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`IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
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`FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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`No. 05-15064
`Non-Argument Calendar
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` FILED
`U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
`ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
`June 12, 2006
`THOMAS K. KAHN
`CLERK
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`D.C. Docket No. 02-01712-CV-P-NE
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`TYRON WHITE, et al.,
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`DOYLE GRIMES, on behalf of Blake Grimes,
`a minor, and on behalf of Cody Grimes, a minor,
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`versus
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`RICKY NICHOLS, in his official capacity,
`DEXTER RUTHERFORD, in his official capacity,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`Plaintiff-Appellant,
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`Defendants-Appellees.
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`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Northern District of Alabama
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`(June 12, 2006)
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`Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, CARNES and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
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`PER CURIAM:
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`Plaintiff-Appellant Doyle Grimes, on behalf of Cody Grimes, a minor,
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`appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees, Ricky
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`Nichols, principal of Lawrence County High School (“LCHS”) and Dexter
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`Rutherford, superintendent of the Lawrence County, Alabama, school system. Per
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`42 USC § 1983, Plaintiff claimed that Defendants’ school dress code ban on
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`clothing bearing a confederate flag constituted an unconstitutional violation of
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`First Amendment rights. No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
`1
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`The district court concluded that Scott v. School Bd. of Alachua County,
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`324 F.3d 1246 (11 Cir. 2003), was controlling; we agree. In Scott, we
`th
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`determined that an unwritten ban on the display of Confederate symbols imposed
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`by school officials constituted no violation of students’s First Amendment rights
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`when officials presented evidence of racial tensions existing within the school and
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`testified about fights that seemed to be racially based which had occurred in the
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`months preceding the ban. Id. at 1249. We accepted in Scott that “public school
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`students’ First Amendment rights are not forfeited at the school door,” but also
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`recognized that “those rights should not interfere with a school administrator’s
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`1
` Suit was brought against Defendants in their official capacities; Plaintiff seeks no money
`damages.
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`2
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`
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` professional observation that certain expressions have led to, and therefore could
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`lead to, an unhealthy and potentially unsafe learning environment.” Id. at 1247.
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`Scott concluded that school officials appropriately may censor student
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`expression under either of two theories. First, citing Tinker v. Des Moines
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`Independent Comm. School Dist., 89 S.Ct. 733 (1969), and Denno v. School Bd.
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`of Volusia County, Fla., 218 F.3d 1267 (11 Cir. 2000), the Scott decision allowed
`th
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`that student speech could be restricted based on a reasonable fear the expression
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`will disrupt discipline in the school. Id. at 1248. Second, citing Bethel School
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`District No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S.Ct. 3159 (1986), and Denno, Scott allowed that,
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`even absent a showing that disruption was immediately likely, school officials --
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`charged with responsibility for developing good citizenship -- “must have the
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`flexibility to control the tenor and contours of student speech within school walls
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`or on school property.” Id.
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`We need not revisit the reasoning of Scott: Scott constitutes binding
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`precedent in this Circuit. See Saxton v. ACF Indus., Inc., 254 F.3d 959, 960 n.1
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`(11 Cir. 2001) (under prior precedent rule we are bound to follow prior panel’s
`th
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`precedent unless and until it is overruled by this Court sitting en banc or by
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`Supreme Court). Here, as in Scott, the record evidenced racial tensions at LCHS
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`preceding implementation of the ban; and testimony linked those racial tensions
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`3
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`and incidents in which racial slurs were spoken to the display of the Confederate
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`flag on student clothing. Principal Nichols heard from students who reported
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`racial slurs spoken by fellow students wearing clothing bearing the Confederate
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`flag; heard concerns of faculty about potential racial unrest; received reports from
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`parents of minority students expressing concerns about racial discord (some of
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`which was attributed directly to the display of the Confederate flag at LCHS); and
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`heard from one minority student who complained of being intimidated and scared
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`to the point of feeling ill because she was surrounded by Confederate flags and
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`racial slurs. 2
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`Scott, recognizing that the Confederate flag evokes strong feelings, said
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`“[i]t is not only constitutionally allowable for school officials to closely contour
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`the range of expression children are permitted regarding such volatile issues, it is
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`their duty to do so.” Id. at 1249 (quoting the district court opinion). Under Scott,
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`the district court committed no reversible error when it concluded that Plaintiff
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`failed to show that his First Amendment rights were unconstitutionally infringed
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`by the imposition of the Confederate flag clothing ban.
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`AFFIRMED.
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`2
` We recognize, as did the district court, that Plaintiff disputes Principal Nichols’s recitation of
`complaints he heard about the Confederate flag. But, also as the district court observed, Plaintiff
`challenged Principal Nichol’s credibility; but Plaintiff proffered no evidence sufficient to create a
`genuine issue of fact about the Principal’s testimony.
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`4