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`IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
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`FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
`________________________
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`No. 04-15642
`Non-Argument Calendar
`________________________
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` FILED
`U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
`ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
`October 6, 2005
`THOMAS K. KAHN
`CLERK
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`D. C. Docket No. 04-60148-CR-JIC
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`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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`JUAN CARLOS CASTILLO-HERNANDEZ,
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`versus
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`Plaintiff-Appellee,
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`Defendant-Appellant.
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`________________________
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`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Southern District of Florida
`_________________________
`(October 6, 2005)
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`Before ANDERSON, BLACK and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
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`PER CURIAM:
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`Juan Carlos Castillo-Hernandez appeals his eight-month sentence for
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`possession of a false social security number, in violation of 42 U.S.C.
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`§ 408(a)(7)(B). Castillo-Hernandez argues that the district court erred when it
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`applied a six-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C)(i) because
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`the social security number that he attempted to use to obtain a port access clearance
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`badge did not belong to an “actual individual” as that term is used by the
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`guidelines, because the number was assigned to a person who died almost 30 years
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`before Castillo-Hernandez committed the criminal offense. Castillo-Hernandez
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`contends that there is no ambiguity in the word “actual,” which means existing and
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`not merely potential or possible. Thus, he argues that an actual individual could
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`not include a person who died almost 30 years ago. Castillo-Hernandez further
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`argues that his reading of the term “actual individual” is supported by the reasons
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`underlying the enhancement, which is designed to punish the defendant for harm,
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`such as a damaged credit rating, damage to an individual’s reputation,
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`inconvenience, and other difficulties, that a victim of identity theft may face.
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`Castillo-Hernandez argues that these harms, and thus the reason for applying the
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`sentencing enhancement, are not present where the means of identification used
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`belonged to a deceased person.
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`We review de novo whether the district court properly applied
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`§ 2B1.1(b)(9)(C)(i) to Castillo-Hernandez’s underlying conduct. See United States
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`2
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`v. Spell, 44 F.3d 936, 938 (11th Cir. 1995). Section 2B1.1 states that if “the
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`offense involved . . . the unauthorized transfer or use of any means of identification
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`unlawfully to produce or obtain any other means of identification . . . increase by 2
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`levels. If the resulting offense level is less than level 12, increase to level 12.”
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`U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C)(i) (2003). “‘Means of identification’ has the meaning
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`given that term in 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7), except that such means of identification
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`shall be an actual (i.e., not fictitious) individual, other than the defendant[.]”
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`U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, cmt. n.8 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Auguste,
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`392 F.3d 1266, 167-68 (11th Cir. 2004) (affirming the enhancement where the
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`defendant had used her own name on the credit cards that she obtained by using the
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`living victim’s existing lines of credit and did not open new lines of credit).
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`We have held that the language in the sentencing guidelines is to be given its
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`plain and ordinary meaning. United States v. Pompey, 17 F.3d 351, 354 (11th Cir.
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`1994). Thus, because “i.e.” is an abbreviation for “that is” or “that is to say,” the
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`plain meaning of the language used by Congress was that “not fictitious” was the
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`exclusive definition for “actual.” See Black’s Law Dictionary 511 (6th ed. 1991).
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`See also United States v. Bush, 404 F.3d 263, 267 (4th Cir. 2005) (affirming the
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`defendant’s conviction for using a false social security number to obtain a car loan,
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`in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B), where the social security number used
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`3
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`was assigned to a deceased person). Accordingly, in light of the plain meaning of
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`the phrase “actual (i.e., not fictitious),” we affirm.
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`In addition, we reject Castillo-Hernandez’s’s argument that the enhancement
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`should not apply because he did not actually obtain a port access clearance badge.
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`The policy of the guidelines is to provide a lesser punishment for an attempt,
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`“unless the defendant completed all the acts the defendant believed necessary for
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`successful completion of the substantive offense or the circumstances demonstrate
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`that the defendant was about to complete all such acts but for apprehension or
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`interruption by some similar event beyond the defendant's control.” U.S.S.G.
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`2X1.1(b)(1) (emphasis added). In this case, Appellant was apprehended just before
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`he completed all of the acts and so under the guidelines, his actions do not
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`constitute an attempt.
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`AFFIRMED.1
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`1
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` Castillo-Hernandez’s request for oral argument is denied.
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`4