`ORAL ARGUMENT NOT YET SCHEDULED
`
`BRIEF FOR APPELLEES
`
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
`
`
`
`NO’S. 22-3038, 22-3039 & 22-3041
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
`Appellant
`v.
`JOSEPH W. FISCHER, EDWARD LANG, and GARRET MILLER,
`Appellees,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
`D. CT. NO’S. 1:21-CR-234, 1:21-CR-119, 1:21-CR-53 (NICHOLS, J.)
`
`
`F. CLINTON BRODEN, ESQ.
` HEIDI R. FREESE, ESQ.
`
`
`
`
`Broden & Mickelsen
`
`
`
`
`
`Federal Public Defender
`2600 State Street
`
`
`
` Middle District of Pennsylvania
`Dallas, TX 75204
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`FREDERICK W. ULRICH, ESQ.
`214-720-9552
`
`Asst. Federal Public Defender
`
`
`
`NICHOLAS D. SMITH, ESQ.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`AMANDA R. GAYNOR, ESQ.
`David B. Smith, PLLC
`
`
`
`1123 Broadway, Ste. 909
`Staff Attorney
`
`
`
`
`
`
`New York, NY 10010
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`100 Chestnut Street, Suite 306
`
`
`
`
`STEVEN A. METCALF, II, ESQ.
` Harrisburg, PA 17101
`
`
`
`
`Metcalf & Metcalf, P.C.
`
`717-782-2237
`
`
`
`
`
`99 Park Avenue
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` New York, NY 10016
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Attorneys for Appellees
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`USCA Case #22-3038 Document #1963748 Filed: 09/14/2022 Page 2 of 72
`
`CERTIFICATE OF PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES
`
`Based on D.C. Circuit Rule 28(a)(1), the Appellees state as follows:
`
`
`
`A. Parties and Amici
`
`The parties appearing before this Court are the United States as
`
`appellant, and Joseph Fischer, Edward Lang, and Garret Miller as
`
`appellees. There are no amici.
`
`B. Rulings Under Review
`
`The district court dismissed count three of the indictment, which
`
`charged Mr. Fischer with obstructing an official proceeding under 18
`
`U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2). App. 508-09. The government sought
`
`reconsideration of this ruling, and the district court denied that motion.
`
`App. 421.
`
`C. Related Cases
`
`The district court dismissed the same charge in United States v.
`
`Fischer, No. 1:21-CR-00234, Doc. 64, United States v. Miller, No. 1:21-
`
`CR-00119, Doc’s. 72 & 86, and in United States v. Lang, No. 1:21-CR-
`
`00053, Minute Order June 7, 2022, App. 12. And more recently, the
`
`district court dismissed the same charge in United States v. Haya, No.
`
`
`
`i
`
`
`
`USCA Case #22-3038 Document #1963748 Filed: 09/14/2022 Page 3 of 72
`
`1:21-CR-00565, Doc. 28. Counsel anticipate a government appeal in
`
`Haya.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
`
`
`USCA Case #22-3038 Document #1963748 Filed: 09/14/2022 Page 4 of 72
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Certificate of Parties, Rulings, and Related Cases ........................................ i
`A.
`Parties and Amici ..................................................................... i
`B. Rulings Under Review ............................................................. i
`C. Related Cases ........................................................................... i
`Table of Authorities ...................................................................................... vi
`Glossary of Abbreviations ............................................................................. xi
`Introduction ................................................................................................... 1
`Statutes and Regulations .............................................................................. 4
`Counterstatement of the Case ....................................................................... 5
`A.
`Factual Background ................................................................ 5
`1.
`Fischer ............................................................................ 5
`2. Miller .............................................................................. 7
`3.
`Lang ................................................................................ 7
` Procedural History ................................................................. 8
`1.
`The district court carefully construed Section 1512(c)
`consistent with its language, structure, history, and
`the relevant interpretive cannons. ................................ 9
`The government moved for reconsideration, and the
`district court further explained its reasoning
`supporting the dismissal of the obstruction count. ..... 12
`Summary of the Argument .......................................................................... 15
`Argument ..................................................................................................... 16
`
`B.
`
`2.
`
`
`
`iii
`
`
`
`USCA Case #22-3038 Document #1963748 Filed: 09/14/2022 Page 5 of 72
`
`A.
`
`b.
`
`b.
`
`The district court’s holding corresponds with the text,
`statutory structure, statutory history, and legislative history
`of Section 1512(c). ................................................................. 18
`1.
`The district court correctly construed the text of
`Section 1512(c). ............................................................ 18
`a.
`The government’s contrary construction diverges
`from the statutory text and would create other
`interpretive problems over the scope of Section
`1512(c)(2). ............................................................ 23
`The district court appropriately applied the rule
`of lenity and exercised restraint in evaluating the
`reach of Section 1512(c)(2). ................................. 27
`The statutory context and structure of Section 1512 .. 30
`The “corruptly” and “nexus” elements cannot salvage
`the government’s interpretation .................................. 32
`The statutory and legislative history of Section 1512(c)
`bolster the district court’s interpretation and reflect a
`focus on investigations and evidence. .......................... 36
`a.
`The statutory predecessors to Section 1512
`confirm its narrow scope. .................................... 37
`The Sarbanes-Oxley amendment did not alter
`Section 1512’s focus on inquiries or
`investigations. ..................................................... 40
`The decisional authority of this Court and others
`support a narrow focus of Section 1512(c) relating to
`investigations and evidence. ........................................ 43
`The government’s interpretation of Section 1512(c)(2)
`would lead to absurd results. ....................................... 47
`
`2.
`3.
`
`4.
`
`5.
`
`6.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`iv
`
`
`
`USCA Case #22-3038 Document #1963748 Filed: 09/14/2022 Page 6 of 72
`
`B.
`
`The district court properly dismissed the obstruction counts
`under Section 1512(c) consistent with Criminal Procedural
`Rule 12(b)(3)(v) when the alleged conduct, participating in
`the Capitol riot, fell outside the purview of the Witness,
`Victim, or Informant Tampering statute in Section
`1512(c) ................................................................................... 49
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 52
`Certificate of Service
`Certificate of Compliance
`
`Statutory Addendum
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`v
`
`
`
`USCA Case #22-3038 Document #1963748 Filed: 09/14/2022 Page 7 of 72
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`Abramski v. United States,
`573 U.S. 169 (2014) .............................................................................. 28
`Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
`552 U.S. 214 (2008) .............................................................................. 24
`Begay v. United States,
`553 U.S. 137 (2008) ................................. 9, 10, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26
`Clark v. Suarez Martinez,
`543 U.S. 371 (2005) .............................................................................. 49
`Donnelly v. Fed. Aviation Admin.,
`411 F.3d 267 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ............................................................... 19
`Gundy v. United States,
`139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) .......................................................................... 30
`Jeannette Rankin Brigade v. Chief of Capitol Police,
`342 F. Supp. 575 (D.D.C. 1972) ............................................................ 49
`Johnson v. United States,
`576 U.S. 591 (2015) .......................................................................... 9, 17
`Lederman v. United States,
`291 F.3d 36 (D.C. Cir. 2002)................................................................. 49
`Liparota v. United States,
`471 U.S. 419 (1985) .............................................................................. 28
`Marinello v. United States,
`138 S. Ct. 1101 (2018) .......................................................................... 35
`Marx v. General Rev. Corp.,
`568 U.S. 371 (2013) .............................................................................. 30
`Setser v. United States,
`566 U.S. 231 (2012) .............................................................................. 19
`United States v. Aguilar,
`515 U.S. 593 (1995) .............................................................................. 33
`United States v. Burge,
`711 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2013) ................................................................ 26
`
`
`
`vi
`
`
`
`USCA Case #22-3038 Document #1963748 Filed: 09/14/2022 Page 8 of 72
`
`United States v. Carson,
`560 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2009) ................................................................ 26
`United States v. Crews,
`612 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2010) .............................................................. 23
`United States v. Ermoian,
`752 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2013) .................................................. 44, 45, 46
`United States v. Hillie,
`227 F. Supp. 3d 57 (D.D.C. 2017) ................................................... 50, 51
`United States v. Kanchanalak,
`37 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999)............................................................. 40
`United States v. Kelley,
`36 F.3d 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ................................................... 43, 44, 49
`United States v. Lanier,
`520 U.S. 259 (1997) .................................................................. 29, 30, 48
`United States v. McHugh,
`No. 21-453, 2022 WL 1302880 (D.D.C. May 2, 2022) .................... 31, 44
`United States v. Montgomery,
`578 F. Supp. 3d 54 (D.D.C. 2021) ....................................... 35, 36, 43, 44
`United States v. Nasir,
`17 F.4th 459 (3d Cir. 2021) .................................................................. 29
`United States v. North,
`910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ......................................................... 33, 34
`United States v. Pasha,
`797 F.3d 1122 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ............................................................. 35
`United States v. Petruk,
`781 F.3d 438 (8th Cir. 2015) ................................................................ 26
`United States v. Phillips,
`583 F.3d 1261 (10th Cir. 2009) ............................................................ 26
`United States v. Poindexter,
`951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ...................... 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 44, 46
`United States v. Reeves,
`752 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1985) .................................................... 33, 35, 36
`
`
`
`vii
`
`
`
`USCA Case #22-3038 Document #1963748 Filed: 09/14/2022 Page 9 of 72
`
`United States v. Ring,
`628 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D.D.C. 2009) ....................................................... 26
`United States v. Stefanie Hazelton,
`21-CR-30 (D. D.C. 2021) ....................................................................... 48
`United States v. Stinson,
`592 F.3d 460 (3d Cir. 2010) .................................................................. 23
`United States v. Volpendesto,
`746 F.3d 273 (7th Cir. 2014) ................................................................ 26
`United States v. Wiltberger,
`18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 76 (1820) ................................................................. 28
`United States v. Young,
`916 F.3d 368 (4th Cir. 2019) ................................................................ 36
`Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc.,
`531 U.S. 457 (2001) .............................................................................. 30
`Wooden v. United States,
`142 S. Ct. 1063 (2022) .......................................................................... 27
`Yates v. United States,
`574 U.S. 528 (2015) ............................................................ 19, 29, 40, 41
`Statutes
`18 U.S.C. § 1503 .................................................................... 30, 32, 37, 38
`18 U.S.C. § 1505 ................................... 3, 30, 32, 37, 38, 39, 40, 43, 44, 46
`18 U.S.C. § 1507 ...................................................................................... 43
`18 U.S.C. § 1512 .. 2, 3, 4, 11, 22, 30, 31, 32, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 44, 45, 46,
`48
`18 U.S.C. § 1512(a) ............................................................................ 40, 45
`18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(A) ................................................................... 11, 45
`18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) ............................................................................ 40, 41
`18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(A) ......................................................................... 32
`18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, 24, 28, 30,
`36, 41, 42, 43, 48, 49, 52
`18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) ........................... 9, 10, 11, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 27
`
`
`
`viii
`
`
`
`USCA Case #22-3038 Document #1963748 Filed: 09/14/2022 Page 10 of 72
`
`18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) ... i, 2, 3, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24,
`25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 42, 44, 47, 48, 50
`18 U.S.C. § 1512(d)(1)........................................................................ 27, 30
`18 U.S.C. § 1515 ........................................................................................ 4
`18 U.S.C. § 1515(a) .................................................................................. 44
`18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(1)(B) ......................................................................... 43
`18 U.S.C. § 3731 ...................................................................................... 51
`18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) ........................................................................... 20
`18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) ................................................................. 21, 25
`18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) .............................................. 17, 20, 21, 22, 24
`18 U.S.C. §1519 ....................................................................................... 29
`40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(G) ................................................................... 34, 48
`Other Authorities
`128 CONG. REC. 26,350 (1982) ................................................................. 39
`128 CONG. REC. 26,810 (1982) ................................................................. 39
`148 CONG. REC. at S6550 ......................................................................... 41
`148 CONG. REC. S6545 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) ..................................... 42
`21 AM. JUR. 2D, Criminal Law § 114 (2016) ........................................... 36
`Act of January 13, 1940, ch. 1, § 135(a), 54 Stat. 13 (1940) ................... 37
`Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 135, 35 Stat. 1113 (1909)..................... 37
`Antitrust Civil Process Act, 76 Stat. 551 (1962) ..................................... 38
`Evidence & Ballot, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) ............... 51
`BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 414 (rev. 4th ed. 1951) ................................... 36
`Memorandum from Ass’t Att’y Gen. Office of Legal Counsel, Steven
`Engle & Principal Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen., Edward C. O’Callaghan
`to Att’y Gen. William P. Barr (March 24, 2019) .................................. 16
`Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. Rod Rosenstein & Ass’t Att’y
`Gen. Steven Engle to Att’y Gen. William P. Barr (June 8, 2018) ....... 16
`Official Proceeding, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual, § 1730 (2018) ... 44
`
`
`
`ix
`
`
`
`USCA Case #22-3038 Document #1963748 Filed: 09/14/2022 Page 11 of 72
`
`Proceeding, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1241 (8th ed. 2004) .................... 45
`Proceeding, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY .............................................. 45
`Pub. L. No. 97-291, sec. 4, 96 Stat. 1252 ................................................ 39
`S. REP. No. 107-146, p. 7 (2002) .............................................................. 41
`S. REP. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1982) ..................................... 39
`WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
`UNABRIDGED (3d ed. 2002) .............................................................. 19, 32
`Rules
`D.C. Circuit Rule 28(a)(1) .......................................................................... i
`FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3)(v).................................................................. 3, 49
`FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c) ............................................................................ 3, 50
`Guideline Provisions
`U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)
`(U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2016) .................................................................. 23
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`x
`
`
`
`USCA Case #22-3038 Document #1963748 Filed: 09/14/2022 Page 12 of 72
`
`GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS
`
`
`Appendix
`
`Supplemental Appendix
`
`App.
`
`SApp .
`
`
`
`xi
`
`
`
`USCA Case #22-3038 Document #1963748 Filed: 09/14/2022 Page 13 of 72
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Appellees arrived in Washington, D.C., on January 6 to attend the
`
`former President’s “Stop the Steal” rally. Along with thousands of
`
`protesters, they later gathered at the Capitol to demonstrate against a
`
`presidential election that they believed was stolen. By the time
`
`Appellee Fischer belatedly joined them, for instance, Congress had been
`
`in recess for over an hour. No barricades, fences, signs, or police
`
`hindered his progress towards the Capitol Building. He entered the
`
`building and exited four minutes later. Fischer broke nothing,
`
`assaulted no one, and encountered neither legislators nor congressional
`
`staff.
`
`For their role in the demonstration and its aftermath, the
`
`government charged Appellees with several offenses typically brought
`
`after a riot. Their indictments include, for example, civil disorder,
`
`disorderly conduct in a restricted building, entering a restricted
`
`building, parading or demonstrating in a Capitol building, and
`
`assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain officers. See, e.g., App. 52-57,
`
`85-89, 443-46.
`
`But the government also alleged an offense under Section 1512(c)
`
`of the Victim, Witness, or Informant Tampering statute, 18 U.S.C.
`1
`
`
`
`
`
`USCA Case #22-3038 Document #1963748 Filed: 09/14/2022 Page 14 of 72
`
`§ 1512, which Congress enacted to criminalize the obstruction of its
`
`legislative inquiries and investigations. Section 1512(c) criminalizes
`
`evidence-impairment crimes in connection with, among other things, “a
`
`proceeding before the Congress.” And its elements focus on conduct
`
`intended to impair evidence used in those proceedings.
`
`Because Congress’s joint session on January 6 did not involve its
`
`power of inquiry, the government advances an unprecedented
`
`application of Section 1512(c)(2), decoupled from investigations and
`
`evidence. Yet standing in the way are the statutory text (as the district
`
`court found), interpretive canons, Supreme Court and Circuit
`
`precedent, statutory history, ex post facto principles, and common
`
`sense. Moreover, the government’s novel decoupling of the obstruction-
`
`of-Congress offense from investigations and evidence extends
`
`criminality to political protest at the seat of government and potentially
`
`to ordinary legislative business. It also collapses any conceptual
`
`distinction between a Class B parading misdemeanor and a 20-year
`
`felony.
`
`Here, it is inappropriate to address Appellees’ alleged offense
`
`conduct by distorting the Victim, Witness, or Informant Tampering
`
`statute with a novel interpretation.
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`USCA Case #22-3038 Document #1963748 Filed: 09/14/2022 Page 15 of 72
`
`STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
`In Section 1505, and in Section 1512 of the Witness, Victim, or
`Informant Tampering statute, Congress criminalized the
`obstruction of its inquiries and investigations. It later added
`Section 1512(c) in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to address fraud
`and abuse by corporate executives involving, for instance,
`document shredding. The government, construing Section
`1512(c)(2)’s residual clause to disassociate it from investigations
`and evidence, fashioned a novel obstruction offense to charge that
`Appellees interfered with the joint session on January 6, a
`function not involving Congress’s power of inquiry. Did the
`district court err in dismissing this charge given the text,
`statutory history, legislative purpose, and a common-sense
`construction of subsection (c)(2)?
`Criminal Procedural Rule 7(c) requires that an indictment include
`the essential facts of the offense charged. Here, the indictment
`alleged, among other things, that Appellees “obstruct[ed],
`influence[d], and impede[d] an official proceeding, that is, a
`proceeding before Congress, specifically, Congress’s certification of
`the Electoral College vote[.]” Did the district court err in
`dismissing this particular count consistent with Rule 12(b)(3)(v)
`when the alleged conduct, participating in the Capitol riot, fell
`outside the purview of the Witness, Victim, or Informant
`Tampering statute in Section 1512(c)?
`
`
`3
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`
`
`
`
`USCA Case #22-3038 Document #1963748 Filed: 09/14/2022 Page 16 of 72
`
`STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
`
`The relevant statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512 & 1515, are produced in
`
`a statutory addendum to Appellant’s brief. Appellees have, however,
`
`included the statutory predecessors to Section 1512 in an addendum to
`
`this brief.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`4
`
`
`
`USCA Case #22-3038 Document #1963748 Filed: 09/14/2022 Page 17 of 72
`
`COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE
`
`
`A. Factual Background
`1. Fischer
`The government borrows its factual recitation from the criminal
`
`complaint, its filings, and Mr. Fischer’s Facebook postings. Compare
`
`App. 428-29, 434, 458-59 with Appellant’s Br. at 9-10. These factual
`
`assertions are not included in the indictment and, in significant
`
`respects, stray from the video evidence.1
`
`At the invitation of the former President, Mr. Fischer and a
`
`companion attended the Stop the Steal rally on January 6 at the
`
`Ellipse. Unlike many of the other attendees, Mr. Fischer declined the
`
`President’s request to march with the crowd to the Capitol. Instead, he
`
`and his companion headed home. See United States v. Fischer, No.
`
`1:21-CR-00234, Doc. 51 at 4. But after learning of the swelling
`
`demonstration, Mr. Fischer made the regretful decision to drive back to
`
`Washington, D.C. See id.
`
`Contrary to the government’s narrative, Mr. Fischer was thus not
`
`part of the mob that forced the electoral certification to stop. See
`
`Appellant’s Br. at 8-9. He arrived at the Capitol grounds well after
`
`
`1 Mr. Fischer’s Facebook posts also differ from the video evidence.
`5
`
`
`
`
`
`USCA Case #22-3038 Document #1963748 Filed: 09/14/2022 Page 18 of 72
`
`Congress recessed. See Fischer, No. 1:21-CR-00234, Doc. 51 at 4.2 And
`
`as Mr. Fischer walked toward the East side of the building, no
`
`barricades, fences, or signs impeded him.3 See id. He ultimately
`
`entered the Capitol around 3:25 p.m. But the crowd knocked Mr.
`
`Fischer to the ground as he neared the police line. Returning to his
`
`feet, Mr. Fischer handed a pair of handcuffs to a Capitol police officer.
`
`Just after, the weight of the crowd pushed Mr. Fischer into the line of
`
`the officers. See id. With that, the Capitol police pepper sprayed the
`
`protesters, blinding Mr. Fischer. The police then escorted him toward
`
`an exit, and he left four minutes after entering. See id. & Doc. 49 at 3.
`
`
`2 Because Congress recessed well before Mr. Fischer’s brief return, at
`least one judge has found that conduct like Fischer’s did not interfere
`with Congress’s joint session. See, e.g., United States v. Matthew
`Martin, No. 1:21-CR-00394, Doc. 41 at 270 (McFadden, J., “find[ing]
`that the proceedings had been halted well before he entered the Capitol
`building and that they did not resume until long after he left. []
`Find[ing] that the government has not proven beyond a reasonable
`doubt that he disrupted congressional proceedings”).
`
` 3
`
` While Mr. Fischer used profanity and harsh language, when he said
`“charge,” he had not yet entered the Capitol. See id. And the context
`attending the “charge” utterances reflects an ill-timed joke. No one in
`the crowd reacted. See id.
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`
`USCA Case #22-3038 Document #1963748 Filed: 09/14/2022 Page 19 of 72
`
`2. Miller
`As with Appellee Fischer, the government’s factual recitation for
`
`Mr. Miller is not drawn from the indictment but from its criminal
`
`complaint and other filings. App. 75-78.
`
`It represents that on January 6, “around 2:40 p.m., Mr. Miller
`
`entered the Capitol building, where he joined a crowd of rioters pushing
`
`against a line of law enforcement officers in the Rotunda.” Appellant’s
`
`Br. at 9. Prior to January 6, Mr. Miller “made statements on his
`
`Facebook account that he was coming to D.C. for ‘this trump shit,’ that
`
`a ‘civil war could start,’ and that he intended to bring with him ‘a
`
`grappling hook and rope and a level 3 vest’ as well as a helmet, mouth
`
`guard, and a ‘bump cap.’” Id. The government adds that, after January
`
`6, “Miller said he had ‘charged the back gates’ [of the Capitol] himself”
`
`and that he commented “assassinate AOC” on social media. Id. 10.
`
`3. Lang
`Video surveillance from January 6 shows Mr. Lang entering the
`
`
`
`Lower West Terrace tunnel of the Capitol at about 2:41 p.m. App. 21-
`
`22. Joining the protestors, Mr. Lang can be overheard saying, among
`
`other things, “this is our house,” “you are enemies of the state,” and “we
`
`are getting squished to death,” “the cops are squishing us to death.”
`
`
`
`7
`
`
`
`USCA Case #22-3038 Document #1963748 Filed: 09/14/2022 Page 20 of 72
`
`Mr. Lang and another individual pushed against a door, and the
`
`government claims that, on different occasions, he assaulted officers.
`
`App. 22-23, 29-30. According to the government, Mr. Lang left and
`
`reentered the building on a couple of occasions. App. 24-25. And,
`
`notably, Mr. Lang appears to have asked officers to help an unconscious
`
`woman, and he dragged another individual out from underneath the
`
`crowd. App. 27.
`
`B.
`
`
`
` Procedural History
`
`A grand jury returned a seven-count indictment, charging Fischer,
`
`Miller, and Lang with, as noted, several riot-related offenses. App. 443-
`
`46. But the government also included a count for obstructing an official
`
`proceeding under Section 1512(c) of the Victim, Witness, or Informant
`
`Tampering statute. App. 444. Fischer, Miller, and Lang moved, among
`
`other things, to dismiss this count. And the district court granted their
`
`motions based on its opinion in United States v. Miller, No. 1:21-CR-
`
`00119, Doc. 72.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`8
`
`
`
`USCA Case #22-3038 Document #1963748 Filed: 09/14/2022 Page 21 of 72
`
`1. The district court carefully construed Section
`1512(c) consistent with its language, structure,
`history, and the relevant interpretive cannons.
`
`In Miller, the district court emphasized that it must exercise
`
`
`
`
`restraint in assessing the reach of a criminal statute. App. 96-97. And
`
`that such restraint corresponds with the rule of lenity. App. 97-98. As
`
`for the reach of Section 1512(c), the court began by pointing out “that
`
`three readings of the statute are possible, but only two are plausible.”
`
`App. 100.
`
`The first, advanced by the government, is that subsection (c)(2),
`
`which begins with the term “otherwise” and then states, “obstructs,
`
`influences, or impedes any official proceeding or attempts to do so[,]”
`
`constitutes a “clean break” from subsection (c)(1), setting forth an
`
`omnibus clause independent of the preceding subsection. App. 100-01.
`
`But the court identified several problems with the government’s
`
`interpretation. One, it failed to give meaning to the term “otherwise,”
`
`rendering it surplusage. App. 101. Two, such interpretation conflicted
`
`with how the Supreme Court had construed “otherwise” in Begay v.
`
`United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008), abrogated on other grounds by
`
`Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 604 (2015), which addressed a
`
`different statute but a similar statutory framework. App. 101-02. And
`
`
`
`9
`
`
`
`USCA Case #22-3038 Document #1963748 Filed: 09/14/2022 Page 22 of 72
`
`three, the authority cited for the clean break interpretation conflicted
`
`with the Supreme Court’s reasoning. App. 103.
`
`
`
`Next, the court addressed whether subsection (c)(1) merely
`
`provides examples of conduct that violate subsection (c)(2). Here, the
`
`court acknowledged that this construction gave effect to the term
`
`“otherwise” by tethering the subsections through a common link to an
`
`“official proceeding.” App. 104. But the court found that this
`
`construction had its own problems. For example, if the common
`
`element is an official proceeding, then “otherwise” is superfluous. Id.
`
`And both subsections reference official proceedings. App. 105. The
`
`court explained that the structure of Section 1512(c) cut against
`
`construing subsection (c)(1) as merely including examples of conduct
`
`violating (c)(2). In the court’s view, a reasonable reader would not
`
`expect the principal offense (indeed, only) to be in the second subsection
`
`with examples preceding it. App. 105.
`
`
`
`Finally, the court considered whether subsection (c)(2) constituted
`
`a residual clause for (c)(1). Under this construction, the word
`
`“otherwise” links the two subsections with the commonality being the
`
`conduct proscribed in (c)(1). Id. And it squared with the Supreme
`
`Court’s reasoning and holding in Begay. App. 106. For instance,
`
`
`
`10
`
`
`
`USCA Case #22-3038 Document #1963748 Filed: 09/14/2022 Page 23 of 72
`
`subsection (c)(2) ensures that by criminalizing specific acts in (c)(1) that
`
`impair object evidence Congress was not underinclusive in proscribing
`
`interference with the availability and integrity of all types of evidence.
`
`App. 107.
`
`
`
`Turning to statutory context, the court viewed it as supporting a
`
`narrow focus in subsection (c)(2). For instance, the court noted that
`
`Congress aimed Section 1512’s other subsections at discrete conduct in
`
`narrow circumstances, like killing a person to prevent their attendance
`
`at an official proceeding. App. 109 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(A)).
`
`Looking next to the statutory history, the court found that it too
`
`reinforced construing subsection (c)(2) as a catchall. App. 112. On this
`
`point, the court traced the development of Section 1512(c) and observed
`
`that it filled in a missing gap, that is, not requiring that the obstructor
`
`act through another person. App. 114. This circumscribed aim also
`
`bolstered a narrow purpose interpretation. Id.
`
`Last, the court addressed the legislative history while
`
`acknowledging its limited role. App. 115. Here, the court recounted the
`
`history surrounding Section 1512(c)’s enactment as part of the
`
`Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. As the court emphasized, nearly all of the
`
`legislative history cited the purpose of the Section 1512(c) amendment
`
`
`
`11
`
`
`
`USCA Case #22-3038 Document #1963748 Filed: 09/14/2022 Page 24 of 72
`
`as deterring fraud and abuse by corporate executives, such as shredding
`
`potentially incriminating documents, as occurred with Enron and
`
`Arthur Anderson, LLP. See 115-16. In oth