`United States Court of Appeals
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
`
`
`
`Decided July 27, 2018
`
`Argued March 16, 2018
`
`
`No. 15-7064
`
`BRIEN O. HILL,
`APPELLANT
`
`v.
`
`ASSOCIATES FOR RENEWAL IN EDUCATION, INC.,
`APPELLEE
`
`
`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the District of Columbia
`(No. 1:12-cv-00823)
`
`
`Yongo Ding, appointed by the court, argued the cause as
`amicus curiae in support of appellant. With him on the brief
`was Anthony F. Shelley, appointed by the court.
`
`
`Brien O. Hill, pro se, filed the briefs for appellant.
`
`Jiyoung Yoon argued the cause and filed the briefs for
`appellee.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`2
`Before: ROGERS, KAVANAUGH* and WILKINS, Circuit
`Judges.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS.
`
`Concurring Opinion filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS.
`
`WILKINS, Circuit Judge: This is an Americans with
`Disabilities Act (“ADA”) employment case. Plaintiff Brien
`Hill is a single-leg amputee who taught in defendant Associates
`for Renewal in Education’s (“ARE’s”) afterschool program.
`The District Court granted partial summary judgment for ARE
`on two of Hill’s claims, which he now appeals. Three other
`claims went to trial, where Hill was awarded damages for
`ARE’s failure to accommodate his disability by refusing his
`request to teach on a lower floor. The primary issues on appeal
`are whether ARE also failed to reasonably accommodate Hill’s
`disability by refusing his request for a classroom aide, and
`whether ARE’s failures to accommodate Hill’s disability
`created a hostile work environment. Hill proceeded pro se in
`the District Court and was represented by appointed counsel
`for this appeal.
`
`We affirm the District Court’s conclusion that Hill has not
`proffered sufficient undisputed facts for his hostile-work-
`environment claim to survive summary judgment. We reverse
`as to Hill’s remaining failure-to-accommodate claim, however,
`because Hill’s allegations present a triable issue of fact as to
`whether ARE violated the ADA when it refused his request for
`a classroom aide.
`
`
`* Judge Kavanaugh was a member of the panel at the time the
`case was argued but did not participate in this opinion.
`
`
`
`

`

`3
`I.
`
`A.
`
`the parties’
`taken from
`The following facts are
`
`submissions on ARE’s motion for summary judgment and are
`undisputed unless otherwise indicated. ARE is a non-profit
`that provides care and educational programs to underserved
`children and adults in Washington, D.C. It is located in a three-
`story building with no elevator, requiring teachers to climb up
`and down the stairs “for fire and emergency evacuation drills,
`supervised outdoor play and scheduled student lavatory breaks
`located on the basement floor.” Supplemental Brief for
`Plaintiff (“Pl. Supp.”) 3, Hill v. Assoc. for Renewal in Educ.,
`No. 12-cv-823, ECF No. 41. Hill, who wears a leg prosthesis,
`was employed by ARE in various capacities until his
`employment was terminated in December 2008. As an ARE
`teacher and program aide, Hill’s duties included “instructing
`participants in the classroom, on field trips or outside activities;
`prepar[ing]
`and
`administer[ing]
`overall
`classroom
`management; counsel[ing] participants on academic and
`behavioral challenges, as well as, provid[ing] administrative
`and/or clerical support to the administrative personnel.”
`Affidavit of La’Troy Bailey (“Bailey Aff.”) ¶ 5, ECF No. 32-
`1. Prior to 2007, Hill requested and was granted several
`accommodations for his disability, including a request for
`assignment to a lower-level classroom.
`
`In May 2007, Hill fell while walking across the ARE
`
`playground, “severely injur[ing his] amputated stump and
`damag[ing his] prosthesis.” Declaration of Brien Hill ¶ 5, ECF
`No. 33. Upon returning to work, he requested a classroom aide
`for himself and his pregnant co-teacher. Hill also requested
`that he be able to continue holding class on the second floor of
`the building. These requests were granted until August 27,
`
`
`
`

`

`4
`2007, when Hill was reassigned to a classroom by himself on
`the third floor and without a classroom aide. Hill alleged that
`he “expressed [his] concerns” about this reassignment verbally
`on August 31, 2007; that he made a written request to be
`“repositioned back to the lower level” and have “the
`accommodation of having an Aide assigned
`to [his]
`classroom;” and that he followed up with “daily verbal
`request[s]” for these two accommodations throughout the
`school year. Declaration of Brien Hill (“Hill Decl.”) ¶¶ 8-10,
`ECF No. 10. These accommodations were not provided. Hill
`was the only teacher in his program who was not assigned a
`classroom aide, and Hill taught more students than any of his
`colleagues.
`
`Around the same period of time, Hill began to have
`
`disciplinary issues at work. On September 1, 2007, Hill’s
`duties were changed to a part-time position due to a reduction
`in force and due to his “excessive tardiness and inconsistent
`call-ins.” Bailey Aff. ¶ 4. His supervisor eventually
`recommended Hill’s termination, and on that same day, Hill
`submitted a letter to ARE’s Deputy Director of Education
`requesting review of the denial of his requests for a classroom
`aide and for assignment to a lower floor, among other issues.
`Hill was terminated effective December 15, 2008.
`
`B.
`
`Hill filed a pro se complaint against ARE asserting, among
`
`other things, a hostile work environment and several ADA
`claims, including failure to accommodate for denying his
`requests for a classroom aide and for denying his request to
`teach on a lower floor. Compl. ¶¶ 43-78, ECF No. 1. ARE
`moved for summary judgment on most of the ADA claims,
`arguing that Hill did not actually make the accommodation
`requests. ARE did not argue that the accommodations of a
`
`
`
`

`

`5
`lower floor or a classroom aide were unreasonable or
`unnecessary for Hill to perform the essential functions of his
`job, nor did ARE argue that Hill was unqualified for his
`position by being physically unable to perform the essential
`functions of his job with or without accommodation.
`
`After receiving the parties’ filings, the District Court
`
`issued an order sua sponte stating that “[t]he record contains no
`evidence (or argument) on the third element of plaintiff’s
`reasonable accommodation claim,” i.e., “whether or not
`plaintiff could perform [his job’s essential] functions with or
`without reasonable accommodation.” Order, ECF No. 40, at 1.
`The order directed the parties “to supplement the record” and
`“advised [Hill] that he should (1) clearly describe the essential
`functions of the part-time job he held in September 2007 when
`he allegedly began requesting the accommodations at issue and
`(2) explain why he needed ‘the accommodation of an Aide’ and
`a relocation to a lower level room to perform the essential
`functions of the job.’” Id. at 2. Hill responded with a fifteen-
`page supplemental submission explaining that “his physical
`disability substantially limited his ability to walk for long
`distances, stand for long periods of time (as required given that
`he supervised his classroom alone), . . . [and] supervise[]
`outdoor play and scheduled student lavatory breaks on the
`basement floor . . . without the hazard of pain and bruises.” Pl.
`Supp. 3. Hill’s supplemental submission also stated that “he
`worked alone and suffered a gradual decline in strength and
`energy due to injury and fatigue from August ’07 - December
`’08,” id. at 4, and that he “performed all the DBA Program
`Aide job(s) . . . alone, from August ’07 - December ’08, and
`experienced grave hardships in doing so,” id. at 12.
`
`In response, ARE argued that Hill admitted he was able to
`
`perform
`the essential
`functions of his
`job without
`accommodation, “but not without pain.” Supplemental Brief
`
`
`
`

`

`6
`for Defendant (“Def. Supp.”) at 3, ECF No. 42. ARE’s
`supplemental submission did not argue
`that Hill was
`unqualified
`for his position or
`that
`the
`requested
`accommodations would cause ARE undue hardship. ARE,
`which was counseled, argued only that Hill did not make the
`accommodation requests and that he did not need the
`accommodations of a lower floor or classroom aide because he
`could perform the essential functions of his position, just with
`“pain.”
`
`The District Court granted summary judgment for ARE on
`
`Hill’s claims for hostile work environment and failure to
`accommodate by refusing to assign him a classroom aide, and
`denied summary judgment on Hill’s claim for failure to
`accommodate by refusing to assign him to a lower floor. Hill
`v. Assoc. for Renewal in Educ., 69 F. Supp. 3d 260, 267-68
`(D.D.C. 2014). Regarding the claim for denial of a classroom
`aide, the District Court concluded Hill “ha[d] not adduced any
`evidence to show that an Aide would have been an effective
`means of addressing the limitations imposed by his amputated
`leg,” and granted summary judgment because “when an
`employee
`seeks
`a workplace
`accommodation,
`the
`accommodation must be related to the limitation that rendered
`the person disabled.” Id. at 268 (quoting Adams v. Rice, 531
`F.3d 936, 944 (D.C. Cir. 2008)).
`
`Three of Hill’s ADA claims proceeded to trial. The jury
`
`found for Hill on his failure-to-accommodate claim for ARE’s
`refusal to assign him to a classroom on a lower floor, awarding
`him compensatory and punitive damages. ARE and Hill both
`moved to set aside the verdict, and the District Court denied
`both motions. Hill now appeals the District Court’s grant of
`summary judgment for ARE on his claims for hostile work
`environment and failure to accommodate by denying the
`request for a classroom aide.
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`7
`
`II.
`
`
`
`
`This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo,
`viewing the “evidence in the light most favorable to the
`nonmoving party” and drawing all reasonable inferences in his
`or her favor. Minter v. District of Columbia, 809 F.3d 66, 68
`(D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Breen v. Dep’t of Transp., 282 F.3d
`839, 841 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). Summary judgment is appropriate
`only if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
`that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,”
`meaning that “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
`return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” Anderson v. Liberty
`Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). We follow the
`general principle that “[a] document filed pro se is ‘to be
`liberally construed.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
`(2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
`
`
`A.
`
`
`ARE did not raise whether a hostile-work-environment
`
`claim is available under the ADA, a question that this Court has
`not yet decided and that we do not reach here. Cf. Lanman v.
`Johnson Cty., 393 F.3d 1151, 155-56 (10th Cir. 2004) (joining
`three other circuits in holding that the ADA’s incorporation of
`language from Title VII shows Congress’s intent to allow
`hostile-work-environment claims to proceed under the ADA).
`Even assuming that the ADA allows recovery for a hostile
`work environment, we affirm the entry of summary judgment
`for ARE on this claim. To prevail on a hostile-work-
`environment claim, “a plaintiff must show that his employer
`subjected him to ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
`insult’ that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
`conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive
`working environment.’” Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d
`
`
`
`

`

`8
`1191, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
`Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). The work environment must be
`both objectively and subjectively hostile, meaning that a
`“reasonable person would find [it] hostile or abusive,” and that
`the victim must “subjectively perceive the environment to be
`abusive.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22. The “conduct must be
`extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of
`employment.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,
`788 (1998).
`
`
`the dismissal of Hill’s hostile-work-
`We affirm
`environment claim because he has not shown that “his
`employer subjected him to ‘discriminatory intimidation,
`ridicule, and insult . . . sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
`the conditions of [his] employment and create an abusive
`working environment.’” Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1201. While a
`jury could find that assigning Hill to the third floor and denying
`him a classroom aide failed to reasonably accommodate his
`disability, these are not the kind of “extreme” conditions that
`this Court and the Supreme Court have found to constitute a
`hostile work environment. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788; cf.
`Singletary v. District of Columbia, 351 F.3d 519, 528 (D.C.
`Cir. 2003) (concluding that a reasonable factfinder could find
`a hostile work environment when the plaintiff was assigned to
`a storage room containing brooms and boxes of debris that
`lacked heat, ventilation, proper lighting, and a working phone,
`and to which plaintiff lacked keys so he was at risk of getting
`locked in). The District Court therefore correctly concluded
`that a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for Hill on his
`hostile-work-environment claim.
`
`
`B.
`
`
`from
`employers
`covered
`prohibits
`The ADA
`
`“discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual on the basis of
`
`
`
`

`

`9
`disability . . . [in the] terms, conditions, and privileges of
`employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Discrimination under the
`ADA includes “not making reasonable accommodations to the
`known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
`individual with a disability.” Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). The ADA
`defines “reasonable accommodation” to include, among other
`things, “making existing facilities used by employees readily
`accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities,” and
`“the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other
`similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.” Id.
`§ 12111(9)(A), (B).
`
`To prevail on a failure-to-accommodate claim, a plaintiff
`
`must show by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that he or
`she has a disability under the ADA; (2) that the employer had
`notice of the disability; (3) that the plaintiff could perform the
`essential functions of the position either with reasonable
`accommodation or without it; and (4) that the employer refused
`to make the accommodation. See Solomon v. Vilsack, 763 F.3d
`1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The requested accommodation “must be
`related to the limitation that rendered the person disabled.”
`Adams, 531 F.3d at 944 (quoting Nuzum v. Ozark Auto.
`Distribs., Inc., 432 F.3d 839, 848 (8th Cir. 2005)). A plaintiff
`“need only show that an ‘accommodation’ seems reasonable on
`its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases. Once the plaintiff
`has made this showing, the defendant/employer then must
`show special (typically case-specific) circumstances that
`demonstrate undue hardship in the particular circumstances.”
`U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401-02 (2002) (citations
`omitted).
`
`
`We conclude Hill sufficiently alleged a connection
`between his disability and the assistance a classroom aide could
`provide while Hill supervised his students to present a triable
`issue of fact as to whether ARE’s denial of an aide violated the
`
`
`
`

`

`10
`in requiring reasonable
` The ADA’s purpose
`ADA.
`accommodations is reducing barriers to employment for
`persons with disabilities. Therefore, to be “reasonable” under
`the ADA, an accommodation must be related to the disability
`that creates the employment barrier and must address that
`barrier; the ADA does not make employers responsible for
`alleviating any and all challenges presented by an employee’s
`disability. See Nuzum, 432 F.3d at 848 (“[T]here must be a
`causal connection between the major life activity that is limited
`and the accommodation sought.”); Felix v. New York City
`Transit Auth., 324 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Adverse
`effects of disabilities and adverse or side effects from the
`medical treatment of disabilities arise ‘because of the
`disability.’ However, other impairments not caused by the
`disability need not be accommodated.”); EEOC’s Interpretive
`Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29
`C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. (2016) (“[A]n employer [does not] have
`to provide as an accommodation any amenity or convenience
`that is not job-related” and “that is not provided to employees
`without disabilities.”). Hill satisfied these requirements by
`alleging that he experienced a hazard of pain and bruising on
`his stump while standing for long periods of time, and by
`specifically connecting that hazard to supervising his class
`without assistance. Construing Hill’s pro se submissions
`liberally and with all reasonable inferences drawn in his favor,
`a reasonable jury could find that if ARE provided Hill a
`classroom aide as it did for his colleagues, that aide could help
`Hill supervise students in the classroom and during outdoor
`activities, reducing his need for prolonged standing and
`mitigating the alleged “hazard of pain and bruising.” Pl. Supp.
`3.
`
`
`ARE argues, for the first time on appeal, that a classroom
`
`aide would not be a reasonable accommodation. (Recall that
`ARE argued below
`that Hill did not request
`these
`
`
`
`

`

`11
`accommodations, a losing argument on summary judgment
`because Hill introduced documentary and testimonial evidence
`of the request). According to ARE, Hill feared only “falling
`while walking” or his prosthesis breaking while he was
`working, and provided “no evidence as to how an aide would
`alleviate this fear” once Hill was assigned to a lower floor.
`ARE Br. in Response to Amicus 10-11. ARE now asserts that
`“[i]t is unlikely an Aide could prevent a fall.” Id. 11. ARE also
`emphasizes that an aide could not help with “problems arising
`from staircase climbing,” and that in any event Hill “assured
`[his supervisor] that his disability did not affect him while he
`worked on the lower level of the facility and did not prevent
`him from performing essential job duties there.” Id. 12. ARE
`uses some language from the complaint to suggest that Hill
`conceded that he did not need an aide if he was moved to a
`lower floor, ignoring that the complaint also alleged that Hill
`supplied ARE “with medical records attesting to his ability to
`perform the essential functions of his job with reasonable
`accommodation of his disability (an aide assigned to his
`classroom).” Compl. ¶ 32 (emphasis added).
`
`ARE also fails to view the evidence in the light most
`
`favorable to Hill, as we must at this stage. Keefe Co. v.
`Americable Int’l, Inc., 169 F.3d 34, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Hill’s
`evidence tended to show not only that he was at risk from
`falling while walking long distances or climbing stairs, but also
`that he would suffer “pain and bruises” from prolonged
`standing while supervising his classroom alone. Hill’s
`submission in response to the District Court’s order also stated
`that “he worked alone and suffered a gradual decline in strength
`and energy due to injury and fatigue from August ’07 -
`December ’08,” Pl. Supp. 4, and that he “performed all the
`DBA Program Aide job(s) . . . alone, from August ’07 -
`December ’08, and experienced grave hardships in doing so,”
`id. at 12. Hill’s documentary evidence showed that he
`
`
`
`

`

`12
`requested an aide “to keep with [my] daily schedule, which
`requires both indoor and outdoor gross motor activities,” Mem.
`from Brien Hill to Nykia Washington, ECF No. 22, at 22,
`thereby connecting the accommodation request to job functions
`that are made difficult and painful by his disability. Construing
`this evidence in the light most favorable to Hill, a reasonable
`jury could find that Hill’s disability put him at risk of pain and
`bruises when standing for long periods of time, that he would
`have to stand for long periods of time while supervising his
`classroom or outdoor play without an aide to assist him, and
`that he did in fact suffer harm “due to injury and fatigue” during
`the time he was denied the accommodation of a classroom aide.
`See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A reasonable jury could also
`conclude that Hill suffered from prolonged standing on his
`stump regardless of the floor on which he taught; therefore,
`contrary to ARE’s assertions, moving Hill to a lower floor
`would not necessarily have resolved his classroom-aide
`request.
`
`
`the
`that Hill did not need
`ARE’s assertion
`accommodation of a classroom aide because he could perform
`the essential functions of his job without accommodation, “but
`not without pain,” Def. Supp. at 3, is unavailing. A reasonable
`jury could conclude that forcing Hill to work with pain when
`that pain could be alleviated by his requested accommodation
`violates the ADA. See Marshall v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 130 F.3d
`1095, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“We assume without deciding
`that if working conditions inflict pain or hardship on a disabled
`employee, the employer fails to modify the conditions upon the
`employee’s demand, and the employee simply bears the
`conditions, this could amount to a denial of reasonable
`accommodation, despite there being no job loss, pay loss,
`transfer, demotion, denial of advancement, or other adverse
`personnel action.”); Gleed v. AT&T Mobility Servs., LLC, 613
`F. App’x 535, 538-39 (6th Cir. 2015) (rejecting an employer’s
`
`
`
`

`

`13
`argument that providing a chair to an employee who
`experienced pain from prolonged standing was not a reasonable
`accommodation
`because
`“the ADA’s
`implementing
`regulations
`require employers
`to provide
`reasonable
`accommodations not only to enable an employee to perform his
`job, but also to allow the employee to ‘enjoy equal benefits and
`privileges of employment as are enjoyed by . . . similarly
`situated employees without disabilities.” (quoting 29 C.F.R.
`§ 1630.2(o)(1)(iii))).
`
`
`To be clear, we do not decide that the classroom aide
`should have been provided as a reasonable accommodation for
`Hill’s disability; rather, we conclude only that on this record, a
`reasonable jury could have concluded as much. We also note
`that this is not a case where Hill’s request for an aide can be
`dismissed, as a matter of law, as a request to have someone else
`perform one or more essential job functions for him. See, e.g.,
`Dark v. Curry Cty., 451 F.3d 1078, 1089 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The
`ADA does not require an employer to exempt an employee
`from performing essential functions or to reallocate essential
`functions to other employees.”); LARSON, EMPLOYMENT
`DISCRIMINATION § 154.04[1] (2d ed. 2007) (“[A]n employer is
`not required to provide an ‘assistant’ to help an employee with
`a disability to perform his or her job” if that assistant is simply
`“reassign[ed] essential functions of a job.”). This is because an
`employer may be required to accommodate an employee’s
`disability by “reallocating or redistributing nonessential,
`marginal job functions,” or by providing an aide to enable the
`employee to perform an essential function without replacing
`the employee in performing that function. 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630,
`App.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (A reasonable
`accommodation may
`include “job
`restructuring,”
`the
`“provision of qualified readers or interpreters,” and “other
`similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.”); see
`also Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 140 (2d
`
`
`
`

`

`14
`Cir. 1995). Viewing the evidence regarding Hill’s request for
`a classroom aide in the light most favorable to Hill, Minter, 809
`F.3d at 68, we understand his request to be for assistance with
`class supervision so that he would not have to “stand for long
`periods of time (as required given that he supervised his
`classroom alone),” Pl. Supp. 3, not a request that an aide
`conduct all class supervision in Hill’s stead, particularly since
`every teacher but Hill had a classroom aide and ARE had given
`Hill such an aide in the past.
`
`
`* * *
`
`
` We affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Hill’s hostile-
`work-environment claim, and we reverse, vacate, and remand
`the partial grant of summary judgment on the claim that Hill
`was denied the reasonable accommodation of a classroom aide
`for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
`
`
`So ordered.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`1
`WILKINS, Circuit Judge, concurring: I write separately to
`note my view that, although we find that the District Court
`erred when it granted partial summary judgment on the claim
`that Hill was denied the reasonable accommodation of a
`classroom aide, it is not absolutely clear that the proper remedy
`is to remand for trial.
`
`
`As stated above, Hill’s complaint alleged a single cause of
`action for failure to accommodate, asserting that ARE failed to
`accommodate his request to be placed on a lower floor and that
`ARE failed to accommodate his request for a teacher’s aide.
`While the District Court granted summary judgment as to the
`teacher aide theory, it nonetheless gave Hill wide latitude
`during the trial to present evidence and argument to the jury
`about the failure to provide an aide. Hill, proceeding pro se,
`complained in both opening statement and closing argument
`about being placed on the third floor “with no assistance.”
`Transcript of Plaintiff Opening Trial Statement at 3, Hill v.
`Associates for Renewal in Educ., No. 12-cv-823 (D.D.C.
`2015), ECF No. 95; Transcript of Jury Trial at 669, ECF No.
`104. Hill also introduced testimony about the duties that aides
`provide, id. at 95-96, ECF No. 101, and suggesting that every
`teacher had an aide other than him during the 2007-2008 school
`year, id. at 288, 293, 318-19, 367-68, ECF No. 102; id. at 553,
`556, ECF No. 103. When Hill testified about the pain and
`injury he allegedly suffered, he stated numerous times that it
`was due to “work[ing] unassisted on the third floor,” id. at 589-
`90, so he repeatedly told the jury that the failure to provide him
`an aide contributed to his pain and suffering, id. at 562, 626-
`27.
`
`
`In sum, although ARE was granted summary judgment
`with regard to the failure to provide an aide, the District Court
`was quite solicitous of Hill in allowing him to present evidence
`and argument at trial regarding his classroom-aide claim.
`
`
`
`

`

`2
`Under these circumstances, it seems quite plausible that in
`finding for Hill on the reasonable accommodation claim, the
`jury took into account any pain and injury Hill suffered due to
`the failure to provide him with an aide. Indeed, the jury was
`not instructed that the only accommodation request that it could
`consider was the failure to move Hill to a lower floor; rather,
`the jury was told simply to recompense Hill if it found in his
`favor on the failure to accommodate claim, without specifying
`which particular accommodation to consider. Id. at 719, 723-
`24, ECF No. 104. Further, the jury was instructed that it could
`award compensatory damages for “any physical pain or
`emotional distress . . . that the plaintiff has suffered in the past.
`. . [or] may suffer in the future,” id. at 731 (emphasis added).
`Similarly, the jury was instructed that “[i]f you find for the
`plaintiff, then you must award the plaintiff a sum of money
`which will fairly and reasonably compensate him for all the
`damage which he experienced that was proximately caused by
`the defendant.” Id. at 730 (emphasis added).
`
`It is well settled that a party “cannot recover the same
`damages twice, even though the recovery is based on two
`different theories.” Medina v. District of Columbia, 643 F.3d
`323, 326 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Thus, even if the
`District Court erred in granting partial summary judgment, Hill
`is not entitled to a windfall of double damages from a second
`trial if the jury already compensated him for ARE’s failure to
`provide him an aide in the damages award from the first trial.
`“[H]e should be made whole for his injuries, not enriched.” Id.;
`see also Youren v. Tintic Sch. Dist., 343 F.3d 1296, 1306 (10th
`Cir. 2003); Tompkins v. Cyr, 202 F.3d 770, 785 (5th Cir. 2000);
`Bender v. City of New York, 78 F.3d 787, 794 (2d Cir. 1996).
`It is appropriate to leave it to the District Court to determine, in
`the first instance, the proper manner to proceed upon remand,
`including whether the remaining failure to accommodate
`theory should be dismissed because Hill “has already obtained
`
`
`
`

`

`3
`all the relief available to [him].” Ridgell-Boltz v. Colvin, 565
`F. App’x 680, 684 (10th Cir. 2014).
`
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`