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`19-10332
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
`
`
`
`
`
` [PUBLISH]
`
`
`In the
`United States Court of Appeals
`For the Eleventh Circuit
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Plaintiff-Appellee,
`
`____________________
`
`No. 19-10332
`
`____________________
`
`
`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
`
`versus
`
`REGINALD GRAHAM,
`a.k.a. The Real Rico,
`a.k.a. To Cool Rico,
`a.k.a. G'Rico Longllive Kingsqueezer,
`a.k.a. Reggie,
`ANTONIO GLASS,
`a.k.a. ntn_1bloodgangsta@yahoo.com,
`a.k.a. Tone Bleedin Red (Tone Gone Bag'em),
`a.k.a. Money Man Future @ S16_Future,
`a.k.a. smackvilletone,
`a.k.a. Tone Glass,
`
`
`
`
`
`19-10332
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
`
`
`
`
`
` [PUBLISH]
`
`
`In the
`United States Court of Appeals
`For the Eleventh Circuit
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Plaintiff-Appellee,
`
`____________________
`
`No. 19-10332
`
`____________________
`
`
`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
`
`versus
`
`REGINALD GRAHAM,
`a.k.a. The Real Rico,
`a.k.a. To Cool Rico,
`a.k.a. G'Rico Longllive Kingsqueezer,
`a.k.a. Reggie,
`ANTONIO GLASS,
`a.k.a. ntn_1bloodgangsta@yahoo.com,
`a.k.a. Tone Bleedin Red (Tone Gone Bag'em),
`a.k.a. Money Man Future @ S16_Future,
`a.k.a. smackvilletone,
`a.k.a. Tone Glass,
`
`
`
`
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`a.k.a. (at)tone.glass,
`JERIMAINE BRYANT,
`a.k.a. RNS DSBF Capo,
`a.k.a. (at) d5bf_mc,
`a.k.a. Blood @_McMaine06,
`a.k.a. Maine,
`MARIO RODRIGUEZ,
`a.k.a. "Blood",
`a.k.a. "str8_crackk",
`a.k.a. "Tuti",
`TORIVIS REGINALD INGRAM,
`a.k.a. "DSBF Mullet'',
`MICHAEL WALKER,
`a.k.a. Laid Back ManMan,
`a.k.a. Baba,
`LEVI BRYANT,
`a.k.a. Fish,
`CURTIS BRYANT,
`a.k.a. Snow Luther King Jr.,
`a.k.a. Snow Bryant,
`a.k.a. Big Momma,
`DANIEL JONES,
`a.k.a. Dodo,
`SAMUEL HAYES,
`a.k.a. DSBF Jit,
`a.k.a. Nba Flame,
`a.k.a. Looney Hoe,
`
`
`
`
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`3
`
`a.k.a. Sammy,
`
`
` Defendants-Appellants.
`
`
`____________________
`
`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Southern District of Florida
`D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cr-20307-JEM-7
`____________________
`
`Before WILSON, JORDAN, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
`
`JORDAN, Circuit Judge:
`
`The Wire is said to be one of best television shows of all time.
`That is in large part because of its realistic depiction of gang vio-
`lence in an American city. See Emma Jones, How the Wire Became
`the Greatest TV Show Ever Made, BBC
`(Apr. 13, 2018),
`https://perma.cc/2V3Q-GYVK; Rob Sheffield, 100 Greatest TV
`of All Time, Rolling Stone
`(Sept. 21, 2016),
`Shows
`https://perma.cc/D862-BGDU. This case is about what happens
`when that fiction becomes reality.
`
`Reginald Graham, Antonio Glass, Jerimaine Bryant, Mario
`Rodriguez, Torivis Reginald Ingram, Michael Walker, Levi Bryant,
`Curtis Bryant, Daniel Jones, and Samuel Hayes appeal their convic-
`tions and sentences for committing numerous crimes in connec-
`tion with their membership in a Miami-based gang—the Dub
`
`
`
`
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`Street Blood Family or DSBF. For nearly two decades, the gang
`operated in and tyrannized a community through its drug opera-
`tions. When narcotics did not prove fruitful enough, its members
`turned to armed robberies. And when members stepped out of line
`or rivals encroached on the gang’s territory, its members did not
`hesitate to kill.1
`The FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Ex-
`plosives, the City of Miami Police Department, and the Miami-
`Dade County Police Department invested considerable resources
`to investigate the DSBF and take it down. Their collective work
`culminated in a broad indictment charging the defendants with nu-
`merous offenses. Count 1 charged Mr. Graham, Mr. Glass,
`Jerimaine Bryant, Mr. Rodriguez, Mr. Ingram, Mr. Walker, Levi
`Bryant, Curtis Bryant, Mr. Jones, and Mr. Hayes with a racketeer-
`ing conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Count 2 charged
`the same defendants—along with Latitia Houser, Donzell Jones,
`and Vencess Toby—with a narcotics conspiracy (to possess 280
`grams or more of crack cocaine and marijuana with the intent to
`distribute) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The indictment also
`charged the defendants with numerous substantive offenses.2
`
`
`1 Because three of the defendants share the last name of Bryant, we use their
`full names or first names where necessary.
`2 Ms. Houser, Donzell Jones, and Mr. Toby were not defendants in the trial
`we review in this appeal.
`
`
`
`
`
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`5
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`After a 38-day trial, a jury found the defendants guilty of
`many of the charges. A summary of the convictions and the sen-
`tences imposed follows:
`
`Sentence of
`Imprisonment
`228 months
`
`Life
`
`
`
`Defendant
`
`Counts
`
`1 – Racketeering Conspir-
`acy (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d))
`
` 2
`
` – Narcotics Conspiracy
`(21 U.S.C. § 846)
`
`11 – Attempted Possession
`of Narcotics with the In-
`tent
`to Distribute
`(21
`U.S.C. § 846)
`
`1 – Racketeering Conspir-
`acy (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d))
`
` 2
`
` – Narcotics Conspiracy
`(21 U.S.C. § 846)
`
`19 – Possession of Narcot-
`ics with the Intent to Dis-
`tribute
`(21
`U.S.C.
`§ 841(a)(1))
`
`
`Reginald Graham
`
`Antonio Glass
`
`
`
`
`
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`Life
`
`260 months
`
`
`
`1 – Racketeering Conspir-
`acy (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d))
`
` 2
`
` – Narcotics Conspiracy
`(21 U.S.C. § 846)
`
` 5
`
` – Possession of Narcotics
`with the Intent to Distrib-
`ute (21 U.S.C § 841)
`
`12 – Possession of Narcot-
`ics with the Intent to Dis-
`tribute (21 U.S.C § 841)
`
`21 – Possession of Narcot-
`ics with the Intent to Dis-
`tribute (21 U.S.C § 841)
`
`2 – Narcotics Conspiracy
`(21 U.S.C. § 846)
`
`10 – Possession of a Fire-
`arm
`in Furtherance of
`Drug Trafficking (18 U.S.C.
`§ 924(c))
`
`22 – Possession of Narcot-
`ics with the Intent to Dis-
`tribute
`(21
`U.S.C.
`§ 841(a)(1))
`
`
`Jerimaine Bryant
`
`Mario Rodriguez
`
`
`
`
`
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`7
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`168 months
`
`235 months
`
`192 months
`
`2 – Narcotics Conspiracy
`(21 U.S.C. § 846)
`
`22 – Possession of Narcot-
`ics with the Intent to Dis-
`tribute
`(21
`U.S.C.
`§ 841(a)(1))
`
`1 – Racketeering Conspir-
`acy (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d))
`
` 2
`
` – Narcotics Conspiracy
`(21 U.S.C. § 846)
`
`20 – Possession of Narcot-
`ics with the Intent to Dis-
`tribute (21 U.S.C § 841)
`
`2 – Narcotics Conspiracy
`(21 U.S.C. § 846)
`
` 4
`
` – Possession of Narcotics
`with the Intent to Distrib-
`ute (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1))
`
`
`Torivis Reginald In-
`graham
`
`Michael Walker
`
`Levi Bryant
`
`
`
`
`
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`Life
`
`235 months
`
`334 months
`
`
`
`
`1 – Racketeering Conspir-
`acy (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d))
`
` 2
`
` – Narcotics Conspiracy
`(21 U.S.C. § 846)
`
`11 – Attempted Possession
`of Narcotics with the In-
`tent
`to Distribute
`(21
`U.S.C. § 846)
`
`2 – Narcotics Conspiracy
`(21 U.S.C. § 846)
`
`1 – Racketeering Conspir-
`acy (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d))
`
`15 – Hobbs Act Robbery
`(18 U.S.C. § 1951(a))
`
`17 – Hobbs Act Robbery
`(18 U.S.C. § 1951(a))
`
`18 – Brandishing a Firearm
`in Furtherance of a Crime
`of Violence
`(18 U.S.C.
`§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii))
`
`
`Curtis Bryant
`
`Daniel Jones
`
`Samuel Hayes
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`The defendants now appeal, raising a host of issues. We va-
`cate the Count 1 RICO conspiracy convictions due to the district
`court’s erroneous and wholesale exclusion of the defendants’ gang
`expert and the government’s complete failure to brief harmless er-
`ror, an issue on which it bears the burden. We also vacate the sen-
`tence of Mr. Jones due to the improper application of a use-of-vio-
`lence enhancement. In all other respects, we affirm.3
`I. THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL
`The government’s case was largely based on the testimony
`of Special Agent Christopher Mayo of the FBI; Sergeant Surami
`Kelly of the City of Miami Police Department; Special Agent Ros-
`niel Perez of the ATF; Larry Grimes and Vandel Coakley, former
`members of the DSBF; Ms. Houser, a drug supplier for the DSBF
`and the ex-girlfriend of one of its members; and Donzell Jones, a
`local drug dealer who was close to the DSBF. Viewing the evi-
`dence in the light most favorable to the government, see United
`States v. Scott, 61 F.4th 855, 863 (11th Cir. 2023), this is generally the
`story they told.
`
`As early as the year 2000, law enforcement authorities be-
`came aware of a group operating out of the South Gwen Cherry
`housing complex in the Allapattah neighborhood of Miami, Flor-
`ida. That group called itself the DSBF and its members frequently
`identified themselves by other monikers such as RNS (Real N****
`Shit) and GMT (Get Money Team). Founded by Isaac “Ike”
`
`
`3 As to any issues not discussed, we summarily affirm.
`
`
`
`
`
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`Thompson, the DSBF had no formal affiliation with the infamous
`Bloods street gang of Los Angeles but its members considered
`themselves to be “[E]ast coast” Bloods.4
`
`The law enforcement investigation into the DSBF began in
`earnest in the early 2010s. The DSBF had a chain of command. At
`the top of the chain was a chief executive of sorts, a position held
`by men like Mr. Thompson (and then Mr. Glass around 2012). Be-
`low him were “Top Smackers” or “TopShottas,” high-ranking dep-
`uties who were in charge of the daily drug operations. Then came
`the “L.T.s.”—lieutenants who were second in command during
`drug transactions and typically collected the money and held the
`drugs and firearms. Although this chain of command became
`more fluid over time, there was always a designated leader.
`
`The DSBF had an initiation ritual, rules, handshakes, and
`hand signs. The initiation involved a 31-second display of loyalty,
`usually consisting of fighting a member or committing an act of
`violence against outsiders. The 31-second initiation was co-opted
`from the “Blood code.” Once initiated, members had to follow at
`least two rules: no stealing from the DSBF and no talking to the
`police. If a rule was broken, an enforcer, like Mr. Rodriguez, would
`oversee a 31-second punishment.
`
`Only members could perform the DSBF handshake; outsid-
`ers who tried using it “could get beat up.” The DSBF’s hand signs
`
`
`4 Later in the opinion, we discuss in more detail the government’s evidence
`about the DSBF’s association or affiliation with the Bloods.
`
`
`
`
`
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`were intended to symbolize a capital B, a lowercase B, and “East
`side,” for “[E]ast coast” Bloods.
`
`The DSBF was not shy about demonstrating its presence to
`the outside world. The area around the South Gwen Cherry com-
`plex had graffiti tags of the DSBF. And the gang’s members tat-
`tooed DSBF on their bodies. As self-proclaimed “[E]ast coast”
`Bloods, the DSBF’s members preferred to wear red.
`
`Members frequently boasted of the DSBF on Facebook and
`disparaged a rival gang, the “13th Avenue Gang.” In a message that
`proved prescient, a friend of the DSBF warned Mr. Graham:
`“[D]on’t put that DGMT shit on you all [Facebook] status. Feds
`watching that shit yeah.”
`
`Through 2017, the DSBF primarily sold crack cocaine and
`marijuana, but its members regularly worked together to commit
`other crimes such as armed robberies. The group’s members were
`no strangers to violence. Members touted firearms and used
`them—killing rival gang members and “outsiders” such as Pooh
`Johnson, Richard Hallman, and Terrell Washington. They some-
`times even shot their own members for violating the DSBF’s rules.
`
`The DSBF’s criminal activities fell under three broad catego-
`ries: (1) drugs; (2) armed robberies; and (3) homicides. We briefly
`summarize each of them.
`
`Drugs. The DSBF controlled the sale of drugs—primarily
`
`crack cocaine and marijuana—in the South Gwen Cherry complex.
`Narcotics were the group’s financial engine, and many of the deci-
`sions were driven by this reality. Only DSBF members could sell
`
`
`
`
`
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`at South Gwen Cherry, and they did so “[e]very day” in shifts. Out-
`siders like Donzell Jones had to obtain permission to sell drugs
`there. Ms. Houser testified that starting in 2015 she began supply-
`ing the DSBF—through Mr. Glass, Quincy Bryant, Mr. Graham,
`and Mr. Walker—with the drugs the gang sold at South Gwen
`Cherry. She also said that Jerimaine Bryant supplied drugs to the
`DSBF.
`
`Mr. Coakley testified that when it came to selling drugs,
`“everyone had a position.” At the bottom of the rung were “watch
`outs,” members who would alert the group if they saw rivals or
`police in the area. Members could graduate from a “watch out” to
`a “bomb man,” a position which required them to hold the drugs.
`They also had a “gunman,” which, as one would expect, was a
`member who had a firearm to protect the group.
`
`Mr. Grimes described how a typical narcotics transaction
`would be conducted. The DSBF would have at least a watch out
`and a bomb man. The drugs would be in a nondescript bag (“the
`bomb”) like a trash bag or a chip bag. When a customer requested
`drugs, the bomb man would take the cash and walk over to set “the
`bomb.” He would then go back to the customer to deliver the
`drugs. Sgt. Kelly similarly described the drug transactions from her
`team’s controlled purchases.
`
`During Mr. Grimes’ time with the DSBF, sometime in late
`2010, Mr. Glass was the L.T. who ran the daily drug operations.
`Mr. Glass would collect the money, assign shifts, and provide the
`drugs and guns.
`
`
`
`
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`In addition, Mr. Grimes gave the jury insight into the fi-
`nances of the DSBF’s narcotics operations. A “rock” of crack co-
`caine sold for $5, and his commission was 20%. On a good day,
`Mr. Grimes would pocket $500, and on a bad day $250. He esti-
`mated that, on average, the DSBF sold 21 grams of crack cocaine
`daily. Like all markets, however, the drug sales would sometimes
`be up and other times be down. Starting in 2016, sales were down.
`The DSBF’s drug operation dried up significantly; supply was un-
`reliable, and the buyers stopped coming. So, like any other market
`actor, the DSBF decided to diversify its operations to tap other in-
`come streams. That meant turning to robberies.
`
`Armed Robberies. The jury learned of the DSBF’s armed
`
`robberies mostly through Mr. Grimes, who in response to defense
`counsel’s questioning stated, “I’m a robber.” Mr. Grimes testified
`that he was arrested for four robberies, but had committed over 25
`robberies; at some point he stopped counting. Mr. Grimes’ first
`robbery with the gang dated to his initiation into the DSBF in 2010,
`when he and Mr. Glass (and others who are not defendants here)
`attempted to rob a drug dealer. During that attempted robbery,
`Mr. Grimes fired a gun provided to him by Mr. Rodriguez to show
`that they “ain’t to be played with and we going to shoot.”
`
`Following his first robbery in 2010, Mr. Grimes consistently
`committed armed robberies with the DSBF (“[m]ainly every day”).
`He identified Mr. Hayes as one of the gang members who fre-
`quently joined him in those endeavors. The firearms for the rob-
`beries were provided by Messrs. Rodriguez and Glass.
`
`
`
`
`
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`Mr. Coakley testified to his participation in four armed rob-
`beries in the fall of 2016 with other DSBF members—Mr. Hayes,
`Mr. Glass, Mr. Graham, and Curtis Bryant. The government intro-
`duced security footage from each of the victimized establishments
`and Mr. Coakley walked the jury through each robbery.
`
`On September 17, 2016, Mr. Coakley, Mr. Glass, Mr. Gra-
`ham, and Curtis Bryant robbed a Metro PCS store near South
`Gwen Cherry at gun point. Less than a week later, Messrs. Coakley
`and Hayes robbed the same store. In October of 2016, Messrs.
`Coakley, Hayes, and Glass robbed a nearby convenience store.
`That same month, Messrs. Coakley and Hayes again robbed the
`Metro PCS store. In all four robberies, the members held up the
`store clerk at gun point. And sometimes they held customers hos-
`tage. After each robbery, the members involved would split the
`proceeds evenly.
`
`Homicides. The jury heard testimony about the DSBF’s
`
`killing of Mr. Johnson, Mr. Hallman, and Mr. Washington. All
`three men were murdered for crossing the gang. Mr. Glass killed
`Mr. Johnson in 2010 for robbing from the DSBF; Mr. Grimes, Mr.
`Coakley, and Ms. Houser all testified about that murder. Curtis
`Bryant killed Mr. Hallman in 2015 after he shot a younger DSBF
`member; Mr. Coakley and Ms. Houser testified about that murder.
`Several DSBF members, including Mr. Glass and Curtis Bryant,
`killed Mr. Washington in 2016; Mr. Coakley, Ms. Houser, and De-
`tective Roderick Passmore testified about that murder.
`
`
`
`
`
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`The DSBF’s violence did not stop with outsiders. For exam-
`ple, Mr. Glass shot Mr. Grimes in a drive-by shooting for violating
`the DSBF’s rules; he had robbed a customer and that was bad for
`business.
`
`The narcotics, the robberies, and the murders all shared one
`thing in common—firearms. Guns were used to sell drugs, to rob,
`and to kill. The DSBF’s members frequently posted pictures on
`social media with their guns—sometimes pointing them directly at
`the camera. Mr. Coakley testified that he had seen Mr. Rodriguez
`and Mr. Glass supply weapons, including handguns and semi-auto-
`matic rifles, to DSBF members at South Gwen Cherry.
`II. PRE-TRIAL ISSUES
`The defendants raise various challenges to the district
`
`court’s pre-trial orders, voir dire findings, evidentiary rulings, jury
`instructions, and sentencing determinations. A number of defend-
`ants also take issue with the sufficiency of the evidence against
`them on some of the charges. We address the issues presented in
`rough chronological order.
`A. COUNT 2 OF THE INDICTMENT
`We begin with Levi Bryant. For the first time on appeal, he
`challenges the sufficiency of Count 2 of the indictment.5
`
`
`5 Mr. Ingram, Mr. Walker, and Jerimaine Bryant adopted Levi Bryant’s chal-
`lenge to Count 2. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(i).
`
`
`
`
`
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`Where a defendant did not raise an issue below, we conduct
`plain error review. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Olano,
`507 U.S. 725, 731–37 (1993). Plain error requires a defendant to
`show (1) that there was an error, (2) that the error is plain, and (3)
`that the error affected his substantial rights. See United States v.
`Hesser, 800 F.3d 1310, 1324 (11th Cir. 2015). If these three condi-
`tions are satisfied, we have discretion to correct the error. We
`“should correct a forfeited plain error that affects substantial rights
`if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputa-
`tion of judicial proceedings.” Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585
`U.S. 129, 137 (2018) (citation and internal quotation marks omit-
`ted).
`
`As relevant here, Count 2 of the indictment charged a num-
`ber of defendants, including Levi Bryant, with conspiracy to pos-
`sess 280 grams or more of crack cocaine (and marijuana) with the
`intent to distribute. See 21 U.S.C. § 846. Numerous other counts
`individually or jointly charged different defendants with substan-
`tive narcotics offenses, such as possession of a controlled substance
`with the intent to distribute. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
`
`According to Levi Bryant, the § 846 conspiracy charged in
`Count 2 required a “linked” substantive § 841 violation. In his
`view, because Count 2 in part alleged a conspiracy involving in part
`280 grams or more of crack cocaine, the government was required
`to allege that at least one of the substantive § 841 violations in-
`volved 280 grams or more of crack cocaine. But a substantive of-
`fense and a conspiracy to commit that offense are separate and
`
`
`
`
`
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`17
`
`distinct crimes. See Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593
`(1961) (citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643 (1946)).
`They may therefore be separately and independently charged, and
`the government is not required to “link” them in the charging in-
`strument. See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 11 (1994) (hold-
`ing that § 846 does not require proof that “a coconspirator commit-
`ted an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy”).
`
`As we explained decades ago, a conspiracy “is not confined
`to the substantive offense which is the immediate aim of the enter-
`prise” because “the essence of the crime of conspiracy . . . is an
`agreement to commit an unlawful act.” United States v. Cowart, 595
`F.2d 1023, 1030 (5th Cir. 1979). As a result, Levi Bryant cannot es-
`tablish a defect in the indictment. There was no error, plain or oth-
`erwise, in the drafting of Count 2.
`B. THE MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS
`The district court denied the motions to suppress filed by
`Messrs. Jones, Ingram, and Rodriguez. They challenge those deni-
`als on appeal.
`
`We review the denial of a motion to suppress under a mixed
`standard. We review factual findings for clear error and the appli-
`cation of the law to those facts de novo. See United States v. Ford, 784
`F.3d 1386, 1391 (11th Cir. 2015).
`1. MR. JONES
`We begin with Mr. Jones. He sought to suppress his cell
`phone and all evidence associated with it on the grounds that (1)
`
`
`
`
`
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`he was illegally detained during a traffic stop and (2) the phone was
`seized without probable cause.
`
`A magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing at which Sgt.
`Kelly and Agent Perez testified. Following that hearing, the mag-
`istrate judge recommended that Mr. Jones’ motion be denied be-
`cause the officers’ search was incident to a lawful arrest. The dis-
`trict court then adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation.
`We find no error in the district court’s factual findings or legal con-
`clusions and affirm the denial of Mr. Jones’ motion to suppress.
`
`The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unrea-
`sonable searches and seizures. See U.S. Const. Amend. IV. “[T]he
`ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonable-
`ness.’” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). “Where a
`search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evi-
`dence of criminal wrongdoing, . . . reasonableness generally re-
`quires the obtaining of a judicial warrant.” Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
`Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995). “In the absence of a warrant, a
`search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the
`warrant requirement.” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014).
`One such exception—which the district court held applied here—
`is when a warrantless search occurs incident to a lawful arrest. See
`id.
`
`We must first determine whether there was a lawful arrest.
`Mr. Jones contends that he was not under arrest, and that even if
`he was, no probable cause supported the arrest.
`
`
`
`
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`19
`
`The detention here “was in important respects indistinguish-
`able from a traditional arrest.” See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
`200, 212 (1979). The record shows that Mr. Jones was pulled over
`and asked to step out of his car, but was not “questioned briefly
`where he was found.” See id. Instead, he was put in handcuffs,
`placed in the back of a police car, transported to the police station,
`and taken to an interrogation room. Sgt. Kelly’s and Agent Perez’s
`subjective beliefs that Mr. Jones was not under arrest or that he
`went to the police station “voluntarily”—while handcuffed in the
`back of a police car—do not control. See id. See also United States v.
`Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d 1216, 1221–22 (11th Cir. 1993) (“The char-
`acter of a seizure as arrest or Terry stop depends on the nature and
`degree of intrusion, not on whether the officer pronounces the de-
`tainee ‘under arrest.’”). Mr. Jones was practically and legally under
`arrest when he was handcuffed and taken to the police station in a
`police car.
`
`Having determined that Mr. Jones was under arrest, we now
`ask whether his arrest was supported by probable cause. Probable
`cause exists when “the facts and circumstances within the officer’s
`knowledge, of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy infor-
`mation, would cause a prudent person to believe, under the cir-
`cumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing,
`or is about to commit an offense.” Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425,
`1435 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). See also District of Columbia
`v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018) (explaining that probable cause “re-
`quires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity,
`not an actual showing of such activity”) (citation omitted).
`
`
`
`
`
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`The magistrate judge—whose report the district court
`adopted—identified two bases which established probable cause
`for the arrest. The first was that Mr. Jones was driving an unregis-
`tered vehicle in violation of Fla. Stat. § 320.02, a second-degree mis-
`demeanor punishable by up to 60 days of imprisonment. See State
`v. Brooks, 295 So. 3d 348, 350, 352–53 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (reversing
`the trial court’s suppression of a firearm because the officers seized
`it incident to a lawful arrest for driving an unregistered vehicle);
`Fla. Stat. § 320.57(1) (making a violation of § 320.02 a second-de-
`gree misdemeanor and referencing statutes setting the available
`punishments). Second, Mr. Jones was involved in the RICO and
`narcotics conspiracies. We agree with the first basis and therefore
`do not address the second.
`
`Mr. Jones does not dispute that he could have been arrested
`for driving an unregistered vehicle. Indeed, he does not challenge
`the validity of the initial stop for that infraction. He instead argues
`that he was not arrested for doing so because he was given two
`traffic citations. But, as we have explained, Mr. Jones was in fact
`under arrest for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when he was
`handcuffed, placed in the back of a police car, and taken to the po-
`lice station. Nor does it matter under the Fourth Amendment that
`the officers could have issued traffic citations rather than execute
`an arrest. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (“We con-
`clude that warrantless arrests for crimes committed in the presence
`of an arresting officer are reasonable under the Constitution, and
`that while States are free to regulate such arrests however they de-
`sire, state restrictions do not alter the Fourth Amendment’s
`
`
`
`
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`21
`
`protections.”). Accordingly, the officers had probable cause to ar-
`rest Mr. Jones for driving an unregistered vehicle in violation of
`Florida law.
`
`Having confirmed the existence of an arrest supported by
`probable cause, we turn to whether the search of Mr. Jones was
`incident to a lawful arrest. Simply put, “a police officer who makes
`a lawful arrest may conduct a warrantless search of the arrestee’s
`person[.]” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 232 (2011). This ex-
`ception exists in part to prevent the concealment or destruction of
`evidence. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
`And the Supreme Court has permitted the seizure of a cell phone
`for that purpose while a warrant is obtained for a search of its con-
`tents. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 388.
`
`An officer retrieved Mr. Jones’ cell phone during a pat down
`following his detention and arrest. According to Agent Perez, cell
`phones hold evidentiary value as the mediums of narcotics trans-
`actions because they contain communications with customers and
`suppliers and, as relevant here, photographs that are used for social
`media posts. Mr. Jones’ cell phone therefore had independent evi-
`dentiary value and was properly seized to prevent the concealment
`or destruction of evidence it may have contained. See United States
`v. Bragg, 44 F.4th 1067, 1071 (8th Cir. 2022) (“Bragg’s iPhone was
`seized incident to his lawful arrest. . . . Because a seizure is gener-
`ally less intrusive than a search, the Supreme Court ‘has frequently
`approved warrantless seizures of property, on the basis of probable
`cause, for the time necessary to secure a warrant, where a
`
`
`
`
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`19-10332
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`warrantless search . . . would have been held impermissible.’”)
`(quoting Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 806 (1984)); Andersen
`v. DelCore, 79 F.4th 1153, 1166 (10th Cir. 2023) (“So long as an of-
`ficer has probable cause that a cell phone contains evidence of a
`crime, he may seize the phone without a warrant if a reasonable
`officer would conclude that the seizure is necessary to prevent the
`destruction of evidence.”). Consequently, the district court did not
`err in denying Mr. Jones’ motion to suppress the cellphone and the
`evidence associated with it.6
`2. MESSRS. INGRAM AND RODRIGUEZ
`We move on to Messrs. Ingram and Rodriguez. They
`
`sought to suppress (1) evidence seized during an initial warrantless
`search of a carport connected to their residence and (2) additional
`evidence subsequently seized from their residence pursuant to a
`search warrant, as fruits of the poisonous tree of the initial warrant-
`less search. The district court denied the motions to suppress, rul-
`ing that the initial warrantless search and seizure did not violate the
`Fourth Amendment and so there was no basis to suppress the fruits
`of that initial search.
`
`a. THE CARPORT
`
`
`6 Mr. Jones also challenges Agent Perez’s delay in obtaining a warrant to search
`the phone. Mr. Jones raised this argument below, but the magistrate judge
`did not address it in his report. Mr. Jones, in turn, did not object to the mag-
`istrate judge’s failure to address this argument and therefore waived the right
`to challenge this aspect of the denial of his motion to suppress on appeal. See
`11th Cir. R. 3-1.
`
`
`
`
`
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`23
`
`The home and its surrounding curtilage are constitutionally
`protected areas, and warrantless searches of them are “presump-
`tively” unreasonable. See Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403. But officers
`may “ent[er] upon private land to knock on a citizen’s door for le-
`gitimate police purposes unconnected with a search of the prem-
`ises.” United States v. Taylor, 458 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2006).
`This so-called knock-and-talk exception is limited in two respects.
`First, when an officer’s behavior “objectively reveals a purpose to
`conduct a search,” the exception ceases. See United States v. Walker,
`799 F.3d 1361, 1363 (11th Cir. 2015). Second, an officer is “geo-
`graphically limited to the front door or a ‘minor departure’ from
`it.” Id.
`
`Mr. Ingram and Mr. Rodriguez contend that Miami-Dade
`
`Police Detectives Terrence Andre White and Charles Woods ex-
`ceeded the scope of the knock-and-talk exception when they ap-
`proached the carport. We disagree.7
`The behavior here did not objectively reveal a purpose to
`search. Detectives White and Woods went to the residence upon
`belief that Mr. Rodriguez, who was wanted for questioning in con-
`nection with a homicide, was present there. Upon arriving at the
`residence, the Detectives saw Messrs. Ingram a
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