`
`
`
`[PUBLISH]
`
`In the
`United States Court of Appeals
`For the Eleventh Circuit
`
`____________________
`
`No. 20-11425
`____________________
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`RONALD COX,
`
`versus
`DEPUTY WARDEN BENJIE NOBLES,
`OFFICER CRUMP,
`WARDEN PERRY,
`SERGEANT DAVIS,
`WARDEN TED PHILBIN,
`UNIT MANAGER HARRIS,
`
`
`Plaintiff-Appellant,
`
`Defendants-Appellees.
`
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 20-11425 Date Filed: 10/18/2021 Page: 2 of 21
`
`2
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`20-11425
`
`____________________
`
`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Southern District of Georgia
`D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-00031-JRH-BKE
`____________________
`
`Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
`JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge:
`
`
`Ronald Cox, a transgender woman, sued six Georgia De-
`partment of Corrections (“GDC”) officials, alleging that other
`prisoners sexually assaulted and physically attacked her1 at three
`Georgia prisons. Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Cox alleged that the
`GDC officials, in failing to protect her, violated her constitutional
`rights under the Eighth Amendment. She further alleged that
`three of the six GDC officials exhibited deliberate indifference to
`the substantial risk of serious harm she faced as a transgender in-
`mate by failing to comply with the Prison Rape Elimination Act
`(the “PREA”), 34 U.S.C. §§ 30301, et seq.
`
`
`1 Cox has been inconsistent in the use of self-referential gender pronouns. In
`the amended complaint, Cox used the pronouns “he/him/his.” In the reply
`brief on appeal, however, Cox uses the pronouns “she/her/hers.” Because
`Cox’s reply brief is the most recent of these filings, we assume Cox currently
`wishes to use the pronouns “she/her/hers.”
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 20-11425 Date Filed: 10/18/2021 Page: 3 of 21
`
`20-11425
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`3
`
`The district court granted the GDC officials’ motion to
`dismiss Cox’s amended complaint on the ground that the GDC
`officials were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court
`determined that Cox failed to allege facts sufficient to establish
`that the GDC officials violated her Eighth Amendment rights.
`The district court also rejected Cox’s claim against three of the
`defendants based on their alleged failure to comply with the
`PREA. Although our analysis differs from the district court’s as to
`Cox’s Eighth Amendment claim against one of the GDC officials,
`Unit Manager Harris,2 we ultimately agree with the district
`court’s conclusions. After careful consideration and with the ben-
`efit of oral argument, we affirm the district court.
`
`BACKGROUND3
`
`I.
`Factual Background
`A.
`Cox was assaulted at three different prisons for male in-
`
`mates: Autry State Prison, Central State Prison, and Augusta State
`
`
`2 Cox’s amended complaint does not provide the first names for four of the
`GDC officials. She styles those four GDC officials as follows: “Unit Manager
`Harris,” “Officer Crump,” “S[er]g[ean]t Davis,” and “Warden Perry.” Doc.
`16 at 2–3 ¶¶ 3–6.
`3 When reviewing an order granting a motion to dismiss, we accept as true
`all well-pled allegations in the operative complaint and construe them in the
`light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Hunt v. Aimco Props., L.P., 814 F.3d
`1213, 1218 n.2 (11th Cir. 2016). We therefore recite the facts as Cox has al-
`leged them.
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 20-11425 Date Filed: 10/18/2021 Page: 4 of 21
`
`4
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`20-11425
`
`Medical Prison. At each of these institutions, Cox received estro-
`gen injections, causing her to present with female features. Doc.
`16 at 4 ¶ 10. Cox’s identity as a transgender woman within these
`male prisons made her a target for sexual and other physical
`abuse she was forced to endure at the hands of other inmates. In
`this section, we review the allegations about each assault she suf-
`fered and then the procedural history of this case.
`Cox’s story begins at Autry. After arriving at Autry, she
`filed a “P.R.E.A[.] complaint” with Benjie Nobles, a deputy war-
`den at the prison. Id. ¶ 11. The amended complaint contains no
`information about the contents of this, or any other, PREA doc-
`ument Cox filed with any prison official. But after Cox filed it,
`Nobles “had [Cox] moved into a cell with Rashad Stanford,” an-
`other prisoner, who threatened Cox with a weapon and sexually
`assaulted her. Id.
`Following the assault, Cox reported the incident to another
`officer, Crump.4 Crump took no action to separate Cox and Stan-
`ford, even though Cox notified Crump that Stanford “had a
`
`
`4 Although Cox named Crump as a defendant in her amended complaint,
`she never served him with a copy of the complaint, and the district court
`dismissed her claim against him. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Cox does not ar-
`gue on appeal that the district court erred in dismissing her claim against
`Crump and thus has abandoned any challenge to the dismissal of that claim.
`See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (“[I]ssues not briefed on ap-
`peal . . . are deemed abandoned.”). Thus, we do not discuss further Cox’s
`claim against Crump.
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 20-11425 Date Filed: 10/18/2021 Page: 5 of 21
`
`20-11425
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`5
`
`shank.” Id. at 5 ¶ 12. In addition to speaking with Crump, Cox
`“immediately filed a[nother] PREA.” Id ¶ 13. Nobles investigated
`the incident but initially took no action to separate her from Stan-
`ford. Cox was then sent to the hospital for medical attention. Up-
`on her return, she was “transferred out of the cell with [Stanford]
`and placed on lockdown for 30 days until [s]he was transferred to
`Central State Prison.” Id. ¶ 14.
`After arriving at Central, Cox requested “PREA protection”
`from Perry, the prison’s warden. Id. at 6 ¶ 15. When Perry failed
`to grant this request, Cox “filed grievances about not being pro-
`tected in accordance with PREA.” Id. After Cox filed these PREA
`documents, Benjamin Israel, another Central prisoner, attacked
`Cox from behind while she was watching television. Israel “hit
`[Cox] so hard that [s]he fell to the ground.” Id. He then “proceed-
`ed to kick [her] in the abdomen and punch [her] continuously.”
`Id. No prison official broke up the fight; Cox attributed this lack of
`response to Central’s being “short staffed.” Id. She alleged that
`there was only “one officer watching four pods.” Id. About four
`months after the attack, Cox was transferred to Augusta.
`Upon arriving at Augusta, Cox requested that Ted Philbin,
`the warden there, provide her “PREA protection.” Id. ¶ 16. Ac-
`cording to Cox, she was “not placed in a safe environment pro-
`vided by PREA.” Id. She “filed grievances” to that effect. Id.
`While at Augusta, Cox was assaulted twice by another
`prisoner, Terry Frasier. The first assault began after Cox entered
`the shower, where Frasier was masturbating. Thinking Cox was
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 20-11425 Date Filed: 10/18/2021 Page: 6 of 21
`
`6
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`20-11425
`
`watching him, Frasier threatened her. Later that day, Frasier
`pulled out a shank and attacked Cox, who “fought back with a
`lock in a sock.” Id. at 7 ¶ 17.
`Following the first assault, Cox filed a PREA document, the
`substance of which was relayed to Harris, a unit manager at the
`prison.5 After no action was taken, Cox approached Harris and
`asked “why Frasier had not been moved from the cell.” Id. ¶ 20.
`Harris responded that “Cox should be moved.” Id. Prison officials
`then moved Cox to a new cell, but she remained in the same
`dorm as Frasier.
`Sometime after Cox was relocated, a second assault took
`place. During this incident, she “was critically stabbed by Terry
`Frasier and hospitalized for six days.” Id. at 8 ¶ 21. When she re-
`turned from the hospital, Cox was placed “on lockdown in a
`PREA dorm.” Id.
`
`
`
`
`5 The amended complaint referred to this official as “Sgt. Harris.” Doc. 16. at
`7 ¶ 20. Cox made no mention of “Sgt. Harris” when formally listing the par-
`ties under the header “Defendants.” Doc. 16 at 2–3. Instead, the amended
`complaint listed “Unit Manager Harris” as a defendant. Id. at 3 ¶ 6. The dis-
`trict court treated “Sgt. Harris” and “Unit Manager Harris” as the same per-
`son, and the briefing on appeal assumes that references to “Sgt. Harris” are
`references to defendant Unit Manager Harris. For the sake of clarity, we do
`the same.
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 20-11425 Date Filed: 10/18/2021 Page: 7 of 21
`
`20-11425
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`7
`
`B.
`
`Procedural History
`Cox brought this § 1983 action alleging that the GDC offi-
`cials violated her constitutional rights. Specifically, Cox alleged
`that at all three prisons, officials Nobles, Perry, Davis,6 and Harris
`violated her Eighth Amendment rights through their failure to
`protect her. In addition, Cox alleged that Nobles,7 Perry, and
`Philbin were “deliberately indifferent” under the PREA because
`they were notified of Cox’s transgender status and failed to “take
`affirmative steps” to protect her from attacks or transfer her to
`“PREA segregated facilities or dormitories.” Id. ¶ 22. Cox sought
`compensatory damages against all defendants.
`The GDC officials moved to dismiss Cox’s amended com-
`plaint. Invoking the affirmative defense of qualified immunity,
`they argued that they had acted in their discretionary authority
`
`6 The district court noted that the amended complaint contained no allega-
`tions about Davis. As a result, the district court dismissed Cox’s claims
`against Davis for failure to state a claim. Cox does not argue on appeal that
`the district court erred in dismissing her claim against Davis and thus has
`abandoned any challenge to the dismissal. See Timson, 518 F.3d at 874.
`7 Cox alleged this claim against “all wardens,” but she did not individually
`name the warden defendants. Doc. 16 at 8 ¶ 22. Thus, it is unclear whether
`Cox intended to assert this claim against Nobles, who was a deputy warden.
`Cox’s factual allegations against Nobles are similar to those she raised against
`the other warden defendants, however. On appeal, the GDC officials assume
`that the claim was alleged against Nobles, and Cox did not object to that as-
`sumption in her reply brief. We therefore join the defendants in assuming
`that she intended to assert this claim against Nobles.
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 20-11425 Date Filed: 10/18/2021 Page: 8 of 21
`
`8
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`20-11425
`
`and the burden was on Cox to allege violations of federal law that
`were clearly established at the time. As to Cox’s traditional Eighth
`Amendment claims, the officials argued that her factual allega-
`tions were inadequate to state a violation of federal law. As to her
`claims based on the PREA, the GDC officials argued that alleged
`PREA violations alone do not constitute Eighth Amendment vio-
`lations. Relatedly, the GDC officials argued that the PREA did not
`create any federal rights enforceable through § 1983.
`The district court granted the motion as to all defendants,
`concluding that Cox failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim
`and that the GDC officials were entitled to qualified immunity.
`Regarding Cox’s Eighth Amendment claims against Nobles, Per-
`ry, Davis, and Harris, the district court concluded that she failed
`to allege facts sufficient to state a constitutional violation. For her
`claims against Nobles, Perry, and Philbin based on their alleged
`failure to comply with the PREA, the district court rejected what
`it saw as Cox’s attempt to create an end-run around the Eighth
`Amendment analysis; it dismissed those claims, reasoning that
`PREA violations are not per se Eighth Amendment violations. Af-
`ter concluding that Cox had failed to allege a constitutional viola-
`tion, the district court dismissed all claims on qualified immunity
`grounds.8
`
`
`8 Cox represents in her briefing that the district court did not answer the
`question of whether the GDC officials were entitled to qualified immunity.
`The GDC officials disagree; they take the position that Cox’s amended com-
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 20-11425 Date Filed: 10/18/2021 Page: 9 of 21
`
`20-11425
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`9
`
`This is Cox’s appeal.
`II.
`STANDARD OF REVIEW
`We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to
`dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
`cedure 12(b)(6). Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283,
`1288 (11th Cir. 2010). In our review, we accept the allegations in
`the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favora-
`ble to the plaintiff. See Ga. State Conf. of the NAACP v. City of
`LaGrange, 940 F.3d 627, 631 (11th Cir. 2019). Although “a com-
`plaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need
`detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the
`grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and
`conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s ele-
`ments will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
`(2007) (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). A
`complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as
`true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ash-
`croft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks
`omitted). A district court may properly dismiss a complaint if it
`rests only on “conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual deduc-
`
`
`plaint was dismissed on qualified immunity grounds. The district court noted
`that, in answering whether Cox had stated a claim, it was answering whether
`the GDC officials had succeeded in asserting the affirmative defense of quali-
`fied immunity. We accept the district court’s characterization of its ruling at
`face value.
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 20-11425 Date Filed: 10/18/2021 Page: 10 of 21
`
`10
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`20-11425
`
`tions or legal conclusions masquerading as facts.” Davila v. Delta
`Air Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1185 (11th Cir. 2003).
`III. DISCUSSION
`The affirmative defense of qualified immunity “generally
`shields government officials from liability for civil damages ‘inso-
`far as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
`or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
`known.’” Simmons v. Bradshaw, 879 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir.
`2018) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). A
`government official asserting a qualified immunity defense bears
`the initial burden of showing “he was acting within his discretion-
`ary authority.” Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136 (11th
`Cir. 2007). Here, Cox does not dispute that the GDC officials
`were acting within their discretionary authority. The burden
`therefore shifts to Cox to show that, when we view the com-
`plaint’s allegations in her favor, “(1) the defendant[s] violated a
`constitutional right, and (2) this right was clearly established at
`the time of the alleged violation.” Holloman ex rel. Holloman v.
`Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004).
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 20-11425 Date Filed: 10/18/2021 Page: 11 of 21
`
`20-11425
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`11
`
`We proceed by addressing whether Cox’s amended com-
`plaint alleged a violation of federal law9 and then address Cox’s
`claims involving the PREA.
`A.
`Cox Failed to State an Eighth Amendment Failure-to-
`Protect Claim.
`The Eighth Amendment prohibits the federal government,
`and state governments through the Due Process Clause of the
`Fourteenth Amendment, from inflicting “cruel and unusual pun-
`ishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The prohibition on cruel and
`unusual punishments requires prison officials to “take reasonable
`measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v.
`Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (internal quotation marks omit-
`ted). The duty to protect encompasses “protect[ing] prisoners
`from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Id. at 833 (internal
`quotation marks omitted). When a plaintiff invokes this principle
`in a lawsuit against prison officials, we often refer to the plaintiff’s
`claims as “failure-to-protect” claims.
`
`To succeed on a failure-to-protect claim, a plaintiff must
`satisfy three elements. First, the plaintiff must show that she was
`“incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious
`harm.” Id. at 834. Second, the plaintiff must show that the “prison
`official [had] a sufficiently culpable state of mind,” amounting to
`
`9 Because we conclude that Cox failed to allege violations of federal law, we
`do not decide whether the federal law in question was “clearly established”
`at the time of the alleged assaults.
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 20-11425 Date Filed: 10/18/2021 Page: 12 of 21
`
`12
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`20-11425
`
`“deliberate indifference.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
`Third, and finally, the plaintiff must demonstrate causation—that
`the constitutional violation caused her injuries. Caldwell v. War-
`den, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1099 (11th Cir. 2014). Cox
`must establish all three elements to prevail on her failure-to-
`protect claims.
`This appeal turns on whether Cox adequately alleged the
`second element—deliberate indifference. Deliberate indifference
`exists when a prison official “knows of and disregards an excessive
`risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “Deliber-
`ate indifference has two components: one subjective and one ob-
`jective.” Mosley v. Zachery, 966 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020)
`(internal quotation marks omitted). A prisoner must establish
`“both that [1] the defendant actually (subjectively) knew that [the
`prisoner] faced a substantial risk of serious harm and that [2] the
`defendant disregarded that known risk by failing to respond to it
`in an (objectively) reasonable manner.” Id. (alterations adopted)
`(internal quotation marks omitted). Because the deliberate-
`indifference analysis is determinative of Cox’s Eighth Amendment
`claims, we examine whether Cox plausibly alleged that each de-
`fendant acted with deliberate indifference.
`1.
`For the Attack at Autry State Prison, Cox Failed to
`Allege that Nobles Acted with Deliberate Indiffer-
`ence.
`Cox failed to allege the subjective component of deliberate
`indifference against Nobles. To satisfy the subjective component,
`Cox had to allege that before the assault at Autry Nobles was
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 20-11425 Date Filed: 10/18/2021 Page: 13 of 21
`
`20-11425
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`13
`
`“aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
`substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed]” and that Nobles “dr[ew]
`the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. But none of the allega-
`tions in the amended complaint indicated that Nobles was aware
`of any danger facing Cox before the assault at Autry.
`To be sure, Cox alleged that she filed a “P.R.E.A. com-
`plaint” before prisoner Stanford assaulted her and that Nobles re-
`viewed that document. Doc. 16 at 4 ¶ 11. But the amended com-
`plaint provided no clue about what the PREA complaint commu-
`nicated. We cannot tell from Cox’s allegations whether in the
`PREA complaint she, for example, informed Nobles of her identi-
`ty as a transgender person, requested segregated housing, or
`communicated to Nobles that she believed she was in danger. In-
`stead, the amended complaint merely alleged that after receiving
`the PREA complaint—the contents of which were unspecified—
`“Nobles . . . had [Cox] moved into a cell with Rashad Stanford
`who sexually assaulted and threatened [her] with a weapon.” Id.
`We find no allegation to support an inference that Nobles knew
`Stanford posed a danger to Cox. We thus conclude that Cox failed
`to allege Nobles acted with the deliberate indifference necessary
`to sustain her Eighth Amendment claim against him.
`2.
`For the Attack at Central State Prison, Cox Failed to
`Allege that Perry Acted with Deliberate Indifference.
`We turn next to Cox’s failure-to-protect claim against Per-
`ry, the warden at Central. Only one paragraph in the amended
`complaint contained allegations about Perry. Cox alleged that
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 20-11425 Date Filed: 10/18/2021 Page: 14 of 21
`
`14
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`20-11425
`
`upon her transfer to Central she filed a PREA document, which
`Perry reviewed. As with the Autry PREA allegations, the amend-
`ed complaint shed no light on what the PREA document com-
`municated to Perry. We do not know, for example, whether Cox
`detailed what had happened to her at Autry. After Perry received
`the PREA document, Cox alleged, prisoner Israel physically at-
`tacked her while she was watching television. Here again, we find
`no allegations to support an inference that before the assault Per-
`ry was subjectively aware of any danger facing Cox at Central.
`Thus, Cox failed to allege that Perry acted with deliberate indif-
`ference.
`3.
`
`For the Attacks at Augusta State Medical Prison, Cox
`Failed to Allege that Harris Acted with Deliberate
`Indifference.
`By contrast, as to Harris, Cox sufficiently alleged the sub-
`jective component of the deliberate indifference test. Our decision
`in Rodriguez v. Secretary for Department of Corrections offers
`insight into the subjective component. 508 F.3d 611 (11th Cir.
`2007). In Rodriguez, we considered whether two prison-official
`defendants, Raymond Kugler and Charles Johnson, were subjec-
`tively aware of a substantial risk of serious harm facing the pris-
`oner-plaintiff, Miguel Rodriguez, ahead of a brutal prison attack.
`Id. at 613. The summary judgment record indicated that Rodri-
`guez “verbally informed [Defendant] Kugler” on “at least two oc-
`casions” of threats made against his life. Id. at 618. Similarly, Ro-
`driguez “spoke to [Defendant] Johnson on a number of occasions
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 20-11425 Date Filed: 10/18/2021 Page: 15 of 21
`
`20-11425
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`15
`
`regarding the threats on his life.” Id. at 614. Besides those conver-
`sations, Rodriguez filed “an Inmate Request form” in which he
`communicated that he feared for his safety and requested protec-
`tion. Id. In vacating the district court’s grant of summary judg-
`ment for the defendants, we concluded that Rodriguez’s commu-
`nications comprised “enough evidence of subjective knowledge to
`get [Rodriguez’s] claim to a jury.” Id. at 618.
`We find Cox’s factual allegations, assumed to be true, more
`compelling than the summary judgment evidence in Rodriguez.
`Cox alleged that Harris was aware of a fight between Frasier and
`Cox in which Frasier wielded a shank, and Cox wielded a lock in a
`sock.10 According to the amended complaint, then, Harris was
`aware of more than the mere threat of future violence present in
`Rodriguez—Harris was aware that violence had already taken
`place. More than that, Cox alleged Harris was aware that she and
`Frasier remained cellmates after the assault, making further con-
`flict likely. And Cox alleged that Harris actually drew the infer-
`ence that Cox was in danger because Harris agreed that Cox and
`Frasier should be separated. In light of our decision in Rodriguez,
`
`
`10 Cox alleged that unnamed officials were aware of the first assault at Au-
`gusta and that after the assault Harris agreed that Cox should be moved out
`of the cell she shared with Frasier. Taken together, these allegations support
`an inference that Harris knew about the first assault before the second as-
`sault took place.
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 20-11425 Date Filed: 10/18/2021 Page: 16 of 21
`
`16
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`20-11425
`
`Cox sufficiently alleged that Harris had subjective knowledge that
`Cox faced a substantial risk of serious harm.11
`But Cox failed to state a failure-to-protect claim against
`Harris nonetheless. Having satisfied the subjective component of
`deliberate indifference, Cox was also required to allege facts sug-
`gesting that Harris acted in an objectively unreasonable manner.
`“[P]rison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to in-
`mate health or safety may be found free from liability if they re-
`sponded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was
`not averted.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. “An official responds to a
`known risk in an objectively unreasonable manner if he knew of
`ways to reduce the harm but knowingly declined to act or if he
`knew of ways to reduce the harm but recklessly declined to act.”
`Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 620 (internal quotation marks omitted).
`But a prison official “who act[s] reasonably cannot be found liable
`under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.” Farmer, 511
`U.S. at 837.
`
`
`11 The district court’s analysis diverges from ours on this point. The district
`court concluded that Cox failed to allege Harris was subjectively aware of a
`substantial risk of serious harm. Still, we may affirm on other grounds sup-
`ported by the record. See Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1256
`(11th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e may affirm [a district court’s] judgment on any
`ground that finds support in the record.” (internal quotation marks omit-
`ted)).
`
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 20-11425 Date Filed: 10/18/2021 Page: 17 of 21
`
`20-11425
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`17
`
`Our decision in Mosley guides us on what constitutes an
`objectively reasonable response by a prison official who is subjec-
`tively aware of a substantial risk of serious harm facing a prisoner.
`In Mosley, we affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
`judgment for the prison-official defendant, Zachery. 966 F.3d at
`1276. The summary judgment record indicated that the prisoner
`plaintiff, Mosley, had told Zachery of a threat made against Mos-
`ley’s life by another prisoner, Taylor. Id. at 1268. After Mosley re-
`ported the threat, Zachery indicated that she was available to talk
`with Mosley about the threat and that she would “look into” re-
`moving Taylor from Mosley’s dorm. Id. at 1269. Zachery parted
`from the conversation by sending Mosley “to the safety of count
`time”—a supervised procedure in which prisoners stand in front
`of their cells for a formal headcount. Id. at 1275. But just after
`count time, Taylor attacked Mosley. Id. at 1269. The district court
`found that although Zachery was subjectively aware of danger
`facing Mosley, she was entitled to summary judgment because it
`was not objectively unreasonable to wait until after count time, a
`period when prisoners were visible and supervised, to take action.
`Id. at 1272.
`In Mosley, we noted that the objective component is a con-
`text-specific one. Id. at 1272. We posed a hypothetical in which “a
`prisoner [comes] running to a corrections official as the prisoner
`[is] being chased by his shiv-wielding cellmate who [is] yelling, ‘I
`will kill you.’” Id. at 1271. Under those circumstances, we ob-
`served, it might be “unreasonable to respond in any manner other
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 20-11425 Date Filed: 10/18/2021 Page: 18 of 21
`
`18
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`20-11425
`
`than immediately placing [the] threatened prisoner in protective
`custody.” Id. But in less exigent circumstances “it is not an unrea-
`sonable response to see that the prisoners are separated and su-
`pervised while the official investigates the threat and looks into
`her options.” Id. at 1271–72. Put differently, the reasonableness of
`the response is dependent upon the exigence of the specific cir-
`cumstances.
`
`The trouble with Cox’s claim against Harris is that there
`are no factual allegations to help us understand where this case
`falls on that sliding scale. Cox alleged that after the fight with Fra-
`sier she was moved to a new cell in the same dorm, a move that
`Harris had some role in accomplishing.12 But there are no allega-
`tions to suggest that in relocating Cox to another cell in the same
`dorm Harris knew that Cox and Frasier would encounter each
`other in an unsupervised setting. Nor are there other allegations
`that would give us insight into the reasonableness of Harris’s ac-
`tions. Particularly given Mosley’s recognition that separating pris-
`oners is among the reasonable responses a prison official can take
`in appropriate circumstances, we cannot say Cox has adequately
`alleged that Harris acted in objectively unreasonable manner. As a
`
`
`12 It is unclear from the amended complaint, which used passive voice,
`whether Harris was personally responsible for moving Cox to a new cell.
`The GDC officials represent in their brief, however, that it was Harris who
`moved Cox. Cox does not challenge this representation in her reply.
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 20-11425 Date Filed: 10/18/2021 Page: 19 of 21
`
`20-11425
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`19
`
`result, we agree with the district court that Cox failed to state a
`claim against Harris.
`
`We emphasize that we do not mean to say that moving a
`prisoner from one cell to another in the same dorm is always an
`objectively reasonable way to prevent one prisoner from harming
`another. Rather, today we merely decide that the amended com-
`plaint in this case fails to provide any context from which we can
`say that Harris’s actions were objectively unreasonable.
`B.
`Cox Failed to Allege an Eighth Amendment Claim Based
`on Violations of the PREA.
`Cox made allegations of a different nature against three de-
`
`fendants—Nobles, Perry, and Philbin. The relevant paragraph in
`the amended complaint alleged:
`Defendants failed to protect Plaintiff Cox from phys-
`ical and sexual attacks for which they were deliber-
`ately indifferent while Plaintiff was incarcerated at
`Autry State Prison, Central State Prison, and Augus-
`ta State Medical prison. As the Complaint alleges
`that all wardens were notified of the transgender sta-
`tus of the Plaintiff, and PREA requires that the war-
`dens
`take affirmative
`steps
`to classify
`such
`transgender individuals who are at risk of sexual at-
`tack such as the Plaintiff and take[] steps to protect
`them from attacks by other inmates and to transfer
`them to PREA segregated facilities or dormitories.
`The wardens took no steps and were deliberately in-
`different to the Plaintiff’s sexual status as well as not
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 20-11425 Date Filed: 10/18/2021 Page: 20 of 21
`
`20
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`20-11425
`
`taking any steps to house [her] in a protected and
`segregated environment.
`Doc. 16 at 8 ¶ 22. The above language has caused confusion in
`this case. Did Cox invoke the PREA as a private right of action?
`Or did she allege that the GDC officials violated her Eighth
`Amendment rights by violating the PREA? The GDC officials
`took the former interpretation. The district court took the latter.
`
`We agree with the district court’s interpretation. The
`amended complaint alleges one “Cause of Action” that references
`the PREA. Id. In support of this cause of action, Cox alleged that
`the defendants were “deliberately indifferent” to the risk of sexual
`attack Cox faced as a transgender inmate, Doc. 16 at 8–10 ¶¶ 22,
`24, 26–28, and that they should have understood the “substantial
`risk of serious harm.” Doc. 16 at 9–10 ¶¶ 26–27. This is Eighth
`Amendment language. And Cox has consistently described this
`cause of action in Eighth Amendment terms. She argued before
`the district court that the failure to comply with PREA amounted
`to “deliberate[] indifferen[ce].” Doc. 22 at 3. She makes the same
`argument on appeal. Further, in her reply brief on appeal, Cox
`confirms that she does not believe the PREA provides an inde-
`pendent cause of action. Thus, we need not—and do not—decide
`today whether the PREA offers a standalone cause of action.
`Instead, we consider Cox’s argument that a violation of the
`PREA violates the Eighth Amendment per se. This argument is
`without merit. We find no authority to support the proposition
`that a litigant can circumvent long-established Eighth Amend-
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 20-11425 Date Filed: 10/18/2021 Page: 21 of 21
`
`20-11425
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`21
`
`ment jurisprudence by alleging a violation of the PREA in a con-
`clusory fashion. Cox’s claim, whether based on a violation of
`PREA or not, is in essence a claim that the defendants failed to
`protect her from abuse by other inmates. The Supreme Court set
`out the test for Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims in
`Farmer. As we explained above, Cox failed to state a claim for re-
`lief under the Farmer standard. Although we have no doubt that
`PREA documents could put prison officials on notice of a substan-
`tial risk of serious harm to an inmate, in this case Cox failed to al-
`lege anything to help us discern what the PREA documents said.
`Thus, she failed to allege that those documents made prison offi-
`cials subjecti