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`In the
`United States Court of Appeals
`For the Eleventh Circuit
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`____________________
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`No. 19-12747
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`____________________
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`SILVIA COTRISS,
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`versus
`CITY OF ROSWELL,
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`JAMES RUSSELL GRANT,
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`Plaintiff-Appellant,
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`Roswell Chief of Police; Individually and in his Official Capacity,
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`KATHERINE GAINES LOVE,
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`Roswell City Administrator; Individually and in her Official Capac-
`ity,
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`Defendants-Appellees.
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`[DO NOT PUBLISH]
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`In the
`United States Court of Appeals
`For the Eleventh Circuit
`
`____________________
`
`No. 19-12747
`
`____________________
`
`
`SILVIA COTRISS,
`
`versus
`CITY OF ROSWELL,
`
`JAMES RUSSELL GRANT,
`
`Plaintiff-Appellant,
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`Roswell Chief of Police; Individually and in his Official Capacity,
`
`KATHERINE GAINES LOVE,
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`Roswell City Administrator; Individually and in her Official Capac-
`ity,
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`Defendants-Appellees.
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`Opinion of the Court
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`19-12747
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`____________________
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`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Northern District of Georgia
`D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-04589-WMR
`____________________
`
`Before ROSENBAUM, LAGOA, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.
`PER CURIAM:
`
`The City of Roswell, Georgia (the “City”), terminated Silvia
`Cotriss, a former sergeant for the City of Roswell Police Depart-
`ment (the “Police Department”), after a Police Department inves-
`tigation concluded that Cotriss displayed a Confederate battle flag
`in front of her private home, sometimes with her police cruiser pre-
`sent. This appeal asks us to determine two separate issues:
`(1) whether Cotriss satisfactorily pleaded a void-for-vagueness
`claim under the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) whether the
`City’s interest in running an efficient and effective Police Depart-
`ment outweighed Cotriss’s First Amendment speech interest in fly-
`ing the flag.
`
`After careful consideration and with the benefit of oral argu-
`ment, we conclude that Cotriss failed to satisfactorily plead a void-
`for-vagueness claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. We there-
`fore affirm the district court’s order denying Cotriss’s request for
`leave to amend her complaint. And on this record, and as applied
`to Cotriss, we also affirm the district court’s determination that the
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`City’s interest in efficiently and effectively running its Police De-
`partment outweighed Cotriss’s interest in flying the Confederate
`battle flag, thereby allowing the City and the Police Department to
`discipline Cotriss based on her speech.
`I.
`FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
`Cotriss began her law enforcement career for the City in
`1996 and was a sergeant with the Police Department at the time of
`her termination on July 14, 2016. During Cotriss’s employment,
`Police Department Chief James Russell Grant sought to foster re-
`lations with the local African-American community during, what
`he described as, a time of “tension in race relations between police
`departments and African-American communities throughout the
`country.” As part of these efforts, Grant spoke during a service at
`Eagle’s Nest Church to a predominately African-American congre-
`gation.
`
`The next day, Christopher Wray, who attended the church
`service, emailed Grant with a complaint about an officer flying a
`Confederate battle flag. Wray’s email stated:
`I was in attendance at eagles nest church this past Sun-
`day and actually sat two rows behind you as we dis-
`cussed race relations and fostering empathy, under-
`standing, and open lines of communication. I do ap-
`preciate your participation and willingness to keep
`that line of communication open. I am however dis-
`heartened when this Monday morning I am taking
`my daughter and son to their pre-school to see a
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`home on west Wiley bridge road flying a confederate
`flag with a Roswell Police department explorer
`parked in the driveway. It is very difficult to explain
`to my daughter that we should trust our police, but
`in the same sentiment if I were to ever be pulled over
`or some situation where my family needs the police
`to protect and serve. My first thought/fear is that it
`may be the officer proudly flying his/her confederate
`flag. I fully support our individual rights of free
`speech and how we express our beliefs as long as
`there is no harm done to anyone. In light of current
`race, police, and human relations this officer is repre-
`sentative of the police force tasked to protect and
`serve.
`I hope this email finds you well and this officer will be
`apart [sic] of your cultural sensitivity and bias re-
`moval in the near future.
`Wray’s July 11, 2016, email prompted an internal investiga-
`tion that ultimately resulted in Cotriss’s termination. Captain
`Helen Dunkin of the Police Department’s Office of Internal Affairs
`headed the investigation. Early into the investigation, Dunkin de-
`termined that the home referenced in the email belonged to Co-
`triss.
`
`During the investigation, Dunkin interviewed Cotriss twice,
`first in person on July 12, 2016, and then telephonically on July 13,
`2016. Over the course of these interviews, it was revealed that Co-
`triss had been on medical leave from the Police Department as of
`March 15, 2016, and that she was not in possession of her police
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`cruiser on the date of Wray’s email, as she had returned it to the
`Police Department months earlier for radio reprogramming. The
`police cruiser was therefore not parked outside her home. During
`the interviews, Cotriss stated that she had lived at her current ad-
`dress for about eleven years, that her neighbors were aware of her
`position at the Police Department, and that she parked her police
`cruiser in her driveway prior to surrendering it for reprogramming.
`Cotriss admitted to Dunkin that there had been two Con-
`federate-like battle flags separately displayed on a flagpole under-
`neath an American flag at her home since about April or May 2015.
`So at least prior to Wray’s email, a version of the Confederate bat-
`tle flag had flown at Cotriss’s home at points when Cotriss’s police
`cruiser was visibly present. Cotriss explained that the first flag was
`purchased by her late-husband and resembled a Confederate battle
`flag with a motorcycle emblem in the center—a flag representing
`a group of motorcyclists who participate in “Bike Week.” Then, in
`June 2016, when this first flag became worn, Cotriss’s roommate
`removed it and, with Cotriss’s permission, replaced it with a new
`Confederate battle flag that the roommate received from a neigh-
`bor. Cotriss explained she viewed the flags as a way to honor her
`“Southern heritage” and her late husband.
`
`Cotriss offered to remove the flag after her initial interview
`with Dunkin, and between the first and second interviews, Cotriss,
`in fact, removed the flag. Then, after the second interview, Dunkin
`prepared a written report, charging Cotriss with engaging in con-
`duct while off duty that was unbecoming and that resulted in
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`discrediting the Police Department. Per the report, Cotriss vio-
`lated Police Department Policies 16.5 and 16.82 and City Personnel
`Policy 13.1(9). The applicable policies, in relevant part, state:
`16.5 Duty Regarding Conduct
`Police Officers having a position of trust and civic re-
`sponsibility should so conduct themselves as to merit
`the confidence and respect of the public and fellow
`officers.
`16.82 Conduct Unbecoming On/Off Duty
`Engaging in conduct on or off duty which adversely
`affects the efficiency of the Department, and has a
`tendency to destroy the public respect for the em-
`ployee or the Department, or destroys confidence in
`the operation of the City service is conduct unbecom-
`ing and is prohibited.
`13.1 Violations
`(9) Any conduct, on or off-duty, that reflects unfavor-
`ably on the City as an employer.
`In concluding her report, Dunkin recommended that the
`charge against Cotriss be “sustained.” Dunkin then transmitted the
`report to Grant, who sustained the charge. Then, on July 14, 2016,
`Grant terminated Cotriss’s employment with the Police Depart-
`ment. According to Grant’s deposition testimony, Grant believed
`that termination of employment, instead of a lesser penalty like
`bias training, was merited for the following reasons: (1) Grant be-
`lieved that displaying the Confederate battle flag suggested poor
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`judgment on the part of Cotriss; (2) Grant believed that Cotriss had
`not been fully forthcoming during the investigation; and (3) Cotriss
`had a prior disciplinary action on her record—a three-day suspen-
`sion without pay.
`Cotriss appealed her termination to the City’s Human Re-
`sources Department, which affirmed Grant’s decision to terminate
`Cotriss. In his response letter to Cotriss, Human Resources Direc-
`tor Jim Harner stated to Cotriss that:
`Flying a Confederate flag prominently in front of
`your home, while also having your marked police ve-
`hicle visible to passersby, has a tendency to destroy
`public confidence in, and respect for, the Roswell Po-
`lice Department and your position as a law enforce-
`ment officer serving all Roswell citizens.
`Harner also noted that, after Cotriss’s prior three-day suspension,
`Cotriss had been “notified in writing that any further performance
`or policy violations may result in disciplinary action up to and in-
`cluding termination.”
`Cotriss then appealed to City Administrator Katherine Love,
`stating that she was “concerned that we (police officers) are ex-
`pected to abide by an unwritten code determined by current
`events” pertaining to the Confederate battle flag. In her letter re-
`questing reversal of her termination, Cotriss noted that the City
`“has a lot of Confederate history,” providing as an example that
`visitors to the “Smith House pay a fee to learn about the Confeder-
`ate history of Roswell.” Cotriss also noted that the “State of
`
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`Georgia still takes pride in the Confederate flag by selling the Geor-
`gia license plate displaying the flag.” Thus, Cotriss’s letter claimed,
`the flag “is not considered offensive by very many people.”1
`After receiving Cotriss’s letter of appeal, Love upheld Co-
`triss’s termination. Love stated that Cotriss’s appeal “d[id] not
`have merit.” Love further explained to Cotriss that:
`[Y]ou have demonstrated unacceptable and poor
`judgment in flying a Confederate flag at your resi-
`dence while at the same time having a marked City of
`Roswell police vehicle at your residence. Holding
`any position in law enforcement requires acute situa-
`tional awareness and the supervisory rank of Sergeant
`requires that one demonstrate behavior to those
`whom you supervise and to the public that promotes
`and upholds public confidence, credibility, and re-
`spect in law enforcement.
`After exhausting these administrative appeals, Cotriss filed
`suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City, as well as against Grant
`and Love, in both their individual and official capacities.2 Cotriss’s
`complaint alleged a single claim—violation of her First Amend-
`ment free speech right for being terminated because of the
`
`
`1 At the time of Cotriss’s termination, the State of Georgia also flew the Con-
`federate battle flag and other flags of the Confederate States of America at
`Stone Mountain Park.
`2 The City, Grant, and Love are referred to as the “Defendants” when dis-
`cussed collectively.
`
`
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`Confederate battle flag that she displayed at her home. In response,
`Defendants moved to dismiss her claim for failing to state a claim
`upon which relief may be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
`cedure 12(b)(6). In an order not on appeal before this panel, the
`district court granted in part the motion as to Cotriss’s free speech
`retaliation claim against Grant and Love in their individual capaci-
`ties on qualified immunity grounds. The district court denied the
`motion against the City, as well as Grant and Love in their official
`capacities, and the case proceeded to the summary judgment stage.
`After Cotriss retained new counsel, she moved for leave to
`amend her complaint to add two counts under the First, Fifth, and
`Fourteenth Amendments, alleging that Defendants’ “disciplinary
`policies were unconstitutional as applied to Sgt. Cotriss because
`they did not provide fair notice that her speech was prohibited.”
`The district court denied the motion, concluding that the proposed
`claims were futile.
`
`Following discovery on the free speech retaliation claim,
`Cotriss and Defendants cross-moved for summary judgment. After
`a hearing on the motions, the district court denied Cotriss’s mo-
`tion, granted Defendants’ motion, and entered judgment for De-
`fendants. The district court found that, although Cotriss’s display
`of the Confederate battle flag constituted speech made as a citizen
`related to a matter of public concern, the City’s interest in operat-
`ing an effective Police Department outweighed Cotriss’s interest in
`her speech, thereby allowing the City and the Police Department
`to discipline Cotriss. This is because the district court held that
`
`
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`Cotriss failed to “identif[y] a coherent interest in her speech,” as she
`provided “only vague references to ‘Southern heritage’ and ‘riding
`motorcycles’” in support of her speech, while Defendants provided
`the rationale that a police officer flying a flag “associated with rac-
`ism” would diminish the Police Department’s standing with mem-
`bers of the community. This timely appeal ensued.
`II.
`STANDARD OF REVIEW
`Generally, we review the appeal of a district court’s denial
`of a motion for leave to amend for abuse of discretion. SFM Hold-
`ings, Ltd. v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 600 F.3d 1334, 1336 (11th Cir.
`2010). But where, as here, the district court determined whether
`an amendment would be futile, our review is de novo. Id.
`We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
`novo, construing the record evidence in the light most favorable to
`the nonmoving party and resolving all reasonable doubts about the
`facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Strickland v. Norfolk S. Ry.
`Co., 692 F.3d 1151, 1154 (11th Cir. 2012). “Summary judgment is
`appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and
`the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. “In
`other words, ‘[t]he District Court [must] consider all evidence in
`the record when reviewing a motion for summary judgment—
`pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, affidavits, etc.—and can
`only grant summary judgment if everything in the record demon-
`strates that no genuine issue of material fact exists.’” Id. (altera-
`tions in original) (quoting Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949,
`952 (11th Cir.1986)).
`
`
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`III. ANALYSIS
`On appeal, Cotriss argues that the district court erred in: (1)
`denying her motion for leave to amend her complaint because her
`additional claims were futile; and (2) granting summary judgment
`for Defendants because the City’s interest in efficient policing out-
`weighed Cotriss’s speech interest. We address each argument in
`turn.
`
`A.
`Leave to Amend the Complaint
`Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), leave to
`amend a complaint should be freely given so long as the amend-
`ment would not be futile. Hall v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 367 F.3d
`1255, 1262–63 (11th Cir. 2004). An amendment is futile when the
`proposed additions would be subject to dismissal under the Rule
`12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
`be granted. See id. at 1263. As applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
`to dismiss, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a com-
`plaint to provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
`that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “When evaluating a motion
`to dismiss,” we “assume the veracity of well-pleaded factual allega-
`tions and ‘then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
`entitlement to relief.’” Newbauer v. Carnival Corp., 26 F.4th 931,
`934–35 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp.,
`605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010)).
`Cotriss appeals the district court’s denial of her motion to
`amend her initial complaint. In her proposed amended complaint,
`
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`Cotriss added two additional counts to her original free speech re-
`taliation count. Under both new counts, Cotriss alleged that:
`Because the Department and Roswell policies under
`which Defendants terminated Sgt. Cotriss did not
`provide her fair notice that displaying a Confederate
`flag on a flagpole at her residence would result in her
`termination, such policies are unconstitutionally
`vague as applied to Sgt. Cotriss.
`Under Count 1 for “Failure to Provide Fair Notice of Prohib-
`ited Speech in Violation of the First Amendment,” Cotriss claimed
`that the policies violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments be-
`cause they were “unconstitutionally vague” and “did not provide
`[her] fair notice that her speech was prohibited.” Under Count 2
`for “Failure to Provide Fair Notice of Prohibited Speech in Viola-
`tion of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
`ments,” Cotriss similarly claimed that the policies violated her
`“right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
`ments” because they were “unconstitutionally vague” and “did not
`provide [her] fair notice that her speech was prohibited.” And the
`third count in her proposed amended complaint is duplicative of
`Cotriss’s free speech retaliation claim in her original complaint.
`
`The district court found that Cotriss’s proposed amended
`complaint “would not withstand a motion to dismiss” because “it
`is futile.” In coming to this determination, the district court made
`several relevant conclusions. First, the district court determined
`that Cotriss’s new “[c]hallenges to the vagueness of a government
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`Opinion of the Court
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`policy are due process claims.” Second, the district court found
`that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment—not
`the Fifth Amendment—governed Cotriss’s claims because the
`Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States. Third, the district
`court noted that Cotriss “d[id] not explain” whether she alleged “a
`violation of procedural or substantive due process” under the Four-
`teenth Amendment but concluded that her claims failed under ei-
`ther theory. Fourth, in conducting its due process analysis, the dis-
`trict court noted that Cotriss did not contend that she had a prop-
`erty interest in her continued employment with the Police Depart-
`ment. Fifth, regarding substantive due process, the district court
`determined that “Cotriss cannot present a First Amendment argu-
`ment as a substantive due process violation where she allege[d] a
`First Amendment violation on the same set of facts” as her free
`speech retaliation claim.
`On appeal, Cotriss argues that her proposed amended com-
`plaint “did not seek to assert her free speech retaliation claim as a
`substantive due process claim.” She asserts that her “fair notice
`claims and her free speech retaliation claim are district [sic] and in-
`dependent claims that arise from different facts.” She contends that
`her “fair notice claims arise from the City’s application of vague
`conduct unbecoming policies to restrict speech that is not clearly
`prohibited under such policies,” whereas “her free speech retalia-
`tion claim arises from the City’s termination of her employment
`due to her protected speech.” Thus, Cotriss frames her “fair notice
`claims,” which she pleaded under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth
`
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`Amendments, on the idea that the Police Department and City pol-
`icies at issue are “vague,” in that she did not know that flying a
`Confederate battle flag could result in her termination.
`As a preliminary matter, the district court correctly deter-
`mined that Cotriss’s Fifth Amendment due process claim failed be-
`cause the Fifth Amendment applies only to the federal govern-
`ment, not to the States. See Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S.
`161, 167 (2002). Likewise, the district court correctly concluded
`that the allegations in both Counts 1 and 2 of the proposed
`amended complaint relate to the void-for-vagueness doctrine un-
`der the Fourteenth Amendment. The doctrine, while often em-
`ployed in relation to criminal statutes, see, e.g., United States v.
`Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 288 (2008), has also been applied in the pub-
`lic employment context, see, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134,
`159–60 (1974) (plurality opinion).
`
`The void-for-vagueness doctrine is grounded in the Due
`Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, not in
`the First Amendment.3 See Williams, 553 U.S. at 304 (“Vagueness
`
`
`3 Cotriss did not bring a separate overbreadth claim under the First Amend-
`ment. The overbreadth doctrine pertains to the illegitimate prohibition of “a
`substantial amount of protected speech.” Williams, 553 U.S. at 292. As ex-
`plained by the former Fifth Circuit, conduct unbecoming “catch-all provi-
`sions” are “often attacked on vagueness (due process) and overbreadth (first
`amendment) grounds.” Davis v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1100, 1103 (5th Cir. 1980);
`see Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc)
`(adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed
`down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981). As a result of Cotriss’s
`
`
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`doctrine is an outgrowth not of the First Amendment, but of the
`Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”); FCC v. Fox Tele-
`vision Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012) (“Th[e] requirement
`of clarity in regulation is essential to the protections provided by
`the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”); Davis v. Wil-
`liams, 617 F.2d 1100, 1102–04 (5th Cir. 1980) (analyzing void-for-
`vagueness doctrine in the Fourteenth Amendment context).
`Though, in some instances, due process concerns about vagueness
`can be magnified if First Amendment expression is involved. See,
`e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974) (“Where a [crimi-
`nal] statute’s literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court in-
`terpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First
`Amendment, the [void-for-vagueness] doctrine demands a greater
`degree of specificity than in other contexts.”).
`
`“The root of the vagueness doctrine is a rough idea of fair-
`ness” in that a person must have “fair warning” or fair notice of
`prohibited conduct. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972).
`Therefore, a governmental employment policy or regulation
`“which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
`vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
`
`
`failure to bring a separate First Amendment overbreadth claim, we are not
`presented with a justiciable opportunity to review the policies at issue for
`overbreadth, and we express no view on the issue. See Holder v. Humanitar-
`ian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 20 (2010) (noting that the void-for-vagueness doc-
`trine is distinct from the overbreadth doctrine and that they are not “substan-
`tially redundant”).
`
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`its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential
`of due process of law.” Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385,
`391 (1926); see also Davis, 617 F.2d 1100 (applying void-for-vague-
`ness doctrine in case centering on municipal fire department rules,
`regulations, and ordinances). Indeed, the void-for-vagueness doc-
`trine encapsulates the ideas that “regulated parties should know
`what is required of them so they may act accordingly” and that
`“precision and guidance are necessary so that those enforcing the
`law do not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way.” Fox, 567 U.S.
`at 253.
`
`Since the void-for-vagueness doctrine applicable to this case
`is rooted in Fourteenth Amendment due process, Cotriss must first
`satisfy the elements of bringing a due process claim, which she
`failed to do here. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
`Amendment states that no State shall “deprive any person of life,
`liberty, or property, without due process of
`law.”
`U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “The Supreme Court’s interpreta-
`tion of this clause explicates that the amendment provides two dif-
`ferent kinds of constitutional protection: procedural due process
`and substantive due process.” McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1555
`(11th Cir. 1994) (en banc). “The substantive component of the Due
`Process Clause protects those rights that are ‘fundamental,’ that is,
`rights that are ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” Id. at
`1556 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), over-
`ruled on other grounds by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794
`(1969)). “Because employment rights are state-created rights and
`
`
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`
`are not ‘fundamental’ rights created by the Constitution, they do
`not enjoy substantive due process protection.” Id. at 1560. State-
`created employment rights can, however, be protected by proce-
`dural due process requirements. Id.
`“The requirements of procedural due process apply only to
`the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth
`Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” Bd. of Regents
`of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). In most cases,
`“[w]hen protected interests are implicated, the right to some kind
`of prior hearing is paramount” before a governmental entity may
`deprive one of that interest. Id. at 569–70 & n.7. A governmental
`entity “may cure a procedural deprivation by providing a later pro-
`cedural remedy; only when the [entity] refuses to provide a process
`sufficient to remedy the procedural deprivation does a constitu-
`tional violation actionable under section 1983 arise.” McKinney, 20
`F.3d at 1557.
`
`“A public employee,” like Cotriss, “has a property interest in
`employment if ‘existing rules or understandings that stem from an
`independent source such as state law create a legitimate claim of
`entitlement.’” Ross v. Clayton County, 173 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th
`Cir. 1999) (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577–78). Cotriss’s proposed
`amended complaint, however, made no reference to having a
`property interest in her job. And throughout subsequent briefing,
`including briefing before this Court, Cotriss conceded that she did
`not have a property interest in her job. As a result, we will not
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 19-12747 Date Filed: 06/29/2022 Page: 18 of 26
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`18
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`Opinion of the Court
`
`19-12747
`
`consider a property interest theory underpinning Cotriss’s void-
`for-vagueness procedural due process claim.
`In public employment cases, a public employee can also
`have a liberty interest in continued employment. See, e.g., Warren
`v. Crawford, 927 F.2d 559, 565 (11th Cir. 1991). A public em-
`ployee’s liberty interest generally centers on her interest in being
`free from reputational harm, stigma, or the foreclosure of future
`employment opportunities by government actions, without being
`given an opportunity for a hearing or redress. See Roth, 408 U.S.
`at 573–75; Arnett, 416 U.S. at 156–58. Indeed, this Court has held
`that “[t]o establish a deprivation of a liberty interest without due
`process of law,” a public employee, like Cotriss, must show: “(1) a
`false statement (2) of a stigmatizing nature (3) attending a govern-
`mental employee’s discharge (4) made public (5) by the govern-
`mental employer (6) without a meaningful opportunity for [an]
`employee name clearing hearing.” Warren, 927 F.2d at 565 (second
`alteration in original) (quoting Buxton v. City of Plant City, 871
`F.2d 1037, 1042–43 (11th Cir. 1989)).
`Despite using the term “liberty interest” in her relevant
`briefings, Cotriss conceded to the district court that she “does not
`allege that she was denied a hearing to which she was legally enti-
`tled” and that she “does not allege a due process violation for the
`City’s failure to allow her a name clearing hearing.” Thus, Cotriss
`does not challenge the procedural adequacy of the Police Depart-
`ment’s investigation of her conduct or the adequacy of the process
`available to her to appeal her termination to the Human Resources
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 19-12747 Date Filed: 06/29/2022 Page: 19 of 26
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`19-12747
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`Opinion of the Court
`
`19
`
`Department and the City Administrator. And, therefore, Cotriss
`failed to sufficiently plead a procedural due process claim under a
`liberty interest theory in her proposed amended complaint.
`In Cotriss’s reply in support of her motion for leave to
`amend the complaint, Cotriss stated that “it goes without saying
`(which is why it was not said) that freedom of speech is a funda-
`mental liberty interest.” Cotriss makes similar statements about
`having a liberty interest in her speech in her briefing before this
`Court. Like the district court, we view these statements as an at-
`tempt to assert a substantive due process claim because the “sub-
`stantive component of the Due Process Clause protects those
`rights that are ‘fundamental,’ that is, rights that are ‘implicit in the
`concept of ordered liberty.’” McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1556 (quoting
`Palko, 302 U.S. at 325); cf. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599
`n.5 (1972) (rejecting argument that “the respondent might have a
`due process right to some kind of hearing simply if he asserts to
`college officials that their decision was based on his constitutionally
`protected conduct”).
`Unlike procedural due process protection, a “finding that a
`right merits substantive due process protection means that the
`right is protected ‘against “certain government actions regardless
`of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.”’”
`McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1556 (quoting Collins v. City of Harker
`Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)). But the Supreme Court has in-
`structed that “[w]here a particular Amendment provides an explicit
`textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 19-12747 Date Filed: 06/29/2022 Page: 20 of 26
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`20
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`Opinion of the Court
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`19-12747
`
`of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more general-
`ized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for ana-
`lyzing these claims.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,
`842 (1998) (alteration in original) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510
`U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (plurality opinion)); accord Echols v. Lawton,
`913 F.3d 1313, 1326 (11th Cir. 2019). Thus, the proper vehicle for
`Cotriss to have alleged a First Amendment deprivation is the First
`Amendment itself under a free speech retaliation theory, which Co-
`triss did allege, or another First Amendment theory, such as over-
`breadth, which Cotriss did not allege.
`Ultimately, the allegations underpinning the additional
`counts in Cotriss’s proposed amended complaint constitute void-
`for-vagueness claims, in that Cotriss alleged that she did not have
`fair notice of prohibited conduct from vague policies. Cotriss failed
`to sufficiently plead the requisites for such claims under the Due
`Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For the above rea-
`sons, the district court correctly determined that Cotriss’s pro-
`posed amended complaint “would not withstand a motion to dis-
`miss.”
`
`B.
`Summary Judgment
`Cotriss next argues that the district court erred in granting
`summary judgment for Defendants on her free speech retaliation
`claim. She believ
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