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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
`
` IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`
` FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
` ________________________
`
` No. 10-11155
`Non-Argument Calendar
` ________________________
`
` FILED
`U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
`ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
` DECEMBER 7, 2010
`JOHN LEY
`CLERK
`
` D.C. Docket No. 2:97-cr-14003-KMM-2
`
`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
`
`FIDENCIO GONZALES,
`a.k.a. Chita,
`
`lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,
`
`versus
`
`lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.
`
`________________________
`
` Appeal from the United States District Court
` for the Southern District of Florida
` ________________________
`
`(December 7, 2010)
`
`Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
`
`PER CURIAM:
`
`Fidencio Gonzales appeals the revocation of his supervised release and his
`
`

`
`60-month sentence for violating the terms of his supervised release. After a
`
`thorough review of the parties’ briefs and the record, we affirm.
`
`I.
`
`Gonzales first challenges the district court’s revocation of his supervised
`
`release. “We generally review a district court's revocation of supervised release
`
`for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Velasquez Velasquez, 524 F.3d 1248,
`
`1252 (11th Cir. 2008). Supervised release may be revoked if the district court
`
`finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant violated a condition
`
`of the supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Gonzales argues that the
`
`district court erred in finding that he intended to distribute the eight grams of
`
`cocaine in his possession. Intent to distribute may be inferred from circumstantial
`
`evidence. See United States v. Poole, 878 F.2d 1389, 1392 (11th Cir. 1989) (per
`
`curiam) (“Intent to distribute can be proven circumstantially from, among other
`
`things, the quantity of cocaine and the existence of implements such as scales
`
`commonly used in connection with the distribution of cocaine.”). The record
`
`shows that the cocaine in Gonzales’s possession was packaged in fifteen plastic
`
`baggies. The two experienced arresting officers testified that this was an
`
`indication that the cocaine was intended for sale or distribution. This evidence
`
`was sufficient to support the district court’s finding that Gonzales intended to
`
`2
`
`

`
`distribute the cocaine. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse
`
`its discretion in revoking Gonzales’s supervised release.
`
`II.
`
`Gonzales next argues that his 60-month sentence is substantively
`
`unreasonable. We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse
`1
`
`of discretion in light of the totality of the circumstances. Gall v. United States,
`
`552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). “[T]he party who challenges the
`
`sentence bears the burden of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable in the
`
`light of both th[e] record and the factors in [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)].” United States
`
`v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005). “[O]rdinarily we would expect a
`
`sentence within the Guidelines range to be reasonable.” Id.
`
`Gonzales argues that the district court failed to adequately and properly
`
`In his statement of the issues, Gonzales challenges both the substantive and procedural
`1
`reasonableness of his sentence. In his argument, however, Gonzales challenges only the
`substantive reasonableness of his sentence. We conclude that Gonzales has waived the issue of
`procedural reasonableness. See United States v. Gupta, 463 F.3d 1182, 1195 (11th Cir. 2006)
`(“We may decline to address an argument where a party fails to provide arguments on the merits
`of an issue in its initial or reply brief. Without such argument the issue is deemed waived.”).
`Even if Gonzales had not waived the issue, we would review only for plain error because
`Gonzales’s objection at sentencing challenged only the substantive reasonableness of his 60-
`month sentence. See United States v. Massey, 443 F.3d 814, 818 (11th Cir. 2006). For this
`Court to correct plain error at sentencing, a defendant must establish that there is a reasonable
`probability that, but for the error, he would have received a lesser sentence. United States v.
`Arias-Izquierdo, 449 F.3d 1168, 1190 (11th Cir. 2006). As Gonzales has not shown that he
`received a longer sentence because of a procedural error, he could not prevail under plain error
`review.
`
`3
`
`

`
`consider his history and characteristics and the nature and circumstances of the
`
`offense, as required by § 3553(a)(1), and imposed a sentence that was greater than
`
`necessary to comply with the purposes of sentencing set forth in § 3553(a)(2).
`
`Gonzales’s advisory guideline range was 51 to 60 months. His original conviction
`
`was for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base in
`
`violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Given that Gonzales’s original conviction was for
`
`conduct similar to the violation that resulted in the revocation of his supervised
`
`release, we cannot say that his within-guideline sentence of 60 months is
`
`unreasonable. See § 3553(a)(2) (requiring courts to consider the need for the
`
`sentence “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” and “to protect the
`
`public from further crimes of the defendant”).
`
`For these reasons, both the revocation of Gonzales’s supervised release and
`
`his 60-month sentence are AFFIRMED.
`
`4

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