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`In the
`United States Court of Appeals
`For the Eleventh Circuit
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` Plaintiffs,
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`____________________
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`No. 19-13926
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`____________________
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`ANTONIO GONZALEZ CARRIZOSA, et al.,
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`DOE 378,
`LUDY RIVAS BORJA, as daughter and successor
`to DOE 840 (deceased),
`ANA OFELIA TORRES TORRES,
`PASTORA DURANGO,
`GLORIA EUGENIA MUNOZ,
`JOSE LOPEZ 339,
`JUANA DOE 11 and MINOR DOE 11A,
`JUANA PEREZ 43A,
`JANE DOE 7,
`JOHN DOE 7, individually and as representative
`of his deceased son JOHN DOE 8,
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`In the
`United States Court of Appeals
`For the Eleventh Circuit
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` Plaintiffs,
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`____________________
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`No. 19-13926
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`____________________
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`ANTONIO GONZALEZ CARRIZOSA, et al.,
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`DOE 378,
`LUDY RIVAS BORJA, as daughter and successor
`to DOE 840 (deceased),
`ANA OFELIA TORRES TORRES,
`PASTORA DURANGO,
`GLORIA EUGENIA MUNOZ,
`JOSE LOPEZ 339,
`JUANA DOE 11 and MINOR DOE 11A,
`JUANA PEREZ 43A,
`JANE DOE 7,
`JOHN DOE 7, individually and as representative
`of his deceased son JOHN DOE 8,
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`2
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`Opinion of the Court
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`19-13926
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`JUVENAL ENRIGUE FONTALVO CAMARGO,
`NANCY MORA LUMUS,
`SARA MATILDE MANJARRES,
`
` Plaintiffs-Appellants
` Cross-Appellees,
`
`versus
`CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
`
`
` Defendant-Appellee
` Cross-Appellant,
`
`
`CHIQUITA FRESH NORTH AMERICA LLC.,
`a Delaware Corporation, et al.,
`
`
`KEITH E. LINDNER,
`CHARLES KEISER,
`CARLA A. HILLS, as representative of the Estate
`of RODERICK M. HILLS, SR.,
`CYRUS FRIEDMAN,
`ROBERT F. KISTINGER,
`ROBERT W. OLSON,
`
` Defendants,
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`19-13926
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`Opinion of the Court
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`3
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`WILLIAM A. TSACALIS,
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`
`DOES 1 THROUGH 976, et al.,
`
`
` Defendants-Appellees
` Cross-Appellants.
`
`
` Plaintiffs,
`
`
`DOE 378,
`LUDY RIVAS BORJA as daughter and successor
`to DOE 840 (deceased),
`
`
` Plaintiffs-Appellants,
` Cross-Appellees.
`
`
`____________________
`
`Appeals from the United States District Court
`for the Southern District of Florida
`D.C. Docket No. 0:08-md-01916-KAM
`____________________
`
`Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.
`JORDAN, Circuit Judge:
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`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`19-13926
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`This appeal arises from a massive and complex multi-district
`
`litigation proceeding based on claims—brought in part under the
`Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, and Colom-
`bian law—that Chiquita Brands International and some of its exec-
`utives provided financial support to the Autodefensas Unidas de
`Colombia, which murdered thousands of persons in Colombia. In
`a dozen bellwether cases, the district court issued a comprehensive
`order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Af-
`ter excluding some of the plaintiffs’ evidence, the court ultimately
`concluded that the plaintiffs “fail[ed] to identify any admissible ev-
`idence” in support of their allegations that the AUC had killed their
`respective decedents. See D.E. 2551 at 71.
`On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the district court abused
`its discretion in excluding much of their evidence and that genuine
`issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on their
`claims. The individual defendants cross-appeal (1) the order deny-
`ing their motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ TVPA claims, and (2) the
`ruling that one individual defendant, Carla Hills (as personal repre-
`sentative of the Estate of Roderick Hills), waived her personal ju-
`risdiction argument. As to the TVPA claims, the individual defend-
`ants argue that the allegations in the complaint were insufficient
`under Rule 12(b)(6). Ms. Hills, for her part, contends that she
`timely raised her personal jurisdiction objection.
`Following oral argument and a review of the extensive rec-
`ord, we affirm in part, vacate in part, reverse in part, and dismiss in
`part. With respect to the evidentiary rulings, we conclude that the
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`5
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`district court got some right and some wrong. As to the merits, we
`hold that most of the bellwether plaintiffs presented sufficient evi-
`dence to withstand summary judgment with respect to whether
`the AUC was responsible for the deaths of their decedents. On the
`cross-appeals, we do not reach the arguments presented by the in-
`dividual defendants and Ms. Hills.1
`
`I2
`Between 1997 and 2004, Chiquita Brands International paid
`over $1.7 million to the AUC, a paramilitary group designated as a
`foreign terrorist organization by the United States Secretary of
`State. During this time, Colombia was in the midst of a civil war
`between paramilitary groups, like the AUC, and guerillas. “[T]he
`AUC was closely aligned—and even intertwined—with the Colom-
`bian [government] through its ideologies and practices that re-
`volved around their shared goals of eliminating the ‘subversive’
`threat posed by guerrilla groups.” D.E. 2346-5 at 1. See also D.E.
`2346-1 at 2. The AUC “controll[ed] territory by terror,” App. 8531,
`and was well known for perpetrating violence not just against
`
`
`1 We thank the district court for its extensive work and thorough opinion in
`this complex MDL proceeding.
`2 In citing to the voluminous record, we refer to docket entries wherever pos-
`sible, but occasionally cite to the appendices filed by the plaintiffs. Although
`the plaintiffs filed certain documents under seal, they have referred to and
`quoted from several of those sealed documents in their publicly-filed briefs.
`So we, too, use those portions of the sealed filings to the extent we find it
`necessary.
`
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`19-13926
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`guerrilla fighters, but also against innocent civilians. See D.E. 2346-
`1 at 2; D.E. 2348-4 at 19–20.
`Eventually, the United States learned of Chiquita’s pay-
`ments to the AUC and charged the company with engaging in
`transactions with a specially-designated global terrorist organiza-
`tion. Chiquita pled guilty to the charge in 2007. See Plea Agree-
`ment, D.E. 11, United States v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Case No. 07-
`CR-00055-RCL (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2007).
`In response, many people who suspected the AUC of killing
`their family members and loved ones sued a number of defendants,
`including Chiquita and some of its executives. As relevant here,
`the bellwether plaintiffs asserted tort claims under Colombian law
`and federal claims under the Torture Victim Protection Act, 28
`U.S.C. § 1350 note, alleging that the defendants’ financial support
`of the AUC led to the group’s murder of their family members and
`loved ones. The plaintiffs conceded that to prevail on their claims
`they had to “show, as a factual predicate for all of their claims, that
`the AUC was responsible for the murder of each decedent.” D.E.
`2551 at 4.3
`
`
`3 With respect to Chiquita, the only bellwether claims left are those brought
`under Colombian law. See In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc. Derivative Litig.,
`2019 WL 11497632, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 5, 2019). See also Mohamad v. Pales-
`tinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449, 461 (2012) (holding that the TVPA “did not extend
`liability to organizations, sovereign or not”); Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l,
`Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1188–89 (11th Cir. 2014) (dismissing similar claims against
`Chiquita under the TVPA and the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350).
`
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`7
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`An MDL panel consolidated the plaintiffs’ cases for pretrial
`proceedings in the Southern District of Florida. A dozen of those
`cases were then selected as bellwether cases. As relevant here, the
`district court denied the individual defendants’ motion to dismiss
`the TVPA claims and ruled that Ms. Hill had waived her personal
`jurisdiction argument.
`Chiquita and the individual defendants then moved for sum-
`mary judgment on multiple grounds. The district court concluded
`that the plaintiffs had not presented sufficient admissible evidence
`demonstrating that the AUC was involved in the death of their fam-
`ily members and loved ones and therefore could not show the ex-
`istence of a genuine issue of material fact for an essential element
`of their claims.
`The district court therefore granted summary judgment in
`favor of all the defendants with respect to the claims of the bell-
`wether plaintiffs. It ruled that (1) the plaintiffs’ documentary evi-
`dence was comprised mostly of inadmissible hearsay, “and even if
`accepted for its substantive content, [would not] support the infer-
`ences urged by [the p]laintiffs”; (2) the testimonial evidence consti-
`tuted inadmissible hearsay, and the plaintiffs did not lay the foun-
`dation for any hearsay exceptions; (3) the “circumstantial evidence,
`standing alone, [was] too speculative to support a reasonable infer-
`ence that the AUC more likely than not was responsible for the
`death of each bellwether victim, and would be insufficient to with-
`stand a directed verdict at trial”; and (4) the ultimate expert opin-
`ions regarding AUC involvement in the deaths of the bellwether
`
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`19-13926
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`decedents were inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702
`in part because they “[did] not involve the application of reliable
`methodologies or principles.” D.E. 2551 at 71. Based on these de-
`terminations, the court concluded that the plaintiffs could not
`withstand summary judgment on their claims because they did not
`have “any admissible evidence supporting their foundational alle-
`gation that the AUC killed their decedents.” Id.4
`II
`Two sets of bellwether plaintiffs—whom we’ll call the Wolf
`plaintiffs (based on the name of their attorney) and the Non-Wolf
`plaintiffs where necessary—challenge a number of evidentiary rul-
`ings by the district court. We generally review those rulings for an
`abuse of discretion. See Fid. Interior Constr., Inc. v. S.E. Carpen-
`ters Reg’l Council, 675 F.3d 1250, 1258 (11th Cir. 2012). “[T]he
`abuse of discretion standard allows ‘a range of choice for the district
`court, so long as that choice does not constitute a clear error of
`judgment.’” United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir.
`2004) (en banc) (quoting In re Rasbury, 24 F.3d 159, 168 (11th Cir.
`1994)). A district court “necessarily abuse[s] its discretion” if it ba-
`ses a ruling “on an erroneous view of the law” or “on a clearly er-
`roneous assessment of the evidence.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
`Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990). So when we conclude that the
`
`
`4 The district court entered partial final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) in
`favor of the defendants as to the bellwether plaintiffs’ claims under Colombian
`law and the TVPA.
`
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`9
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`district court erred, we mean to say that the district court abused
`its discretion in one of these ways.
`With this standard in mind, we turn to the contested eviden-
`tiary rulings.5
`
`A
`The Non-Wolf plaintiffs argued below that several pieces of
`evidence—the indictment of AUC leader Raúl Hasbún and several
`letters from Colombian prosecutors—were admissible under the
`business record and public record exceptions to the hearsay rule.
`See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6), 803(8). The Wolf plaintiffs made the same
`argument as to certain letters from prosecutors. The district court
`excluded the evidence from both sets of plaintiffs. We conclude
`that the Hasbún indictment was admissible under both exceptions,
`that the Non-Wolf plaintiffs’ letters must be reconsidered under
`Rule 803(8) on remand, and that the Wolf plaintiffs’ letters were
`properly excluded.
`
`A document is admissible as a business record under Rule
`803(6) if (1) it was made at or near the time of an event by someone
`with knowledge, (2) it was kept in the regular course of business,
`(3) it was the organization’s regular practice to make such a record,
`(4) a qualified witness is able to testify to these facts, and (5) the
`opponent of
`the document does not show a
`lack of
`
`
`5 Some of the challenged evidentiary rulings are subject to plenary review.
`Where that is the case, we note the different standard in the text.
`
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`19-13926
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`trustworthiness. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6); Equity Lifestyle Props.,
`Inc. v. Fla. Mowing & Landscape Serv., Inc., 556 F.3d 1232, 1243
`(11th Cir. 2009). “The touchstone of admissibility under [Rule
`803(6)] is reliability[.]” United States v. Bueno-Sierra, 99 F.3d 375,
`378 (11th Cir. 1996).
`Under Rule 803(8), a document is admissible in a civil case
`as a public record if it is “[a] record or statement of a public office”
`that “sets out . . . factual findings from a legally authorized investi-
`gation[,] and . . . the opponent does not show that the source of
`information or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthi-
`ness.” Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(A)(iii), 803(8)(B). “[P]ortions of investi-
`gatory reports otherwise admissible under [the public-records ex-
`ception] are not inadmissible merely because they state a conclu-
`sion or opinion.” Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 170
`(1988). And “[n]o distinction is drawn between federal and non-
`federal records—the sole criterion is whether the record is that of
`a ‘public office.’” 5 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Wein-
`stein’s Fed. Evid. § 803.10[1] (2d ed. 2022).
`Significantly, only minimal foundational testimony is re-
`quired in order to admit public records under Rule 803(8). See
`United States v. Loyola-Dominguez, 125 F.3d 1315, 1318 (9th Cir.
`1997) (“[T]he public records exception is one of the few hearsay
`exceptions that does not require a foundation.”); 5 Weinstein’s Fed.
`Evid. at § 803.10[2] (“Since the assurances of accuracy are generally
`greater for public records than for regular business records, the pro-
`ponent is usually not required to establish their admissibility
`
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`through foundation testimony.”). Moreover, the party attempting
`to admit the evidence does not need to establish that the report is
`trustworthy; “[t]he burden is on the party opposing admission to
`prove the report’s untrustworthiness.” Crawford v. ITW Food
`Equip. Grp., LLC, 977 F.3d 1331, 1347 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation
`omitted). This is because of the “reliability gained from regularly
`conducted activities generally,” the “assumption that a public offi-
`cial will perform his duty properly[,] and the unlikelihood that he
`will remember details independently of the record.” United States
`v. Garland, 991 F.2d 328, 335 (6th Cir. 1993) (quotation marks omit-
`ted).
`
`1
`Four of the plaintiffs—Ana Ofelia Torres Torres, Gloria Eu-
`genia Muñoz, Pastora Durango, and John Doe 7—submitted an ex-
`cerpt of the Colombian indictment of AUC leader Raúl Hasbún
`(sometimes referred to by the parties as Record 138). See D.E.
`2346-78. Appended to the indictment was a chart listing multiple
`homicides associated with Mr. Hasbún.6
`The district court excluded the Hasbún indictment, ruling
`that the document did not satisfy either Rule 803(6) or Rule 803(8).
`The court explained that the indictment was not admissible as a
`business record because it did not contain the custodian’s
`
`6 The chart included the decedents of these four plaintiffs. Those decedents
`are Ceferino Antonio Restrepo Tangarife, Miguel Angel Cardona Muñoz,
`Waynesty Machado Durango, and John Doe 8.
`
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`testimony or a certification indicating that perjury would result in
`criminal liability in Colombia. And it was not admissible as a public
`record because the plaintiffs “[did] not demonstrate that th[e] doc-
`ument set[ ] out a ‘matter observed while under a legal duty,’ nor
`[did] it appear that th[e] document set[ ] out factual findings based
`on a legally authorized investigation.” D.E. 2551 at 32.
`In order to lay the foundation for the admissibility of the
`Hasbún indictment, the plaintiffs presented the declaration of Nel-
`son Camilo Sánchez León, a Colombian lawyer and the Director
`of the International Human Rights Clinic at the University of Vir-
`ginia School of Law. See D.E. 2510-1. His declaration detailed the
`procedures of the Justice and Peace process under Colombian law,
`and attached a translated copy of the Justice and Peace Act as an
`exhibit.
`Mr. Sánchez León stated that the “objective of the Justice
`and Peace Process is to guarantee victims’ rights to truth, justice,
`and reparation.” Id. at ¶ 9. In furtherance of that goal, the Justice
`and Peace Act incentivizes “demobilized” paramilitary group
`members to truthfully confess to crimes committed during their
`time as paramilitaries by offering “alternative lesser penalties” in
`exchange. See id. at ¶ 10. As part of this process, both the executive
`and judicial branches in Colombia carry out independent investiga-
`tions to corroborate any confession made by a paramilitary partic-
`ipant. A special prosecutorial body—the Justice and Peace Unit of
`the Colombian Office of the Public Prosecutor—undertakes these
`investigations and preserves all records. A paramilitary participant
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`who is found to have lied can be subject to criminal proceedings
`for having given false testimony. These penalties may be imposed
`on a paramilitary participant for either “fail[ing] to confess to a
`crime” he committed or for “confess[ing] to a crime that [he] did
`not in fact commit.” Id. at ¶ 19.7
`With respect to the Hasbún indictment, Mr. Sánchez León
`said the following. First, the homicides listed in the chart appended
`to the indictment were murders to which Mr. Hasbún had con-
`fessed during an earlier phase of the Justice and Peace process. Sec-
`ond, “[a]ny acts to which the paramilitary [participant] does not ac-
`cept responsibility cannot be processed through Justice and Peace.”
`Id. at ¶ 34 (citing Justice and Peace Act, art. 21). Third, a prosecutor
`cannot charge a paramilitary participant based solely on his confes-
`sion; the prosecutor must “undertake ‘serious and exhaustive in-
`vestigations’ to verify the truth of those confessions.” Id. at ¶ 22
`(footnote omitted).
`The district court excluded Mr. Sánchez León’s declaration
`from the summary judgment record because it was untimely filed,
`and thus did not consider it “in [its] assessment of the sufficiency of
`[the plaintiffs’] proofs on causation.” D.E. 2551 at 31. The court
`also concluded that, even if accepted, the declaration “does not
`
`7 For additional background on the Justice and Peace Act, see, e.g., Courtney
`Hillebrecht et al., The Judicialization of Peace, 59 Harv. Int’l L.J. 279 (2018),
`and José E. Arvelo, International Law and Conflict Resolution in Colombia:
`Balancing Peace and Justice in the Paramilitary Demobilization Process, 37
`Geo. J. Int’l L. 411 (2006).
`
`
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`supply a foundation for admission of the proffered Colombian gov-
`ernment records under the hearsay exceptions advanced by [the
`plaintiffs].” Id.8
`We first address the timeliness of the Sánchez León declara-
`tion. The plaintiffs filed the declaration in support of their court-
`ordered supplemental brief on hearsay challenges. See D.E. 2499,
`2510. The plaintiffs were responding to the argument made by the
`defendants in their summary judgment reply that certain evidence
`was inadmissible on hearsay grounds. The defendants had not pre-
`viously challenged the plaintiffs’ evidence on those grounds, so the
`supplemental brief was the plaintiffs’ first opportunity to respond
`to the objection. See generally 4 Christopher B. Mueller et al., Fed.
`Evid. § 8:64 (4th ed. & 2021 update) (noting that Rule 802’s bar
`against hearsay “is not self-executing” and “requires a timely objec-
`tion”).
`
`Our cases recognize “the importance of giving the non-
`movant a meaningful opportunity to respond to a motion for sum-
`mary judgment.” Burns v. Gadsden State Cmty. Coll., 908 F.2d
`1512, 1516 (11th Cir. 1990). As the Seventh Circuit has put it,
`“[d]istrict courts abuse their discretion when they deny a party a
`chance to respond to new arguments or facts raised for the first
`time in a reply brief in support of a motion for summary judgment
`
`
`8 Despite excluding the declaration, the district court seemingly relied on Mr.
`Sánchez León’s explanation of the Justice and Peace process in its order. See
`D.E. 2551 at 5 n.4.
`
`
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`and subsequently enter judgment on the basis of those new argu-
`ments or facts.” Physicians Healthsource, Inc. v. A-S Medication
`Sols., LLC, 950 F.3d 959, 968 (7th Cir. 2020). See also First Specialty
`Ins. Corp. v. 633 Partners, Ltd., 300 F. App’x 777, 788 (11th Cir.
`2008) (“[A] district court can abuse its discretion by failing to give
`the opposing party a chance to respond to materials presented for
`the first time in a reply brief and instead granting summary judg-
`ment on the basis of that evidence.”).
`
`In this case, the district court abused its discretion in exclud-
`ing the Sánchez León declaration on timeliness grounds. In our
`view, the plaintiffs timely filed the Sánchez León declaration in re-
`sponse to hearsay objections the defendants first raised in their
`summary judgment reply. With the benefit of the declaration, we
`conclude that the plaintiffs established the foundation for the ad-
`missibility of the Hasbún indictment under both Rule 803(6) and
`Rule 803(8).
`
`The Hasbún indictment is admissible as a business record
`under Rule 803(6). The district court was concerned with the plain-
`tiffs’ purported failure to have a proper, qualified witness to testify
`to the foundational facts under Rule 803(6). Mr. Sánchez León,
`however, demonstrated in his declaration that he is a sufficiently
`qualified witness to lay the necessary foundation. “A qualified wit-
`ness is one who can explain the system of record keeping and
`vouch that the requirements of Rule 803(6) are met.” Curtis v. Per-
`kins, 781 F.3d 1262, 1268 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v.
`Box, 50 F.3d 345, 356 (5th Cir. 1995)). The witness “need not be
`
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`the [one] whose first-hand knowledge was the basis of the facts
`sought to be proved.” Bueno-Sierra, 99 F.3d at 379. See 5 Wein-
`stein’s Fed. Evid. § at 803.08[8][a] (“The phrase [a ‘]qualified wit-
`ness’ is given a very broad interpretation. The witness need only
`have enough familiarity with the record-keeping system of the en-
`tity in question to explain how the record came into existence . . . .
`In fact, the witness need not even be an employee of the record-
`keeping entity . . . .”). The declaration shows that Mr. Sánchez
`León is such a witness. He is a Colombian lawyer and the Director
`of the International Human Rights Clinic at the University of Vir-
`ginia School of Law. And he is “deeply familiar” with the Justice
`and Peace process through which the Hasbún indictment was pre-
`pared, as well as the legal framework behind it. See D.E. 2510-1 at
`¶ 6.
`
`The Hasbún indictment also meets the requirements of the
`public records hearsay exception under Rule 803(8). It sets forth
`the findings of the Justice and Peace prosecutors that Mr. Hasbún
`was responsible for the listed homicides, which satisfies Rule
`803(8)(A)(iii). Mr. Sánchez León stated that persons making false
`confessions are subject to perjury charges in Colombia, and prose-
`cutors must corroborate a confession through an independent in-
`vestigation. These matters tend to show that the indictment is
`trustworthy absent evidence to the contrary from the defendants.
`Cf. Mike’s Train House, Inc. v. Lionel, LLC, 472 F.3d 398, 412 (6th
`Cir. 2006) (“The notices of arrest, Korean complaint, and the inves-
`tigative reports are generally admissible under the public-records
`
`
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`17
`
`exception, as set forth in Rule 803(8).”), abrogation recognized as
`to another issue in A.K. v. Durham Sch. Servs., L.P., 969 F.3d 625,
`630 (6th Cir. 2020).
`Because the Hasbún indictment is admissible as both a busi-
`ness record and a public record, the district court erred in excluding
`it.9
`
`2
`John Doe 7, Juvenal Fontalvo Camargo, Juana Pérez 43A,
`and Juana Doe 11 and Minor Doe 11A submitted various letters by
`Colombian prosecutors and investigators from the Justice and
`Peace process. The letters offered by Juvenal Fontalvo Camargo,
`Juana Pérez 43A, and Juana Doe 11 and Minor Doe 11A discussed
`the process with respect to AUC leader José Lugo Mangones (also
`called El Tijeras). John Doe 7’s letter discussed Mr. Hasbún’s pro-
`ceedings in the Justice and Peace process. We summarize the let-
`ters below.
`♦ The letter offered by Mr. Camargo, from a criminal
`investigator, stated that Mr. Mangones “accepted his
`participation in the homicide” of the decedent and
`listed the possible dates on which he would be in-
`dicted in the Court of Justice and Peace. See D.E.
`2346-60.
`
`
`9 Given our ruling, the plaintiffs’ motion to supplement the appellate record
`and/or for judicial notice as to the Hasbún indictment is denied as moot.
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 19-13926 Date Filed: 09/06/2022 Page: 18 of 104
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`Opinion of the Court
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`19-13926
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`♦ The first Juana Pérez 43A letter, from a prosecutor,
`stated that Mr. Mangones confessed to the homicide
`of the decedent; that charges were filed against him;
`that the magistrate “ordered a measure of preventa-
`tive detention against” Mr. Mangones because of the
`homicide; that the criminal charges “were con-
`firmed”; that a “sentence judgment” was issued; that
`the judge “ruled in favor of the victims” as to dam-
`ages; and that there was an appeal. See D.E. 2346-50.
`The letter also stated that the decedent’s “homicide”
`was “attributable to members of the extinct northern
`block of the William Rivas Front of the AUC.” Id.
`♦ The second Juana Pérez 43A letter, also from a pros-
`ecutor and in response to the plaintiffs’ request for a
`copy of the Mangones judgment, confirmed that
`Mr. Mangones had accepted responsibility for the de-
`cedent’s homicide and repeated the timeline of his
`case. See D.E. 2346-77.
`♦ The letter offered by Juana Doe 11 and Minor Doe
`11A, from the Government Attorney’s Office, at-
`tached a video of Mr. Mangones’ confession “regard-
`ing” the decedent’s homicide. See D.E. 2346-75.
`♦ The letter offered by John Doe 7, from the Assistant
`to the Attorney General, stated that the matter of the
`decedent’s homicide was being heard in the Court of
`Justice and Peace, that the homicide was attributed to
`
`
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`19
`
`the AUC, that Mr. Hasbún was presumed responsi-
`ble, and that Mr. Hasbún had agreed to the circum-
`stances of the homicide. See D.E. 2348-129 at 35–38.
`The plaintiffs argued below that these letters from Colom-
`bian prosecutors and investigators were admissible as business rec-
`ords under Rule 803(6) or as public records under Rule 803(8). The
`district court ruled that the letters were not admissible on either
`basis. On appeal, the plaintiffs challenge only the public records
`ruling.
`The district court concluded that the letters were not admis-
`sible as public records because “no information [was] given as to
`how the prosecutors gathered the information, or from what
`sources that information was derived. Without knowing where or
`how the prosecutors obtained the information recited in [the let-
`ters], or anything about the procedures and methods actually used
`to reach the stated conclusions in the specific investigations at
`hand,” the court said it could not conclude that Rule 803(8) was
`satisfied. See D.E. 2551 at 34.10
`A document is admissible as a public record if it sets out ei-
`ther “a matter observed while under a legal duty to report” or “fac-
`tual findings from a legally authorized investigation,” and the
`
`
`10 The district court quoted an earlier version of Rule 803(8) which required
`that “neither the source of the information nor other circumstances indicate a
`lack of trustworthiness.” D.E. 2551 at 34. As noted earlier, the current and
`applicable version requires that the opponent show untrustworthiness.
`
`
`
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`19-13926
`
`opponent has not shown “that the source of information or other
`circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.” Fed. R. Evid.
`803(8). We conclude that the district court erred in ruling that the
`letters were not admissible under Rule 803(8).
`The district court did not consider whether the letters de-
`scribed “a matter observed while under a legal duty to report” or
`“factual findings from a legally authorized investigation” under
`Rule 803(8) because it found that it could not determine whether
`those requirements were satisfied due to its own lack of knowledge
`regarding the “procedures and methods” used in the investigations.
`See D.E. 2551 at 34. The court cited cases where evidence was ex-
`cluded because either (1) little to no information was provided or
`known about the investigation or source of the evidence, or
`(2) there was positive evidence of the document’s untrustworthi-
`ness. See Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 843 F.3d
`958, 969–70 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (affirming the district court’s exclusion
`of web pages because the “[a]ppellants rested on a bare, one-sen-
`tence assertion that [they] were admissible under Rule 803(8), but
`offered no further explication” of how the evidentiary require-
`ments were satisfied); United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467,
`497–501 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that documents seized from the
`Palestinian Authority in a military operation should have been ex-
`cluded because they did not meet the trustworthiness require-
`ments of Rule 807, as “there is nothing known about the circum-
`stances under which the documents were created,” including
`“whether the documents were created by some third person or
`
`
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`21
`
`agency and were merely collected . . . as intelligence” and “in the
`case of two of the documents, the identities of the authors”); Gill
`v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 542, 571 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (hold-
`ing that certain reports by an alleged terrorist were not admissible
`because they were “based directly on [the alleged terrorist’s] relay-
`ing of information of uncertain provenance” and hearsay within
`hearsay); Mamani v. Berzain, 309 F. Supp. 3d 1274, 1297 (S.D. Fla.
`2018) (excluding certain military and police reports because they
`contained hearsay).
`The letters here, however, did not have the problems iden-
`tified in the cited cases. And the district court cited no basis for its
`implied doubt that the Colombian officials had utilized legally au-
`thorized investigations to reach the factual findings discussed in the
`letters. As far as we can tell from the record, there is no basis for
`such doubt. The plaintiffs explained that the letters came from Co-
`lombian officials involved with the Justice and Peace process, and
`public records from other countries can be admitted under Rule
`803(8). See, e.g., United States v. Mena, 863 F.2d 1522, 1531 (11th
`Cir. 1989) (admitting a Honduran document). Indeed, the court
`acknowledged that the letters were correspondence “issued by Co-
`lombian prosecutors, excerpted from Justice and Peace Law files.”
`D.E. 2551 at 33–34. The letters were signed and written on official
`letterhead, and the defendants haven’t demonstrated that the let-
`ters or the information in them was untrustworthy. Cf. Mamani,
`309 F. Supp. 3d at 1295–96 (ruling that a “final” report prepared by
`
`
`
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`22
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`Opinion of the Court
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`19-13926
`
`Bolivian prosecutors with respect to extrajudicial killings was ad-
`missible under Rule 803(8)).
`A decision can constitute an ab
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