U.S. Department of Justice
` Civil Division, Appellate Staff
` 950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Rm. 7260
` Washington, DC 20530
`
`Tel: (202) 514-3388
`
` August 26, 2025
`VIA CM/ECF
`
`Clifton Cislak, Clerk of Court
`U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
`333 Constitution Avenue, NW
`Washington, DC 20001
`
`RE: Global Health Council v. Trump;
`AIDS Vaccine Advocacy Coalition v. Department of State,
`Nos. 25-5097, 25-5098 (D.C. Cir.)
`
`Dear Mr. Cislak:
`
` I write to inform the Court that the government has this evening filed
`an application with the Supreme Court to stay the district court’s
`preliminary injunction in these cases. The application is attached to this
`letter.
` S i n c e r e l y ,
`
` /s/ Sean R. Janda
` S e a n R . J a n d a
`cc: Counsel of Record (via CM/ECF)
`USCA Case #25-5097 Document #2132152 Filed: 08/26/2025 Page 1 of 41
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`No. 25A
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`In the Supreme Court of the United States
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`───────────
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`DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL., APPLICANTS
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`v.
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`GLOBAL HEALTH COUNCIL, ET AL.
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`───────────
`
`UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ET AL., APPLICANTS
`
`v.
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`AIDS VACCINE ADVOCACY COALITION, ET AL.
`
`───────────
`
`APPLICATION TO STAY THE INJUNCTION ISSUED
`BY THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
`AND REQUEST FOR AN IMMEDIATE ADMINISTRATIVE STAY
`
`───────────
`
`D. JOHN SAUER
` Solicitor General
` Counsel of Record
` Department of Justice
` Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
` SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov
` (202) 514-2217
`
`
`USCA Case #25-5097 Document #2132152 Filed: 08/26/2025 Page 2 of 41
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`(i)
`TABLE OF C ONTENTS
`Statement ....................................................................................................................... 7
`A. Legal background ..................................................................................... 7
`B. Factual and procedural background ...................................................... 11
`Argument ..................................................................................................................... 21
`A. The government is likely to succeed on the merits ............................... 21
`1. Respondents lack a cause of action to assert a
`freestanding constitutional claim ............................................... 22
`2. The APA does not provide a cause of action for
`respondents’ impoundment claims ............................................. 25
`3. Respondents cannot bring an ultra vires claim.......................... 28
`B. The other factors support a stay ............................................................ 30
`1. The issues in this case warrant the Court’s review ................... 30
`2. The district court’s order causes irreparable harm to the
`Executive Branch ......................................................................... 32
`3. The balance of equities strongly favors the government ........... 35
`C. This Court should issue an administrative stay ................................... 35
`Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 36
`
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`PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
`Applicants (defendants-appellants below) in Trump v. Global Health Council
`are Donald J. Trump, in his official capacity as President of the United States; Marco
`Rubio, in his official capacity as Secretary of State and Acting Administrator of the
`United States Agency for International Development (USAID); Russell T. Vought, in
`his official capacity as Director of the Office of Management and Budget; Jeremy
`Lewin in his official capacity as Under Secretary of Foreign Assistance , Humanitar-
`ian Affairs and Religious Freedom at the Department of State and in his official ca-
`pacity performing the duties of Deputy Administrator and Chief Operating Officer of
`USAID; the United States Department of State; USAID ; and the Office of Manage-
`ment and Budget.*
`Applicants (defendants-appellants below) in United States Department of State
`v. AIDS Vaccine Advocacy Coalition are the United States Department of State;
`USAID; the Office of Management and Budget ; Marco Rubio, in his official capacity
`as Secretary of State and Acting Administrator of USAID ; Russell T. Vought, in his
`official capacity as Director of the Office of Management and Budget; and Donald J.
`Trump, in his official capacity as President of the United States.
`Respondents (plaintiffs-appellees below) in Trump v. Global Health Council
`are Global Health Council; Small Business Association for International Companies;
`HIAS; Management Sciences for Health, Inc.; Chemonics International, Inc.; DAI
`Global LLC; Democracy International, Inc.; and the American Bar Association.
`
`* The complaint named as a defendant Peter Marocco, in his official capacity
`as then-Acting Deputy Administrator for Policy and Planning of USAID, then-Acting
`Deputy Administrator for Management and Resources of USAID, and then -Director
`of Foreign Assistan ce of the Department of State. In their amended complaint,
`Global Health Council respondents dropped Mr. Marocco as a defendant and substi-
`tuted Acting Under Secretary Lewin pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
`25(d). See 25-cv-402 Am. Compl. at 7 & n.2 (Apr. 22, 2025).
`USCA Case #25-5097 Document #2132152 Filed: 08/26/2025 Page 4 of 41
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`iii
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`Respondents (plaintiffs-appellees below) in United States Department of State
`v. AIDS Vaccine Advocacy Coalition are AIDS Vaccine Advocacy Coalition; and Jour-
`nalism Development Network, Inc.
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`RELATED PROCEEDINGS
`United States District Court (D.D.C.):
`AIDS Vaccine Advocacy Coalition v. United States Department of State, No. 25-
`cv-400 (Feb. 13, 2025) (granting temporary restraining order)
`Global Health Council v. Trump, No. 25-cv-402 (Feb. 13, 2025) (granting tem-
`porary restraining order)
`AIDS Vaccine Advocacy Coalition v. United States Department of State, No. 25-
`cv-400 (Mar. 10, 2025) (granting preliminary injunction)
`Global Health Council v. Trump, No. 25-cv-402 (Mar. 10, 2025) (granting pre-
`liminary injunction)
`AIDS Vaccine Advocacy Coalition v. United States Department of State, No. 25-
`cv-400 (Aug. 26, 2025) (denying stay of preliminary injunction)
`Global Health Council v. Trump, No. 25-cv-402 (Aug. 26, 2025) (denying stay
`of preliminary injunction)
`United States Court of Appeals (D.C. Cir.):
`AIDS Vaccine Advocacy Coalition v. United States Department of State, No. 25-
`5046 (Feb. 26, 2025) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction)
`Global Health Council v. Trump, No. 25-5047 (Feb. 26, 2025) (dismissing ap-
`peal for lack of jurisdiction)
`Global Health Council v. Trump, No. 25-5097 (Aug. 13, 2025) (vacating prelim-
`inary injunction)
`AIDS Vaccine Advocacy Coalition v. United States Department of State, No. 25-
`5098 (Aug. 13, 2025) (vacating preliminary injunction)
`Supreme Court of the United States:
`Department of State v. AIDS Vaccine Advocacy Coalition, No. 24A831 (Mar. 5,
`2025) (denying motion to vacate order)
`
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`(1)
`In the Supreme Court of the United States
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`───────────
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`No. _______
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`DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., APPLICANTS
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`v.
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`GLOBAL HEALTH COUNCIL, ET AL.
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`───────────
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`UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ET AL., APPLICANTS
`
`v.
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`AIDS VACCINE ADVOCACY COALITION, ET AL.
`
`───────────
`
`
`APPLICATION TO STAY THE INJUNCTION ISSUED
`BY THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
`AND REQUEST FOR AN IMMEDIATE ADMINISTRATIVE STAY
`
`───────────
`Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Rules of this Court and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.
`1651, the Solicitor General —on behalf of applicants President Donald J. Trump, et
`al.—respectfully files this application for a stay of the injunction issued by the United
`States District Court for the District of Columbia (App., infra , 1a-48a), pending the
`consideration and disposition of any en banc proceedings in the United States Court
`of Appeals for the District of Columbia and, if that court affirms, pending the timely
`filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari and any further proceedings
`in this Court. In addition, the Solicitor General respectfully requests an immediate
`administrative stay pending the Court’s consideration of this application. Finally ,
`the Solicitor General respectfully requests a decision by September 2, 2025, due to
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`the additional irreparable harms the government would incur past that point.
`This case began as an emergency over whether a district court had jurisdiction
`to order the government to pay $2 billion for contractual work completed under foreign-
`aid grants within 36 hours. 145 S. Ct. 753, 754. Now, that district court has installed
`itself as supervisor-in-chief of further spending and rescissions proposals, issuing a
`preliminary injunction ordering the government to make available for obligation tens
`of billions of dollars in appropriated foreign aid funds and to spend many billions of
`dollars by September 30, before those appropriations expire. Instead of seeking emer-
`gency relief in March, the government proposed a schedule that would allow the D.C.
`Circuit to rule on the preliminary injunction’s legality before irrevocable compliance
`steps became necessary to meet the September 30 deadline. On August 13, the D.C.
`Circuit panel agreed that the preliminary injunction should be vacated in its entirety.
`But the en banc court, without granting review, has refused either to stay the injunc-
`tion or to issue the mandate, leaving the government subject to an injunction that the
`panel held to be deeply erroneous. The government is thus forced to ask this Court
`to give effect to the D.C. Circuit’s decision, which correctly held that private parties
`cannot enlist Article III courts to supplant the interbranch dialogue regarding the
`expenditure of appropriated funds.
`Since the Founding, Congress and the President have occasionally clashed over
`the use of appropriated funds. Congress, with the power of the purse, appropriates
`money for specific programs; the President, vested with exclusive authority to enforce
`the laws, has often disagreed about whether and how much of those funds should be
`spent. See Louis Fisher, Presidential Spending Power 147-152 (1975) (Presidential
`Spending Power) (collecting examples). President Jefferson, for example, famously
`withheld $50,000 appropriated for gunboats on the Mississippi during negotiations
`USCA Case #25-5097 Document #2132152 Filed: 08/26/2025 Page 7 of 41
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`over the Louisiana purchase. Presidential Spending Power 150. And President
`Lyndon Johnson (among other instances) impounded funds for small watershed pro-
`jects and for the construction of a national aquarium. Id. at 166.
`Congress and the President have long resolved disagreements through the po-
`litical process. For instance, when President Grant informed Congress that he would
`not spend funds appropriated for harbor and river improvements based on his view
`of the national interest, some members of Congress expressed objections. See Nile
`Stanton, History and Practice of Executive Impoundment of Appropriated Funds, 53
`Neb. L. Rev. 1, 5-7 (1974). But Congress ultimately dropped the issue and “no efforts
`were made to restrict presidential discretion over the appropriated money.” Id. at 7.
`For most of the Nation’s history, such give-and-take involved informal inter-
`branch negotiations. In response to President Nixon’s impoundments, however, Con-
`gress enacted Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (ICA), 2 U.S.C. 681 et seq ., which
`codified mechanisms for the political branches to work through such interbranch dis-
`putes. Under the ICA, the Executive Branch initiates negotiations: if the Executive
`Branch determines that specific appropriated funds should not be obligated, the Ex-
`ecutive Branch shall notify Congress. Then Congress may consider rescinding all or
`a portion of the appropriated funds. 2 U.S.C. 683(b). The ICA does not set any dead-
`line within a fiscal year by which the Executive Branch must propose rescissions, nor
`does it specify what happens if the funds expire while Congress is considering a re-
`scission proposal. Presidents have proposed rescissions shortly before the end of the
`fiscal year, and funds have not been spent when Congress failed to act on proposed
`rescissions before funding lapsed . See Impoundment Control Act —Withholding of
`Funds through Their Date of Expiration, B-330330.1, 2018 WL 6445177, at *9 (Comp.
`Gen. Dec. 10, 2018) (recounting lapses after proposed rescissions in 1975).
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`The ICA involves the Judiciary in those interbranch disputes only as a last
`resort. The ICA authorizes suits to challenge alleged executive -branch noncompli-
`ance with the ICA. But the Act contemplates such suits only if the Comptroller Gen-
`eral—the head of the General Accounting Office (GAO) within the Legislative
`Branch—concludes that the Executive Branch failed to “ma[k ]e available for obliga-
`tion” some appropriated funds that are “required to be made available for obligation.”
`2 U.S.C. 687. Even then, Congress authorized t he Comptroller General to sue the
`Executive Branch only after notifying Congress of the proposed suit and its rationale
`and allowing “25 calendar days of continuous session of the Congress” to elapse. Ibid.
`Regardless of whether such suits would be justiciable, they make plain that Congress
`intended to strictly limit federal courts’ involvement in those interbranch disputes.
`Yet, in March 2025, a single district court supplanted that process. The court
`held that, notwithstanding the ICA’s specific, calibrated enforcement mechanism via
`Comptroller General suits, all sorts of private parties —in fact, anyone who might
`receive appropriated funds but fears their impoundment —can sue to preemptively
`challenge putative impoundments. App., infra, 29a-38a. As relief, the court further
`held, those private parties can obtain preliminary injunctions from federal district
`court forcing the Executive Branch to expend the appropriated funds absent “lawful
`rescissions,” as judged by the district court. Id. at 48a. The district court thus dis-
`placed the process that the political branches agreed upon to resolve such disputes
`with a dysfunctional process of the court’s own devising. Private parties could leap-
`frog the ICA’s processes via that novel cause of action, and district courts could dis-
`pense with the political branches’ views in favor of judicial supervision —on pain of
`contempt—until all the money goes out the door.
`Thus, here, respondents—organizations that intended to compete (or have mem-
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`bers that intended to compete) for appropriated foreign -assistance funds—objected
`that the President’s Executive Order on foreign aid and accompanying e xecutive-
`branch memoranda and notices amounted to de facto impoundments that unlawfully
`bypassed the ICA’s procedures. The district court in March granted a preliminary
`injunction requiring petitioners to “make available for obligation the full amount of
`funds that Congress appropriate d for foreign assistance programs in the Further
`Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2024,” App., infra, 48a. The funds subject to the
`injunction comprise tens of billions of dollars, some $12 billion of which would have
`to be spent before those appropriations expire on September 30. The government
`obtained an expedited appeal, seeking a decision from the D.C. Circuit by August 15
`to avoid incurring irreparable costs in obligating billions of dollars that the Executive
`Branch would otherwise seek to avoid spending through the interbranch dialogue the
`ICA contemplates.
`The D.C. Circuit correctly vacated the preliminary injunction. The panel rec-
`ognized that this Court’s decision in Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994), forecloses
`respondents’ cause of action. Dalton held that “claims simply alleging that the Pres-
`ident has exceeded his statutory authority are not ‘constitutional’ claims, subject to
`judicial review.” Id. at 473. That is all respondents have alleged —that, six months
`before the end of the fiscal year, the government purportedly acted without statutory
`authority by not yet obligating the appropriated funds or notifying Congress of an
`intent to rescind or defer the funds. The panel also held that respondents cannot
`bring their claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.
`The APA does not supply a cause of action when another statute “preclude[s] judicial
`review” either through its text or structure, 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(1)—as the ICA does here.
`Finally, the panel held, respondents cannot meet the high bar for an ultra vires claim;
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`they cannot point to any specific statutory command that the government has vio-
`lated. See Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n v. Texas, 605 U.S. 665, 681-682 (2025).
`Now, with September 30 fast approaching, the en banc D.C. Circuit has effec-
`tively maintained the district court’s preliminary injunction without explanation—
`notwithstanding the panel opinion, issued after full briefing and argument on the
`merits—and exacerbated its destabilizing consequences. Absent this Court’s inter-
`vention, the D.C. Circuit’s inaction will preclude the government from proposing re-
`scissions and allowing funds to expire if Congress’s fails to act before September 30.
`In other words, it will effectively force the government to rapidly obligate some $12
`billion in foreign-aid funds that would expire September 30 and to continue obligating
`tens of billions of dollars more —overriding the Executive Branch’s foreign -policy
`judgments regarding whether to pursue rescissions and thwarting interbranch dia-
`logue. That alone is irreparable harm. See, e.g., National Inst. of Health v. American
`Public Health Ass’n, No. 25A103, 2025 WL 2415669 (Aug. 21, 2025); Department of
`Education v. California, 145 S. Ct. 966 (2025). And unless this Court grants relief by
`September 2, the Executive Branch must also take extensive preliminary steps that
`themselves inflict irreparable harm on the United States —for instance, negotiating
`with foreign countries about the scope and conditions of potential assistance pro-
`grams. Even if the government were to prevail, backtracking on those commitments
`and proposing rescissions after September 2 would inflict irreparable diplomatic costs
`and generate needless interbranch friction. App., infra, 133a.
`Worse still, by recognizing a novel cause of action for private parties to preemp-
`tively challenge perceived impoundments, the district court has issued a blueprint
`for virtually any prospective recipient of federal funds to circumvent the ICA’s proce-
`dures and enlist district courts to preempt and thwart negotiations between the po-
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`litical branches over the expenditure of appropriated funds . Regardless of when (or
`whether) those funds expire, and regardless of whether the Executive Branch has
`valid reasons to seek to rescind the funds that Congress would accept, those parties
`could persuade district courts to superintend the Executive Branch’s disbursement of
`funding streams and second-guess the political branches’ views of the ICA.
`That result would be alarming enough even if respondents faced countervailing
`irreparable harm. But, as the panel recognized, respondents face no such injury .
`They cannot claim irreparable harm from the unavailability of certain funding
`streams when they have no entitlement to those funds anyway. They simply want to
`compete for foreign-aid awards. But even under the injunction, they have no guar-
`antee of getting a penny, making it all the more incongruous for them to effectively
`commandeer the spending of billions of dollars. Further, a stay would still allow the
`ordinary appellate process to unfold for funds that do not expire September 30. T he
`government respectfully requests relief as soon as possible, and no later than Sep-
`tember 2, 2025.
`STATEMENT
`A. Legal Background
`1. Congress has long authorized foreign- assistance programs through the
`Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq., and other legislation. Con-
`sistent with the Executive Branch’s broad authority over the conduct of foreign af-
`fairs, that Act confers on the President and his subordinates significant discretion to
`manage foreign aid. Congress repeatedly authorized the President to provide assis-
`tance for various foreign-assistance programs “on such terms and conditions as the
`President may determine.” 22 U.S.C. 2151b- 2(c)(1) (treating a nd preventing
`HIV/AIDS); see, e.g., 22 U.S.C. 2151b(c)(1) (health programs); 22 U.S.C. 2291(a)(4)
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`(antinarcotic and other anticrime programs); 22 U.S.C. 2346(a) (economic and politi-
`cal stability assistance); 22 U.S.C. 2347(a) (military education and training assis-
`tance); 22 U.S.C. 2348 (peacekeeping operations); 22 U.S.C. 2349aa (antiterrorism
`assistance). And Congress has given the Secretary of State, “[u]nder the direction of
`the President,” the responsibility for the “continuous supervision and general direc-
`tion of economic assistance,” to ensure that “the foreign policy of the United States is
`best served thereby.” 22 U.S.C. 2382(c); see 22 U.S.C. 2346(b) (“The Secretary of
`State shall be responsible for policy decisions and justifications for economic support
`programs under this part.”).
`2. Congress regularly appropriates funds to allow the Executive Branch to
`implement the foreign -assistance programs set out in the Foreign Assistance Act.
`The funds at issue here were appropriated in Titles III and IV of Division F of the
`Further Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2024 (2024 Appropriations Act), Pub. L.
`No. 118-47, 138 Stat. 740-750. As to those funds, Congress sometimes appropriated
`large sums without imposing specific requirements regarding their obligation. See,
`e.g., Tit. III, 138 Stat. 742 (appropriating nearly $4 billion “[f  ]or necessary expenses
`to carry out the provisions of  ” certain sections of the Foreign Assistance Act concern-
`ing development assistance) . In some cases, Congress restricted how some funds
`could be used. See, e.g. , Tit. III, 138 Stat. 740- 741 (prohibiting the use of funds “to
`pay for the performance of abortion” or “to lobby for or against abortion”) . And in
`other cases, Congress appropriated funds for more specific purposes or specific recip-
`ients. See, e.g., Tit. III, 138 Stat. 742 (appropriating $1.65 billion “for a United States
`contribution to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria”). Congress
`also included an allocation table for ce rtain lump-sum appropriations, in which it
`designated amounts that “shall be made available” subject to specified procedures to
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`deviate from those amounts. Tit. VII, § 7019(a), 138 Stat. 771, 772.
`The date the relevant appropriated funds expire also varies. Some funds
`(roughly $16 billion) remain available until September 30, 2025, see, e.g., 2024 Ap-
`propriations Act, Tit. III, 138 Stat. 740 (Economic Support Fund) , whereas others
`remain available until 2027 (roughly $41 million) or 2028 (roughly $6 billion) , see,
`e.g., Tit. III, 138 Stat. 742 (Global Health Programs); 138 Stat. 747 (Debt Restructur-
`ing); and still others (roughly $16 billion) are available “until expended,” and without
`expiration, see, e.g., Tit. III, 138 Stat. 742 (International Disaster Assistance).
`3. In the ICA, Congress recognized that the President might not wish to
`spend all of an appropriation, and so it prescribed various notification procedures and
`mechanisms for resolving interbranch disagreements. First, whenever the President
`“determines that all or part of any budget authority will not be required to carry out
`the full objectives or scope of programs for which it is provided or that such budget
`authority should be rescinded for fiscal policy or other reasons ,” or “whenever all or
`part of budget authority provided for only one fiscal year is to be reserved from obli-
`gation for such fiscal year,” the President must “transmit to both Houses of Congress
`a special message.” 2 U.S.C. 683(a). The message must contain information about
`the proposed rescission, including the “amount of budget authority” involved and the
`“reasons why the budget authority should be rescinded.” 2 U.S.C. 683(a)(1) and (3);
`see 2 U.S.C. 683(a)(1)-(5). Upon receiving the message, Congress may consider a bill
`to rescind some or all of the funds covered . See 2 U.S.C. 688 (providing procedures
`ensuring timely consideration of such rescission bill). If Congress do es not “com-
`plete[] action on a rescission bill rescinding all or part of the amount proposed to be
`rescinded” within 45 days of continuous session after receiving the message, the ICA
`provides that the amount proposed to be rescinded “shall be made available for obli-
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`gation.” 2 U.S.C. 683(b); see 2 U.S.C. 682(3).
`Second, whenever the Executive Branch “proposes to defer any budget author-
`ity provided for a specific purpose or project,” the President must also submit a special
`message. 2 U.S.C. 684(a). That message must contain information including “the
`amount of the budget authority proposed to be deferred”; the “period of time during
`which the budget authority is proposed to be deferred”; and the “reasons for the pro-
`posed deferral.” 2 U.S.C. 684(a)(1), (3) and (4); see 2 U.S.C. 684(a)(1)- (6). The ICA
`restricts the grounds for deferrals as well as their duration. 2 U.S.C. 684(a)-(b). Ei-
`ther the House or the Senate may “express[] its disapproval of a proposed deferral of
`budget authority” by adopting an “impoundment resolution.” 2 U.S.C. 682(4).
`The ICA does not set any deadline within a fiscal year by which the President
`must send a special message proposing a rescission or deferral. And, after the ICA’s
`enactment, Presidents proposed rescinding funds that would expire before the end of
`the 45-day period during which Congress would consider a rescission bill. T he year
`after the ICA was enacted, President Ford sent a special message proposing to rescind
`funds that would lapse “nearly a month before expiration of the 45 days of continuous
`session the Congress normally has to review proposed rescissions.” GAO B-115398
`(ACG-76-5), Enclosure II (Aug. 12, 1975) , https://www.gao.gov/ assets/acg-76-5.pdf.
`President Carter similarly sent proposed rescissions for funds that would expire be-
`fore the end of the 45-day period. See GAO B-115398 (OGC-76-2), at 2 (Oct. 26, 1977),
`https://www.gao.gov/assets/ogc-78-2.pdf. In both cases, the funds lapsed during the
`45-day period without being obligated . In response, the Comptroller General pro-
`posed that Congress consider “changing the [ICA] to prevent funds from lapsing
`where the 45-day period has not expired.” Ibid. Congress did not do so.
`The ICA also sets out its own enforcement mechanisms for challenging presi-
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`dential impoundments, rescissions, and deferrals. As relevant here, if the Comptrol-
`ler General concludes that “budget authority is required to be made available for ob-
`ligation and such budget authority is not made available for obligation,” the Act states
`that Comptroller General may “bring a civil action” in district court . 2 U.S.C. 687.
`But the Act provides that such a suit may be brought only after the Comptroller Gen-
`eral files with Congress an “explanatory statement” detailing the “circumstances giv-
`ing rise to the action contemplated” and waits for “the expiration of 25 calendar days
`of continuous session of the Congress” after that filing. Ibid ; see 2. U.S.C. 686(a)
`(providing for other enforcement procedures through Comptroller General reports to
`Congress if the President fails to transmit requisite special messages).
`1
`B. Factual and Procedural Background
`1. On January 20, 2025, the President issued Executive Order No. 14,169,
`titled Reevaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid . 90 Fed. Reg. 8619
`(Jan. 30, 2025). That order stated that “[i]t is the policy of the United States that no
`further United States foreign assistance shall be disbursed in a manner that is not
`fully aligned with the foreign policy of the President of the United States.” Ibid. To
`provide time to review programs “for programmatic efficiency and consistency with
`United States foreign policy,” the order directed agencies to “immediately pause new
`obligations and disbursements of development assistance funds to foreign countries,”
`
`1 The Executive Branch has long raised concerns about the lawfulness of limits
`on impoundment. See, e.g., Nile Stanton, History and Practice of Executive Impound-
`ment of Appropriated Funds, 53 Neb. L. Rev. 1, 6-7 (1974). The Office of Legal Coun-
`sel has previously reasoned that, should Congress direct spending so as to “interfere
`with the President’s authority in an area confided by the Constitution to his substan-
`tive direction and control, such as his authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed
`Forces and his authority over foreign affairs,” that may violate Article II. Memoran-
`dum from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel,
`Presidential Authority to Impound Funds Appropriated for Assistance to Federally
`Impacted Schools, 1 Supp. Op. O.L.C. 303, 310 -311 (Dec. 1, 1969) . See App., infra ,
`35a n. 16. Those contentions, however, are not at issue in this application.
`USCA Case #25-5097 Document #2132152 Filed: 08/26/2025 Page 16 of 41
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`implementing organizations and contractors. Ibid . (emphasis omitted). Agencies
`were directed to conduct a review “within 90 days” and determine “whether to con-
`tinue, modify, or cease each foreign assistance program” in consultation with the Di-
`rector of the Office of Management and Budget and with the concurrence of the Sec-
`retary of State. Ibid.
`The Secretary of State then issued a memorandum directing a pause on foreign-
`assistance programs funded by or through the State Department and the United
`States Agency for International Development (USAID). The Secretary approved var-
`ious waivers of the funding pause pending review, including for foreign military fi-
`nancing for Israel and Egypt, emergency food assistance , and certain other humani-
`tarian assistance. C.A. App. 135. After the review, the State Department and USAID
`decided to retain hundreds of USAID awards and thousands of State Department
`awards, but terminated the remaining preexisting awards. Id. at 43.
`The State Department and USAID notified Congress on March 28, 2025, “of
`their intent to (1) undertake a reorganization that would involve realigning certain
`USAID functions to State by July 1, 2025, and (2) discontinue the remaining USAID
`functions that do not align with Administration priorities.” C.A. App. 236. The State
`Department also “informed Congress of its intent to restructure certain State bureaus
`and offices that would implement programs and functions realigned from USAID.”
`Ibid.
`2. Respondents are organizations that have (or whose members have) pre-
`viously competed for and receive d federal funds for foreign -assistance projects, and
`that would compete for the funds at iss