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`IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
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`FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
`________________________
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`No. 07-10432
`Non-Argument Calendar
`________________________
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` FILED
`U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
`ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
`November 9, 2007
`THOMAS K. KAHN
`CLERK
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`D. C. Docket No. 05-00241-CR-2-LSC-RRA
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`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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`KEVIN A. STEVENS,
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`Plaintiff-Appellee,
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`versus
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`Defendant-Appellant.
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`________________________
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`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Northern District of Alabama
`_________________________
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`(November 9, 2007)
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`Before BIRCH, DUBINA and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
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`PER CURIAM:
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`Kevin A. Stevens appeals his sentence imposed for violating the terms and
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`conditions of his supervised release. Stevens contends the district court erred by
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`not providing an adequate statement of reasons for the imposition of a 24-month
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`sentence, and that the sentence was unreasonable. We address his arguments in
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`turn, and affirm Stevens’ sentence.
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`I.
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`Stevens asserts his sentence should be vacated and his case remanded for
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`resentencing because the district court failed to state any specific reasons for the
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`sentence it imposed, or why it imposed an above-Guidelines sentence, as required
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`by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2).
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`We normally review “a district court’s decision to exceed the Chapter 7
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`recommended guidelines range for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Silva,
`1
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`443 F.3d 795, 798 (11th Cir. 2006). We review de novo whether a district court
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`1
` The district court committed a technical violation under United States v. Jones, 899 F.2d
`1097, 1102 (11th Cir. 1990), overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Morrill, 984
`F.2d 1136, 1137 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc), by failing to elicit objections after it imposed the
`sentence. The rule in Jones applies to supervised release revocation. See United States v. Campbell,
`473 F.3d 1345, 1348 (11th Cir. 2007). While Stevens did not specifically object that the district
`court failed to state the § 3553(a) factors or that it failed to state its reasons for exceeding the
`advisory Guidelines range, in light of the technical Jones violation, we overlook Stevens’ failure to
`raise these arguments. Id. In any event, Stevens’ arguments are meritless irrespective of the
`standard of review. Additionally, the record in this case is sufficient for meaningful appellate
`review. See id. at 1348 (stating we will not remand where appellant did not raise the Jones error on
`appeal and the record was sufficient for meaningful appellate review).
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`2
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`complied with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). United States v. Bonilla, 463 F.3d 1176, 1181
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`(11th Cir. 2006).
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`If the district court “finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the
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`defendant violated a condition of supervised release,” it may revoke a term of
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`supervised release, after considering factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1),
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`(a)(2)(B)-(D), and (a)(4)-(7), and impose a sentence of imprisonment for the
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`violation. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The term imposed cannot exceed the statutory
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`maximum, which is determined by grade of the felony offense that resulted in the
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`term of supervised release. See id. Revocation of supervised release is mandatory,
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`however, if, among other things, the defendant possesses a controlled substance in
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`violation of the conditions of supervised release, refuses to comply with drug
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`testing imposed as a condition of supervised release, or as a part of drug testing,
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`tests positive for illegal controlled substances more than three times over the
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`course of one year. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(1), (3), (4).
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`In United States v. Brown, 224 F.3d 1237, 1241 (11th Cir. 2000), a case in
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`which the district court exceeded the Chapter 7 recommended range in imposing a
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`sentence, we held “[i]f supervised release is subsequently revoked under 18 U.S.C.
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`§ 3583(e), the statute . . . requires that the § 3553(a) factors be considered.
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`3
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`However, when revocation of supervised release is mandatory under 18 U.S.C.
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`§ 3583(g), the statute does not require consideration of the § 3553(a) factors.”
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`Id. (citation and quotation omitted) (emphasis in original).
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`The district court was required to revoke Stevens’s supervised release upon a
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`finding that he either possessed a controlled substance, refused to comply with
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`drug testing, or tested positive for drugs more than three times during the course of
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`one year. At the revocation hearing, Stevens made several admissions regarding
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`his drug use, including that he tested positive for cocaine twice in December 2006
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`and in August 2005, he used cocaine a couple of days prior to testing positive in
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`December 2006, and he missed “some” of his drug tests. Stevens was subject to
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`mandatory revocation in light of these admissions, and the district court was not
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`required to consider the § 3553(a) factors in imposing the term of imprisonment
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`under § 3583(g).
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`II.
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`Stevens further asserts his sentence is unreasonable because the probation
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`office recommended a sentence of only nine months and he merely tested positive
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`for cocaine on a couple of occasions. Stevens acknowledges his sentence did not
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`exceed the statutory maximum penalty, but asserts his sentence was unreasonable
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`considering it was well above his recommended Guidelines range.
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`4
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`We review a sentence imposed upon the revocation of supervised release for
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`reasonableness. United States v. Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105, 1106-07 (11th Cir.
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`2006). “[T]he party who challenges the sentence bears the burden of establishing
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`that the sentence is unreasonable in the light of both [the] record and the factors in
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`section 3553(a).” United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005).
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`When reviewing a sentence for unreasonableness, we must evaluate whether the
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`sentence achieves the purposes of sentencing stated in § 3553(a). United States v.
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`Williams, 456 F.3d 1353, 1360-61 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. dismissed, 127 S. Ct.
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`3040 (2007). Our evaluation must be made having regard for the factors listed in
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`§ 3553(a) and the reasons for the particular sentence as stated by the district court.
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`Id. at 1361.
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`Relevant factors in determining the length of imprisonment upon revocation
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`include the nature and circumstances of the offense; the history and characteristics
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`of the defendant; the need for the sentence to afford adequate deterrence to
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`criminal conduct, to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, and to
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`provide the defendant with medical care or other correctional treatment; the kinds
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`of sentences available; and the applicable advisory Guidelines range. 18 U.S.C.
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`§ 3553(a).
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`5
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`Stevens’ above-Guidelines sentence is reasonable. Stevens’ advisory-
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`Guidelines range was 3 to 9 months’ imprisonment, and he was sentenced to 24
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`months’ imprisonment. Even though the district court was not required to do so, it
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`considered the § 3553(a) factors. The district court expressly considered Stevens’
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`history and characteristics by acknowledging he had a drug problem and noting he
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`repeatedly used drugs, even though he worked regularly. The court also
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`considered the need for incarceration and to provide adequate deterrence in light of
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`its comments that his previous five-year prison term did not “do [him] any good.”
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`The court also considered the kinds of sentences available by noting the maximum
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`penalty for Stevens’ violations was 36 months’ imprisonment and by indicating
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`that it would, after the completion of Stevens’ 24-month prison sentence, reinstate
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`the drug treatment program that was conducted by the Probation Office.
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`Furthermore, Stevens’ sentence is within the applicable statutory maximum, and is
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`reasonable in light of the evidence of his repeated drug use while on supervised
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`release. Accordingly, his sentence is reasonable.
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`AFFIRMED.
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`6