`United States Court of Appeals
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
`
`
`
`Argued February 6, 2024
`
`
`Decided May 28, 2024
`
`No. 22-3064
`
`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
`APPELLEE
`
`v.
`
`THOMAS WEBSTER,
`APPELLANT
`
`
`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the District of Columbia
`(No. 1:21-cr-00208-1)
`
`
`
`
`
`Elizabeth A. Brandenburg argued the cause for appellant.
`With her on the briefs was Marcia G. Shein.
`
`
`David B. Goodhand, Assistant U.S. Attorney, was on the
`brief for appellee. With him on the brief were Chrisellen R.
`Kolb, Nicholas P. Coleman, and Brian P. Kelly, Assistant U.S.
`Attorneys.
`
`
`Before: MILLETT, KATSAS, and RAO, Circuit Judges.
`
`Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge MILLETT.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`MILLETT, Circuit Judge: Thomas Webster attended
`former-President Trump’s rally on January 6, 2021, and then
`went to the Capitol. Upon arriving, Webster confronted a line
`of police officers and violently assaulted Officer Rathbun of
`the Metropolitan Police Department. A jury convicted Webster
`of five felonies and one misdemeanor offense. The district
`court imposed a ten-year prison sentence. Webster appeals,
`raising challenges both to his convictions and his sentence. We
`have considered each of Webster’s challenges and, because
`none of them succeed, we affirm his convictions and sentence.
`
`
`I
`
`A
`
`
`
`
`
`Thomas Webster is a retired police officer and resident of
`New York. In the days and months following the 2020
`presidential election, Webster became convinced that the
`election had been stolen. He planned to attend the January 6th
`rally convened by the former President, and he spoke with
`others about how they should prepare for the event. For
`example, he texted two contacts: “Guide to your Jan 6 trip
`includes D.C. gun laws, self-defense options, citizen’s arrest
`policy, drone policy, common sense gear list, bonus prep info,
`and the Constitution for obvious reasons. Don’t be a liability,
`be prepared for it to get wild. The Donald. America first[.]”
`J.A. 982.
`
`Two days before the rally, Webster drove from his home
`in New York to Washington, D.C. He brought an assortment
`of gear with him, including body armor and a United States
`Marine Corps flag on a metal flagpole. J.A. 1120–1122.
`
`Webster attended former-President Trump’s speech on
`January 6th, wearing his body armor and carrying his Marine
`
`
`
`
`
`3
`
`Corps flag. After that, he joined the crowd in marching on the
`Capitol. Webster made his way toward the Capitol’s West
`Terrace. As he got closer, he heard “flash bangs going off[,]”
`“sense[d] that there was some gas[,]” and “saw people being
`injured.” J.A. 1140. He continued forward until he reached the
`leading edge of the rioters. A single row of bicycle racks
`separated them from a police line. He recognized that the
`bicycle racks were meant to keep people back. But he tried to
`get past them nonetheless.
`
`the Metropolitan Police
`Officer Noah Rathbun of
`Department was one of the officers on the other side of the
`police line. Webster approached him, yelling and accusing him
`of being a communist who was attacking Americans. Officer
`Rathbun pushed Webster back from the barrier several times,
`and Webster responded by pushing the bicycle rack toward
`Officer Rathbun. Webster then swung his flagpole toward
`Officer Rathbun “in a chopping motion.” J.A. 852. The
`flagpole struck the bicycle rack. Officer Rathbun grabbed the
`flagpole and wrested it from Webster.
`
`Shortly thereafter, the mob broke through the police line.
`Webster charged Officer Rathbun, knocking him to the ground.
`He got on top of Officer Rathbun and began pushing Officer
`Rathbun’s gas mask into his face. After about ten seconds of
`struggling, Webster got up, and the two men broke apart.
`
`
`B
`
` A
`
` grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted Webster
`on five felony counts: (1) Assaulting, Resisting, or Impeding
`Certain Officers Using a Dangerous Weapon, 18 U.S.C.
`§ 111(a)(1), (b); (2) Civil Disorder, id. § 231(a)(3); (3)
`Entering and Remaining in a Restricted Building or Grounds
`with a Deadly or Dangerous Weapon, id. § 1752(a)(1),
`
`
`
`
`
`4
`
`(b)(1)(A); (4) Disorderly and Disruptive Conduct in a
`Restricted Building or Grounds with a Deadly or Dangerous
`Weapon, id. § 1752(a)(2), (b)(1)(A); and (5) Engaging in
`Physical Violence in a Restricted Building or Grounds with a
`Deadly or Dangerous Weapon, id. § 1752(a)(4), (b)(1)(A). The
`grand jury also indicted Webster on one misdemeanor: Act of
`Physical Violence in the Capitol Grounds or Buildings. 40
`U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(F).
`
`Webster moved to change venue, arguing that he could not
`get an impartial jury in the District. According to him, the
`District’s jury pool was simply too Democratic, too connected
`to the federal government, and too steeped in January 6th news
`coverage to produce twelve unbiased jurors.
`
`The district court denied his motion. The court reasoned
`that the District’s size and characteristics did not indicate that
`the jury pool was presumptively prejudiced against Webster.
`The court also found that the January 6th news stories were not
`clearly prejudicial to Webster. The district court added that
`other January 6th cases had proceeded to jury trial in the
`District without any jury-bias issues. On that basis, the district
`court concluded that it could empanel an impartial jury.
`
` A
`
` jury subsequently found Webster guilty on all counts.
`The district court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 120
`months for four of the felony counts, 60 months for another
`felony, and six months for the misdemeanor. The court also
`ordered that Webster serve 36 months of supervised release and
`pay a $510 special assessment.
`
`
`II
`
`
`The district court had jurisdiction over Webster’s criminal
`prosecution under federal law. See 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have
`
`
`
`
`
`5
`
`jurisdiction over Webster’s appeal of his conviction and
`sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742; 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
`
`Several standards of review apply in this case. We review
`legal questions that the defendant preserved de novo. United
`States v. Wilson, 605 F.3d 985, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 2010). We
`review his unpreserved claims for only plain error. United
`States v. Sayan, 968 F.2d 55, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1992); FED. R.
`CRIM. P. 52(b). We review a district court’s finding of juror
`impartiality for manifest error, United States v. Childress, 58
`F.3d 693, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1995), and its handling of voir dire for
`an abuse of discretion, United States v. Tsarnaev, 595 U.S. 302,
`313 (2022).
`
`Lastly, we review Webster’s sentence for both procedural
`and substantive reasonableness. At the procedural step, we
`review a district court’s “purely legal” interpretation of the
`Guidelines de novo. United States v. Cooper, 886 F.3d 146,
`155 (D.C. Cir. 2018). We give “due deference” to its
`“application of the Guidelines to facts.” United States v.
`McKeever, 824 F.3d 1113, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2016). We review
`the sentence’s substantive reasonableness for an abuse of
`discretion. Id.
`
`
`III
`
`
`Webster raises three challenges to his convictions. First,
`he argues that the jury was not impartial. Second, he contends
`that the district court wrongly denied him his right to
`effectively cross-examine Officer Rathbun. Third, he objects
`to how the district court instructed the jury on his Section
`111(b) charge. Each of those objections fails.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`6
`
`A
`
`The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants an
`“impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
`have been committed[.]” U.S. CONST. Amend. VI. So when
`“extraordinary local prejudice” prevents impartiality, courts
`must transfer the trial to a location where an impartial jury can
`be drawn. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 378 (2010).
`The Sixth Amendment’s requirement of a local trial cannot
`“impede” the right to a fair one. Id.
`
`Webster first argues that the District’s entire jury pool was
`presumptively prejudiced against him, and so the district court
`should have transferred his case to a different venue before the
`start of the jury-selection process (known as voir dire). He also
`argues that the voir dire process was flawed and produced a
`biased jury. He is incorrect on both fronts.
`
`
`
`
`1
`
`Prejudice across an entire jury pool can be presumed “only
`[in] the extreme case[,]” Skilling, 561 U.S. at 381, where
`“prejudicial publicity so poisoned the proceedings that it was
`impossible for the accused to receive a fair trial by an impartial
`jury[,]” United States v. Capo, 595 F.2d 1086, 1090 (5th Cir.
`1979); see Skilling, 561 U.S. at 380. The Supreme Court has
`found presumptive prejudice in only the rare case where a jury
`pool was so “pervasively exposed” to prejudicial pretrial
`publicity about the defendant and the case that “[a]ny
`subsequent court proceedings in [that] community * * *
`[w]ould be but a hollow formality.” Rideau v. Louisiana, 373
`U.S. 723, 726 (1963).
`
`
`Webster does not clear that very high bar.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`7
`
`First, nothing in the record suggests that the District’s jury
`pool had any preconceived notions about Webster or his guilt
`or innocence, or even knew who he was. The record lacks any
`evidence of pervasive (or much of any) media coverage aimed
`at Webster and his conduct.
`
`Webster points to two newspaper articles that name him
`and describe his January 6th conduct. Webster Opening Br.
`24–25 & nn.5–6; see Jonah E. Bromwich, Retired N.Y.P.D.
`Officer Who Guarded City Hall Charged in Capitol Riot, N.Y.
`TIMES (Feb. 23, 2021, 1:16 PM), https://perma.cc/V6PC-
`QET6; Nina Golgowski, Ex-NYPD Cop Charged with
`Assaulting Washington Officer with Pole During Riot,
`HUFFPOST (Feb. 24, 2021, 3:19 PM), https://perma.cc/N92B-
`C4QV. Webster also claims that “[a] Google search using the
`terms ‘Thomas Webster Capitol’ garnered 4,690,000 search
`results at the time of the motion to change venue.” Webster
`Opening Br. 25.
`
`That evidence comes up short. To begin, neither of the
`newspaper articles contain the type of “vivid, unforgettable
`information” of the “smoking-gun variety” that is necessary to
`trigger presumptive prejudice concerns—that is, information
`that not only “invite[s]” jurors to prejudge the defendant’s
`culpability, but also makes it nearly impossible for them not to.
`Skilling, 561 U.S. at 383–384. Instead, the articles provide
`“straightforward, unemotional factual accounts of events and
`of the progress of official * * * investigations.” United States
`v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (per
`curiam) (footnote omitted). Both simply recite the facts of the
`allegations confronting Webster, his surrender to authorities,
`and the details of his bond hearing. They also include a
`counternarrative from Webster’s defense attorney. See
`Golgowski, supra; Bromwich, supra. True, one article notes
`that some on social media have called Webster the “eye
`
`
`
`
`
`8
`
`gouger[,]” Golgowski, supra, and they both mention that
`Webster’s prosecutor referred to Webster as a “junkyard
`dog[,]” id.; Bromwich, supra. But those articles do not endorse
`either label. Without more, such routine and objective press
`coverage of a criminal prosecution does not trench upon the
`defendant’s right to a fair trial.
`
`As for Webster’s Google search, Webster has not shown
`how many of the results actually referred to him as opposed to
`other Thomases or Websters. Neither does Webster claim that
`all—or even most—of the search results pertained to his
`activity at the Capitol rather than to some unrelated event
`Google’s algorithm saw fit to include. He likewise offers no
`evidence as to how many readers actually engaged with any of
`these results, let alone that members of the District’s jury pool
`were more exposed to those search results than were people
`living elsewhere.
`
`
`Webster also relies on a poll purporting to gauge the
`sentiments of the District’s jury pool. The poll surveyed 400
`individuals registered to vote in the District and concluded that
`they had a “decidedly negative impression of individuals
`arrested in conjunction with the activities of January 6, 2021.”
`Webster Opening Br. 20 (quoting J.A. 31).
`
`But Webster’s focus on the jury pool’s opinion of January
`6th and its perpetrators misses the point. We expect jurors to
`view significant criminal events in their hometown with an
`unapproving eye, whether it is the January 6th attack on the
`Capitol, a murder, or an armed robbery spree. Generalized
`disapproval of criminal conduct—even the specific conduct at
`issue in a defendant’s case—says nothing about a juror’s ability
`to be impartial in deciding whether a particular individual
`committed a crime or not. What the Constitution forbids is for
`a juror to hold a firmly entrenched view about an individual
`
`
`
`
`
`9
`
`defendant’s guilt or innocence before the trial starts. See
`Skilling, 561 U.S. at 384 n.17, 391–392 (emphasizing
`prejudicial impact of media coverage aimed at defendant over
`coverage of the criminal event); United States v. Malmay, 671
`F.2d 869, 875–876 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding jury sufficiently
`impartial despite jurors’ broad familiarity with alleged local
`vote-buying scheme because jury was relatively unfamiliar
`with defendant). Webster’s poll, in other words, does not
`answer the essential question: Can the District’s potential
`jurors “lay aside [their] impression or opinion” of Webster or
`events on January 6th and “render a verdict based on the
`evidence presented in court”? United States v. Nassif, 628 F.
`Supp. 3d 169, 187 (D.D.C. 2022) (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366
`U.S. 717, 723 (1961)), aff’d, 97 F.4th 968 (D.C. Cir. 2024) .
`
`Second, Webster has not shown that the District’s jury
`pool is structurally incapable of producing fair juries for
`January 6th defendants. The District’s size is no impediment
`to producing a fair jury. It consists of more than 600,000
`individuals. Contrast Rideau, 373 U.S. at 724 (presuming
`prejudice when news coverage blanketed community of
`150,000). “Given this large, diverse pool of potential jurors,”
`there is no basis to conclude “12 impartial individuals could
`not be empaneled[.]” Skilling, 561 U.S. at 382 (citing Gentile
`v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1044 (1991) (plurality
`opinion), for the proposition that there is a “reduced likelihood
`of prejudice where venire [i]s drawn from a pool of over
`600,000 individuals”); Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 429
`(1991) (potential for prejudice mitigated by the size of the
`“metropolitan Washington [, D.C.] statistical area, which has a
`population of over 3 million”).
`
` Webster asserts that the District overwhelmingly voted for
`President Biden and historically votes for Democratic
`candidates. Webster Opening Br. 22–23. That may be. But
`
`
`
`
`
`10
`
`the political inclinations of a populace writ large say nothing
`about an individual’s ability to serve impartially in adjudicating
`the criminal conduct of an individual. See Connors v. United
`States, 158 U.S. 408, 414 (1895) (“The law assumes that every
`citizen is equally interested in the enforcement of the [law]
`* * * and that his political opinions or affiliations will not stand
`in the way of an honest discharge of his duty as a juror[.]”).
`Indeed, we have held that District juries could impartially
`adjudicate other criminal cases arising out of political matters,
`including Watergate. See Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 59–64
`(holding that a District jury could try President Nixon’s aides
`for attempting to cover up Watergate).
`
`Webster’s own data illustrates the point. For example,
`when asked how they were “likely to vote if [they were] on a
`jury for a defendant charged with crimes for his or her activities
`on January 6th[,]” 46% of respondents either “[v]olunteered”
`that they did not know how they would vote or that their vote
`“[d]epend[ed]” on other factors, or “refused” to speculate about
`how they would decide such a case. J.A. 36.
`
`
`Webster’s last argument for presuming prejudice is that
`the timing of his trial, approximately twelve months after
`January 6th, was too soon for all the media attention about the
`riot to dissipate. Webster puts the cart before the horse: He
`must first show prejudice before arguing that the prejudice did
`not dissipate. He has failed to do so.
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`Webster’s second tack—arguing that the “voir dire in this
`case was inadequate” and so failed to secure an impartial
`jury—also fails. Webster Opening Br. 29.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`11
`
`Demonstrating actual prejudice in the jury is an arduous
`task. “The test is whether the nature and strength of the opinion
`formed” by a juror before trial “necessarily” shows her to be
`partial. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723 (quotation marks omitted). It is
`not enough to establish that a juror was familiar with the facts
`of the case because the law does not require that jurors be
`“totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved.” Id. at 722;
`see Skilling, 561 U.S. at 398 (Jurors “need not enter the box
`with empty heads in order to determine the facts impartially.”).
`As long as jurors can “lay aside their impressions or opinions
`and render a verdict” fairly and objectively based on the
`evidence, they are not prejudiced. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723
`(formatting modified).
`
`In determining whether a defendant has shown actual
`prejudice on the part of a juror, the voir dire process is often
`critical. “No hard-and-fast formula dictates the necessary
`depth or breadth of voir dire.” Skilling, 561 U.S. at 386; see
`Mu’Min, 500 U.S. at 427 (“Particularly with respect to pretrial
`publicity, we think * * * primary reliance on the judgment of
`the trial court [in conducting voir dire] makes good sense.”).
`What matters is that the defendant be given “a full and fair
`opportunity” to expose any partiality in potential jurors. United
`States v. West, 458 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting United
`States v. Orenuga, 430 F.3d 1158, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). To
`do so, we examine whether the voir dire process was searching
`enough to smoke out bias. See id. at 7; Skilling, 561 U.S. at
`386–395. We also look to see if a juror’s answers during voir
`dire reveal any “partiality or hostility against the defendant that
`cannot be laid aside[.]” Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 508 (9th
`Cir. 2011) (formatting modified).
`
`
`Webster’s jury-selection process involved an exacting
`search. The court first screened the potential jurors with 21
`questions largely agreed upon by the defense and prosecution.
`
`
`
`
`
`12
`
`The questions probed (i) any relationship to the case, parties,
`attorneys, witnesses, or court personnel; (ii) any association
`with the U.S. Capitol, knowledge about the January 6th attack,
`or familiarity with Webster’s role in the attack; (iii) feelings
`and opinions about January 6th, former-President Trump, or
`former-President Trump’s supporters that could impact the
`ability to be impartial; (iv) relationships with or opinions about
`law enforcement officers; (v) the ability to follow and respect
`the rules of the trial including the presumption of innocence,
`privilege against self-incrimination, legal instructions, and
`instructions about avoiding media; and (vi) any unique
`hardships serving on a jury could pose.
`
`
`Next, the district court brought prospective jurors into the
`courtroom one by one, sat them in the jury box, and asked them
`additional questions under oath. See Skilling, 561 U.S. at 389
`(commending the district court for being “aware of the greater-
`than-normal need, due to pretrial publicity, to ensure against
`jury bias” by “examin[ing] each prospective
`juror
`individually”); United States v. Edmond, 52 F.3d 1080, 1095
`(D.C. Cir. 1995) (endorsing the view that potential jurors
`should be questioned individually if possibly exposed to
`potentially prejudicial information). If the potential juror felt
`uncomfortable answering, the court offered to use a white-
`noise device known as a “husher” so the potential juror could
`relay sensitive information in a manner heard only by the court
`and the parties. See Skilling, 561 U.S. at 389 (steps that
`“encourage candor” strengthen the voir dire process). Unless
`the court had already resolved to dismiss a prospective juror for
`cause, it allowed the parties to follow up with additional
`questions. See id. (noting that the parties “were accorded an
`opportunity to ask followup questions of every prospective
`juror brought to the bench for colloquy”).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`13
`
`Despite that searching inquiry, Webster raises four
`objections, none of which succeeds.
`
`First, he criticizes the length of the process, suggesting it
`was truncated. But Webster’s full-day voir dire is on par with
`what has passed constitutional muster in other cases. See
`Skilling, 561 U.S. at 388–389 (five-hour voir dire with
`questionnaire found to be constitutionally sufficient). And in
`evaluating the sufficiency of a particular voir dire, we generally
`focus on its substance, rather than its length, asking whether, in
`light of “the facts and circumstances of the particular case[,]”
`necessary questions were asked. West, 458 F.3d at 7–8.
`Webster tellingly cannot identify how the district court’s
`timing or questioning prejudiced his defense, nor what
`questions should have been but were not asked. Neither does
`he assert that the court rushed his counsel or denied him
`adequate time to investigate or to evaluate the prospective
`jurors. The Constitution does not require courts to take more
`time just for more time’s sake.
`
`Second, Webster contends both that “each juror had seen
`at least some coverage [of January 6th] and only one had not
`seen any videos in the last year,” and that several “had strong
`feelings about the events and/or President Trump[.]” Webster
`Opening Br. 29. Yet to demonstrate partiality, Webster needs
`to show that a juror was unable to judge Webster “solely on the
`basis of the evidence presented at trial.” Mu’Min, 500 U.S. at
`428. Webster’s contentions reveal nothing about that metric.
`
`Webster highlights Jurors 3, 8, and 13 as evidence of
`individual bias. Jurors 3 and 8 generally expressed negative
`views of former-President Trump and his supporters. J.A. 302
`(Juror 3 explaining “I certainly don’t have a high opinion of
`former-President Donald Trump, and by extension, I don’t
`think his supporters are particularly smart for supporting him”);
`
`
`
`
`
`14
`
`J.A. 344–345 (Juror 8 relaying that “I wasn’t a fan of Trump
`* * * . So his supporters, I mean, you know * * * some of them
`do get a little chaotic, and they’re not fun to be around when
`they’re being wild around the streets”). Juror 13 shared that,
`as “a black woman, at that period of [Trump] being President,
`I just felt unsafe.” J.A. 458.
`
`Nothing in those jurors’ statements suggests that they had
`prejudged Webster’s guilt or were incapable of deciding the
`case objectively based on the evidence. Webster’s counsel, in
`fact, was so unconcerned that he did not move to strike any of
`them. He also declined the offer to question Juror 8 further.
`J.A. 346. As for Juror 3, Webster’s counsel asked only if
`Webster was “at a disadvantage with” him. J.A. 304. When
`Juror 3 said no, counsel responded, “[N]o? Okay[,]” and
`moved on. J.A. 304. Similarly, counsel questioned Juror 13
`only to clarify whether her feelings of unsafety were related to
`January 6th or the Trump presidency. When she told him it
`was the latter, he responded: “Then I’m going to sit down.”
`J.A. 460. Counsel’s reactions and the absence of any motion
`to strike are “strong evidence” that he “was convinced the
`jurors were not biased and had not formed any opinions as to
`[Webster’s] guilt.” Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 558
`(1962).
`
`Third, Webster points to two instances where the district
`court denied his motion to strike potential jurors for cause.
`Webster’s counsel asked potential juror 0974 if, as a
`government employee, she saw herself “more aligned with the
`attorneys who are here representing the government as opposed
`to [Webster’s counsel.]” J.A. 372. She replied “I do. I feel
`more aligned with them.” J.A. 373. Webster’s counsel also
`asked potential juror 1156 whether his support of President
`Biden “put [Webster] at a disadvantage[.]” J.A. 328–329. The
`
`
`
`
`
`15
`
`potential juror said yes. The district court denied counsel’s
`motion to strike both jurors for cause.
`
`Pointing to those two potential jurors’ answers does not
`help Webster’s case for the simple reason that neither one sat
`on his jury. See Skilling, 561 U.S. at 389 n.24 (“Statements by
`nonjurors do not themselves call into question the adequacy of
`the jury-selection process.”). Beyond that, Webster does not
`connect the district court’s failure to strike those potential
`jurors to any asserted deeper flaw in the voir dire process that
`could have led to the seating of a biased juror. And the
`Supreme Court has rejected the proposition that “a defendant’s
`peremptory challenge right is impaired when he peremptorily
`challenges a potential juror whom the district court erroneously
`refused to excuse for cause[.]” United States v. Martinez-
`Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 310 (2000).
`
`Having said that, and to be clear, the district court should
`have struck at least potential juror 1156 for cause. That juror
`said that he did not view the trial as “a zero-zero game to start”
`and, when asked if he could abide by the presumption of
`innocence, candidly responded, “I really, I honestly don’t think
`so.” J.A. 330–331. A district court should never allow a juror
`to sit after he admits he cannot presume the defendant innocent.
`Full stop. Still, that single error in a lengthy voir dire process
`does not indict the process itself given the absence of any
`prejudice tied to the jurors who actually decided Webster’s
`case.
`
`Fourth, Webster argues that the district court wrongfully
`prohibited his counsel from asking prospective jurors if
`Webster would be “disadvantaged” in their eyes. Webster
`Opening Br. 33.
` The court reasoned
`that
`the
`term
`“disadvantaged” was unclear and asked Webster’s counsel to
`focus his questioning on the “presumptions and burdens and
`
`
`
`
`
`16
`
`the like; you know, would you presume this person would have
`done something wrong, et cetera[.]” J.A. 338–339. Webster
`did not object to the district court’s ruling. Yet Webster now
`asks this court to hold that the district court’s rephrasing
`“caused counsel to not question any subsequent jurors in the
`same way, likely not uncovering similar biases[.]” Webster
`Reply Br. 5.
`
`Because Webster raises this argument for the first time on
`appeal, we review it for only plain error. United States v. Pole,
`741 F.3d 120, 124 (D.C. Cir. 2013); FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
`We find no error, let alone plain error. Webster points to no
`case—and we are aware of none—holding that a court cannot
`avert juror confusion and focus voir dire questioning more
`directly on what matters: the ability of a potential juror to
`objectively follow the law and fairly adjudge the defendant’s
`guilt. A district court, after all, has wide latitude to sculpt
`questioning to “cover the substance of the appropriate areas of
`concern by framing its own questions in its own words.”
`United States v. Delgado-Marrero, 744 F.3d 167, 201 (1st Cir.
`2014) (formatting modified) (quoting Real v. Hogan, 828 F.2d
`58, 62 (1st Cir. 1987)); Darbin v. Nourse, 664 F.2d 1109, 1113
`(9th Cir. 1981) (“The court need not use the question in the
`precise form suggested by counsel.”). Besides, even if it were
`an error to modify counsel’s question, Webster offers no
`evidence—beyond his own speculation—of prejudice that
`resulted from the district court’s ruling. See Pole, 741 F.3d at
`124.
`
`
`B
`
`
`Webster separately argues that the district court abridged
`his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against
`him “by excluding all evidence of the investigation into
`[Officer] Rathbun’s conduct” for an unrelated and ultimately
`
`
`
`
`
`17
`
`unsubstantiated use-of-force claim. Webster Opening Br. 34.
`Webster did not preserve this argument below, and he cannot
`pass plain-error review now.
`
`
`1
`
`
`Five months after the riot at the Capitol, Officer
`Rathbun—the officer whom Webster assaulted at the Capitol—
`used force while responding to an alleged kidnapping. The
`United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia
`reviewed the incident and declined to prosecute Officer
`Rathbun. The Metropolitan Police Department opened its own
`administrative investigation, which was still pending at the
`time the voir dire process began.
`
`The government moved to bar Webster from cross-
`examining Officer Rathbun about the Metropolitan Police
`Department investigation. The district court promised to
`“discuss with the parties the scope of such cross-examination
`at the pretrial conference.” J.A. 159.
`
`At that conference, Webster’s counsel questioned whether
`Officer Rathbun’s “role as an important witness” for the U.S.
`Attorney’s Office “c[a]me into play in their ultimate decision
`in clearing him” during their review. J.A. 226. He noted the
`pending Metropolitan Police Department investigation and
`proposed that the district court delay Webster’s trial until that
`investigation closed in case it uncovered any dishonesty or
`wrongdoing. He then informed the district court about the type
`of questioning he wished to pursue: “[I]sn’t it true, sir, that
`there’s a pending investigation against you regarding your use
`of force as a police officer[?]” J.A. 232.
`
`The district court ruled that Webster could not cross-
`examine Officer Rathbun about “the substance and the nature
`
`
`
`
`
`18
`
`of the investigation” because that would be “highly prejudicial”
`and “inflammatory[.]” J.A. 230. But the district court agreed
`that cross-examination about “the fact of a pending
`investigation” was “certainly fair game.” J.A. 230; see J.A.
`234 (“So the existence of the investigation is okay. And, you
`know—and I don’t know whether you’re going [to] follow up
`with that in terms of bias, et cetera, but I think that’s about it.
`And if there’s more, you’ll let me know, though.”).
`
`Several days later, the government announced that the
`Metropolitan Police Department had found Officer Rathbun’s
`use of force justified and closed its investigation. The
`government then renewed its request to bar Webster from
`asking Officer Rathbun about “any pending investigations, as
`there no longer [wa]s a pending investigation.” J.A. 824.
`Webster’s counsel responded that “the government’s position
`is right[,]” and that, while he would “certainly like to delve into
`it,” he agreed that he no longer could ask about the
`investigation since it had closed in favor of Officer Rathbun.
`J.A. 824. The district court simply responded, “[a]ll right.”
`J.A. 824. No one brought the issue up again, and Webster’s
`counsel chose not to ask Officer Rathbun about any use-of-
`force investigation at trial.
`
`
`2
`
`
`The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
`guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
`shall enjoy the right * * * to be confronted with the witnesses
`against him[.]” U.S. CONST. Amend. VI. The Clause demands
`that a defendant have “a realistic opportunity to ferret out a
`potential source of bias.” Wilson, 605 F.3d at 1003 (quoting
`United States v. Davis, 127 F.3d 68, 70 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). A
`Confrontation Clause violation occurs if the court impaired
`counsel’s ability to show “bias on the part of the witness,” id.,
`
`
`
`
`
`19
`
`such that “a reasonable jury might have received a significantly
`different impression of the witness’s credibility had defense
`counsel been permitted to pursue his proposed line of cross-
`examination,” Davis, 127 F.3d at 70–71 (formatting modified)
`(quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986)).
`At the same time, no violation occurs when the district court
`blocks “only marginally relevant” questioning unlikely to
`move the jury, id. at 71, or when the district court imposes
`“reasonable limits” meant to curtail ills like “harassment,
`prejudice, confusion of the issues, [or] the witness’[s] safety,”
`United States v. Derr, 990 F.2d 1330, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
`(quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679).
`
`
`3
`
`
`Webster forfeited any objection to the district
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