USCA11 Case: 18-12147 Date Filed: 10/04/2022 Page: 1 of 135
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`[PUBLISH]
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`In the
`United States Court of Appeals
`For the Eleventh Circuit
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`____________________
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`No. 18-12147
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`____________________
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`WILLIE JAMES PYE,
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` Petitioner-Appellant,
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`versus
`WARDEN, GEORGIA DIAGNOSTIC PRISON,
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` Respondent-Appellee.
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`____________________
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`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Northern District of Georgia
`D.C. Docket No. 3:13-cv-00119-TCB
`____________________
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`

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`Opinion of the Court
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`JORDAN,
`Judge, WILSON,
`Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief
`ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, BRANCH, LUCK, LAGOA, and
`BRASHER, Circuit Judges.*
`NEWSOM, Circuit Judge, delivered the opinion of the Court, in
`which WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and BRANCH, LUCK, LAGOA,
`and BRASHER, Circuit Judges, joined.
`JORDAN, Circuit Judge, filed an opinion concurring in the judg-
`ment, in which ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge, joined.
`JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge, filed a dissenting opinion, in which
`WILSON, Circuit Judge, joined.
`NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:
`More than a quarter century ago, Willie James Pye was con-
`victed by a Georgia jury of having kidnapped, robbed, gang-raped,
`and viciously murdered Alicia Yarbrough. The jury recommended
`that Pye be sentenced to death for his crimes, and the trial judge so
`sentenced him. Having exhausted his state post-conviction reme-
`dies, Pye filed a federal habeas corpus petition, arguing, as relevant
`here, that his trial counsel rendered him constitutionally ineffective
`assistance in connection with the sentencing phase of his trial. The
`district court denied relief, but a panel of this Court reversed and
`vacated Pye’s death sentence, holding that the state court’s rejec-
`tion of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was based on an
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`* Judge Grant is recused.
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`unreasonable determination of the facts and involved an unreason-
`able application of clearly established federal law. See Pye v. War-
`den, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 853 F. App’x 548, 570–71 (11th Cir.),
`reh’g en banc granted, 9 F.4th 1372 (11th Cir. 2021); 28 U.S.C.
`§ 2254(d).
`We granted rehearing en banc to decide whether the state
`court’s decision that Pye is not entitled to relief on his ineffective-
`assistance claim warrants deference under the Antiterrorism and
`Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Because the state court rea-
`sonably concluded that Pye was not prejudiced by any of his coun-
`sel’s alleged deficiencies in connection with his sentencing proceed-
`ing, we affirm the district court’s denial of Pye’s petition and re-
`mand to the panel for further proceedings.
`I
`A
`The Georgia Supreme Court’s decision on direct appeal re-
`counts the grisly facts of Pye’s crimes:
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`Pye had been in a sporadic romantic relation-
`ship with the victim, Alicia Lynn Yarbrough, but, at
`the time of her murder, Ms. Yarbrough was living
`with another man, Charles Puckett. Pye and two
`companions, Chester Adams and Anthony Freeman,
`planned to rob Puckett because Pye had heard that
`Puckett had just collected money from the settlement
`of a lawsuit. Pye was also angry because Puckett had
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`signed the birth certificate of a child whom Pye
`claimed as his own.
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`The three men drove to Griffin[, Georgia] in
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`Adams’ car and, in a street transaction, Pye bought a
`large, distinctive .22 pistol. They then went to a party
`where a witness observed Pye in possession of the
`large .22. Just before midnight, the three left the party
`and drove toward Puckett’s house. As they were
`leaving, a witness heard Pye say, “it’s time, let’s do it.”
`All of the men put on the ski masks which Pye had
`brought with him, and Pye and Adams also put on
`gloves.
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`They approached Puckett’s house on foot and
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`observed that only Ms. Yarbrough and her baby were
`home. Pye tried to open a window and Ms. Yar-
`brough saw him and screamed. Pye ran around to the
`front door, kicked it in, and held Ms. Yarbrough at
`gunpoint. After determining that there was no
`money in the house, they took a ring and a necklace
`from Ms. Yarbrough and abducted her, leaving the in-
`fant in the house. The men drove to a nearby motel
`where Pye rented a room using an alias. In the motel
`room, the three men took turns raping Ms. Yar-
`brough at gunpoint. Pye was angry with Ms. Yar-
`brough and said, “You let Puckett sign my baby’s
`birth certificate.”
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`After attempting to eliminate their fingerprints
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`from the motel room, the three men and Ms.
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`Yarbrough left in Adams’ car. Pye whispered in Ad-
`ams’ ear and Adams turned off onto a dirt road. Pye
`then ordered Ms. Yarbrough out of the car, made her
`lie face down, and shot her three times, killing her. As
`they were driving away, Pye tossed the gloves, masks,
`and the large .22 from the car. The police later recov-
`ered these items and found the victim’s body only a
`few hours after she was killed. A hair found on one
`of the masks was consistent with the victim’s hair,
`and a ballistics expert determined that there was a
`90% probability that a bullet found in the victim’s
`body had been fired by the .22. Semen was found in
`the victim’s body and DNA taken from the semen
`matched Pye’s DNA. When Pye talked to the police
`later that day, he stated that he had not seen the vic-
`tim in at least two weeks. However, Freeman con-
`fessed and later testified for the State.
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`Pye v. State, 505 S.E.2d 4, 9–10 (Ga. 1998). Based on the evidence
`presented, a Georgia jury found Pye guilty of malice murder, kid-
`napping with bodily injury, armed robbery, burglary, and rape.
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`Attorney Johnny Mostiler represented Pye at both the guilt
`and penalty phases of his trial. At sentencing, Mostiler—with help
`from his investigator Dewey Yarbrough, who had no relation to
`the victim—called eight witnesses to testify on Pye’s behalf: Pye’s
`sister Pam Bland, sister Sandy Starks, brother Ricky Pye, father Ern-
`est Pye, niece Chanika Pye, nephew Dantarius Usher, sister-in-law
`Bridgett Pye, and family friend Lillian Buckner. While Mostiler
`elicited some testimony about Pye’s impoverished upbringing—
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`for instance, that his childhood home lacked running water and
`heat—Pye’s witnesses mainly testified to his good moral character
`and asked the jury to show mercy by declining to impose a death
`sentence. The State, meanwhile, presented evidence of Pye’s rep-
`utation for violence in the community, earlier crimes and alterca-
`tions with Alicia Yarbrough, and the aggravating circumstances of
`the murder. The State also argued Pye would pose a danger to
`prison staff were he to remain incarcerated. The jury recom-
`mended a death sentence, which the trial court imposed, and the
`Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. See id. at 14.
`B
`Pye filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Butts
`County Superior Court. He raised numerous grounds, including,
`as relevant here, that Mostiler had provided constitutionally inef-
`fective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of his trial
`by failing to “conduct an adequate pretrial investigation into [Pye’s]
`life, background, physical and psychiatric health to uncover and
`present to the jury evidence in mitigation.” Doc. 13-31 at 13; see
`Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that an
`attorney’s performance is constitutionally ineffective when he
`(1) renders deficient performance (2) that prejudices the defend-
`ant). The state court conducted a three-day evidentiary hearing.
`In support of his petition, Pye presented affidavit testimony from
`27 witnesses, 24 of whom testified about matters relevant to his
`ineffective-assistance-at-sentencing claim. Many of these affiants
`asserted (1) that Pye’s childhood was marked by significant
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`poverty, abuse, and neglect—mitigating circumstances that, Pye
`argues, his trial counsel failed to present at sentencing—and (2) that
`they would have been willing to testify to these facts had they been
`asked to do so at the time of sentencing but were never contacted
`by Pye’s trial team. Two corrections officers who had known Pye
`during an earlier period of incarceration provided affidavit testi-
`mony that Pye was not a dangerous inmate. Pye also offered testi-
`mony from mental-health experts that he suffered from frontal-
`lobe brain damage that impaired his ability to plan and control his
`impulses—damage, they said, that was potentially caused by fetal
`alcohol syndrome.
`The State’s response to Pye’s petition, as relevant here, in-
`cluded testimony from Dewey Yarbrough. Yarbrough testified
`that he and Mostiler investigated Pye’s background in preparation
`for trial but found Pye’s family generally unwilling to cooperate in
`his defense or to help pursue other leads. The State also called its
`own mental-health expert, who testified that the facts of Pye’s
`crime, which involved significant premeditation and planning,
`weren’t consistent with frontal-lobe impairment or fetal-alcohol
`syndrome—though he acknowledged that Pye had cognitive defi-
`cits that would have affected his ability to function in the commu-
`nity.
`
`The Butts County court denied relief on all counts. The
`court concluded that Mostiler’s performance at sentencing wasn’t
`constitutionally deficient and that, even if it was, it didn’t prejudice
`Pye. With respect to evidence of Pye’s childhood of poverty and
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`abuse, the court concluded that any failure to investigate and pre-
`sent this evidence wasn’t prejudicial. In so holding, the court em-
`phasized (1) credibility concerns regarding the affidavit testimony
`presented at the state post-conviction proceedings; (2) evidence of
`Pye’s family’s unwillingness to cooperate in his defense at the time
`of trial; (3) the minimal connection between Pye’s background and
`the crimes he committed; (4) Pye’s age at the time of his crimes;
`and (5) the extensive aggravating evidence presented by the State
`at sentencing. See Doc. 20-40 at 64–67. With respect to Pye’s men-
`tal-health evidence, the court credited the testimony of the State’s
`expert that Pye was not as impaired as his witnesses suggested. Id.
`at 63–64. And with respect to Pye’s evidence of his behavior in
`prison and lack of future dangerousness, the court concluded that
`disciplinary reports in Pye’s prison records indicated “a history of
`insubordination, aggressiveness and propensity for violence to-
`ward those in authority” that negated any reasonable probability
`that testimony like that offered by the corrections officers during
`state post-conviction proceedings would have affected the out-
`come of sentencing. Id. at 61–62. The Georgia Supreme Court
`summarily denied Pye a certificate of probable cause to appeal.
`C
`Pye filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
`28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the North-
`ern District of Georgia. In his amended petition, Pye alleged 16
`claims for relief, including a claim that Mostiler provided ineffec-
`tive assistance during the penalty phase of the trial by failing to
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`conduct an adequate mitigation investigation. The district court
`rejected Pye’s ineffective-assistance claim, reviewing the state
`court’s decision deferentially under AEDPA. As to Strickland’s de-
`ficient-performance prong, the district court emphasized that
`Mostiler and Yarbrough had visited Pye’s home more than once
`and obviously knew about his childhood living conditions. The
`court held that Pye had failed to “rebut the theory that counsel
`could have reasonably determined that a strategy of humanizing
`[Pye], highlighting the fact that [he] did not have a violent reputa-
`tion, and begging for mercy would be preferred to attempting to
`provide excuses for [his] crimes because he had led a difficult life.”
`On prejudice, the district court concluded that while Pye had
`demonstrated an impoverished upbringing and that there was
`some evidence of “fighting by and among [his] family members,”
`he hadn’t “presented evidence that he was subjected to regular and
`brutal beatings, sexual abuse, or conditions so severe that the state
`had to step in and remove [him] and his siblings from the home or
`that his parents were charged with neglect,” as might overcome
`the aggravating evidence and thus undermine confidence in his
`sentence. Pye timely appealed.
`
`A three-judge panel of this Court reversed the district court
`and vacated Pye’s death sentence in an unpublished opinion. Pye,
`853 F. App’x 548. The panel held that the district court erred in
`rejecting Pye’s sentencing-phase Strickland claim because the state
`court’s conclusions as to both deficient performance and prejudice
`were based on unreasonable factual determinations and involved
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`unreasonable applications of Strickland—and therefore weren’t en-
`titled to AEDPA deference. Id. at 563, 567. Engaging in de novo
`review, the panel held that Mostiler’s performance at sentencing
`was deficient because he failed (1) to conduct a sufficient investiga-
`tion into the potentially mitigating circumstances of Pye’s back-
`ground—specifically, his childhood history of extreme poverty and
`abuse; (2) to obtain a mental-health evaluation of Pye or otherwise
`uncover his mental deficiencies; and (3) to attempt to rebut the
`State’s argument about Pye’s future dangerousness. Id. at 563–65.
`The panel concluded that these deficiencies were prejudicial not-
`withstanding the aggravating evidence that the State presented at
`sentencing, and thus concluded that Pye was entitled to habeas re-
`lief. Id. at 570–71.
`The State filed a petition for rehearing en banc, which pre-
`sented a single issue: whether the panel’s review “of the state
`court’s determination that the petitioner failed to establish preju-
`dice at the sentencing phase” conflicts with Eleventh Circuit and
`Supreme Court precedent. App. Doc. 59 at 1. After this Court
`voted to rehear the case en banc, we issued a briefing notice that
`framed the issue somewhat more generally: whether the state
`court’s decision that Pye’s trial counsel “did not render constitu-
`tionally ineffective assistance during the penalty phase of trial” was
`contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established
`federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.
`App. Doc. 62 at 1. Pye’s opening en banc brief focused almost ex-
`clusively on the prejudice prong of Strickland’s two-part test,
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`noting that because “the [state] did not seek rehearing of” the
`panel’s deficient-performance holding, it had abandoned that issue.
`En Banc Br. of Appellant at 70 n.20. The State’s brief in response
`addressed only prejudice but said, in a footnote, that it had focused
`on prejudice because “it [was] easier to do so in this case” and that
`it was “not conceding that trial counsel’s performance was defi-
`cient.” En Banc Br. of Appellee at 39 n.8.
`
`Given the State’s failure to seek rehearing on or brief the
`merits of the deficient-performance issue, we won’t consider
`whether the district court erred in holding that the state court’s
`conclusion as to deficient performance at sentencing was reasona-
`ble and entitled to deference. Instead, we will assume that
`Mostiler’s performance was deficient and evaluate only the state
`court’s conclusion that Pye was not prejudiced by these alleged de-
`ficiencies.
`
`II
`A
`We review de novo a district court’s denial of habeas relief
`on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, which presents a
`mixed question of law and fact. See Connor v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of
`Corr., 713 F.3d 609, 620 (11th Cir. 2013).
`When a state court has adjudicated a habeas petitioner’s
`claim on the merits, we review its decision under AEDPA’s “highly
`deferential” standards. Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 269 (2015).
`Under those standards, we may not grant the writ unless the state
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`court’s “adjudication of the claim . . . (1) resulted in a decision that
`was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
`established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of
`the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
`unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
`presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). To
`meet the “unreasonable application” standard, “a prisoner must
`show far more than that the state court’s decision was merely
`wrong or even clear error.” Shinn v. Kayer, 141 S. Ct. 517, 523
`(2020) (per curiam) (quotation marks omitted). The decision must
`be “so obviously wrong that its error lies beyond any possibility for
`fairminded disagreement.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). When
`it comes to factual determinations, “[s]tate court fact-findings are
`entitled to a presumption of correctness unless the petitioner re-
`buts that presumption by clear and convincing evidence.” Conner
`v. GDCP Warden, 784 F.3d 752, 761 (11th Cir. 2015); see 28 U.S.C.
`§ 2254(e)(1). Overall, “[a] state court’s determination that a claim
`lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded ju-
`rists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.”
`Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quotation marks
`omitted).
`When the final state court decision on the merits doesn’t
`come with reasons—as here, where the Georgia Supreme Court
`summarily denied Pye a certificate of probable cause to appeal the
`denial of his habeas petition—the federal court must “‘look
`through’ the unexplained decision to the last related state-court
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`decision that does provide a relevant rationale” and “presume that
`the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson v.
`Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).
`B
`Before diving into the merits, we pause to clarify three
`
`points about AEDPA’s standard of review.1
`1
`First, despite some lingering confusion—including among
`
`the parties here—it’s not (any longer) the law that a federal court
`should decline to defer to a state court’s factual determinations if it
`concludes that those findings “lacked . . . fair support in the record.”
`Rose v. McNeil, 634 F.3d 1224, 1241 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation
`omitted). Unlike this case, Rose involved a habeas petition filed
`“before the effective date of [AEDPA],” so it applied “pre-AEDPA
`law.” Id. at 1240. The pre-AEDPA version of the federal habeas
`statute “provided that factual findings of a state court were pre-
`sumed to be correct unless ‘the Federal court on consideration of
`the record as a whole concludes that such factual determination is
`not fairly supported by the record.’” Fugate v. Head, 261 F.3d 1206,
`
`
`1 It seems clear enough that our dissenting colleagues don’t much like AEDPA,
`whose “abstruse language,” they say, leaves much to “imagination and rumi-
`nation.” Dissenting Op. at 12. Not to put too fine a point on it, but the statute
`is what it is and says what it says. Congress passed it, and President Clinton
`signed it. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7. It is now our job to apply it according to
`its terms.
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`1215 n.11 (11th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
`§ 2254(d)(8) (1994)). In AEDPA, Congress eliminated and replaced
`the fair-support-in-the-record standard. Under the amended stat-
`ute, a state court’s factual determinations are “presumed to be cor-
`rect,” and the petitioner has the burden of proving otherwise “by
`clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
`2
`Second, even if a petitioner successfully carries his burden
`
`under § 2254(e)(1)—showing by clear and convincing evidence that
`a particular state-court factual determination was wrong—he does
`not necessarily meet his burden under § 2254(d)(2): Even if the
`state court made a clearly erroneous factual determination, that
`doesn’t necessarily mean the state court’s “decision” was “based
`on” an “unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evi-
`dence presented in the State court proceeding.” Id. § 2254(d)(2).
`Depending on the importance of the factual error to the state
`court’s ultimate “decision,” that decision might still be reasonable
`“even if some of the state court’s individual factual findings were
`erroneous—so long as the decision, taken as a whole, doesn’t con-
`stitute an ‘unreasonable determination of the facts’ and isn’t ‘based
`on’ any such determination.” Hayes v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
`10 F.4th 1203, 1224–25 (11th Cir. 2021) (Newsom, J., concurring)
`(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)); see also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537
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`U.S. 322, 341 (2003) (noting that subsections (e)(1) and (d)(2) are
`“independent requirements”).2
`
`3
`Third, although the Supreme Court’s decision in Wilson in-
`
`structs us to “review[] the specific reasons given by the state court
`and defer[] to those reasons if they are reasonable,” 138 S. Ct. at
`1192, we are not required, in assessing the reasonableness of a state
`
`
`2 The dissent vehemently objects to our explanation of the “interplay” be-
`tween §§ 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1)—not, to be clear, to the merits of our explana-
`tion, but to the fact that we have offered it at all. Calling our decision to ad-
`dress those sections’ relationship “irregular[],” “wrong,” and “odd at best,” the
`dissent equates our discussion to a “‘takeover of the appeal.’” Dissenting Op.
`at 33 (quoting United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579, 1581
`(2020)); see also Concurring Op. at 1 (citing Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. at
`1579–80). We respectfully disagree. This case doesn’t remotely present the
`situation that the Supreme Court confronted in Sineneng-Smith or that this
`Court recently debated in United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860 (11th Cir.
`2022) (en banc). Those cases considered the questions whether and under
`what circumstances it is appropriate for an appellate court to consider sua
`sponte a discrete legal issue, claim, or defense that the parties haven’t squarely
`presented. Here, by contrast, in elaborating on the relationship between §§
`2254(d)(2) and (e)(1), we are simply explaining how two adjacent statutory
`provisions interact—in short, how the law works. And of course, once “an
`issue or claim is properly before the court”—as Pye’s entitlement to relief un-
`der 28 U.S.C. § 2254 plainly is—“the court is not limited to the particular legal
`theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to
`identify and apply the proper construction of governing law.” Kamen v. Kem-
`per Fin. Servs., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991); cf. Babb v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans Affs.,
`992 F.3d 1193, 1208 & n.9 (11th Cir. 2021) (doubting that “the correct stand-
`ard” is an issue subject to ordinary forfeiture rules).
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`court’s reasons for its decision, to strictly limit our review to the
`particular justifications that the state court provided. Rather, in or-
`der to “give appropriate deference to [the state court’s] decision,”
`id., having determined the reasons for the state court’s decision, we
`may consider any potential justification for those reasons. If, as
`here, the “specific reason[]” for a state court’s decision to deny ha-
`beas relief was that the petitioner wasn’t prejudiced by his counsel’s
`deficient performance, we can, in evaluating whether that “reason
`[was] reasonable,” id., consider additional rationales that support
`the state court’s prejudice determination. We have so held repeat-
`edly, both before and since Wilson. See, e.g., Whatley v. Warden,
`Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Ctr., 927 F.3d 1150, 1178 (11th Cir.
`2019) (“[O]ur review is not limited to the reasons the [state court]
`gave in its analysis.”), reh’g en banc denied, 955 F.3d 924 (11th Cir.
`2020); id. at 1182 (“[W]e are not limited to the reasons the [state
`court] gave and instead focus on its ‘ultimate conclusion.’” (citation
`omitted)); Meders v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 911 F.3d
`1335, 1350 (11th Cir. 2019) (“We have explicitly rejected the prop-
`osition that a state court decision involves an unreasonable appli-
`cation of federal law and is not entitled to deference unless that
`court’s opinion on its face ‘shows its work’ by explicitly mentioning
`‘all relevant circumstances’ that the defendant argues in support of
`relief.” (citation omitted)); Lee v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 726
`F.3d 1172, 1223 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Under Supreme Court and our
`Circuit precedent, a state court’s written opinion is not required to
`mention every relevant fact or argument in order for AEDPA def-
`erence to apply. . . . [W]e still examine what other ‘implicit
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`findings’ the state court could have made in its denial of a federal
`claim.”); cf. Butts v. GDCP Warden, 850 F.3d 1201, 1232 (11th Cir.
`2017) (deferring to a state court’s “ultimate conclusion” under
`AEDPA despite the court’s “unreasonable finding” regarding what
`happened at the sentencing hearing).
`Both Pye and our dissenting colleagues assert that Wilson
`prohibits us from considering justifications that support the reasons
`underlying the state court’s decision but that, for whatever reason,
`the state court didn’t explicitly memorialize in its written opinion.
`For reasons we will explain, we disagree.
`Given the vigor with which the dissent presses its Wilson-
`based argument—and the fact that it is, for all practical purposes,
`the lone basis on which the dissent sidesteps AEDPA deference—
`it’s worth explaining our position in some detail. The dissent stren-
`uously—and stridently—insists that because the Butts County Su-
`perior Court issued a written opinion, we are obliged by Wilson to
`limit our review not just to the “reasons” for that court’s decision—
`as relevant here, that Pye wasn’t prejudiced by Mostiler’s allegedly
`deficient performance—but also, at an even more granular level,
`to the particular justifications that the court provided to support
`those reasons. Indeed, the dissent goes so far as to assert that our
`contrary view is a “[n]onsense” “gambit” that “nullifi[es]” Wilson.
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`Dissenting Op. at 16, 18. Respectfully, we don’t think so. Here’s
`why.3
`
`With a promise to return to Wilson in short order, we begin
`with first principles. Put simply, our approach is the one that
`AEDPA’s plain language requires. With respect to “any claim that
`was adjudicated on the merits in State court”—which Pye’s ineffec-
`tive-assistance claim indisputably was—the statute focuses exclu-
`sively on the reasonableness of the state court’s “decision.” In par-
`ticular, it states that a petitioner “shall not be granted” relief unless
`the state court’s “adjudication of the claim . . . resulted in a deci-
`sion” that was either contrary to or involved an unreasonable ap-
`plication of federal law or was based on an unreasonable determi-
`nation of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2) (emphasis added).
`AEDPA’s text couldn’t be any clearer: A federal habeas court is
`
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`3 A brief preface: The dissent nitpicks our terminology, deploying dictionaries
`as if we were engaged in statutory or contractual interpretation. See Dissent-
`ing Op. at 17. But, of course, everyone recognizes the difference between
`macro-level reasons and their constituent rationales—what we’ve called justi-
`fications. And to be clear, that distinction is hardly “nonsense.” Id. at 18. The
`law is shot through with similar gradations, and the fact that lines can be tough
`to draw doesn’t eliminate our responsibility to draw them. See, e.g., Yee v.
`City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534 (1992) (distinguishing between “claim[s]”
`and their constituent “argument[s]”); Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500
`U.S. 90, 99 (1991) (distinguishing between “issue[s]” and constituent “theo-
`ries”). What the dissent never does is convincingly explain why a federal court
`should be limited on habeas review to the precise explanation offered by the
`state court—in every jot and tittle, right down to the last syllable.
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`tasked with reviewing only the state court’s “result[ing] deci-
`sion”—not the constituent justifications for that decision.
`Consistent with the statutory text, the Supreme Court unan-
`imously held in Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, that a state
`court’s decision rejecting a petitioner’s post-conviction claim is en-
`titled to AEDPA deference even “when state-court relief is denied
`without an accompanying statement of reasons”—e.g., in a “one-
`sentence summary order.” Id. at 92, 96.4 Notably, in so holding,
`the Court emphasized § 2254(d)’s “terms”: “There is no text in the
`statute requiring a statement of reasons. The statute refers only to
`a ‘decision,’ which resulted from an ‘adjudication.’” Id. at 98. And
`“determining whether a state court’s decision resulted from an un-
`reasonable legal or factual conclusion does not require that there
`be an opinion from the state court explaining the state court’s rea-
`soning.” Id. Even “[w]here a state court’s decision is unaccompa-
`nied by an[y] explanation” at all, the Court explained, “the habeas
`petitioner’s burden still must be met by showing there was no rea-
`sonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Id. “AEDPA de-
`mands,” the Court concluded, that the federal court determine
`what “arguments or theories” either “supported or . . . could have
`
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`4 Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment. See 562 U.S. at 113–14 (Gins-
`burg, J., concurring in the judgment).
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`supported . . . the state court’s decision.” Id. at 102 (emphasis
`added).5
`Consistent with both AEDPA’s plain language and the logic
`of the Supreme Court’s decision in Richter, this Court has long
`(and consistently) held that where, as here, a state court rejects a
`petitioner’s claim in a written opinion accompanied by an explana-
`tion, the federal habeas court reviews only the state court’s “deci-
`sion” and is not limited to the particular justifications that the state
`court supplied. See, e.g., Parker v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 331
`F.3d 764, 785 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e review the state court’s ‘deci-
`sion’ and not necessarily its rationale.”); Gill v. Mecusker, 633 F.3d
`1272, 1288–93 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he statutory language focuses
`on the result, not on the reasoning that led to the result.”); What-
`ley, 927 F.3d at 1178 (“[O]ur review is not limited to the reasons
`the Court gave in its analysis.”). Our decisions in that respect are
`part and parcel of our recognition that “overemphasis on the lan-
`guage of a state court’s rationale would lead to a grading papers
`approach that is outmoded in the post-AEDPA era.” Jones v. Sec’y,
`Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1311