USCA11 Case: 19-15072 Date Filed: 10/26/2021 Page: 1 of 29
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`[PUBLISH]
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`In the
`United States Court of Appeals
`For the Eleventh Circuit
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`____________________
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`No. 19-15072
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`____________________
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`AUTAUGA COUNTY EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
`COMMUNICATION DISTRICT,
`CALHOUN COUNTY 911 DISTRICT,
`BIRMINGHAM
`EMERGENCY
`DISTRICT,
`MOBILE COUNTY COMMUNICATIONS DISTRICT,
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`COMMUNICATIONS
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`versus
`FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
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` Petitioners,
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` Respondent,
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`Opinion of the Court
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`ATT,
`BELLSOUTH,
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` Intervenors-Respondents.
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`____________________
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`Petition for Review of a Decision of the
`Federal Communications Commission
`Agency No. 19-FCC-44
`____________________
`
`Before ROSENBAUM, LUCK, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
`ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge:
`Dialing 9-1-1 from anywhere in the United States, using just
`about any type of phone system, connects a user with an emer-
`gency-services hotline. That, of course, is by design.
`
`The groundwork for our national emergency-system hot-
`line started to be laid in the 1960s. Since that time, new telephony
`technology continued to develop: basic analog systems, digital sys-
`tems, mobile and cellular systems, and most recently, systems that
`use the internet to transmit messages. This internet telephony
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`technology is often referred to as “Voice over Internet Protocol,”
`or “VoIP,” for short.1 And Congress took notice of it.
`Indeed, in 2008, Congress enacted legislation that required
`the development of a “national plan for migrating to a national IP-
`enabled emergency network capable of receiving and responding
`to all citizen-activated emergency communications and improving
`information sharing among all emergency response entities.” 47
`
`
`1 To understand how VoIP functions, it’s helpful to compare it to how
`conventional phone calls work. A “regular” phone call using the “public
`switched telephone network” (“PSTN”) (also known by the retronym “plain
`old telephone service” (“POTS”)) relies on circuit-switched telephony. See
`ThinkSecure Network, How does a VoIP phone system work differently than
`POTS?, Difference Between VoIP and PSTN, ThinkSecureNet (June 11, 2021),
`https://www.thinksecurenet.com/blog/how-does-a-voip-phone-system-
`work-differently-than-pots/. The system works by setting up a dedicated cir-
`cuit between two points at different sites for the duration of a call. See Cam-
`eron Johnson, What is POTS? Plain Old Telephone Service Line & Network
`Explained, Nextiva Blog
`(Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.nextiva.com
`/blog/what-is-pots.html. Traditionally, this type of telephony system has
`used copper wires carrying analog voice data over dedicated circuits. Id. In
`more recent years, integrated services digital network (“ISDN”) technology
`has been used to carry digital voice data, using the traditional public switched
`telephone network. Id. In contrast, VoIP refers to phone service over the
`internet. See Difference Between VoIP and PSTN, GeeksforGeeks (updated
`on Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/difference-between-voip-
`and-pstn/. For calls using VoIP, the internet is the transmission medium for
`voice data in the form of packets using Internet Protocol (“IP”). Id. VoIP
`transmits real-time voice signals from a source IP address to the target IP ad-
`dress. Id. VoIP has come a long way since its invention, and today, some
`consider it more reliable and cost-effective than good, old-fashioned POTS.
`Id.
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`U.S.C. § 942(d)(1) (2008). That legislation is called the New and
`Emerging Technologies 911 Improvement Act of 2008 (“NET 911
`Act”), Pub. L. 110-283, 122 Stat. 2620 (July 23, 2008), and it is codi-
`fied at 47 U.S.C. §§ 222, 615a, 615a-1, 615b and 942.2
`Congress identified three interrelated purposes of the NET
`911 Act: “To promote and enhance public safety by facilitating the
`rapid deployment of IP-enabled 911 and E-911 services, encourage
`the Nation’s transition to a national IP-enabled emergency net-
`work, and improve 911 and E-911 access to those with disabilities.”
`Pub. L. 110-283, 122 Stat. 2620.
`
`In furtherance of these purposes, Congress legislated “par-
`ity” between VoIP-based and non-VoIP-based providers and sub-
`scribers when it comes to providing and obtaining 911-system ac-
`cess. Put simply, Congress sought to eliminate any financial pen-
`alty to VoIP providers and subscribers, in comparison to non-VoIP
`providers and subscribers, for 911-system access.
`
`As part of this plan, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 615a-
`1(f)(1), which we refer to as the “911 Fee Parity Provision.” This
`statute allows non-federal government entities to charge a fee to
`commercial phone services for the support or implementation of
`various 911 services. But it specifies that, “[f]or each class of
`
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`2 Section 942 has since been substantially amended by the Next Gen-
`eration 9-1-1 Advancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-96, §§ 6501-09, 126 Stat.
`156, 237-45 (Feb. 22, 2012). For that reason, our further citations of Section
`942 in this opinion refer to the 2008 version.
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`subscribers to IP-enabled voice services, the fee or charge may not
`exceed the amount of any such fee or charge applicable to the same
`class of subscribers to telecommunications services.” Id.
`Appellants here are four 911 Districts in Alabama who con-
`tend that the 911 Fee Parity Provision authorizes them to charge
`non-VoIP and VoIP service providers using a different unit of meas-
`ure for each, as long as the Districts apply the same base fee for
`each unit. For example, the 911 Districts argue that they may
`charge non-VoIP service providers per access line and VoIP service
`providers per ten-digit telephone number as long as they charge,
`say, $1.00 each for both units—even if the total charges for a given
`class of VoIP subscribers exceed the total charges for the same class
`of non-VoIP subscribers for the same amount of burden each group
`of subscribers imposes on the 911 system.
`
`Asserting that Intervenor BellSouth failed to pay the fee for
`each ten-digit number, the 911 Districts filed suit against BellSouth
`in district court. BellSouth disagreed that it was required to pay
`these fees.
`Under the primary-jurisdiction doctrine, the district court
`referred the matter to the Federal Communications Commission
`(the “Commission”), since the Commission was charged with exe-
`cuting and enforcing the provisions of the NET 911 Act, see 47
`U.S.C. § 151. After receiving comments, the FCC issued a declara-
`tory ruling concluding that the 911 Fee Parity Provision prohibits
`state and local governments from charging 911 fees to VoIP pro-
`viders that are greater than those charged to non-VoIP providers
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`for the same amount of burden the services impose on the 911 sys-
`tem. The effect of that order would preclude the 911 Districts from
`charging VoIP providers and non-VoIP providers the same base fee
`based on different units if the total fee charged for comparable 911
`access is higher for VoIP service providers. The 911 Districts now
`challenge that ruling on a petition for review.
`After careful consideration and with the benefit of oral argu-
`ment, we independently arrive at the same conclusion as the FCC.
`We base our determination on congressional intent as expressed in
`the statutory text, structure, and purpose of the NET 911 Act. Be-
`cause Congress’s intent is unambiguous, we deny the 911 Districts’
`petition for review.
`
`I.
`
`A.
`
`
`Factual Background
`1.
`History of 911
`Just three presses of a button on any telephone—9-1-1—re-
`quest emergency assistance in the United States. Dialing 911 auto-
`matically links the caller to a nearby “public safety answering
`point,” (referred to in the U.S. Code as “PSAP,” see 47 U.S.C. §
`615b(3)) where a trained telephone operator can dispatch emer-
`gency responders such as police, firefighters, and ambulance ser-
`vices directly to the caller’s location. Better yet, today, in most
`parts of the country, the 911 system automatically provides the dis-
`patcher with the caller’s location and phone number.
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`But things weren’t always this way. Before the designation
`of 911 as the nationwide three-digit emergency-call number, indi-
`viduals needed to know and dial local phone numbers to reach
`their nearby police or fire station in case of emergency. Or they
`could dial “0” to reach a telephone-company operator, who would
`then have to transfer the call. But unlike the emergency dispatch-
`ers who are now trained for their specific positions, general tele-
`phone operators weren’t necessarily equipped or taught to perform
`emergency-call-assistance services.
`
`By the mid-1950s, people started to recognize that this sys-
`tem was inadequate to meet the emergency communication needs
`of the public. In 1957, for example, the National Association of Fire
`Chiefs reportedly suggested the need for a single telephone num-
`ber for reporting fires. See History of 911: And What it Means for
`the Future of Emergency Communications, iCERT and 911 Edu-
`cation Foundation, https://static.wixstatic.com/ugd/b8d2ce_e6b
`60db90b47454dbb047f451278aa66.pdf.
`And ten years later, in 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson’s
`Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice
`recommended that citizens be able to contact police departments
`using a uniform telephone number. Id. Its report stated, “Wher-
`ever practical, a single police telephone number should be estab-
`lished, at least within a metropolitan area and eventually over the
`entire United States . . .” Id. To make that vision a reality, in No-
`vember 1967, the Federal Communications Commission met with
`the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (“AT&T”)—
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`the provider of telephone service throughout most of the United
`States at that time—to find a means of establishing a universal
`emergency number that could be implemented quickly.
`Two months later, on January 12, 1968, AT&T announced
`its designation of 911 as the universal emergency number. Id. Why
`those digits? According to the National Emergency Number Asso-
`ciation (“NENA”), 911 was “brief” and “easily remembered,” and
`because it was “a unique number, never having been authorized as
`an office code, area code, or service code,” “it best met the long
`range numbering plans and switching configurations of the tele-
`phone industry.” See 9-1-1 Origin & History, NENA The 9-1-1 As-
`(last
`sociation, https://www.nena.org/page/911overviewfacts
`visited Oct. 26, 2021). On February 16, 1968, Alabama’s state
`Speaker of the House Rankin Fite completed the first ever 911 call
`to Tom Bevill, a U.S. Representative, in Haleyville, Alabama, who
`was sitting at the police station, waiting to inaugurate the new sys-
`tem. See Haleyville – The First 911 Call, http://archives.ubalt.edu
`/bsr/articles/feb%2016.pdf.
`2.
`Statutory regulation of 911
`Fast forward to 1999 and the new age the cell-phone rang in:
`Congress directed the Federal Communications Commission to
`designate 911 as the nationwide emergency hotline for wireline
`and wireless voice services. See Wireless Commc’ns and Pub.
`Safety Act of 1999, Pub. L. 106-81, § 3(a), 113 Stat. 1286, 1287 (Oct.
`26, 1999) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 251(e)(3)). Since that time, the
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`Commission has issued numerous orders overseeing and regulat-
`ing the nation’s 911 emergency call system.3
`And then, the internet took off.4 After 2000, with the prolif-
`eration of new technologies and the growing popularity of voice
`
`
`3 See, e.g., In the Matter of Revision of the Commission’s Rules to En-
`sure Compatibility with Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling Systems, Report
`and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd 18676,
`18678, ¶1 (1996) (“today we are taking several important steps to foster major
`improvements in the quality and reliability of 911 services” in furtherance of
`“our longstanding and continuing commitment to manage use of the electro-
`magnetic spectrum in a manner that promotes the safety and welfare of all
`Americans”); In the Matter of Revision of the Commission’s Rules to Ensure
`Compatibility with Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling Systems; Amendment
`of Parts 2 and 25 to Implement Global Mobile Personal Communications by
`Satellite (GMPCS) Memorandum of Understanding and Arrangements; Peti-
`tion of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration to
`Amend Part 25 of the Commission’s Rules to Establish Emissions Limits for
`Mobile and Portable Earth Stations Operating in the 1610-1660.5 MHz Band,
`Report and Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18
`FCC Rcd 25340, 25341, ¶1 (2003) (“we revise the scope of our enhanced 911
`rules to clarify which technologies and services will be required to be capable
`of transmitting enhanced 911 information to public safety answering points”).
`Enhanced 911 (“E911”) service, in contrast with the original basic 911, routes
`emergency calls to a geographically appropriate public safety answering point
`based on the caller’s location, provides the caller’s call-back number and, in
`many instances, the caller’s location. To keep things simple, we refer to basic
`911 and E911 collectively as “911” unless otherwise noted.
`4 See Anne Hyland, How the internet changed everything, Australian
`Financial Review (Apr. 14, 2015), https://www.afr.com/life-and-luxury/
`how-the-internet-changed-everything-20150306-13x619.
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`calls made online using VoIP technology, the Commission initiated
`a rulemaking proceeding to explore the impact that internet and
`VoIP services “have had and will continue to have on the United
`States’ communications landscape.” In the Matter of IP-Enabled
`Services, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 FCC Rcd 4863, 4864,
`¶ 1 (2004). Relevant here, the Commission specifically sought com-
`ment “on the potential applicability of 911, E911, and related criti-
`cal infrastructure regulation to VoIP and other IP services.” See
`id., 19 FCC Rcd at 4898-99, ¶ 53.
`In 2005, the Commission adopted rules “requiring providers
`of interconnected voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) service to
`supply enhanced 911 (E911) capabilities to their customers.” In re
`IP-Enabled Servs. & E911 Requirements for IP-Enabled Serv. Pro-
`viders, 20 F.C.C.R. 10245, 10246 (2005). These rules define “inter-
`connected Voice over Internet protocol (VoIP) service” as “a ser-
`vice that: (i) Enables real-time, two-way voice communications; (ii)
`Requires a broadband connection from the user’s location; (iii) Re-
`quires internet protocol-compatible customer premises equipment
`(CPE); and (iv) Permits users generally to receive calls that origi-
`nate on the public switched telephone network and to terminate
`calls to the public switched telephone network.” 47 C.F.R. § 9.3.
`We refer to these rules as the “2005 VoIP 911 Order.”
`In 2008, Congress followed suit by enacting the New and
`Emerging Technologies 911 Improvement Act of 2008 (“NET 911
`Act”), Pub. L. 110-283, 122 Stat. 2620 (July 23, 2008). That law,
`which codified the rules set forth in the 2005 VoIP 911 Order,
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`directed that it “shall be the duty of each IP-enabled voice service
`provider to provide 9-1-1 service and enhanced 9-1-1 service to its
`subscribers in accordance with the requirements of the . . . Com-
`mission.” 47 U.S.C. § 615a-1(a).
`As we have noted, the statute also preserved the ability of
`states and other jurisdictions to impose fees on these types of ser-
`vices to assist in supporting the 911 emergency-hotline system. In
`so doing, the Act required that any fees charged be used exclusively
`“in support of 9-1-1 and enhanced 9-1-1 services, or enhancements
`of such services” as the state or local law authorizing the fees spec-
`ified, and it directed that the fee for “each class of subscribers to
`[VoIP] services” not exceed that for “the same class of subscribers
`to telecommunications services”:
`
`Nothing in this Act, the Communica-
`tions Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 151 et seq.),
`the New and Emerging Technologies
`911 Improvement Act of 2008, or any
`Commission regulation or order shall
`prevent the imposition and collection of
`a fee or charge applicable to commercial
`mobile services or IP-enabled voice ser-
`vices specifically designated by a State,
`political subdivision thereof, Indian
`tribe, or village or regional corporation
`serving a region established pursuant to
`the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
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`Act, as amended (85 Stat. 688)[,] for the
`support or implementation of 9-1-1 or
`enhanced 9-1-1 services, provided that
`the fee or charge is obligated or ex-
`pended only in support of 9-1-1 and en-
`hanced 9-1-1 services, or enhancements
`of such services, as specified in the pro-
`vision of State or local law adopting the
`fee or charge. For each class of subscrib-
`ers to IP-enabled voice services, the fee
`or charge may not exceed the amount of
`any such fee or charge applicable to the
`same class of subscribers to telecommu-
`nications services.
`
`Id. § 615a-1(f)(1).
`B.
`Procedural Background
`
`1.
`The district-court lawsuit
`On May 6, 2015, BellSouth Telecommunications, LLC, filed
`a notice of removal in the United States District Court for the
`Northern District of Alabama, relating to a complaint three 911
`emergency-communications districts—those for Autauga County,
`Calhoun County, and Birmingham—filed in state court.
`
`In an amended complaint, the 911 Districts—now including
`the communications district for Mobile County as well (we refer to
`the four 911 emergency-communications districts collectively as
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`the “911 Districts”)—alleged that they provide their districts with
`911 services, which are funded by emergency telephone service
`charges. They further asserted that BellSouth did not collect the
`proper charges from VoIP customers as required under Alabama’s
`Emergency Telephone Service Act (“ETSA”), Ala. Code § 11-98-1,
`et seq. (effective until Oct. 1, 2013). More specifically, the com-
`plaint contended that, between 2005 and 2013, BellSouth failed to
`correctly bill its business VoIP customers for emergency telephone
`service fees, and it misapplied a cap on 911 charges.
`
`Initially, ETSA had imposed a 911 charge on service provid-
`ers for every “exchange access line” up to a cap of 100 “per person,
`per location.” Ala. Code § 11-98-5. But in 2005, Alabama amended
`ETSA to require VoIP providers to instead bill one “fee for each 10-
`digit access number assigned to the [VoIP] user.” Id. at § 11-98-5.1.
`It was these fees that the 911 Districts claimed BellSouth had failed
`to properly pay. As later became apparent during the course of the
`litigation (and for reasons we explain more below), this difference
`in the way that VoIP and non-VoIP subscribers were to have their
`911 fees assessed was significant because it would result in higher
`total charges to the VoIP subscribers for the same ability of the
`VoIP and non-VoIP subscribers to reach 911 at any given time.5
`
`
`5 During the course of the litigation through the district court and the
`Commission, Bellsouth actually explained its refusal to charge and collect the
`fees per telephone number based on the position that the services it provided
`were not VoIP services as that term is defined for purposes of the fee but were
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`The 911 Districts sought in five counts to recover these allegedly
`unpaid charges: (1) under ETSA, (2) for negligence, negligence per
`se, gross negligence, and recklessness, (3) for breach of fiduciary
`duty, (4) for wantonness, and (5) for negligent misrepresentation
`and fraud.
`BellSouth moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, argu-
`ing that the factual allegations of the complaint were too conclu-
`sory and the common-law claims failed as a matter of law. The
`court denied the motion.
`Then BellSouth filed a motion to refer two issues relating to
`the litigation to the Commission under the primary-jurisdiction
`doctrine.6 That doctrine allows a court to “stay an action pending
`
`
`instead traditional telephone services. Because that issue is not before us on
`appeal, we do not discuss it further.
`6 The two issues BellSouth sought to have the Commission consider
`are not the issues the Commission ultimately decided to address, so they are
`not before us in this appeal. For that reason, though we note those issues for
`the sake of completeness, we do not pause to explain the technological details
`of them and how those technological aspects are relevant to the issues raised.
`The two issues included the following:
`Whether a traditional voice service, such as In-
`tegrated Services Digital Network (“ISDN”)
`Primary Rate Interface (“PRI”), that does not
`utilize Internet Protocol to transmit voice
`communications to or from the customer’s
`premises is nonetheless interconnected Voice-
`over-Internet-Protocol (“VoIP”) service when
`provisioned over fiber-optic facilities to a
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`resolution of an issue that falls within the special competence of an
`administrative agency.” Beach TV Cable Co. v. Comcast of
`Fla./Ga., LLC, 808 F.3d 1284, 1288 (11th Cir. 2015). BellSouth’s
`motion also sought a stay of the district-court proceedings while
`the Commission addressed the issues BellSouth sought to refer.
`The 911 Districts opposed the motion. They argued that the case
`involved a state-law dispute over which the Commission had no
`say.
`
`But the district court did not agree with the 911 Districts,
`and it granted the motion for referral. In its order, the court noted
`that the parties disagreed about how to characterize the claims in
`the case and about the claims’ relation to the communications tech-
`nologies at issue. Although the court referred the matter to the
`Commission “for further guidance,” it did not explicitly adopt Bell-
`South’s framing of the issues, nor did it otherwise specify the issues
`it was referring to the Commission.
`
`The district court proceedings remain stayed pending this
`appeal.
`
`
`customer that also has IP-compatible customer
`premises equipment (“CPE”).
`Whether 47 U.S.C. § 615a-1(f)(1) preempts Ala.
`Code § 11-98-5.1(c) insofar as it requires cus-
`tomers of VoIP or similar services to pay a
`charge that exceeds the 911 charges applicable
`to the same class of subscribers to traditional
`voice services.
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`The administrative proceeding
`2.
`After the referral to the Commission, the 911 Districts and
`BellSouth filed cross-petitions for declaratory ruling with the Com-
`mission. The Commission released a public notice seeking com-
`ment on the petitions.
`Once the Commission considered the comments it received,
`it issued its declaratory ruling. To explain the ruling, we must
`pause to explain the concept of call capacity. Call capacity refers to
`the number of concurrent calls a business’s communications sys-
`tem can handle at any one time. See How much call capacity does
`your business need?, Bandwidth (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www
`.bandwidth.com/blog/how-much-call-capacity-does-your-busi-
`ness-need/. A business that employs 100 people, for example, may
`wish to assign each employee her own phone number, and it may
`wish to have additional phone numbers for departments or other
`aspects of the business. Besides allowing direct contact with those
`outside the business, this type of setup also permits internal em-
`ployee-to-employee communications. But most businesses of this
`size will not require a communications system that will allow all
`100 employees to be on external phone calls at the same time.
`Modern phone-communications services are able to offer such
`business customers telecommunications services that suit their
`needs without providing them with the capacity for each of their
`assigned phone numbers to be in use concurrently. See id.
`Here’s why the concept of concurrent calling capacity is im-
`portant: Under Alabama’s ETSA provision, the 911 Districts took
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`a position that the 911 Fee Parity Provision required only that the
`absolute base 911 fees they charged non-VoIP and VoIP service
`providers be the same, regardless of the systems’ concurrent call
`capacity. This construction would allow the 911 Districts to charge
`911 fees per access line to non-VoIP customers but per phone num-
`ber to VoIP customers, as long as the base fee amount charged was
`the same for each. A fee structure like this would result in higher
`total charges on VoIP customers than on non-VoIP customers.
`
`To understand why, consider a VoIP and non-VoIP cus-
`tomer that each bought ten access lines capable of outbound calling
`and that each obtained twenty telephone numbers for internal
`communications between the employees. If the fee were $1.00 per
`access line for a non-VoIP customer and $1.00 per assigned tele-
`phone number for a VoIP customer, the absolute base fee charged
`to customers of both types of services—$1.00—would be the same.
`But the non-VoIP customer would be charged a total of $10.00
`($1.00 times 10 access lines), while the VoIP customer would have
`to pay $20.00 ($1.00 times 20 individual phone numbers) for the
`same concurrent outbound call capacity. As a result, if a customer
`switched from a non-VoIP telecommunications service to a VoIP
`one with the same concurrent outbound calling capacity and the
`same number of individual phone numbers, BellSouth asserted
`that such a customer would “see its monthly telephone bill increase
`substantially.”
`With that basic understanding, we return to the order the
`Commission issued in response to the district court’s referral. The
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`Commission’s order interpreted the 911 Fee Parity Provision, 47
`U.S.C. § 615a-1(f)(1), to “prohibit[] non-federal governmental enti-
`ties from imposing 911 fees or charges on VoIP services in any man-
`ner that would result in a subscriber to such VoIP services paying
`a total amount of 911 fees or charges that exceeds the total amount
`of 911 fees or charges that the same subscriber would pay for a tra-
`ditional telecommunications service with the same 911 outbound
`calling capability or same quantity of units upon which 911 fees are
`imposed for traditional telecommunications services.”
`
`In other words, the oranges-to-oranges comparison the
`Commission’s interpretation of § 615a-1(f)(1) requires is based on
`the unit of outbound concurrent calling capacity—effectively, the
`same ability to burden 911 services at any point in time—not the
`base fee. So under this construction, the number of phone num-
`bers a VoIP customer has is necessarily irrelevant to the maximum
`amount the VoIP customer may be charged if it is not possible for
`the VoIP customer to use all its phone numbers simultaneously to
`call 911. Rather, both VoIP and non-VoIP customers may be
`charged the 911 fee for only as many numbers as they have the
`ability to simultaneously use to call 911. So VoIP and non-VoIP
`customers pay the same total 911 fee for the same maximum con-
`current call capacity, without respect to how the system is config-
`ured.
`
`Beyond this, though, the Commission declined to rule fur-
`ther on the specific arguments the parties raised in the district-court
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`proceeding, including whether the 911 Fee Parity Provision
`preempted ETSA.
`The 911 Districts now appeal the Commission’s Order di-
`rectly to us under the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2342, which endows
`federal courts of appeals with “exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set
`aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of”
`Commission rulings. See Mais v. Gulf Coast Collection Bureau,
`Inc., 768 F.3d 1110, 1113 (11th Cir. 2014) (“In the Hobbs Act, 28
`U.S.C. § 2342, Congress unambiguously deprived the federal dis-
`trict courts of jurisdiction to invalidate FCC orders by giving exclu-
`sive power of review to the courts of appeals.”). In particular, the
`Hobbs Act authorizes us to review orders “adopted by the Com-
`mission in the avowed exercise of its rule-making power” and that
`“affect or determine rights generally.” Id. at 1121 (citing Columbia
`Broad. Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 417 (1942)).
`By the terms of the Hobbs Act, the 911 Districts’ appeal is
`against the Commission. See 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (“The action shall
`be against the United States.”). For its part, BellSouth has inter-
`vened as an interested party, as have two trade groups—
`USTelecom (The Broadband Association) and NCTA (The Inter-
`net and Television Association)—to defend the Commission’s in-
`terpretation of the 911 Fee Parity Provision.
`II.
`Under the Hobbs Act, when we conduct our review, we ap-
`
`ply the standards from the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).
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`See RTC Transp., Inc. v. I.C.C., 708 F.2d 617, 619 (11th Cir. 1983).
`The APA, in turn, requires us to set aside “agency action, findings,
`and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
`discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. §
`706(2), (2)(A). This deferential standard seeks only a “rational con-
`nection between the facts found and the choice made.” Motor Ve-
`hicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463
`U.S 29, 43 (1983) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
`Our sole mission in conducting a review under this standard, then,
`“is to ensure that the agency came to a rational conclusion.” Sierra
`Club v. Van Antwerp, 526 F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation
`and internal quotation marks omitted).
`III.
`In reviewing the FCC’s construction of a statute that it ad-
`
`ministers, we apply the two-step process that Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.
`v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
`(1984), sets forth. See Nat’l Ass’n of State Util. Consumer Advocs.,
`457 F.3d 1238, 1253 (11th Cir. 2006). At Chevron’s first step, we
`evaluate “whether Congress has spoken to the precise question at
`issue.” Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842). “If the intent of
`Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well
`as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed in-
`tent of Congress.” Id. at 842–43; cf. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400,
`2415 (2019) (before deferring to an agency’s reading of its own am-
`biguous regulation, a court must “carefully consider the text,
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`structure, history, and purpose of a regulation, in all the ways it
`would if it had no agency to fall back on”).
`But if, after employing all the “traditional tools of statutory
`construction,” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 n.9, the s