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`[PUBLISH]
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`IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
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`FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
`________________________
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`No. 16-12866
`________________________
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`D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cv-01694-AT
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`ASKIA MUSTAFA RAHEEM,
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` Petitioner - Appellant,
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`versus
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`GDCP WARDEN,
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` Respondent - Appellee.
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`________________________
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`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Northern District of Georgia
`________________________
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`(April 26, 2021)
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`Before JORDAN, ED CARNES and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
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`MARCUS, Circuit Judge:
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`In this double homicide case, Askia Mustafa Raheem was convicted of
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`murdering Brandon Hollis and his mother, Miriam Hollis, and sentenced to death
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`by a Superior Court judge in Georgia. He urges us to overturn his convictions and
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`the ensuing death sentence arguing, among other things, that he received
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`ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his trial because his
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`lawyers failed to investigate and present to the jury additional mitigating evidence
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`about his mental health and social history. Alongside this claim, Raheem says the
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`state trial court violated procedural due process by failing to hold a hearing to
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`determine whether he was competent to stand trial. Because this claim was never
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`raised in the trial court, he attempts to overcome his default by arguing that his
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`counsel were ineffective in not raising the claim. He adds that regardless of the
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`failure to conduct a hearing, his substantive due process rights were violated
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`because he was in fact tried while incompetent.
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`Raheem also says that his due process rights were violated when he was
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`forced to wear a stun belt during trial, and when the prosecutor made
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`impermissible arguments about his future dangerousness. Because these claims
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`were procedurally defaulted too, he argues again that his counsel were
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`prejudicially ineffective. Finally, Raheem argues that the prosecutor improperly
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`mentioned his failure to testify at trial, denying him the privilege against self-
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`incrimination afforded by the Fifth Amendment.
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`The Georgia Supreme Court denied Raheem’s Fifth Amendment claim on
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`direct review. The state habeas court then denied on the merits Raheem’s
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`2
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`ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims and found that his claims about
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`competency and being required to wear a stun belt were procedurally defaulted.
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`The denial of these claims was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application
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`of clearly established law, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of
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`the facts in light of the overwhelming evidence presented by the state. The district
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`court reviewed for the first time Raheem’s substantive due process claim. It did
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`not clearly err when it found that Raheem was competent to stand trial.
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`Accordingly, we affirm.
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`I.
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`These are the essential facts and procedural history surrounding this § 2254
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`petition. In the afternoon of April 2, 1999, Raheem was driving his girlfriend
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`Veronica Gibbs’s blue Honda in and around Clayton County, Georgia, just south
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`of Atlanta. He stopped to pick up his friends Michael Jenkins and Dione Feltus
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`from their homes. Later, he dropped Feltus off at work at five o’clock in the
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`afternoon. Raheem decided to go target shooting with Jenkins and another friend,
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`Brandon Hollis, whom Jenkins had never met. Raheem and Jenkins drove to
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`Gibbs’s apartment, where Raheem was living, and retrieved a .380-caliber handgun
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`from his bedroom. As this tragic story developed, Raheem then pulled to the side
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`of the road and twice fired his weapon outside the window. Raheem claimed that
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`he wanted to be sure the weapon would not jam.
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`On his way to pick up Brandon Hollis, Raheem stopped at a Kroger
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`supermarket, where he purchased a box of black trash bags. Raheem and Jenkins
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`picked up Brandon. They drove down a dirt road in Henry County, Georgia, some
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`five minutes from Brandon’s home, and they walked into the woods as it started to
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`get dark. Raheem shot the firearm at a tree, but missed his target. Jenkins then
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`took the weapon, intending to fire it. But Brandon suggested that they find another
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`location because the gun was “loud.” As Brandon turned and started to walk to the
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`car, Raheem grabbed the firearm. Raheem instructed Brandon not to walk so
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`quickly because he did not have a flashlight and Brandon might step in a puddle
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`and get mud in his girlfriend’s car. Jenkins looked down at his shoes to see if they
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`were muddy. When he looked up, Raheem “had the gun at the back of Brandon’s
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`head, and he shot him.” Brandon fell to the ground. Jenkins asked if Brandon
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`Hollis was dead. Raheem responded, “No, but he is on his way out.” Raheem
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`stopped to take Brandon’s watch, remarking, “I guess you ain’t going to be
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`needing this watch no more.” He also stole Brandon’s keys and his wallet. When
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`Raheem and Jenkins returned to the car, Raheem told his friend, “I’m glad you
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`didn’t run.”
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`Raheem and Jenkins proceeded to Brandon Hollis’s home. Raheem used
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`Brandon’s keys to open the door. Before entering, Raheem told Jenkins to bring a
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`trash bag into the house. When they walked in, Brandon’s mother, Miriam Hollis,
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`was sitting in a chair reading a book. As Raheem entered brandishing the firearm,
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`Miriam jumped up. Raheem fired at her and jumped behind a wall. Raheem
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`yelled, “Get down, this is a robbery.” As Miriam started to lie down on the floor
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`on the other side of the chair, Raheem reached over the chair and shot her. Miriam
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`Hollis fell, blood seeping out of her head onto the carpet. Jenkins handed the
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`garbage bag to Raheem, who placed it over her head to contain the flow of the
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`blood. After making sure no one else was in the house, Raheem grabbed the keys
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`to Miriam’s Lexus. Raheem explained that he killed Miriam Hollis because he had
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`paid her $8,000 for the Lexus and she refused to give him the car. Raheem popped
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`the trunk of the Lexus, and he and Jenkins placed Miriam’s body inside. Raheem
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`tried to clean the blood off the carpet with a mop.
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`Later, Raheem and Jenkins visited Raheem’s girlfriend, Veronica Gibbs, at a
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`B.P. gas station where she worked. Raheem brought Gibbs outside the station,
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`popped the trunk of the Lexus, and showed her Miriam’s body. Raheem and
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`Jenkins then went to eat at a Wendy’s, but Jenkins could not keep any food down.
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`The two rode around in Miriam’s Lexus until midnight and then picked up Gibbs
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`from work. She, Raheem, and Jenkins drove back to the Hollis home in the Lexus.
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`Gibbs and Raheem proceeded to burglarize the house.
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`At around 4 a.m., Raheem and Jenkins disposed of Miriam’s body. They
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`drove to some train tracks and took her body out of the trunk. Raheem dragged the
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`body along the tracks. They covered Miriam Hollis with wood and debris.
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`Raheem said he wanted to burn the body, but Jenkins advised against it.
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`Nevertheless, Raheem doused Miriam’s body with alcohol or gasoline -- Jenkins
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`was not sure which -- struck a match, and set the body ablaze. The two of them
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`then drove back to Gibbs’s house and went to sleep. A few days later, Raheem
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`gave the firearm to a friend (Tamika Woods), asking her to hide it. She threw the
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`weapon into a sewer, where it was later recovered by the police.
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`Raheem was indicted in Henry County, Georgia on two counts of malice
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`murder, four counts of felony murder (each of the murders were committed in the
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`course of an aggravated assault and both were committed with firearms while
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`Raheem was a felon in possession of a firearm), two counts of armed robbery, and
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`one count of burglary. See Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-5-1(a), (c), 16-7-1(a), 16-8-41(a)
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`(1999). During the guilt phase of Raheem’s trial, the state presented extensive
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`evidence of the brutal crimes, much of it from the testimony of Michael Jenkins.
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`Veronica Gibbs and Dione Feltus testified that Raheem had confessed to
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`murdering both Brandon and Miriam Hollis, and Gibbs confirmed that Raheem
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`had shown her Miriam’s body in the trunk of the Lexus on the night of the
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`murders.
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`The prosecution also called a number of police officers, crime scene
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`investigators, and forensic analysts to corroborate the lay witnesses’ accounts.
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`Among other things, the state presented evidence that Brandon and Miriam Hollis
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`were both killed by gunshot wounds to their heads, that the firearm used in the
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`crimes was the one Woods had dumped in the sewer, that a box and ammunition
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`for the type of handgun used in the murders was found in Raheem’s bedroom in
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`Gibbs’s apartment, and that DNA from Brandon and Miriam Hollis was found in
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`blood on shoes known to be worn by Raheem. The state further introduced
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`evidence that missing items from the Hollis home (including Miriam Hollis’s
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`checkbook) were found in Gibbs’s apartment, that Miriam Hollis’s stolen Lexus
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`was found within walking distance of Gibbs’s apartment, and that Miriam Hollis’s
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`burned body was discovered at the railroad tracks across the street from the home
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`of Raheem’s cousin.
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`In addition, the prosecution introduced a videotape of an interview
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`conducted on April 6, 1999, between Raheem and the police. Raheem described
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`substantially the same chain of events that Jenkins had recounted, but, notably,
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`Raheem claimed that Jenkins was the shooter. Detective Renee Swanson testified
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`that after Raheem made the videotaped statement, he took her to the location of
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`Brandon’s body in the woods. The jury convicted Raheem on all counts.
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`At the penalty phase, the prosecution called a number of jail officers who
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`testified about various contraband items that had been found in Raheem’s
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`possession at the jail. The defense offered mental health experts Dr. Charles Nord
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`7
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`and Dr. Jack Farrar in mitigation. Farrar had testified on Raheem’s behalf at the
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`guilt phase as well. Raheem’s father, Askia Raheem, and his mother, Elaine
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`Raheem, also gave testimony on behalf of their son. The jury unanimously
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`recommended that Raheem be sentenced to die for the malice murder of Miriam
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`Hollis. On each remaining murder count, the jury recommended life in prison
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`without parole. The trial judge sentenced Raheem to death for the malice murder
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`of Miriam Hollis, to life in prison for the remaining murder counts and the armed
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`robbery counts, and to twenty years in prison for the burglary count, all sentences
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`to run consecutively to one another.
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`Raheem directly appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court. Georgia’s high
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`court affirmed his convictions and the ensuing sentences on March 11, 2002.
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`Raheem v. State, 560 S.E.2d 680 (Ga.), cert. denied, Raheem v. Georgia, 537 U.S.
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`1021 (2002), reh’g denied, 537 U.S. 1150 (2003).1 Relevant for our purposes, the
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`Georgia Supreme Court considered Raheem’s claim that his Fifth Amendment
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`right had been violated when the prosecutor commented, in closing argument, that
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`Raheem had failed to testify at trial. Id. at 685. The Georgia Supreme Court
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`concluded that although his constitutional right had been violated, the error was
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`1 The court noted that “[t]he trial court properly vacated the felony murder convictions [as
`duplicative] and imposed the jury’s sentences for the malice murders.” Id. at 682 n.1 (citing
`Malcolm v. State, 434 S.E.2d 479, 482 (Ga. 1993); Ga. Code Ann. § 16–1–7(a)(1)).
`8
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`harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18
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`(1967). Id.
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`Raheem first collaterally attacked his convictions in Butts County, Georgia.
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`The state habeas court conducted an extensive evidentiary hearing in late January
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`2008. Raheem offered additional mental health evidence. First, Dr. Ruben Gur
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`testified. Another defense expert, Dr. James Evans, presented an affidavit and the
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`test results from his examination of Raheem. Additional affidavits were offered
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`from other mental health experts who had consulted with the defense team before
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`the trial: Dr. Jack Farrar (the primary mental health expert who aided the defense),
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`Dr. Charles Nord, and Dr. Dennis Herendeen. Raheem’s habeas counsel also
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`presented a supplemental affidavit from Dr. Melissa Carran. In rebuttal, the state
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`called its own mental health expert, Dr. Daniel Martell. The state habeas court
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`took live testimony from Raheem’s trial lawyers -- Gregory Futch and Wade
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`Crumbley -- as well as from the state’s chief investigator, Renee Swanson, and
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`from the district attorney who prosecuted Raheem, Tommy Floyd. Finally, the
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`court reviewed affidavits offered by Raheem’s family members and friends.
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`On February 13, 2009, the Superior Court judge denied Raheem’s petition,
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`adopting nearly verbatim a 106-page proposed order submitted by the state. In
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`relevant part, the state habeas court determined that defense counsel were not
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`deficient in investigating or preparing for the guilt or penalty phases of his trial,
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`9
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`nor was Raheem prejudiced by counsel’s performance. The court found that trial
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`counsel had “conducted a thorough investigation” into the available mitigation
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`evidence and “developed a reasonable strategy of mitigation.” It concluded that
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`“while there is some evidence [in the postconviction record] that Petitioner’s brain
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`does not function normally, contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, there is not
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`consensus as to what that actually means and what, if any, affect [sic] that has on
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`Petitioner’s behavior on the night of the crime, nor its influence on the decision of
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`the jury.” The state court also rejected the claim that defense counsel were
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`ineffective for not offering the additional theory that Raheem suffers from some
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`kind of seizure disorder. The court observed that multiple mental health experts
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`did not discern any evidence of the disorder. Nor was the proffered evidence
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`conclusive. Finally, the state habeas court rejected Raheem’s claims about the use
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`of a stun belt at trial, again finding no deficient performance nor any prejudice.
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`The Georgia Supreme Court summarily denied Raheem’s application for a
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`certificate of probable cause to appeal the denial of his habeas petition, and, on
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`May 23, 2011, the Supreme Court denied his petition for writ of certiorari.
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`Raheem v. Hall, 563 U.S. 1010 (2011).
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`The next day, Raheem turned his sights on the federal district court, filing
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`this § 2254 petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
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`Georgia, raising many of the same claims. Applying the deference mandated by
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`10
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`the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. §
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`2254(d), the district court concluded that none of the state court’s findings were
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`contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court
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`law, nor were they the product of unreasonable determinations of fact in light of
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`the evidence presented.
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`The district court reviewed de novo one remaining claim -- that Raheem was
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`not competent to stand trial. First, the district court determined that Raheem was
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`not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
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`§ 2254(e)(2). Then, after examining all of the evidence placed in the record, it
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`concluded that Raheem was competent to stand trial.
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`The district court granted a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on these
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`issues:
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`1. Ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of his capital
`trial by his counsel unreasonably failing to investigate and present
`evidence of Raheem’s mitigating background and brain damage.
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`2. Violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
`incrimination when the prosecutor commented, during closing
`arguments, on Raheem’s failure to testify.
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`3. Ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to the
`prosecutor’s invoking his own expertise, injecting non-record
`evidence into the proceedings, and telling the jurors that petitioner
`would kill them if he was not sentenced to death.
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`4. Raheem was incompetent to stand trial, the trial court failed to hold
`a competency hearing, and counsel were prejudicially ineffective for
`failing to raise the claim at trial or on direct appeal.
`11
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`5. Prosecutorial misconduct deprived Raheem of due process and a fair
`trial, specifically through the prosecutor presenting false testimony
`and withholding Brady evidence at the guilt and penalty phases.2
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`This Court granted in part a motion to expand the COA, adding one issue:
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`Whether the district court erred in denying Appellant’s Sixth
`Amendment claim that his trial counsel unreasonably, prejudicially,
`and falsely showed and told the jurors that Petitioner was dangerous.
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`II.
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`We review de novo a district court’s denial of a habeas corpus petition.
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`McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1297 (11th Cir. 2005). Because Raheem
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`filed his federal habeas petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed by
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`AEDPA.3 “Under AEDPA, if a state court has adjudicated the merits of a claim --
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`as the state court did here -- we cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court’s
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`decision ‘was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
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`established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,’
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`2 Although this claim was included in the COA, Raheem never argued it on appeal and,
`therefore, it has been abandoned. Isaacs v. Head, 300 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2002).
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` 3
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` As for Raheem’s claim that AEDPA deference does not apply to the state habeas court order
`because the court ignored the evidence he presented, he is mistaken. In the cases Raheem relies
`on, the courts began their analyses with AEDPA deference -- not de novo review -- and only
`later concluded that the state court had “unreasonably” ignored or discounted evidence. See
`Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 42–44 (2009); Guzman v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 663 F.3d
`1336, 1351–52 & 1347 n.13 (11th Cir. 2011); see also Cooper v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 646 F.3d
`1328, 1353 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that “we do not owe the state court’s findings deference
`under AEDPA,” and apply a de novo standard of review, only when we first find that “a state
`court unreasonably determines the facts relevant to a claim”) (quotations omitted, emphasis
`added). In this case, the state court did not unreasonably determine the facts.
`12
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`or ‘was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
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`evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’” Kilgore v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of
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`Corr., 805 F.3d 1301, 1309 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).
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`“Under § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘contrary to’ clause, we grant relief only ‘if the state
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`court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a
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`question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme
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`Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.’” Jones v. GDCP
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`Warden, 753 F.3d 1171, 1182 (11th Cir. 2014) (alterations in original) (quoting
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`Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000)). “Under § 2254(d)(1)’s
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`‘unreasonable application’ clause, we grant relief only ‘if the state court identifies
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`the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but
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`unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.’” Id.
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`(alteration in original) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413).
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`The second prong of § 2254(d) -- that an adjudication resulted in a decision
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`that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
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`evidence presented in the state-court proceeding -- also “requires that we accord
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`the state trial court substantial deference.” Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 314
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`(2015). “If ‘[r]easonable minds reviewing the record might disagree’ about the
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`finding in question, ‘on habeas review that does not suffice to supersede the trial
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`court’s . . . determination.’” Id. (alteration and ellipsis in original) (quoting Wood
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`13
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`v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010)). In addition, on AEDPA review, “a
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`determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be
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`correct” -- a presumption the petitioner has the burden of rebutting “by clear and
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`convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).4 “Clear and convincing evidence
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`is a demanding but not insatiable standard, requiring proof that a claim is highly
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`probable.” Nejad v. Att’y Gen., State of Ga., 830 F.3d 1280, 1289 (11th Cir. 2016)
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`(quotations omitted). “Highly probable is a standard that requires more than a
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`preponderance of the evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
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`(quotations omitted, alteration adopted).
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`As for Raheem’s substantive competency claim, we review the district
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`court’s factual findings for clear error, and its legal conclusions de novo. See
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`Lawrence v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 700 F.3d 464, 481 (11th Cir. 2012) (setting
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`forth the standard for a substantive competency claim raised on federal habeas and
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`reviewed by the district court de novo, and noting that the petitioner “has not met
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`that high burden, especially because he must show that the district court’s finding
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`that [petitioner] was competent was not just wrong, but clearly erroneous”). “A
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`finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the
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`reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
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`4 “The Supreme Court has not yet defined § 2254(d)(2)’s ‘precise relationship’ to § 2254(e)(1),”
`and we need not do so here. Tharpe v. Warden, 834 F.3d 1323, 1337 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting
`Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 18 (2013)).
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`that a mistake has been committed.” Jenkins v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 963
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`F.3d 1248, 1264 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333
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`U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
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`III.
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`The main thrust of Raheem’s arguments on appeal is that his trial attorneys
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`were prejudicially ineffective by failing to further investigate and present to the
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`jury evidence of his mental illness, cognitive deficits, and brain damage, and by
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`failing to investigate and present evidence of additional mitigating family
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`background and social history. The state habeas court disagreed. So do we. The
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`state court’s rejection of these claims was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable
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`application of clearly established Supreme Court law, nor was it based on an
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`unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.
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`To successfully show ineffective assistance of counsel, Raheem must
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`establish that counsels’ performance was constitutionally deficient -- that his
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`counsel “made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’
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`guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment” -- and that the deficient
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`performance prejudiced the defendant, depriving him of a “fair trial, a trial whose
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`result is reliable.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In other
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`words, Raheem must show that: (1) “counsel’s representation fell below an
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`objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) “there is a reasonable probability
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`15
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`that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
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`have been different.” Id. at 688, 694; accord Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S.
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`111, 124 (2009); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S.
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`at 390; Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 184 (1986). The failure to meet
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`either Strickland prong is fatal to the claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700.
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`As for the first prong -- counsel’s performance -- “[j]udicial scrutiny . . .
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`must be highly deferential.” Id. at 689. We apply a “strong presumption” that
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`counsel performed competently and ask only whether any “identified acts or
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`omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id.
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`at 689–90. And our review under AEDPA is doubly deferential: we extend
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`deference both to the trial counsel’s choices and to the state court’s assessment of
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`their reasonableness. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011). Harrington
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`therefore affords “double deference to the state court ruling on counsel’s
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`performance.” Daniel v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 822 F.3d 1248, 1262 (11th
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`Cir. 2016). “The pivotal question is whether the state court’s application of the
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`Strickland standard was unreasonable[,]” which “is different from asking whether
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`defense counsel’s performance fell below Strickland’s standard.” Harrington, 562
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`U.S. at 101.
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`Indeed, “evaluating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires
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`considering the rule’s specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway
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`courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.” Yarborough v.
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`Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004). Just as Strickland allows for a range of
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`strategic choices by trial counsel, so too is there considerable latitude for state
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`courts to determine the reasonableness of those choices. See Shinn v. Kayer, 141
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`S. Ct. 517, 523 (2020). Accordingly, “[a] state court’s determination that a claim
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`lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could
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`disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at
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`101 (quoting Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664). For Raheem to prevail, then, he
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`would have to show that no reasonable jurist could find that his counsel’s
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`performance fell within the wide range of reasonable professional conduct.
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`In addition, it is well established that counsel’s obligation to render
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`competent performance includes “a duty to make reasonable investigations” of
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`potential mitigating evidence “or to make a reasonable decision that makes
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`particular investigations unnecessary.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521 (quoting
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`Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). In any ineffectiveness case, an attorney’s “decision
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`not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the
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`circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.”
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`Id. at 521–22 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). But counsel’s duty to
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`investigate “does not necessarily require counsel to investigate every evidentiary
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`lead.” Williams v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1326, 1337 (11th Cir. 2008). “Under
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`USCA11 Case: 16-12866 Date Filed: 04/26/2021 Page: 18 of 84
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`Strickland, strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are
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`reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support
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`the limitations on investigation.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted); compare
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`Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699 (stating that counsel’s “decision not to seek more
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`character or psychological evidence than was already in hand was . . . reasonable”),
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`with Porter, 558 U.S. at 40 (noting that counsel “failed to uncover and present any
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`evidence of [the petitioner’s] mental health or mental impairment, his family
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`background, or his military service,” and “[t]he decision not to investigate did not
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`reflect reasonable professional judgment”).
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`A.
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`1.
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`We begin by painting a full picture of trial counsel’s extensive investigation
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`of the available mitigating evidence and the presentation of this evidence to the
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`jury. Raheem’s lawyers, Wade Crumbley and Gregory Futch, aided in the
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`investigation by attorney Tom Carr, were experienced trial attorneys who each had
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`some familiarity with death penalty cases. “When courts are examining the
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`performance of an experienced trial counsel, the presumption that his conduct was
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`reasonable is even stronger.” Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1316
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`(11th Cir. 2000) (en banc); see also Spaziano v. Singletary, 36 F.3d 1028, 1040
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`(11th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he more experienced an attorney is, the more likely it is that
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`USCA11 Case: 16-12866 Date Filed: 04/26/2021 Page: 19 of 84
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`his decision to rely on his own experience and judgment in rejecting a defense
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`without substantial investigation was reasonable under the circumstances.”)
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`(quotations omitted).
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`Futch and Crumbley had each been practicing law for over fifteen years.
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`Crumbley had worked on five death penalty cases and investigated or supervised
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`investigations in each one, though he had never tried a death penalty case. He had
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`also defended a number of non-capital murder trials, and had experience handling
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`habeas cases. Futch had worked as an assistant district attorney and in private
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`practice doing criminal defense, and had handled over one hundred felony trials,
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`including “several murder cases,” and “countless misdemeanors.” Futch had also
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`handled two death penalty cases -- one as a prosecutor and one as a defense
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`attorney.
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`When defense counsel were appointed in July 1999, they quickly began
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`investigating Raheem’s background and mental health. Crumbley testified that he
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`and Futch “tried to get all of the records we could from his educational past, his
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`medical past, and his counseling past,” in addition to his prison records; “[w]e got
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`every kind of record we could think of.” Crumbley added that he “tried to find
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`every member of his family [he] could, to see if they were willing to cooperate.”
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`Crumbley also “tried to go back and . . . interview or at least talk to all of the
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`USCA11 Case: 16-12866 Date Filed: 04/26/2021 Page: 20 of 84
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`mental health professionals and counselors who had talked to [Raheem] in the
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`past,” and “[s]ome of those people became part of the defense team.”
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`To learn about Raheem’s family life, counsel met with Raheem’s father,
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`Askia, his mother, Elaine, his sister, Jameelah, his grandfather, and other family
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`members on multiple occasions. Crumbley testified that Raheem’s family
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`“indicated willingness to do anything they could to try to help save him.”
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`Crumbley talked “at length” with Raheem’s parents about “everywhere he’d been
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`to school, everywhere he’d ever been to the doctor, everywhere he’d ever been for
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`counseling.” At one point a few months after an initial appointment, trial counsel
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`spoke with Raheem’s father Askia because they were concerned about Raheem’s
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`“apparent lack of concern.” Askia said that he and Elaine had “always been
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`concerned [and] tried to help him.”
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`During their meetings, Askia told counsel about several troubling instances
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`when Raheem was growing up. First, Askia recounted that when Raheem was in
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`kindergarten, he left school and caught a bus that took him downtown. When he
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`arrived downtown, he told people that he was from out of state and needed to get
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`home. Counsel further learned from Askia that Raheem shot himself in the leg
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`about three years before murdering Brandon and his mother. Raheem claimed that
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`someone jumped him and shot him. Askia added that several times Raheem took a
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`loaded nine-millimeter gun to school on the bus, carried the weapon around other
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`USCA11 Case: 16-12866 Date Filed: 04/26/2021 Page: 21 of 84
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`children,