throbber
USCA Case #21-7078 Document #1940859 Filed: 03/28/2022 Page 1 of 48
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`[ORAL ARGUMENT NOT YET SCHEDULED]
`No. 21-7078
`
`In the United States Court of Appeals
`for the District of Columbia Circuit
`
`__________________________________________
`
`STATE OF NEW YORK, ET AL.,
`Plaintiffs-Appellants,
`v.
`FACEBOOK, INC.,
`Defendant-Appellee.
`
`__________________________________________
`
`On Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the District of Columbia, No. 1:20-cv-03589
`The Honorable James E. Boasberg
`BRIEF FOR AMICI CURIAE THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
`OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, COMPUTER &
`COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, AND THE
`BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE SUPPORTING DEFENDANT-
`APPELLEE AND AFFIRMANCE
`
`__________________________________________
`
`__________________________________________
`
`
`
`Jonathan D. Urick
`Tyler S. Badgley
`U.S. Chamber Litigation Center
`1615 H Street, N.W.
`Washington, DC 20062
`Counsel for Amicus Curiae
`Chamber of Commerce of the
`United States of America
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Noel J. Francisco
`Craig A. Waldman
`James M. Burnham
`Brinton Lucas
`Charles E.T. Roberts*
`JONES DAY
`51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, DC 20001
`Telephone: 202-879-5429
`jburnham@jonesday.com
`*Admitted in Pennsylvania
`Not admitted in D.C. (directly
`supervised by James M. Burnham,
`a licensed D.C. Bar member)
`Counsel for Amici Curiae
`(additional counsel listed on inside cover)
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`

`USCA Case #21-7078 Document #1940859 Filed: 03/28/2022 Page 2 of 48
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`
`(continued from front cover)
`
`
`David C. Kiernan
`Craig E. Stewart
`JONES DAY
`555 California Street, 26th Floor
`San Francisco, CA 94104
`
`Counsel for Amici Curiae
`
`
`
`Stephanie A. Joyce
`Computer & Communications
`Industry Association
`25 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, DC 20001
`
`Counsel for Amicus Curiae
`Computer & Communications
`Industry Association
`
`Liz Dougherty
`Business Roundtable
`1000 Maine Avenue, S.W.
`Washington, DC 20024
`
`Counsel for Amicus Curiae
`Business Roundtable
`
`
`
`ii
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`

`

`USCA Case #21-7078 Document #1940859 Filed: 03/28/2022 Page 3 of 48
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`
`CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS,
`AND RELATED CASES
`
`Pursuant to D.C. Cir. R. 28(a)(1), the undersigned counsel for amici
`
`curiae certifies the following:
`
`(A) Parties and Amici.
`
`Except for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
`
`America, Computer & Communications Industry Association, Business
`
`Roundtable, and the following, all parties and amici appearing before the
`
`district court and in this Court are listed in the Brief for Plaintiffs-
`
`Appellants and the Brief for Defendant-Appellee.
`
`Amici Curiae: International Center for Law and Economics, Henry
`
`N. Butler, Richard A. Epstein, Thomas Hazlett, Justin (Gus) Hurwitz,
`
`Jonathan Klick, Thomas A. Lambert, Daniel Lyons, Geoffrey A. Manne,
`
`Alan J. Meese, Paul H. Rubin, Michael Sykuta, John Yun, Washington
`
`Legal Foundation, the Information Technology and Innovation Fund, and
`
`Shana Wallace.
`
`(B) Ruling Under Review.
`
`References to the ruling at issue appear in the Brief for Plaintiffs-
`
`Appellants and the Brief for Defendant-Appellee.
`
`i
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`

`

`USCA Case #21-7078 Document #1940859 Filed: 03/28/2022 Page 4 of 48
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`(C) Related Cases.
`
`FTC v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-03590, pending before the
`
`United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
`
`/s/ James M. Burnham
`James M. Burnham
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`

`USCA Case #21-7078 Document #1940859 Filed: 03/28/2022 Page 5 of 48
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`
`CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
`
`The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America is a
`
`nonprofit organization organized under the laws of the District of
`
`Columbia. It has no parent corporation, and no publicly held company
`
`owns ten percent or more of its stock.
`
`Computer & Communications Industry Association (CCIA) is a
`
`trade association operating as a 501(c)(6) non-profit, non-stock
`
`corporation organized under the laws of Virginia. CCIA has no parent
`
`corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its
`
`stock.
`
`The Business Roundtable is a nonprofit organization organized
`
`under the laws of the District of Columbia. It has no parent corporation,
`
`and no publicly held corporation owns more than ten percent of its stock.
`
`/s/ James M. Burnham
`James M. Burnham
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
`
`

`

`USCA Case #21-7078 Document #1940859 Filed: 03/28/2022 Page 6 of 48
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`RULE 29(d) CERTIFICATION
`
`Pursuant to D.C. Cir. R. 29(d), amici certify that a separate brief is
`
`necessary because the amici, the Chamber of Commerce of the United
`
`States of America, Computer & Communications Industry Association,
`
`and the Business Roundtable, have a unique perspective and expertise
`
`on issues raised in this appeal, and seek to address only those issues for
`
`which that perspective and expertise is most relevant. Amici believe that
`
`a separate brief is required to offer this unique perspective and expertise.
`
`
`
`/s/ James M. Burnham
`James M. Burnham
`
`
`
`iv
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`

`

`USCA Case #21-7078 Document #1940859 Filed: 03/28/2022 Page 7 of 48
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`Page
`
`CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS
`AND RELATED CASES ...................................................................... i
`CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT.......................................... iii
`RULE 29(d) CERTIFICATION ................................................................ iv
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................... vi
`IDENTITY AND INTERESTS OF THE AMICI CURIAE ...................... 1
`ARGUMENT .............................................................................................. 3
`I. The Doctrine Of Laches Forecloses The States’ Claims ................... 4
`A. Laches Applies To State Actions Seeking Injunctive
`Relief Under Section 16 Of The Clayton Act .............................. 4
`B. The District Court Properly Applied Laches Here ................... 18
`II. Refusal-To-Deal Claims Cannot Survive The Pleading
`Stage Where There Is No Prior Course of Profitable
`Dealing Between The Parties, Nor Where There Are
`Pro-Competitive Justifications ........................................................ 22
`A. A Business’s Unilateral Refusal To Deal May
`Support Antitrust Liability Only In Exceedingly
`Narrow Circumstances .............................................................. 22
`B. Dismissing Refusal-To-Deal Claims Wherever
`The Complaint Fails To Satisfy This Framework
`Provides Vital Certainty ............................................................ 29
`CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 33
`
`
`v
`
`

`

`USCA Case #21-7078 Document #1940859 Filed: 03/28/2022 Page 8 of 48
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`CASES
`Adams v. Woods,
`6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336 (1805) ............................................................... 10
`Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n,
`139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019) .......................................................................... 15
`Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah,
`414 U.S. 538 (1974) .............................................................................. 14
`Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,
`472 U.S. 585 (1985) .................................................................. 24, 25, 26
`Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) ........................................................................ 32, 33
`Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of
`Yakima Indian Nation,
`492 U.S. 408 (1989) .............................................................................. 17
`Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,
`745 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1984) .............................................................. 32
`Chapman v. Tristar Prods., Inc.,
`940 F.3d 299 (6th Cir. 2019) .................................................................. 6
`Christy Sports, LLC v. Deer Valley Resort Co.,
`555 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2009) ............................................................ 27
`City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y.,
`544 U.S. 197 (2005) .............................................................................. 17
`Costello v. United States,
`365 U.S. 265 (1961) .............................................................................. 19
`Covad Commc’ns Co. v. BellSouth Corp.,
`374 F.3d 1044 (11th Cir. 2004) ............................................................ 27
`EEOC v. Fed. Express Corp.,
`268 F. Supp. 2d 192 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) .................................................. 16
`
`vi
`
`

`

`USCA Case #21-7078 Document #1940859 Filed: 03/28/2022 Page 9 of 48
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`Page(s)
`
`Elmendorf v. Taylor,
`23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152 (1825) .............................................................. 4
`Gabelli v. SEC,
`568 U.S. 442 (2013) .............................................................................. 15
`Georgia v. Evans,
`316 U.S. 159 (1942) ............................................................................ 5, 7
`Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co.,
`324 U.S. 439 (1945) ................................................................................ 9
`Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. United States,
`304 U.S. 126 (1938) .............................................................................. 18
`In re Elevator Antitrust Litig.,
`502 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2007) ................................................................... 27
`Minnesota v. N. Sec. Co.,
`194 U.S. 48 (1904) .................................................................................. 6
`Morris Commc’ns Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc.,
`364 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2004) ............................................................ 28
`NCAA v. Alston,
`141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021) .................................................................... 13, 30
`New York v. Microsoft Corp.,
`209 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D.D.C. 2002) ........................................................ 7
`Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`731 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2013) ................................................ 26, 27, 30
`Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue
`Cross & Blue Shield of R.I.,
`883 F.2d 1101 (1st Cir. 1989) .............................................................. 27
`Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co.,
`797 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1986) ................................................................ 27
`Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc.,
`321 U.S. 342 (1944) .............................................................................. 13
`
`vii
`
`

`

`USCA Case #21-7078 Document #1940859 Filed: 03/28/2022 Page 10 of 48
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`Page(s)
`
`Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc.,
`555 U.S. 438 (2009) ............................................................ 23, 25, 29, 30
`People ex rel. Vacco v. Mid Hudson Med. Grp., P.C.,
`877 F. Supp. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ........................................................ 16
`Rothe Dev., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def.,
`836 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 2016) .................................................................. 7
`Russell v. Todd,
`309 U.S. 280 (1940) .............................................................................. 19
`SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc.,
`36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 1994) ................................................................ 27
`Schor v. Abbott Labs.,
`457 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 2006) ................................................................ 23
`St. Luke’s Hosp. v. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc.,
`8 F.4th 479 (6th Cir. 2021) .................................................................. 27
`State v. LG Elecs., Inc.,
`375 P.3d 636 (Wash. 2016) .................................................................... 9
`Trump v. Vance,
`140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) .......................................................................... 17
`United States v. Colgate & Co.,
`250 U.S. 300 (1919) ........................................................................ 22, 26
`Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offs. of
`Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,
`540 U.S. 398 (2004) .................................................. 4, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27
`Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp.,
`951 F.3d 429 (7th Cir. 2020) ................................................................ 28
`
`
`
`
`
`viii
`
`

`

`USCA Case #21-7078 Document #1940859 Filed: 03/28/2022 Page 11 of 48
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`Page(s)
`
`STATUTES
`15 U.S.C. § 4 ............................................................................................... 6
`15 U.S.C. § 15b............................................................................................ 6
`15 U.S.C. § 22 ........................................................................................... 11
`15 U.S.C. § 26 ............................................................................................. 5
`15 U.S.C. § 1264........................................................................................ 16
`16 U.S.C. § 1532........................................................................................ 16
`16 U.S.C. § 1540........................................................................................ 16
`28 U.S.C. § 1407.......................................................................................... 8
`29 U.S.C. § 626.......................................................................................... 16
`33 U.S.C. § 1365........................................................................................ 16
`42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 ................................................................................... 16
`42 U.S.C. § 6972........................................................................................ 16
`42 U.S.C. § 7604........................................................................................ 16
`42 U.S.C. § 12117...................................................................................... 16
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp,
`Antitrust Law (1978 & Suppl. 2021) ..................... 14, 15, 18, 21, 23, 26
`Phillip E. Areeda, Essential Facilities: An
`Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles,
`58 Antitrust L.J. 841 (1990) ................................................................ 24
`Phillip E. Areeda, Monopolization, Mergers,
`and Markets: A Century Past and the Future,
`75 Cal. L. Rev. 959 (1987) .................................................................... 10
`51 Cong. Rec. S14519 (daily ed. Sept. 1, 1914) ......................................... 7
`Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust,
`63 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1984) ....................................................................... 30
`
`ix
`
`

`

`USCA Case #21-7078 Document #1940859 Filed: 03/28/2022 Page 12 of 48
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`Page(s)
`
`Fed. R. App. P. 29 ....................................................................................... 1
`Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys Gen. to
`Sen. Klobuchar et al. (June 18, 2021) ................................................... 8
`A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements
`and Other Exclusionary Conduct—Are There
`Unifying Principles?, 73 Antitrust L.J. 375 (2006) ............................ 30
`
`
`
`x
`
`

`

`USCA Case #21-7078 Document #1940859 Filed: 03/28/2022 Page 13 of 48
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`
`IDENTITY AND INTERESTS OF THE AMICI CURIAE1
`
`The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America (the
`
`Chamber) is the world’s largest business federation. It represents
`
`approximately 300,000 direct members and indirectly represents the
`
`interests of more than three million companies and professional
`
`organizations of every size, in every industry sector, and from every
`
`region of the country. An important function of the Chamber is to
`
`represent the interests of its members in matters before Congress, the
`
`Executive Branch, and the courts. To that end, the Chamber regularly
`
`files amicus briefs in cases, like this one, that raise issues of concern to
`
`the Nation’s business community.
`
`Computer & Communications Industry Association
`
`(CCIA)
`
`represents more than 20 companies offering high-technology products
`
`and services. For 50 years, CCIA has promoted open markets, open
`
`systems, and open networks. CCIA members employ more than 1.6
`
`
`1 Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4)(E), amici curiae state that all
`parties to this appeal have consented to the filing of this brief, and that
`no counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part and no
`entity or person, aside from amici curiae, their members, or their counsel,
`made any monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or
`submission of this brief.
`
`1
`
`

`

`USCA Case #21-7078 Document #1940859 Filed: 03/28/2022 Page 14 of 48
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`million workers, invest more than $100 billion in research and
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`development, and contribute trillions of dollars in productivity to the
`
`global economy. A list of CCIA members is available at https://
`
`www.ccianet.org/members.
`
`Business Roundtable is an association of over 200 chief executive
`
`officers of leading U.S. companies with 20 million employees and $9
`
`trillion in annual revenues. The association was founded on the belief
`
`that businesses should play an active and effective role in the formation
`
`of public policy, and Business Roundtable participates in litigation as
`
`amicus curiae where important business interests are at stake.
`
`Amici and their members have a substantial interest in this appeal
`
`for two reasons. First, amici’s members rely on the doctrine of laches as
`
`a defense against claims brought after unreasonable delays. The
`
`availability of that defense takes on increased importance in contexts like
`
`this one, where States seek to sanction businesses based on long-ago
`
`transactions that regulators approved at the time.
`
`Second, one theory of antitrust liability advanced here seriously
`
`threatens the ability of businesses to freely and efficiently operate.
`
`Under federal antitrust law, refusal-to-deal liability can exist only when
`
`2
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`

`

`USCA Case #21-7078 Document #1940859 Filed: 03/28/2022 Page 15 of 48
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`a firm unilaterally terminates a prior profitable course of dealing and,
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`even then, only when the refusal to continue dealing has no pro-
`
`competitive justification. Any other rule—and especially the ad hoc test
`
`the States propose—would deprive businesses of the certainty required
`
`to innovate in competitive markets, while subjecting them to costly
`
`antitrust litigation that will deter pro-competitive behavior and thus
`
`undermine consumer welfare.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`Seeking injunctive relief under Section 16 of the Clayton Act, a
`
`coalition of 46 States, the District of Columbia, and the Territory of Guam
`
`(the States) asks this Court to fundamentally change the law in at least
`
`two respects. As a threshold matter, they seek a ruling that a federal
`
`court can never—not after 10 years, 20 years, or 200 years—apply laches
`
`to any State or Territory when it sues to enforce federal law or protect
`
`federal public rights. As a backup, they ask this Court to conjure a novel
`
`and constricted version of laches that would lead to much the same place.
`
`And while this case involves antitrust claims, the States’ sweeping
`
`position would have much broader ramifications—threatening eternal
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`liability across large swaths of the economy. That theory cannot be
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`3
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`

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`USCA Case #21-7078 Document #1940859 Filed: 03/28/2022 Page 16 of 48
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`squared with the Clayton Act’s text, nor does it have anything to
`
`commend it as a policy matter.
`
`On the merits, the States ask this Court to abandon the Supreme
`
`Court’s holding in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis
`
`V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004), that entities have the right to not
`
`deal with competitors except in exceedingly narrow circumstances. This
`
`Court should decline. It should instead follow the Supreme Court and
`
`hold that a refusal-to-deal claim cannot survive a motion to dismiss
`
`where, as here, the parties have no prior course of profitable dealing or,
`
`even if such a course of dealing existed, the refusal serves some pro-
`
`competitive justification.
`
`I.
`
`The Doctrine Of Laches Forecloses The States’ Claims.
`A. Laches Applies To State Actions Seeking Injunctive
`Relief Under Section 16 Of The Clayton Act.
`
`For as long as courts have sat in equity, the doctrine of laches has
`
`protected parties from stale and prejudicial claims. See Elmendorf v.
`
`Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 168 (1825) (Marshall, C.J.). The States
`
`nevertheless seek a wholesale exemption from this defense that would
`
`apply no matter how unreasonable the delay or how prejudicial its effect.
`
`4
`
`

`

`USCA Case #21-7078 Document #1940859 Filed: 03/28/2022 Page 17 of 48
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`That is not a framework approved by Congress, sanctioned by history, or
`
`supported by sound policy.
`
`1.
`
`Section 16 of the Clayton Act provides that “[a]ny person” may
`
`obtain an injunction to prevent threatened injury from an antitrust
`
`violation “when and under the same conditions and principles as
`
`injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or
`
`damage is granted by courts of equity.” 15 U.S.C. § 26. The States do
`
`not deny they qualify as “person[s]” under Section 16, and the Supreme
`
`Court’s decision in Georgia v. Evans says as much. 316 U.S. 159, 162
`
`(1942). Nor do they dispute that “the conditions and principles”
`
`governing the availability of an injunction in “courts of equity” include
`
`the defense of laches. The States are thus subject to the defense of laches
`
`as much as any other “person” who invokes the Clayton Act.
`
`That should be the end of the matter, but the States invoke what
`
`is, in their view, another “settled principle of equity”—that laches
`
`provides no shield against suits by “sovereign States enforcing public
`
`rights.” Br. 25. Whatever the merits of that principle, the States do not
`
`come here as “sovereign States enforcing public rights”; again, they come
`
`here as “persons” under Section 16—the only provision their complaint
`
`5
`
`

`

`USCA Case #21-7078 Document #1940859 Filed: 03/28/2022 Page 18 of 48
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`
`invokes. See JA44. The United States has a cause of action as the
`
`sovereign to obtain injunctive relief, 15 U.S.C. § 4, but that provision does
`
`not deputize the States as parallel sovereign enforcers. Confirming as
`
`much, Congress did put the States on the same footing as the United
`
`States in another provision—subjecting damages actions when either
`
`sues as parens patriae to a four-year statute of limitations. See id. § 15b.
`
`The States’ theory of standing underscores their equivalence to
`
`other “persons” under the Clayton Act. The States have claimed standing
`
`not as sovereigns, but as parens patriae—“a form of third-person standing
`
`that allow[s] the sovereign to legally step into the shoes of individual
`
`citizens.” Chapman v. Tristar Prods., Inc., 940 F.3d 299, 305 (6th Cir.
`
`2019); see D. Ct. Dkt. 122 at 5; JA234-37. The States cannot have it both
`
`ways. They cannot bring a claim on their citizens’ behalf that is, in turn,
`
`free from the equitable restrictions those citizens themselves would face
`
`had they sued as “persons” under Section 16.
`
`The Clayton Act’s history is no better for the States than its text.
`
`Congress passed the Clayton Act after two decades of the Sherman Act
`
`omitting a cause of action for States or private parties. See Minnesota v.
`
`N. Sec. Co., 194 U.S. 48, 70-71 (1904). When Congress in 1914 decided
`
`6
`
`

`

`USCA Case #21-7078 Document #1940859 Filed: 03/28/2022 Page 19 of 48
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`
`to create such a cause of action via the Clayton Act, it rejected an
`
`amendment that would have deputized state attorneys general to bring
`
`suit “in the name of the United States.” 51 Cong. Rec. S14519-27 (daily
`
`ed. Sept. 1, 1914); see Evans, 316 U.S. at 162 n.1. “‘Few principles of
`
`statutory construction are more compelling than the proposition that
`
`Congress does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it
`
`has earlier discarded in favor of other language.’” Rothe Dev., Inc. v. U.S.
`
`Dep’t of Def., 836 F.3d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
`
`The United States has long agreed, taking the position that “the
`
`States … do not stand on equal footing with the United States as
`
`enforcers of the federal antitrust laws.” Mem. Amicus Curiae of the
`
`United States at 4, New York v. Microsoft Corp., 209 F. Supp. 2d 132
`
`(D.D.C. 2002) (No. 98-1233), https://bit.ly/3fJDlVw. Specifically, “[i]n
`
`pursuing injunctive relief” under the Clayton Act, “the States appear
`
`before the Court as private parties, not as sovereign law enforcers.” Id.
`
`The United States has not retreated from this position. It filed an amicus
`
`brief in support of the States here, but its support on the vital issue of
`
`laches is confined to deafening silence.
`
`7
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`

`

`USCA Case #21-7078 Document #1940859 Filed: 03/28/2022 Page 20 of 48
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`
`Even the States themselves—in a recent letter signed by the
`
`attorneys general for nearly every jurisdiction suing here—have
`
`acknowledged they do not stand “on equal footing with federal enforcers
`
`in deciding where, when, and how to prosecute cases” for federal antitrust
`
`violations. Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys Gen. to Sen. Klobuchar et al.
`
`(June 18, 2021), https://bit.ly/3D31Po8. In that context, the States urged
`
`Congress to amend 28 U.S.C. § 1407(g) to exempt them from the ordinary
`
`venue rules governing multidistrict litigation so that they, like the
`
`federal government, could “pursue relief without undue delay and
`
`distractions caused by the particularized interests of private plaintiffs.”
`
`Id. But that plea to Congress just underscores that current law treats
`
`the United States differently from state plaintiffs when it comes to
`
`antitrust litigation.
`
`2.
`
`In the face of all this, the States turn to policy arguments. The
`
`States do not identify a single appellate decision in the Clayton Act’s
`
`century-plus history approving of injunctions under Section 16 without
`
`overcoming laches, see Br. 22-28; JA263, and instead ask this Court to
`
`innovate based on pleas about the historic role of States in enforcing
`
`antitrust laws. Setting aside that policy pleas cannot overcome statutory
`
`8
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`

`

`USCA Case #21-7078 Document #1940859 Filed: 03/28/2022 Page 21 of 48
`
`
`text, this particular request is misplaced on its own terms. States
`
`obviously play an important role in protecting the public good, including
`
`in antitrust. States are free to sue as sovereigns to enforce their own
`
`antitrust laws. See, e.g., State v. LG Elecs., Inc., 375 P.3d 636, 638 (Wash.
`
`2016). States may even sue to enforce federal antitrust laws, including
`
`by filing suit under Section 16. See, e.g., Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S.
`
`439, 447 (1945). But what they cannot do is bring whatever equitable
`
`claim they choose free from the constraints of equity.
`
`Nor does the broader policy calculus favor the States. Far from
`
`yielding an unalloyed good for consumers, unleashing more than 50
`
`governments to file antitrust claims based on ancient conduct would
`
`upend the national economy.
`
` It would subject every business
`
`transaction—no matter how uncontroversial or pro-competitive—to the
`
`eternal threat of litigation based on political, cultural, and business
`
`trends decades after the deal has closed. That is a recipe for uncertainty
`
`and inefficiency, all to the detriment of consumers.
`
`a.
`
`Timeliness defenses, laches included, play a fundamental role
`
`in our legal system and our economy by providing certainty to businesses
`
`in conducting their affairs. In the words of Chief Justice Marshall, it
`
`9
`
`

`

`USCA Case #21-7078 Document #1940859 Filed: 03/28/2022 Page 22 of 48
`
`
`“would be utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws” if an action for
`
`financial sanctions could “be brought at any distance of time.” Adams v.
`
`Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 342 (1805). The same could be said about
`
`an action seeking the equitable remedies available under the Clayton
`
`Act, at least some of which are orders of magnitude more severe, such as
`
`the divestiture of long-ago-acquired companies that the States seek here.
`
`JA114. Businesses, their shareholders, and their customers deserve to
`
`know that decades-old transactions will not be unwound by a state or
`
`territorial government’s belated trip to the courthouse. The insecurity of
`
`knowing that the structure of an established enterprise is forever subject
`
`to judicial revision would cast a cloud over all business dealings down the
`
`line.
`
`The States’ contrary approach would inject deep uncertainty and
`
`impose substantial costs for all businesses engaged in conduct potentially
`
`subject to the Sherman Act—not just the companies that are actually
`
`targeted by stale claims. Clear rules allow “private parties to plan their
`
`affairs,” while the opaque standard the States advocate would yield the
`
`“quixotic results” that flow from “vague standards, inconsistently
`
`applied.” Phillip Areeda, Monopolization, Mergers, and Markets: A
`
`10
`
`

`

`USCA Case #21-7078 Document #1940859 Filed: 03/28/2022 Page 23 of 48
`
`
`Century Past and the Future, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 959, 970 (1987).
`
`Maintaining a state of readiness for potential claims that arise from
`
`every prior transaction in a company’s long history would require
`
`maintaining greater financial reserves, avoiding certain transactions, or
`
`purchasing insurance policies for ever-higher prices. Those costs would
`
`not be borne by billionaires; they would fall on consumers via increased
`
`prices and abandoned transactions that would have otherwise enhanced
`
`efficiency and consumer welfare. And those costs would proliferate
`
`across the country, given the antitrust laws’ liberal venue provision. See
`
`15 U.S.C. § 22 (permitting suit “in any district wherein [a corporation]
`
`may be found or transacts business”).
`
`Consider the tumult that would accompany a State or Territory
`
`suddenly challenging transactions like Bristol Myers-Squibb (1989),
`
`Atlantic Richfield-Sinclair Oil (1969), or perhaps the merger of multiple
`
`concerns into Edison General Electric Company (1889). Regardless of
`
`whether such a challenge ultimately succeeded, the litigation would
`
`impose significant burdens on the parties and untold costs on the
`
`economy. Just consider the difficulties of this case, where the States seek
`
`to unwind federally pre-cleared transactions from between eight and ten
`
`11
`
`

`

`USCA Case #21-7078 Document #1940859 Filed: 03/28/2022 Page 24 of 48
`
`
`years ago (Whatsapp and Instagram) that were worth billions of dollars
`
`and that have served as the foundation for countless developments in
`
`Facebook’s business and the tech sector more broadly.
`
`b. Beyond providing much-needed certainty to businesses,
`
`defenses like laches promote effective enforcement of the law. For
`
`starters, they focus agencies’ attention on fresh cases and ongoing
`
`misconduct. Removing any requirement to timely file suit would invite
`
`delay, distract from enforcing against current conduct, massively expand
`
`the scope of potential enforcement against companies caught up in
`
`contemporary political maelstroms, and enable enforcers to capitalize on
`
`shifts in the law that postdate the underlying conduct by decades or more.
`
`Timeliness defenses provide one bulwark against these problematic
`
`practices. They confine enforcement to current harms rather than
`
`everything a company has ever done. They support stability in the law
`
`and minimize the retroactive imposition of liability when the law evolves.
`
`And they provide the certainty needed to build a business by closing the
`
`door to challenging transactions after a reasonable amount of time has
`
`passed.
`
`12
`
`

`

`USCA Case #21-7078 Document #1940859 Filed: 03/28/2022 Page 25 of 48
`
`
`Requiring that plaintiffs assert their rights soon after their injury
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`arises also maximizes the odds that the legal process will b

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