner and patentee understand the term “telephone number” to be broader than Google now
`
`suggests, including broad enough to encompassthe alias addresses (e.g., SIP URIs) in Black. Thus,
`
`as discussed further below, there is no viable disclaimeror prosecution history estoppel argument
`
`based on “bridge telephone number.”
`
`B.
`
`The Court should deny partial summary judgment
`noninfringementof the Inbound Patents.
`
`regarding literal
`
`The Court should deny Google’s Motion because it is improperly premised on untimely
`
`and incorrect claim construction arguments that Google has waived.
`
`1.
`
`Google’s Motion is improperly premised on untimely and incorrect
`claim constructions of “bridge telephone number” and “telephone
`number.”
`
`Google’s Motion is a thinly veiled attempt to reopen claim construction for the term
`
`“bridge telephone number.” But by waiting until summary judgmentto raise that issue, Google
`
`has waived it. See Finalrod IP, LLC v. John Crane, Inc., 2019 WL 4061703, at *2 (W.D. Tex.
`
`May 30, 2019) (“an accused infringer waives any argument with respect to the construction of a
`
`claim term when they fail to raise that issue during the claim construction phase of a patent
`
`infringement action”). Google admits that it never “proposed any construction for the term
`
`‘telephone number’or‘bridge telephone number’” and that “those terms have their plain and
`
`ordinary meaning in the context of the [Inbound Patents’] claims and specification.” (Mot. at 5.)
`
`It thus cloaks its Motion as an argumentoverthe plain and ordinary meaning ofthat term in the
`
`art. But its argumentsbelie this position as they are premised almostentirely on prototypical claim
`
`construction analysis, including depending on purported disclaimers in the prosecution history and
`
`statements in specification to limit the terms “bridge telephone number”and “telephone number.”
`
`See id. at 6-9 (arguing these terms should be limited based on the specification and prosecution
`
`history). Consistent with Fina/rod IP, those arguments are waived.
`
`

`

`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 10 of 20
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 10 of 20
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`Those arguments are also wrong. As explained above, the prosecution history that Google
`
`cites related to an amendmentto add the limitation for sending pre-call information overa data
`
`channel
`
`that
`
`includes the bridge telephone number (and the handset-associated telephone
`
`number)—without any suggestion that the patentee was limiting the term “bridge telephone
`
`number”(or “telephone number”) as Google proposes. Google’s arguments from the specification
`
`fare no better. There, Google relies on disclosures that some embodiment may require calling the
`
`bridge telephone numberand that the returncall may be routed over the PSTN:
`
`If the call is accepted in step 414, however, the handset application
`may automatically cause_the_ handset 340 to call the bridge
`telephone numberin step 422 over a voice channel. The return call
`from the handset 340to the bridge telephone number maybe routed
`over _the PSTN 310 to the switch 110 using a voice channel
`connection.
`
`(Mot. at 6 (quoting ECF No. 146-1 at 6:62-7:2) (emphasis added).)
`
`But Google identifies no clear disclaimer that would limit the claims to such embodiments.
`
`Absent that, Google is mistaken that the Court should limit the claimsto a specific embodiment in
`
`whichcalls are routed over the PSTN. See, e.g., Maxell, Ltd. v. Amperex Tech. Ltd., No. W-21-
`
`CV-00347-ADA, 2022 WL 16858824, at *11 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2022) (Albright, J.) (rejecting
`
`proposed construction that “improperly limits the scope of the claim term to specific disclosed
`
`embodiments,” and quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 913 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2004) (“[I]t is improper to read limitations from a preferred embodiment described in the
`
`specification—evenif it is the only embodiment—uinto the claims absent a clear indication in the
`
`intrinsic record that the patentee intended the claimsto be so limited.”)).”
`
`? Google also incorrectly suggests that the Court should construe the claims to require PSTN
`telephone numbers because
`this is rrelevant because “[i]nfringementis determined on the
`. (See, e.g., Mot. at n.4.) But
`basis of the claims, not on the basis of a comparison with the patentee's commercial embodiment
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 11 of 20
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 11 of 20
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`Moreover,the claims themselves show that Google is wrong. Some unasserted claims(e.g.,
`
`claim 2 from the °105 patent) may capture embodiments that involving calling the bridge
`
`telephone number. (See, e.g., ECF No. 146-2 at claim 2 (“whereby the pre-call information allows
`
`the telephone handset to accept the incomingcall to the secondary telephone numberby making
`
`a first bridge call using the first bridge telephone numberto connect the incoming call to the
`
`telephone handsetvia the switch” (emphasis added)).) But the asserted claims more broadly recite
`
`“connecting” (not calling) using the bridge telephone number. (See, e.g., id. at claim 1 (“said pre-
`
`call information including a bridge telephone numberfor connecting the handset to the incoming
`
`call at the switch” (emphasis added)).)
`
`Contrary to Google’s attempts to conflate those embodiments,this distinction in the claims
`
`raises a presumption underthe doctrine of claim differentiation that they are distinct—andthatthe
`
`connecting asserted claims should notbe limited to the unasserted calling embodiments. See, e.g.,
`
`Ancora Techs., Inc. v. LG Elecs. Inc., No. 1-20-CV-00034-ADA, 2020 WL 4825716, at *12 (W.D.
`
`Tex. Aug. 19, 2020) (rejecting defendants’ proposed construction because “would violate the
`
`doctrine of claim differentiation”to eliminate a distinction between two claims).? The Court should
`
`therefore deny Google’s Motion based on these waived andincorrect claim construction positions.
`
`of the claimed invention.” See Int’] Visual Corp. v. Crown Metal Mfg. Co., Inc., 991 F.2d 768, 772
`(Fed. Cir. 1993).
`
`3 Google incorrectly suggests the Cout should also limit the claims based on statements and
`amendments that Flyp made in a foreign application. (Mot. at n.8.) But the claim that Google
`identifies recites “calling the first bridge telephone number”and explicitly limits the voice channel
`to the PSTN. (See ECF No. 146-7 at 2-3.) These limitations do notexist in the asserted claims and
`the foreign application provides no basis for limiting the asserted claims here.
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 12 of 20
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 12 of 20
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`2.
`
`Google’s untimely construction of “bridge telephone number” as a
`number that can be dialed on a telephone is inconsistent with the
`understanding of a person of ordinary skill in the art and the intrinsic
`evidence.
`
`Google is also wrong that the plain meaning of “bridge telephone number” is a number
`
`“that can be dialed from a telephone device.” (See Mot. at 5.) Aside from its incorrect reliance on
`
`the specification (as discussed above), Google relies exclusively on misrepresenting the testimony
`
`of the experts in this case to support this proposition. Contrary to Google’s false suggestion that
`
`Dr. Netsts
`SS5,
`
`But the pertinent question for this case is not what some hypothetical, lay person best friend might
`
`expect a telephone number to be—the question is what a person of ordinary skill of art would
`
`understand the scope of telephone numberbein the art. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
`
`1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“The inquiry into howaperson ofordinary skill in the art understands a
`
`claim term provides an objective baseline from which to begin claim interpretation.
`
`... That
`
`starting pointis based onthe well-settled understanding that inventors are typically personsskilled
`
`in the field of the invention and that patents are addressed to and intendedto be read by others of
`
`skill in the pertinentart.”). For that question, Dr. Nettles was crystal-clearin his deposition thatff
`
`

`

`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 13 of 20
`
`
`
`(ECF No. 145-3 at 179:16-179:25.)
`
`Google’s expert, Dr. Gottesman, similarly testified thatPo
`
`a s
`
`pecification explains, for instance, that the primary telephone numbercanbedistinct from a 10-
`
`digit PSTN number, such as a SIM number or an ESN. (See ECF No. 146-1 at 5:2-4 (“The primary
`
`telephone number, preferably, may be a SIM numberor ESN whichis assignedto the handset 340
`
`at
`
`the time of activation.”).) Confronted with this, Dr. GottesmanPo
`
`

`

`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 14 of 20
`
`(Ex.
`
`1 at 248:9-249:2.) Dr. Gottesman explained that
`
`(Id. at 250:20-251:7, 183:15-184:6
`
`10
`
`

`

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`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 15 of 20
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`Po Asexplained above, however, Dr. Gottesman’s proposed
`
`disclaimeris factually and legally inaccurate.
`
`There is accordingly no consensus among the experts, as Google suggests, that the plain
`
`meaning of telephone numberwould excludeidentifiers like a SIP URI. Rather (as Dr. Gottesman
`
`concedes above for primary telephone number) there appears to be a consensusthat the plain
`
`meaning of telephone numberis broad enough to encompass any number(oraddress) that uniquely
`
`identifies the destination for a call leg—except that Google and its expert have improperly
`
`narrowed that meaning for bridge telephone numberbased on the improperand untimely claim
`
`construction arguments. Google has thus identified (at most) a dispute between Dr. Nettles and
`
`Dr. Gottesman regarding claim application, which is a questionof fact for the jury to resolve. See
`
`CFMT, Inc. v. Steag Microtech, Inc., 194 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 1999). And Google is accordingly
`
`not due summary judgmentof noninfringement.
`
`3.
`
`Google’s arguments that Dr. Nettles is wrong about whether Google
`Voice’s inbound VoIPcalling includes a bridge telephone numberis a
`factual dispute appropriate for the jury to decide.
`
`When attempting to refute Dr. Nettles’
`
`infringement analysis, Google underscores
`
`testimony that precludes summary judgment. Based on his review of Google’s source code and
`
`technical documents, Dr. Nettles has opinedtha
`
`(Ex. 2 § 321.)
`
`

`

`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 16 of 20
`
`
`
`
`(Id. at 177:9-21.) Google vaguely complains that Dr. Nettles did 0iii
`. But as Dr. Nettles explains, fF
`
`aa
`
`( )
`
`Regardless, at this stage,
`
`the Court should accept Dr. Nettles’ opinions and drawall
`
`inferences in Flyp’s favor, despite Google’s protestations. “At the summary judgmentstage ‘the
`
`12
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`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 17 of 20
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 17 of 20
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`evidence of the nonmovantis to be believed, andall justifiable inferences are to be drawnin his
`
`favor.’” Elliott v. DFW Commc’ns, Inc., No. 215-CV-00317-JRG-RSP, 2015 WL 8207506, at *1
`
`(E.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2015) (quoting Andersonv. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,477 U.S. 242, 255 (U.S. 1986)).
`
`Basedon Dr. Nettles’ testimony,as set forth above andin his expert report, a reasonable jury could
`
`nd
`
`and Google’s Motion should be denied.
`
`Cc.
`
`regarding
`judgment
`summary
`partial
`deny
`should
`The Court
`noninfringement of the Inbound Patents under the doctrine of equivalents
`becausethere is no clear disclaimer of claim scope in the prosecution history.
`
`Google has not metits burden to assert prosecution history estoppel. Prosecution history
`
`estoppel can only apply in twoinstances: (1) when there has been a narrowing amendmentto the
`
`claim (amendment-based estoppel) and (2) when the patentee has surrendered claim scope through
`
`argumentto the examiner (argument-based estoppel). See VLSI Tech. LLC v. Intel Corp., No. 6:21-
`
`CV-057-ADA, 2022 WL 1477724, at *14 (W.D. Tex. May 10, 2022).
`
`Importantly, the reach of amendment-based estoppel does not extend to “aspects of the
`
`invention that have only a peripheral relation to the reason the amendment was submitted.” Festo
`
`Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722 (2002). In other words,
`
`amendment-based estoppel is appropriate when “the rationale underlying the amendment may
`
`bear no morethan a tangential relation to the equivalent in question.” Jd. at 740. And “[t]o invoke
`
`argument-based estoppel, ‘the prosecution history must evince a clear and unmistakable surrender
`
`of subject matter.”” VLSI Tech. LLC, 2022 WL 1477724, at *16 (quoting Conoco, Inc. v. Energy
`
`& Env’t Int’l, L.C., 460 F.3d 1349, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
`
`First, amendment-based estoppel cannot apply because the bridge telephone number was
`
`tangential to Flyp’s amendmentrelated to the examiner’s rejection over Black. (See Section II.A,
`
`supra.) The applicant and the examiner both understoodthe alias numbers(i.e., addresses) in Black
`
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`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 18 of 20
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 18 of 20
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`to be telephone numbers, and nothing in the amendment affected that understanding. (/d.) The
`
`amendment was instead addressed (in relevant part) to clarifying that the invention involved
`
`transmitting the bridge telephone numberand a handset-associated telephone number to the
`
`handset over a data channel. (/d.) Equivalents that would use a SIP URI in place of the bridge
`
`telephone number(if it were so limited) are (at most) peripheral or tangential to that amendment.
`
`The Court should therefore deny Google’s Motionasit relates to amendment-based estoppel.
`
`Second, Google has failed to identify any clear and unmistakable surrender of subject
`
`matter that would justify applying argument-based estoppel. Flyp made no statements to the
`
`examinerregarding the scope of the bridge telephone number. (See id.) Moreover, Flyp made no
`
`statements to contradict the examiner’s application of Black’s alias numbers as the primary
`
`telephone numberand secondary telephone numberin the claims. (See id.) The Court should
`
`therefore also deny Google’s Motion as it relates to argument-based estoppel.
`
`Il.
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`The Court should deny Google’s Motion and reserve for the jury the question of whether
`
`Flyp has proven infringement of the Inbound Patents by a preponderance ofthe evidence,either
`
`literally or underthe doctrine of equivalents.
`
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`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 19 of 20
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 19 of 20
`
`DATED: November28, 2023
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`/s/ Thomas M. Melsheimer
`Thomas M. Melsheimer
`
`Texas Bar No. 13922550
`tmelsheimer@winston.com
`M.Brett Johnson
`
`Texas Bar No. 00790975
`mbjohnson@winston.com
`Michael A. Bittner
`Texas Bar No. 24064905
`mbittner@winston.com
`C. Charles Liu
`
`Texas Bar No. 24100410
`ccliu@winston.com
`Steven R. Laxton
`
`Texas Bar No. 24120639
`slaxton@winston.com
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`2121 North Pearl Street, Suite 900
`Dallas, TX 75201
`Telephone: (214) 453-6500
`
`Matthew R. McCullough
`California Bar No. 301330
`mrmecullough@winston.com
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`275 Middlefield Road, Suite 205
`Menlo Park, CA 94025
`Telephone: (650) 858-6500
`
`William M. Logan
`Texas Bar No. 24106214
`wlogan@winston.com
`Evan D. Lewis
`Texas Bar No. 24116670
`edlewis@winston.com
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`800 Capitol Street, Suite 2400
`Houston, TX 77002
`Telephone: (713) 651-2766
`
`ATTORNEYSFOR PLAINTIFF
`
`15
`
`

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`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 20 of 20
`Case 6:22-cv-00031-ADA Document 186 Filed 12/05/23 Page 20 of 20
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I hereby certify that on November 28, 2023, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
`document wasfiled electronically with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECFsystem.As of this
`date, all counsel of record have consented to electronic service and are being served with a copy
`of this document through the Court’s CM/ECF system and by email. Administrative Policies and
`Procedures for Electronic Filing in Civil and Criminal Cases, Western District of Texas, Section
`14.
`
`/s/ Michael A. Bittner
`Michael A. Bittner
`
`16
`
`