[DO NOT PUBLISH]
`
` IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
` FILED
` FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
`U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
`ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
` ________________________
`SEP 22, 2011
`JOHN LEY
` CLERK
`
` No. 11-10779
`Non-Argument Calendar
` ________________________
`
` D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-02485-TCB
`
`KHALID H. SYED,
`
`llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
`
`COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
`
`versus
`
` Plaintiff-Appellant,
`
`llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
`________________________
`
` Defendant-Appellee.
`
` Appeal from the United States District Court
` for the Northern District of Georgia
` ________________________
`
`(September 22, 2011)
`
`Before MARCUS, WILSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
`
`PER CURIAM:
`
`Khalid Syed appeals the district court’s order affirming the Commissioner’s
`
`denial of his applications for Disabled Adult Child’s (“DAC”) Insurance Benefits,
`
`
`
` IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
` FILED
` FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
`U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
`ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
` ________________________
`SEP 22, 2011
`JOHN LEY
` CLERK
`
` No. 11-10779
`Non-Argument Calendar
` ________________________
`
` D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-02485-TCB
`
`KHALID H. SYED,
`
`llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
`
`COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
`
`versus
`
` Plaintiff-Appellant,
`
`llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
`________________________
`
` Defendant-Appellee.
`
` Appeal from the United States District Court
` for the Northern District of Georgia
` ________________________
`
`(September 22, 2011)
`
`Before MARCUS, WILSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
`
`PER CURIAM:
`
`Khalid Syed appeals the district court’s order affirming the Commissioner’s
`
`denial of his applications for Disabled Adult Child’s (“DAC”) Insurance Benefits,
`
`
`
`Disability Benefits, Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”), and Supplemental Social
`
`Security Income (“SSI”). On appeal, Syed argues that: (1) the Administrative Law
`
`Judge (“ALJ”) did not apply the appropriate legal standard in assessing his mental
`
`limitations, as she failed to apply the Psychiatric Review Technique Form (“PRTF”);
`
`(2) the district court erred in not finding that the magistrate provided post hoc
`
`rationale for the ALJ’s residual functioning capacity (“RFC”) determination; (3)
`
`substantial medical evidence indicates greater limitations than those found by the
`
`ALJ; and (4) because the hypothetical question posed did not include any limitations
`
`regarding concentration or attention deficits, the testimony of the vocational expert
`
`(“VE”) cannot provide substantial evidence to support a finding that he is not
`
`disabled. After careful review, we affirm.1
`
`We review the Commissioner’s decision for substantial evidence. Winschel
`
`v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011). “Substantial evidence
`
`is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would
`
`accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quotations omitted).
`
` As an initial matter, we review the decision of the ALJ as the Commissioner’s final
`1
`decision when the ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies review of the ALJ’s
`decision. See Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001); Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d
`1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting that our review in a social security case is the same as that of
`the district court). Because we review the decision of the ALJ, we need not consider Syed’s
`arguments with respect to the post hoc rationale in the magistrate’s report and recommendation,
`or any other errors in the district court’s opinion.
`
`2
`
`
`
`The Commissioner uses
`
`a five-step, sequential evaluation process . . . to determine whether a
`claimant is disabled: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in
`substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe
`impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment
`meets or equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing
`of Impairments; (4) based on [the RFC] assessment, whether the
`claimant can perform any of his or her past relevant work despite the
`impairment; and (5) whether there are significant numbers of jobs in the
`national economy that the claimant can perform given the claimant’s
`RFC, age, education, and work experience.
`
`Id. We do not re-weigh the evidence, decide facts anew, or make credibility
`
`determinations. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005).
`
`At Step Two of the evaluation process, the ALJ must use a “special technique”
`
`dictated by the PRTF for evaluating mental impairments. Moore, 405 F.3d at 1213;
`
`20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a-(a). This technique requires separate evaluations on a
`
`four-point scale of how the claimant’s mental impairment impacts four functional
`
`areas: “activities of daily living; social functioning; concentration, persistence, or
`
`pace; and episodes of decompensation.” Moore, 405 F.3d at 1213; see 20 C.F.R. §
`
`404.1520a-(c)(3-4). The ALJ must incorporate the results of this technique into the
`
`findings and conclusions. Moore, 405 F.3d at 1213-14; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a-(e)(2).
`
`At Step Four of the evaluation process, the ALJ must determine a claimant’s
`
`RFC by considering all relevant medical and other evidence. See Phillips v.
`
`3
`
`
`
`Barhnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1238-39 (11th Cir. 2004). RFC is an assessment, based
`
`upon all of the relevant evidence, of a claimant’s ability to do work despite his
`
`impairment. Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997). In assessing
`
`RFC, the ALJ must state with particularity the weight given different medical
`
`opinions and the reasons for doing so. Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th
`
`Cir. 1987).
`
`At Step Five of the evaluation process, the burden shifts to the Commissioner
`
`to prove that other jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant can perform.
`
`Wolfe v. Chater, 86 F.3d 1072, 1077 (11th Cir. 1996). “The ALJ must articulate
`
`specific jobs that the claimant is able to perform, and this finding must be supported
`
`by substantial evidence, not mere intuition or conjecture.” Wilson v. Barnhart, 284
`
`F.3d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir. 2002). One manner of determining this is for the ALJ to
`
`ask a VE hypothetical questions “to establish whether someone with the limitations
`
`that the ALJ has previously determined that the claimant has will be able to secure
`
`employment in the national economy.” Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1232. In order for a
`
`VE’s testimony to constitute substantial evidence, the ALJ must pose a hypothetical
`
`question that comprises all of the claimant’s impairments. Winschel, 631 F.3d at
`
`1180. However, the ALJ is not required to include findings in the hypothetical that
`
`the ALJ has found to be unsupported. Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d
`
`4
`
`
`
`1155, 1161 (11th Cir. 2004). When medical evidence demonstrates that a claimant
`
`can engage in simple, routine tasks or unskilled work despite limitations in
`
`concentration, persistence, and pace, courts have concluded that limiting the
`
`hypothetical to include only unskilled work sufficiently accounts for such limitations.
`
`Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1180-81.
`
`In this case, the ALJ addressed Syed’s mental limitations in accordance with
`
`the PRTF. Following a discussion of the pertinent medical evidence and Syed’s
`
`school records as they related to Syed’s mental impairments, including discrediting
`
`Syed’s higher Global Assessment Functioning (“GAF”) scores because they were not
`
`generated by a physician or psychologist, the ALJ specifically addressed Syed’s
`
`mental limitations pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a-(c)(3-4). The ALJ found the
`
`following mental limitations as set forth in the mental listings: “mild restriction of
`
`activities of daily living; moderate difficulties in maintaining social functioning;
`
`moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace, and no
`
`episodes of decompensation.” The ALJ incorporated these findings into the five-step,
`
`sequential evaluation process, during which the ALJ concluded that Syed was not
`
`disabled. Accordingly, the ALJ applied the appropriate legal standard in assessing
`
`Syed’s mental limitations.
`
`5
`
`
`
`Moreover, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determinations that Syed
`
`had the RFC to perform work at all exertion levels, limited to simple, unskilled work
`
`that was low-stress, requiring only the occasional need to make decisions, use
`
`judgment, or have contact with the general public. As the record shows, numerous
`
`medical reports indicated that Syed possessed adequate social skills, followed rules,
`
`related to co-workers, and that he was only moderately limited in his work
`
`capabilities. The medical evidence also reported that Syed engaged in behavior such
`
`as answering his cell phone during evaluations which could cost him any job.
`
`Contrary to Syed’s contention, the ALJ specifically noted Syed’s difficulty
`
`with maintaining a schedule and keeping track of time. In addition, the ALJ
`
`sufficiently explained that greater weight was given to the vocational evaluation in
`
`arriving at Syed’s RFC because it considered his functional deficits, evaluated his
`
`remaining abilities, and was consistent with the vocational and medical opinions of
`
`record. The ALJ also sufficiently explained that certain evaluating physicians were
`
`given less weight in their consideration because they only examined Syed once or
`
`twice. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s RFC determination,
`
`as it properly detailed the severity of Syed’s medically determinable impairments, his
`
`improvements when medicated and employed, as well as the various jobs for which
`
`he was qualified.
`
`6
`
`
`
`Finally, although the hypothetical question posed by the ALJ to the VE did not
`
`expressly include Syed’s impairments, it implicitly accounted for them, and thus, was
`
`not improper. See Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1180-81. As the record shows, the
`
`hypothetical included that there were impairments, and that the individual would
`
`require a low-stress work environment. Indeed, the medical evidence demonstrated
`
`that Syed could engage in simple, routine tasks and unskilled work despite any
`
`limitations, as he was not significantly limited in his ability to complete simple
`
`work-like procedures. The medical evidence also showed that Syed understood and
`
`followed specific, multi-step instructions, and was cooperative and responsive. Thus,
`
`Syed was only moderately limited in his work capabilities, could accept instruction
`
`and criticism, and was not significantly limited in his ability to complete simple
`
`work-like procedures. Because simple, unskilled work sufficiently accounted for
`
`limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace, as set forth in Winschel, the
`
`hypothetical posed adequately accounted for Syed’s limitations as they were
`
`implicitly included. Accordingly, we affirm the Commissioner’s decision to deny
`
`Syed’s claims for benefits.2
`
`AFFIRMED.
`
` Moreover, Syed cites to no precedent, and we can find none, in support of his contention
`2
`that a VE must answer only in a vacuum or that the ALJ must announce her RFC determination
`prior to posing the hypothetical question.
`
`7
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