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`In the
`United States Court of Appeals
`For the Eleventh Circuit
`
`____________________
`
`No. 19-13070
`
`____________________
`
`
`HEATHER KOKESCH DEL CASTILLO,
`
` Plaintiff-Appellant,
`
`versus
`SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
`
`
` Defendant-Appellee.
`
`
`____________________
`
`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Northern District of Florida
`D.C. Docket No. 3:17-cv-00722-MCR-HTC
`____________________
`
`
`
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`19-13070
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`Before BRANCH, LUCK, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.
`LUCK, Circuit Judge:
`
`Heather Kokesch Del Castillo, an unlicensed dietician and
`nutritionist, claims that Florida’s Dietetics and Nutrition Practice
`Act, which requires a license to practice as a dietician or nutrition-
`ist, violates her First Amendment free speech rights to communi-
`cate her opinions and advice on diet and nutrition to her clients.
`The district court granted summary judgment for the Florida De-
`partment of Health, which enforces the Act, on Del Castillo’s First
`Amendment free speech claim because, the district court con-
`cluded, it was bound by our decision in Locke v. Shore, 634 F.3d
`1185 (11th Cir. 2011). Locke held that a similar state licensing
`scheme for commercial interior designers did not violate the free
`speech rights of unlicensed interior designers.
`
`Del Castillo argues that the district court erred, and we are
`
`not bound by Locke, because Locke was abrogated by the Supreme
`Court’s decision in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates
`v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). So the narrow question for us is
`whether Locke is still good law after NIFLA. After reviewing what
`we said in Locke, what the Supreme Court said in NIFLA, and our
`prior panel precedent rule, we hold that it is. And because Locke
`is still good law, we conclude that we are bound to affirm the dis-
`trict court’s summary judgment for the department.
`
`
`
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`FACTUAL BACKGROUND
`Del Castillo owned and operated a health-coaching business
`
`called Constitution Nutrition. She started her business in Califor-
`nia, which did not require her to have a license to operate it. After
`moving to Florida in 2015, Del Castillo continued to run her busi-
`ness—meeting online with most of her clients and meeting in per-
`son with two clients who lived in Florida. She described herself as
`a “holistic health coach” and not as a dietician. Del Castillo tailored
`her health coaching to each client, which included dietary advice.
`She advertised her business in a local health magazine, on Face-
`book, and on flyers at a local gym.
`Del Castillo’s business focused on “[o]ne-on-one health
`coaching,” which she described as “meeting with clients and dis-
`cussing overall health and wellness, as well as goal setting.” She
`gave them tailored advice on dietary choices, exercise habits, and
`general lifestyle strategies. For example, Del Castillo recom-
`mended vitamin supplements to some clients with low energy and
`told them to consult with their physicians before taking the supple-
`ments. For another client with food intolerances, Del Castillo rec-
`ommended health goals that fit within a list of foods to avoid pro-
`vided by the client’s doctor.
`Before her initial consultation with a new client, Del Castillo
`would ask them to fill out a “health history form.” The health his-
`tory form sought general background information about the client,
`like his or her age and occupation, as well as particulars about the
`client’s dietary health, including past serious illness or recent
`
`
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`19-13070
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`weight change. Del Castillo used this form to get an overall picture
`of her client’s health but did not make medical conclusions. In-
`stead, she would recommend that a client consult a doctor if the
`client had experienced something unusual like drastic weight loss.
`Del Castillo never held herself out to her clients as a health care
`professional, never gave a diagnosis or provided medical treat-
`ment, and never gave advice contrary to physician advice.
`Del Castillo had a certificate in holistic health coaching that
`she received from an online school. But she did not have a Florida
`dietician or nutritionist license. Del Castillo was not qualified to
`receive a license because she lacked the necessary education and
`professional experience.
`Del Castillo’s lack of a license eventually became a problem
`for her business. Florida regulates dietetics and nutrition counsel-
`ing through the Dietetics and Nutrition Practice Act. Fla. Stat. §§
`468.501–.518. The Act defines “[d]ietetics” as “the integration and
`application of the principles derived from the sciences of nutrition,
`biochemistry, food, physiology, and management and from the be-
`havioral and social sciences to achieve and maintain a person’s
`health throughout the person’s life.” Id. § 468.503(4). It defines
`“[n]utrition counseling” as “advising and assisting individuals or
`groups on appropriate nutrition intake by integrating information
`from the nutrition assessment.” Id. § 468.503(10). The Act provides
`that “[d]ietetics and nutrition practice” “include[s] assessing nutri-
`tion needs and status using appropriate data; recommending ap-
`propriate dietary regimens, nutrition support, and nutrient intake;
`
`
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`ordering therapeutic diets; improving health status through nutri-
`tion research, counseling, and education; and developing, imple-
`menting, and managing nutrition care systems.” Id. § 468.503(5).
`And, relevant to this appeal, the Act provides that “[n]o person may
`engage for remuneration in dietetics and nutrition practice or nu-
`trition counseling or hold himself or herself out as a practitioner of
`dietetics and nutrition practice or nutrition counseling unless the
`person is licensed in accordance with the provisions of this part.”
`Id. § 468.504. Under the Act, a person who knowingly engages in
`unlicensed “dietetics and nutrition practice or nutrition counseling
`for remuneration” commits “a misdemeanor of the first degree.”
`Id. § 468.517(1), (2).
`In March 2017, a licensed dietician filed a complaint against
`Del Castillo with the Florida Department of Health, alleging that
`Del Castillo was violating the Act by providing nutritionist services
`without a license. The department’s practice was to investigate
`every complaint, so it opened an investigation into Del Castillo. A
`department investigator posed as a client and contacted Del Cas-
`tillo about her services. In response, Del Castillo described her ser-
`vices and provided the investigator with a health history form to
`fill out. The department concluded that Del Castillo was violating
`the Act and, in May 2017, sent her a citation and a cease-and-desist
`order. Del Castillo paid the department $500.00 in fines and
`$254.09 in investigatory fees for “providing individualized dietary
`advice in exchange for compensation in Florida.”
`
`
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`PROCEDURAL HISTORY
`Del Castillo brought a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 action against
`
`the department, claiming that the Act, as applied to her, violated
`her First Amendment free speech rights. She sought a declaratory
`judgment that the Act is “unconstitutional to the extent that [it]
`prohibit[s] [her] and others similarly situated from offering individ-
`ualized advice about diet and nutrition.” She also requested injunc-
`tive relief and attorneys’ fees and costs.
`After discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment.
`The department argued that the Act was a lawful regulation of the
`dietetics and nutritionist profession. Because any restriction of Del
`Castillo’s speech was merely incidental to the regulation of profes-
`sional conduct, the department maintained, the Act was not sub-
`ject to First Amendment scrutiny and did not violate Del Castillo’s
`free speech rights. The department relied on our decision in Locke,
`which upheld Florida’s licensing scheme for interior designers
`against a free speech challenge similar to Del Castillo’s challenge in
`this case because that regulation governed occupational conduct
`with only an incidental effect on speech.
`Del Castillo argued in her motion for summary judgment
`that her dietary advice to her clients was pure speech rather than
`conduct. Del Castillo argued that the Act was a content-based reg-
`ulation of her speech and was, therefore, subject to strict scrutiny.
`The Act couldn’t survive strict scrutiny, Del Castillo maintained,
`because it wasn’t narrowly tailored to address a compelling gov-
`ernment interest. Finally, Del Castillo argued that Locke had been
`
`
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`abrogated by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in NIFLA be-
`cause Locke relied on the “professional speech doctrine” and the
`NIFLA Court “expressly rejected the professional speech doctrine.”
`The district court granted the department’s motion for sum-
`mary judgment and denied Del Castillo’s. It concluded that our
`“binding” decision in Locke “controls the outcome of this case.”
`The district court explained that in Locke, we rejected a challenge
`to Florida’s licensing scheme for commercial interior designers be-
`cause a statute that governs “the practice of an occupation is not
`unconstitutional as an abridgement of the right to free speech, so
`long as any inhibition of that right is merely the incidental effect of
`observing an otherwise legitimate regulation.” The district court
`said that Locke also relied on the principle that “generally applica-
`ble licensing provisions limiting the class of persons who may prac-
`tice the profession” are not subject to First Amendment scrutiny.
`The district court concluded that the Act’s dietician and nu-
`trition licensing scheme was like the licensing scheme we upheld
`in Locke. This was because, the district court said, the licensing
`scheme that Del Castillo challenged had an “impact on speech” that
`was “merely incidental to the regulation of the profession” of die-
`ticians and nutritionists. The district court concluded that, under
`Locke, the Act was “not subject to heightened scrutiny because it
`is a generally applicable professional licensing statute with a merely
`incidental impact on speech.”
`The district court rejected Del Castillo’s argument that the
`Supreme Court’s decision in NIFLA had abrogated Locke. The
`
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`district court reasoned that although the NIFLA Court had de-
`clined to recognize “professional speech” as a unique category of
`speech exempt from ordinary First Amendment principles, the sec-
`ond reason for Locke’s holding, it had reaffirmed that states “may
`regulate professional conduct, even though that conduct inci-
`dentally involves speech,” consistent with the first reason for
`Locke’s holding. Thus, the district court applied rational basis re-
`view to Del Castillo’s First Amendment claim and concluded that
`the Act was rationally related to a legitimate state interest: the pro-
`motion of public health and safety.
`
`Del Castillo appeals the district court’s summary judgment
`for the department.1
`
`
`1 After we heard oral argument in this case, the department filed a motion to
`dismiss the appeal as moot. In 2020, Florida amended the Act to exempt from
`the state’s licensing requirement certain persons providing nutritional advice.
`The new exception applies to:
`Any person who provides information, wellness recommenda-
`tions, or advice concerning nutrition, or who markets food,
`food materials, or dietary supplements for remuneration, if
`such person does not provide such services to a person under
`the direct care and supervision of a medical doctor for a disease
`or medical condition requiring nutrition intervention, not in-
`cluding obesity or weight loss, and does not represent himself
`or herself as a dietitian, licensed dietitian, registered dietitian,
`nutritionist, licensed nutritionist, nutrition counselor, or li-
`censed nutrition counselor, or use any word, letter, symbol, or
`insignia indicating or implying that he or she is a dietitian, nu-
`tritionist, or nutrition counselor.
`
`
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`STANDARD OF REVIEW
`We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary
`
`judgment. Buending v. Town of Redington Beach, 10 F.4th 1125,
`1130 (11th Cir. 2021). Summary judgment is appropriate when
`“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
`is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
`In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court must “re-
`solve all ambiguities and draw reasonable factual inferences from
`the evidence in the non-movant’s favor.” Buending, 10 F.4th at
`1130 (quotation marks omitted).
`
`
`Fla. Stat. § 468.505(1)(n) (2020). The department argues that this amendment
`exempts Del Castillo’s business and moots her appeal. Del Castillo responds
`that her business is not covered by the new exception because she has had,
`and in the future wants to be free to have, clients who are “under the direct
`care and supervision of a medical doctor for a disease or medical condition
`requiring nutrition intervention.”
`
`“Generally, when an ordinance is repealed any challenges to the con-
`stitutionality of that ordinance become moot.” Coal. for the Abolition of Ma-
`rijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1310 (11th Cir. 2000).
`But, “when an ordinance is repealed by the enactment of a superseding stat-
`ute, then the superseding statute or regulation moots a case only to the extent
`that it removes challenged features of the prior law.” Id. (quotation marks
`omitted). Here, the amendment to the Act did not remove all of the Act’s
`features that Del Castillo challenged. Del Castillo still challenges the part of
`the Act prohibiting her from giving dietetic and nutritional advice to paying
`clients who are under the supervision of a doctor for a disease or medical con-
`dition requiring nutrition intervention. Thus, her First Amendment challenge
`to the Act is not moot.
`
`
`
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`DISCUSSION
`Del Castillo argues that the Act, as applied to her and her
`
`business of giving clients individualized dietary and nutrition ad-
`vice, is a content-based regulation of speech that is subject to strict
`scrutiny. She contends that the district court erred in relying on
`Locke because NIFLA abrogated Locke. And regardless of what
`level of scrutiny we apply to the Act, Del Castillo argues, the de-
`partment failed to justify the burden on her First Amendment free
`speech rights.
`
` We conclude that Locke is still good law and controls the
`outcome of this case. We break up our discussion into four parts.
`First, we discuss Locke and the two reasons the Locke court gave
`for why Florida’s interior designer licensing scheme did not violate
`the First Amendment: the professional speech doctrine; and the
`licensing scheme regulated professional conduct with only an inci-
`dental effect on speech. Second, we review NIFLA, its refusal to
`recognize the professional speech doctrine, and its reaffirmation
`that the regulation of professional conduct that has only an inci-
`dental effect on speech does not violate the First Amendment.
`Third, we apply our prior panel precedent rule and discuss how
`one of the two independent reasons for our decision in Locke—
`that the regulation of professional conduct with an incidental effect
`on speech does not violate the First Amendment—was not abro-
`gated by, but instead survived, NIFLA. And finally, we apply Locke
`to this case and conclude that the Act’s dietician and nutritionist
`licensing scheme did not violate Del Castillo’s free speech rights
`
`
`
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`because, like the interior designer licensing scheme in Locke, the
`Act regulated her professional conduct and had only an incidental
`effect on her speech.
`Our decision in Locke v. Shore
`Locke involved a First Amendment free speech challenge to
`a Florida law “requir[ing] interior designers practicing in nonresi-
`dential, commercial settings within the state to obtain a state li-
`cense.” 634 F.3d at 1189. The statute defined “‘interior design’ as
`‘designs, consultations, studies, drawings, specifications, and ad-
`ministration of design construction contracts relat[ed] to nonstruc-
`tural interior elements of a building or structure.” Id. (quoting
`what is now Fla. Stat. § 481.203(10)). To get a license, a designer
`had to “complete a combined total of six years of interior design
`education and internship experience with a licensed interior de-
`signer” and “pass an examination administered by the National
`Council of Interior Design Qualifications.” Id. “Practicing interior
`design in commercial settings in Florida without a license” could
`result in a misdemeanor charge and an administrative penalty. Id.
`at 1189–90.
`
`The plaintiffs were educated and trained in interior design
`and practiced in residential settings in Florida. Id. at 1190. They
`“wish[ed] to expand their practice to commercial settings,” but
`they were not licensed as interior designers by the state. Id. The
`plaintiffs “argue[d] that the license requirement unconstitutionally
`burden[ed] protected speech under the First Amendment.” Id. at
`1191. “We conclude[d] that Florida’s license requirement [was]
`
`
`
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`constitutional under the First Amendment,” id. at 1192, and gave
`two distinct reasons for our holding.
`The first reason we gave was that a “statute that governs the
`practice of an occupation is not unconstitutional as an abridgement
`of the right to free speech, so long as any inhibition of that right is
`merely the incidental effect of observing an otherwise legitimate
`regulation.” Id. at 1191 (quotation marks omitted). We relied, in
`part, on Wilson v. State Bar of Georgia, 132 F.3d 1422, 1430 (11th
`Cir. 1998), which recognized that “regulations that ‘govern occu-
`pational conduct’ with only an ‘incidental effect’ on speech with-
`stand First Amendment scrutiny.” Locke, 634 F.3d at 1191 (paren-
`thetically quoting from Wilson). “Because the [interior designer]
`license requirement govern[ed] ‘occupational conduct, and not a
`substantial amount of protected speech,’” Locke said, it did “not
`implicate constitutionally protected activity under the First
`Amendment.” Id. (quoting Wilson, 132 F.3d at 1429).
`This first reason was an independently adequate reason for
`our holding in Locke. It was not only the first reason we gave but
`also the reason we reiterated in the concluding paragraph of our
`discussion. Id. at 1192 (concluding “that Florida’s license require-
`ment is constitutional under the First Amendment” “[b]ecause the
`license requirement is a professional regulation with a merely inci-
`dental effect on protected speech”). In case there was any doubt
`about the matter, in her separate concurring opinion in the Locke
`case, Judge Black nailed down our holding and the reason for it. Id.
`at 1197 (Black, J., concurring in the result) (“As I understand the
`
`
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`majority opinion, it holds that Florida’s licensing scheme does not
`violate the First Amendment because it is a regulation of occupa-
`tional conduct with only an incidental impact on protected
`speech.”).
`As courts sometimes do, the Locke court also gave an addi-
`tional reason for its holding. The second reason we gave for con-
`cluding that the interior designer licensing scheme did not violate
`the First Amendment was that, if “the government enact[ed] gen-
`erally applicable licensing provisions limiting the class of persons
`who may practice the profession, it cannot be said to have enacted
`a limitation on freedom of speech . . . subject to First Amendment
`scrutiny.” Id. at 1191 (majority opinion) (omission in original)
`(quoting Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concur-
`ring)). There was “a difference,” we reasoned, “for First Amend-
`ment purposes, between regulating professionals’ speech to the
`public at large versus their direct, personalized speech with cli-
`ents.” Id. The interior designer “license requirement regulate[d]
`solely the latter,” we said. Id. This second reason, derived from
`Justice White’s concurring opinion in Lowe, is the professional
`speech doctrine.
`
`Both reasons supported our conclusion that the interior de-
`signer licensing statute did not violate the plaintiffs’ First Amend-
`ment free speech rights.
`
`
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`The Supreme Court’s decision in NIFLA v. Becerra
`NIFLA involved California’s regulation of crisis pregnancy
`centers—“pro-life (largely Christian belief-based) organizations
`that offer a limited range of free pregnancy options, counseling,
`and other services to individuals that visit a center.” 138 S. Ct. at
`2368 (quoting report). The state’s regulation required centers that
`qualified as licensed covered facilities to “disseminate a govern-
`ment-drafted notice on site,” which read: “California has public
`programs that provide immediate free or low-cost access to com-
`prehensive family planning services (including all FDA-approved
`methods of contraception), prenatal care, and abortion for eligible
`women.” Id. at 2369 (quotation marks omitted).2
`A licensed pregnancy center sued, alleging that the notice
`requirement “abridge[d] the freedom of speech protected by the
`First Amendment.” Id. at 2370. The district court denied the cen-
`ter’s motion for a preliminary injunction, and the Ninth Circuit af-
`firmed because the notice requirement “survive[d] the lower level
`of scrutiny that applie[d] to regulations of professional speech.” Id.
`(quotation marks omitted)
`The Supreme Court reversed. Id. The Court began by ex-
`plaining that when it enforces the First Amendment prohibition on
`the abridgment of the freedom of speech, it distinguishes “between
`
`2 California’s regulation had a separate notice requirement for unlicensed
`pregnancy centers, NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2369–70, but the notice requirement
`for unlicensed centers isn’t relevant to whether Locke has been abrogated.
`
`
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`content-based and content-neutral regulations of speech.” Id. at
`2371. Content-based regulations “target speech based on its com-
`municative content,” and generally they “are presumptively un-
`constitutional and may be justified only if” they survive strict scru-
`tiny—“the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to
`serve compelling state interests.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
`The notice requirement for licensed pregnancy centers was a con-
`tent-based regulation because it compelled the center to speak a
`particular message. Id.
`But, the NIFLA Court explained, some courts of appeals,
`like the Ninth Circuit, had “recognized ‘professional speech’ as a
`separate category of speech that is subject to different rules.” Id.
`(citing cases from the Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits). These
`courts defined professional speech as speech that is based on expert
`knowledge and judgment by individuals who provided personal-
`ized services to clients and who are subject to a generally applicable
`licensing and regulatory regime. Id. “[T]hese courts except[ed]
`professional speech from the rule that content-based regulations of
`speech are subject to strict scrutiny.” Id.
`The NIFLA Court refused to recognize “‘professional
`speech’ as a separate category of speech.” Id. “Speech is not un-
`protected merely because it is uttered by ‘professionals.’” Id. at
`2371–72. A government cannot impose content-based restrictions
`on speech, the Court explained, “without persuasive evidence of a
`long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition to that effect.” Id. at
`2372 (cleaned up). While the Court had never recognized “a
`
`
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`tradition for a category called ‘professional speech,’” it has tradi-
`tionally “afforded less protection for professional speech in two cir-
`cumstances.” Id.
`First, the Court has “applied more deferential review to
`some laws that require professionals to disclose factual, noncontro-
`versial information in their ‘commercial speech.’” Id. And second,
`the Court has said that “[s]tates may regulate professional conduct,
`even though that conduct incidentally involves speech.” Id. The
`Supreme Court “has upheld regulations of professional conduct
`that incidentally burden speech” because the “First Amendment
`does not prevent restrictions directed at commerce or conduct
`from imposing incidental burdens on speech.” Id. at 2373 (quota-
`tion marks omitted).
`
`Neither traditional circumstance applied to California’s no-
`tice requirement for licensed pregnancy centers. Id. at 2372–74.
`And the NIFLA Court found no “persuasive reason for treating pro-
`fessional speech as a unique category that is exempt from ordinary
`First Amendment principles.” Id. at 2375. Even applying the eas-
`ier-to-meet standard of intermediate scrutiny, the Court concluded
`that California’s notice requirement couldn’t meet it because the
`notice requirement wasn’t sufficiently drawn to achieve the state’s
`claimed substantial interest. Id. at 2375–76.
`NIFLA did not abrogate Locke
`Del Castillo argues that NIFLA abrogated Locke. And her
`argument goes something like this. Locke’s holding relied on the
`
`
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`“professional speech doctrine” to conclude that Florida’s interior
`designer licensing scheme did not violate the plaintiffs’ First
`Amendment free speech rights. But NIFLA rejected the “profes-
`sional speech doctrine.” So the prop supporting Locke’s holding
`has been taken away, and Locke has been abrogated. For three
`reasons, we disagree.
`First, Locke’s First Amendment holding relied on more than
`the “professional speech doctrine.” The Locke court also con-
`cluded that the interior designer licensing requirement did not vi-
`olate the First Amendment because it was “a professional regula-
`tion with a merely incidental effect on protected speech.” 634 F.3d
`at 1192; see also id. at 1197 (Black, J., concurring in the result) (“As
`I understand the majority opinion, it holds that Florida’s licensing
`scheme does not violate the First Amendment because it is a regu-
`lation of occupational conduct with only an incidental impact on
`protected speech.”). “A statute that governs the practice of an oc-
`cupation is not unconstitutional as an abridgment of the right to
`free speech, so long as any inhibition of that right is merely the in-
`cidental effect of observing an otherwise legitimate regulation.” Id.
`at 1191 (majority opinion).
`Second, while the NIFLA Court “refused to recognize pro-
`fessional speech as a new speech category deserving less protec-
`tion,” Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854, 867 (11th Cir. 2020),
`it also reaffirmed that “[s]tates may regulate professional conduct,
`even though that conduct incidentally involves speech,” NIFLA,
`138 S. Ct. at 2372. The NIFLA Court explained that “regulations of
`
`
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`professional conduct that incidentally burden speech” have been
`“upheld,” and the “First Amendment does not prevent restrictions
`directed at commerce or conduct from imposing incidental bur-
`dens on speech.” Id. at 2373 (quotation marks omitted).
`Third, NIFLA did not undermine Locke to the point of ab-
`rogation. “We are bound to follow a prior panel or en banc hold-
`ing, except where that holding has been overruled or undermined
`to the point of abrogation by a subsequent en banc or Supreme
`Court decision.” Chambers v. Thompson, 150 F.3d 1324, 1326
`(11th Cir. 1998). A prior panel precedent is “undermined,” we ex-
`plained in United States v. Petite, where the “Supreme Court’s sub-
`sequent decision . . . so fully undermined our prior panel’s decision
`. . . as to abrogate its holding.” 703 F.3d 1290, 1297 (11th Cir. 2013)
`(emphasis added). To “fully undermine[]” a prior panel decision,
`the later Supreme Court decision must “demolish[]” and “eviscer-
`ate[]” each of its “fundamental props.” See id. at 1297–98. Because
`Locke’s holding relied on more than the “professional speech doc-
`trine”—and the only thing NIFLA refused to recognize was the
`“professional speech doctrine”—both of Locke’s props have not
`been demolished; its holding is still standing.
`The NIFLA Court spoke with unmistakable clarity about the
`line of precedents upholding regulations of professional conduct
`that incidentally burden speech and another line of precedents (up-
`holding laws compelling the disclosure of information in certain
`contexts): “neither line of precedents is implicated here.” 138
`S. Ct. at 2372. Reasoning based on a line of Supreme Court
`
`
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`precedents that the Court itself emphasizes in a later decision is not
`implicated by that later decision cannot have been rejected, over-
`ruled, or abrogated by the later decision.
`So what we have here is a prior panel precedent—the hold-
`ing in Locke—that rests on two bases, only one of which has been
`rejected by the Supreme Court while the other basis has not been.
`If anything, that surviving basis or rationale has been endorsed by
`the Supreme Court. And it takes only one valid basis or rationale
`for a prior holding to make it binding precedent. See McLellan v.
`Miss. Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919, 925 n.21 (5th Cir. 1977) (en
`banc) (“It has long been settled that all alternative rationales for a
`given result have precedential value.”); see also Massachusetts v.
`United States, 333 U.S. 611, 623 (1948) (explaining that where a case
`has “been decided on either of two independent grounds” and
`“rested as much upon the one determination as the other,” the “ad-
`judication is effective for both”).
`
`Two of our decisions illustrate this point. The first is an ex-
`ample of a dual-rationale prior precedent that was abrogated by a
`supervening Supreme Court decision because the supervening Su-
`preme Court decision was inconsistent with both rationales of the
`prior precedent. In the Petite case, “we ha[d] a prior panel opinion
`on all fours with the case before us.” 703 F.3d at 1297. That prior
`panel decision was United States v. Harrison, 558 F.3d 1280 (11th
`Cir. 2009). Petite, 703 F.3d at 1297. “In Harrison”—the prior panel
`opinion—we had “held that the offense of simple vehicle flight . . .
`—the same offense at issue [in Petite]—was not a violent felony for
`
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`purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act.” Id. “Harrison,” we
`said, “rested on two fundamental props.” Id. “The first founda-
`tional prop was the panel’s conclusion that Florida’s simple vehicle
`flight offense, as ordinarily committed, was not ‘roughly similar’ to
`the ACCA’s enumerated offenses in ‘degree of risk posed.’” Id.
`(quoting Harrison, 558 F.3d at 1294). “The second prop on which
`the panel’s holding in Harrison rested wa