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`[PUBLISH]
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`In the
`United States Court of Appeals
`For the Eleventh Circuit
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`____________________
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`No. 20-11994
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`____________________
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`TIMOTHY ALLEN DAVIS, SR.,
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`versus
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`CITY OF APOPKA,
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` Plaintiff-Appellant,
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` Defendant-Appellee
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`____________________
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`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Middle District of Florida
`D.C. Docket No. 6:15-cv-01631-RBD-LRH
`____________________
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`[PUBLISH]
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`In the
`United States Court of Appeals
`For the Eleventh Circuit
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`____________________
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`No. 20-11994
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`____________________
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`TIMOTHY ALLEN DAVIS, SR.,
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`versus
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`CITY OF APOPKA,
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` Plaintiff-Appellant,
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` Defendant-Appellee
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`____________________
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`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Middle District of Florida
`D.C. Docket No. 6:15-cv-01631-RBD-LRH
`____________________
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`Opinion of the Court
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`20-11994
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`Before BRANCH, GRANT, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.
`ED CARNES, Circuit Judge:
`
`During a domestic dispute, Timothy Allen Davis, Sr. shot
`his unarmed twenty-two-year-old son, killing him. He was ar-
`rested and prosecuted for murder but was acquitted after a jury
`trial. Davis then filed a lawsuit against the City of Apopka, Florida
`and some of its police officers. He asserted a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim
`that he was arrested without probable cause, a Florida state law
`claim for false arrest based on the same contention, and a § 1983
`claim that the officers’ search of his home violated his Fourth
`Amendment rights.
`The search claim was tried to a jury, but before that trial the
`district court dismissed the federal and state arrest claims under
`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Davis challenges those
`rulings, based on his contention that the operative complaint
`shows that after his wife called 911 to report that her husband shot
`their son, the three officers who were dispatched to the scene of
`the shooting should have believed Davis when he said that he had
`acted in self-defense. The complaint also claims that if the officers
`didn’t believe him, they should have conducted a more thorough
`investigation before making the arrest.
`On the § 1983 claim that the officers had searched his house
`in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the jury returned a verdict
`in favor of the City. Davis challenges the denial of his motion for
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`3
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`a new trial on that claim based on the failure to give a municipal
`liability jury instruction that he requested.
`Before we get to the facts as alleged in the complaint, we
`need to point out a few more procedural aspects of the case. First,
`the officers involved in the search and arrest are no longer parties.
`They were dismissed after Davis settled with them. The City is the
`only remaining defendant. Davis’ position is that the City is liable
`for the conduct of its Chief of Police because he was the final poli-
`cymaker, and he personally and directly participated in the arrest
`and the search of Davis’ home. The City does not deny that Chief
`Manley was the final policymaker, although it vigorously denies
`that there is any liability, insisting that none of Davis’ claims is
`valid.
`
`This is not the first time this case has been before our Court.
`See Davis v. City of Apopka, 734 F. App’x 616 (11th Cir. 2018) (un-
`published). In the first appeal, Davis argued that the district court
`had erred in dismissing his arrest claims. A panel of this Court re-
`manded the case for the district court to address in the first instance
`Davis’ argument that, in light of Florida’s “Stand Your Ground”
`law, Fla. Stat. §§ 776.012(2), 776.032, the officers lacked actual prob-
`able cause to arrest him because his use of deadly force was legally
`justified. Davis, 734 F. App’x at 621–22.
`On Davis’ § 1983 unlawful search claim, the panel concluded
`that Chief Manley “was a final policymaker such that his order to
`search Davis’ home without a warrant rendered the City liable
`
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`20-11994
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`absent any established custom or practice.” Id. at 619. The panel
`determined:
`The district court, rather than addressing Davis’s allegation
`that the warrantless search was conducted upon the direc-
`tion of the Chief of Police, addressed and rejected Davis’s
`alternative allegation that the City had a custom of improper
`training or permitting the Chief of Police to override estab-
`lished protocols and standard operating procedures. But Da-
`vis stated a claim for relief against the City based on a single
`decision by a final policymaker.
`Id. at 620.
`On remand, the district court followed this Court’s man-
`date. It determined that there was actual probable cause to support
`Davis’ arrest and that even in light of Florida’s Stand Your Ground
`law, the facts as alleged did not “conclusively establish the suffi-
`ciency of the defense [of self-defense] so as to negate probable cause
`in the context of a false arrest claim.” (The court did not believe
`that the absence of self-defense was an element of murder under
`Florida law.) The district court once again dismissed Davis’ § 1983
`and state law claims that the officers arrested him without probable
`cause.
`The case was tried on the § 1983 claim that the search of his
`home violated Davis’ rights under the Fourth Amendment. The
`jury returned a verdict in favor of the City, finding that Chief Man-
`ley did not knowingly direct, participate in, adopt or ratify the un-
`lawful search of Davis’ home. Davis filed a motion for a new trial,
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`contending that, among other things, the district court had erred
`in refusing to give a jury instruction on a custom and policy theory
`of municipal liability. The court denied that motion. Among the
`reasons for the denial was its interpretation of our mandate as cast-
`ing out of the case Davis’ custom and policy theory of municipal
`liability, leaving only the “final policymaker” basis for potential li-
`ability. The district court’s decision not to give the requested cus-
`tom and policy jury instruction is Davis’ only basis for challenging
`the denial of his motion for a new trial.
`We will first address Davis’ § 1983 and state law claims that
`he was arrested without probable cause.
`I. THE DISMISSAL OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE
`WRONGFUL ARREST CLAIMS
`We review de novo the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismis-
`sal of Davis’ federal and state claims involving the arrest.
`McGroarty v. Swearingen, 977 F.3d 1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 2020). In
`doing so, we “accept[] the factual allegations in the complaint as
`true and constru[e] them in the light most favorable to” Davis. Id.
`(quotation marks omitted).
`A. What the Complaint Does and Does Not Allege
`Davis’ third amended complaint is the operative one. It al-
`leges that on the night of October 1, 2011, his wife called 911 and
`reported that her husband “had had a confrontation with their son
`and that she believed her husband had shot” him. The complaint
`does not allege that Ms. Davis told the 911 operator then, or told
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`Opinion of the Court
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`20-11994
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`any of the responding officers when they arrived at the scene, that
`the shooting had been in self-defense or that her husband had to
`shoot their son Timmy to protect himself.
`
`The complaint does allege that before the shooting occurred
`that night, Davis and Timmy had gotten into a heated argument
`outside their home. Timmy walked off down the street but re-
`turned home about fifteen minutes later and continued to argue
`with his father, who was trying to calm him down. In the upstairs
`bathroom, the fight turned physical. Timmy tackled Davis and re-
`peatedly punched him. Ms. Davis broke up the fight between her
`husband and son. Davis then went downstairs but was followed
`by Timmy. In hopes of scaring Timmy off, Davis “limped out of
`the garage and retrieved his firearm from his vehicle that was
`parked in the driveway.”
`According to his complaint, Davis was afraid, panicked, and
`fired a shot at Timmy, who was walking toward him. The com-
`plaint alleges that Davis fired the first “shot in Timmy’s direction
`to scare him off,” and then because that did not appear to work,
`Davis fired again with a different intent. The complaint states that
`Davis “fired a second time in self-defense.” That necessarily means
`that Davis is alleging that he fired the second shot deliberately, al-
`legedly with the intent to stop Timmy from seriously wounding or
`killing him. See Fla. Stat. § 776.012(2) (providing that a person’s
`use of deadly force is justified if that person reasonably believes his
`deliberate action is “necessary to prevent imminent death or great
`bodily harm to himself”). Davis does not allege that he acted
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`accidentally in self-defense, if there even is such a thing. He doesn’t
`contend that he did not intend for his second shot to strike Timmy
`and seriously injure or kill him.
`And the second shot that Davis fired did hit Timmy in the
`chest, mortally wounding him.
`When they arrived at the scene a few minutes after Ms. Da-
`vis’ 911 call on the evening of October 1, the officers found Davis
`in the driveway, lying on top of Timmy.1 Timmy was bleeding
`from the chest. Davis had bruises and was bleeding, too, but he
`had not been shot. It was apparent that the two men had been in
`a fight and that the only one of them who had been shot was
`Timmy.
`When an officer asked Davis who had shot Timmy, Davis
`responded, “I did because my son beat me up and kept coming at
`me.” When the officer asked Davis where the gun was, he an-
`swered that it was in his front pants pocket. The officer handcuffed
`
`
`1 A “few minutes” after Ms. Davis’ 911 call, two officers from the Apopka Po-
`lice Department arrived at the Davis home, and “[w]ithin minutes” of their
`arrival the Chief of Police joined them there. The rank of the officers does not
`alter the standard for determining whether there was probable cause to arrest
`Davis. See Washington v. Howard, 25 F.4th 891, 902 (11th Cir. 2022) (“[T]he
`correct legal standard to evaluate whether an officer had probable cause to
`seize a suspect is to ‘ask whether a reasonable officer could conclude . . . that
`there was a substantial chance of criminal activity.’”) (quoting District of Co-
`lumbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 61 (2018)). For that reason and for ease of ref-
`erence, we describe the chief and the two officers who responded to the 911
`call as “the officers.”
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`20-11994
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`Davis and took the gun from his pocket. While that was happen-
`ing, Timmy yelled at the officers, “Get away from daddy and leave
`my daddy alone!”
`Some neighbors had come over to the Davis house after
`they heard loud noises. Two of them knew that Davis and Timmy
`had argued outside the house, and thirty minutes later they had
`heard two gunshots, but it is undisputed that no neighbor wit-
`nessed the shooting or the events occurring immediately before it.
`The complaint acknowledges that while at the scene, one of
`the officers noticed a camera affixed to the garage and asked Davis:
`“I see you got cameras up here. Do they work?” Davis replied,
`“Yeah they do.” But the effort to obtain video evidence was
`thwarted through no fault of the officers. When asked if the cam-
`eras recorded, Davis answered: “Nah, it don’t record because I had
`the DVR hooked up to my computer and when the computer
`broke down and I got it fixed, I forgot to re-program [the DVR]
`back to my computer.” (Brackets in original.) The complaint does
`not allege that any surveillance camera recorded the shooting or
`the fight leading up to it.
`There is not now, nor has there ever been, any allegation in
`the complaint or elsewhere that Ms. Davis saw any part of the
`shooting itself. The allegation is that she saw “Timmy on the
`ground after he had been shot.” (Emphasis added.) The only two
`people the complaint alleges actually saw the shooting were Davis
`the shooter and Timmy the shooting victim.
`
`
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`The complaint alleges that Ms. Davis was interviewed by an
`officer sometime the day after the shooting. During that interview
`she stated that before Davis shot Timmy, the two of them had been
`arguing and fighting upstairs in the home; Timmy was getting
`“progressively nastier and more vulgar”; and he had pushed his fa-
`ther. She heard Davis scream that his knees had been hurt. (It was
`a re-injury. Sometime before that night his knees had been injured
`seriously enough on his job that he had retired.)
`But the complaint does not allege that Ms. Davis told any
`officer at any time that when Davis went downstairs and got his
`gun and shot Timmy, Timmy had done anything that would have
`justified Davis shooting him. She could not have known if Davis
`shot Timmy in self-defense or out of anger or in retribution for the
`blows Timmy had inflicted on him while they were fighting. She
`was upstairs when Davis went downstairs. There is no allegation
`that she saw Davis get his gun out of his car that was parked in the
`driveway. She did not see him fire the first shot or the second one.
`She could not have known if the shooting was in self-defense.
`What she did know is what she told the 911 operator, which is that
`Davis “had a confrontation with their son” and then shot him.
`Timmy died at the hospital at 12:36 a.m. on October 2, 2011,
`about six hours after Davis had shot him. Following Timmy’s
`death, Davis was formally charged with first degree murder “in Or-
`ange County Felony Case Number 48-2011-CF-013424 in the State
`of Florida.”
`
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`20-11994
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`The complaint is not clear about whether the officers actu-
`ally arrested Davis at the scene on the evening of October 1 or
`sometime on October 2, after he had been taken to the hospital and
`interviewed further. Viewed in the light most favorable to Davis,
`the allegations are that he was arrested the evening of October 1 at
`the scene where he shot Timmy, not afterwards while he was at
`the hospital.2 That is, and apparently always has been, Davis’ po-
`sition. So for purposes of the probable cause analysis, that will be
`our position, too.3
`B. The Governing Probable Cause Principles
`The existence of probable cause is an absolute bar to a § 1983
`claim of false arrest, Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1505–06
`(11th Cir. 1990), and to a claim of false arrest under Florida law,
`
`
`2 Davis remained at the hospital from the evening of October 1, 2011 until on
`or about October 7, 2011 when he was discharged and taken into custody at
`the Orange County Jail. He was released from jail on October 22, 2011, and
`remained on “home confinement” until February 14 or 15, 2013, when he was
`acquitted of the charge of murdering Timmy.
`3 Probable cause is measured at the time of the arrest, not at some time before
`or after. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (“Whether probable
`cause exists depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the
`facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.”); see also, e.g.,
`United States v. Leonard, 4 F.4th 1134, 1146 (11th Cir. 2021) (“Probable cause
`is based on what a reasonable officer would think at the time of arrest –– not
`on what they could understand with the benefit of hindsight.”); Huebner v.
`Bradshaw, 935 F.3d 1183, 1187 (11th Cir. 2019) (assessing probable cause based
`on the facts known or available to the officers “at the time of the arrest”);
`United States v. Gonzalez, 969 F.2d 999, 1003 n.6 (11th Cir. 1992) (same).
`
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`Bolanos v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 677 So. 2d 1005, 1005 (Fla. 3d DCA
`1996).
`Probable cause is “a fluid concept that is not readily, or even
`usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” District of Columbia
`v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018) (quotation marks omitted). It is
`“incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages.”
`Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003). A good place to
`begin a discussion of it is with a statement that Chief Justice John
`Marshall made a couple of centuries ago in Locke v. United
`States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813). The Supreme Court
`quoted that statement with approval in Illinois v. Gates: “[T]he
`term ‘probable cause,’ according to its usual acceptation, means
`less than evidence which would justify condemnation . . . . It im-
`ports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspi-
`cion.” 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983).
`
`Over the years caselaw has added some well-established
`principles to reinforce and refine Chief Justice Marshall’s definition
`of the term. One important principle that the Supreme Court has
`stressed is: “Probable cause is not a high bar.” Wesby, 583 U.S. at
`57 (quotation marks omitted); accord Kaley v. United States, 571
`U.S. 320, 338 (2014). We have ourselves held that probable cause
`“does not require anything close to conclusive proof or proof be-
`yond a reasonable doubt that a crime was in fact committed, or
`even a finding made by a preponderance of the evidence.” Paez v.
`Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added).
`
`
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`That is important because the preponderance standard,
`where it applies, means that the evidence must make a given fact
`or conclusion more likely true than not true. See United States v.
`Watkins, 10 F.4th 1179, 1184–85 (11th Cir. 2021) (en banc). Be-
`cause probable cause requires less than a preponderance of the ev-
`idence, it necessarily follows that probable cause does not require
`that it be more likely than not the person arrested for a crime is
`actually guilty of it.
`After all, probable cause can survive an acquittal. See, e.g.,
`Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971) (holding that the Fourth
`Amendment’s reasonableness requirement was not violated by an
`arrest based on probable cause, even though the officers arrested
`the wrong person); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 663–64
`(1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Under the prevailing view in this
`country a peace officer who arrests someone with proba-
`ble cause is not liable for false arrest simply because the inno-
`cence of the suspect is later proved.”); see also Baker v. McCollan,
`443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979) (“The Constitution does not guarantee that
`only the guilty will be arrested. If it did, § 1983 would provide a
`cause of action for every defendant acquitted — indeed, for every
`suspect released.”); Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1298 (11th
`Cir. 2018) (same).
`This Court has quoted with favor Judge Learned Hand’s
`wise observation that “the ‘reasonable cause’ necessary to support
`an arrest cannot demand the same strictness of proof as the ac-
`cused’s guilt upon a trial, unless the powers of peace officers are to
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`be so cut down that they cannot possibly perform their du-
`ties.” Marx, 905 F.2d at 1507 (quoting United States v. Heitner, 149
`F.2d 105, 106 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.) as quoted in Draper v. United
`States, 358 U.S. 307, 312 n.4 (1959)); accord, e.g., Von Stein v.
`Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 578 n.9 (11th Cir. 1990) (“‘Probable cause’
`defines a radically different standard than ‘beyond a reasonable
`doubt,’ and while an arrest must stand on more than suspicion, the
`arresting officer need not have in hand evidence sufficient to obtain
`a conviction.”); United States v. Pantoja-Soto, 739 F.2d 1520, 1524
`n.7 (11th Cir. 1984) (same).
`
`Probable cause exists if the totality of the circumstances
`known to the officers could persuade a reasonable officer that there
`is a “substantial chance of criminal activity” by the person who is
`arrested. Wesby, 583 U.S. at 57. A substantial chance is all that is
`required, “not an actual showing of such activity.” Id.; see also
`Washington v. Howard, 25 F.4th 891, 902 (11th Cir. 2022) (holding
`that the correct standard to evaluate whether an officer had proba-
`ble cause to arrest a suspect is to “ask whether a reasonable officer
`could conclude that there was a substantial chance of criminal ac-
`tivity”) (alteration adopted) (emphasis added) (quoting Wesby, 583
`U.S. at 61).
`Probable cause is not a technical concept that only the le-
`gally trained can apply. Actually, it’s designed to be just the oppo-
`site. The Supreme Court has reminded us that: “On many occa-
`sions, we have reiterated that the probable-cause standard is a prac-
`tical, nontechnical conception that deals with the factual and
`
`
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`practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and
`prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Pringle, 540 U.S. at 370
`(quotation marks omitted); see also Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237,
`244 (2013); Gates, 462 U.S. at 231 (“Perhaps the central teaching of
`our decisions bearing on the probable cause standard is that it is a
`‘practical, nontechnical conception.’”) (quoting Brinegar v. United
`States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
`That means evidence of every element of a crime is not re-
`quired for a showing of probable cause. See Adams v. Williams,
`407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972) (“Probable cause does not require the same
`type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would
`be needed to support a conviction.”); Gates, 884 F.3d at 1300; Jor-
`dan v. Mosley, 487 F.3d 1350, 1355 (11th Cir. 2007) (“No officer has
`a duty to prove every element of a crime before making an ar-
`rest.”). We have never imposed “a rigid requirement that an ar-
`resting officer must have specific evidence” of suspects’ “subjective
`intent” when their conduct “otherwise gives rise to probable cause
`to arrest.” Gates, 884 F.3d at 1300; Jordan, 487 F.3d at 1355 (“[N]o
`police officer can truly know another person’s subjective intent.”);
`United States v. Everett, 719 F.2d 1119, 1120 (11th Cir. 1983) (hold-
`ing that evidence of intent was not required for probable cause to
`arrest for passing or possessing counterfeit money). We have
`pointed out that arrests are different from criminal prosecutions,
`and “[p]olice officers are not expected to be lawyers or prosecu-
`tors.” Jordan, 487 F.3d at 1355 (quotation marks omitted). And
`“officers are not required to perform error-free investigations or
`
`
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`independently investigate every proffered claim of innocence.”
`Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1229 n.10.
`Neither are officers expected to be judges. It is not unusual
`to find at the scene of a crime evidence pointing in different direc-
`tions, but “[a] law enforcement officer is not required to resolve
`every inconsistency found in the evidence.” Paez, 915 F.3d at 1286.
`That is especially true because on-the-scene officers are often
`“hampered by incomplete information and forced to make a split-
`second decision between action and inaction.” Crosby v. Monroe
`Cnty., 394 F.3d 1328, 1334 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Ryburn v. Huff,
`565 U.S. 469, 477 (2012) (reversing a court of appeals in an exigent
`circumstances case for “not heed[ing] the . . . wise admonition that
`judges should be cautious about second-guessing a police officer’s
`assessment, made on the scene,” and for not following the Court’s
`instructions that “[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody al-
`lowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make
`split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncer-
`tain, and rapidly evolving”) (second alteration in original) (quota-
`tion marks omitted). The Supreme Court has been unequivocal
`about that. So has this Court.
`
`For example, last year we had before us a § 1983 case raising
`a Fourth Amendment claim that the probable cause supporting an
`arrest pursuant to a warrant “was later undermined by contrary ex-
`culpatory evidence.” Howard, 25 F.4th at 898. The perpetrator
`was shown a photograph of the plaintiff and identified her as a part-
`ner in the crime. See id. at 894–95. The plaintiff alleged that after
`
`
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`she was arrested, the perpetrator saw her in person at the jail and
`told the investigating officer that the plaintiff was not the woman
`who had committed the crime with him. See id. at 895. We
`acknowledged that his later statement, if true, was exculpatory as
`to the plaintiff, but held that the officer “was not required to believe
`it or to weigh the evidence in such a way as to conclude that prob-
`able cause did not exist.” Id. at 902. We emphasized that “a police
`officer need not resolve conflicting evidence in a manner favorable
`to the suspect.” Id.
`In the same vein, when officers are making a probable cause
`determination they simply are not required “to rule out a suspect’s
`innocent explanation for suspicious facts.” Wesby, 583 U.S. at 61;
`see also Howard, 25 F.4th at 902 (quoting Wesby, 583 U.S. at 61).
`We have been nothing if not consistent about that rule. Thirty-
`three years ago we held in our Marx decision that “[the officers]
`were not required to forego arresting [the plaintiff] based on ini-
`tially discovered facts showing probable cause simply because [he]
`offered a different explanation.” 905 F.2d at 1507 n.6. And we em-
`ployed that same holding in our Huebner decision four years ago.
`See 935 F.3d. 1183, 1188.
`
`We are not alone. That same important principle about
`probable cause is the law of other circuits. See Loftin v. City of
`Prentiss, 33 F.4th 774, 781 (5th Cir. 2022) (“A suspect’s declaration
`of innocence is not a fact supporting a defense. And a soon-to-be
`arrestee’s naked assertion of self-defense under these circum-
`stances does not vitiate probable cause. Otherwise, every suspect
`
`
`
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`for a litany of violent crimes could avoid, or delay, arrest by simply
`proclaiming self-defense.”) (footnote omitted); Hinkle v. Beckham
`Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 962 F.3d 1204, 1221 (10th Cir. 2020)
`(“Even a plausible explanation does not require the officer to
`forego arrest pending further investigation if the facts as initially
`discovered provide probable cause.”) (citation and quotation marks
`omitted); Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 395–96 (2d Cir. 2006)
`(“[T]he fact that an innocent explanation may be consistent with
`the facts alleged does not negate probable cause, and an officer’s
`failure to investigate an arrestee’s protestations of innocence gen-
`erally does not vitiate probable cause.”) (cleaned up); Curley v. Vill.
`of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2001) (explaining that an officer
`is not required to “explore and eliminate” every plausible claim of
`innocence before making an arrest once he has “a reasonable basis
`for believing there is probable cause”) (quotation marks omitted);
`Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 1997)
`(holding that although the arresting officer could have believed the
`plaintiff’s version of events, claiming self-defense, he was not obli-
`gated to believe the plaintiff’s assertions that he was acting in self-
`defense or “make a full investigation into plaintiff’s state of mind
`prior to taking action”); Criss v. City of Kent, 867 F.2d 259, 263 (6th
`Cir. 1988) (While an officer can take a suspect’s explanation into
`consideration in deciding whether he has probable cause, the of-
`ficer “is under no obligation to give any credence to a suspect’s
`story nor should a plausible explanation in any sense require the
`officer to forego arrest pending further investigation if the facts as
`initially discovered provide probable cause.”) (citation omitted).
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 20-11994 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 08/28/2023 Page: 18 of 56
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`This widespread, bedrock principle of probable cause law is
`particularly relevant in violent crime cases like this one where, as
`the Florida Supreme Court has pointed out, “suspects will often
`claim self-defense even when the facts would not appear to support
`such a claim.” Kumar v. Patel, 227 So. 3d 557, 560 (Fla. 2017).
`Given that, and “considering the well-established body of law de-
`tailing the responsibilities of law enforcement officers,” the Florida
`Supreme Court decided that, regardless of what the state’s Stand
`Your Ground statute says, the reality is that officers cannot be ex-
`pected to make on-the-spot self-defense determinations at the
`scene of a violent crime before deciding whether to make an arrest.
`See id. A more particular self-defense determination will have to
`await later proceedings, or as the Florida Supreme Court has put
`it, “a post-arrest and post-charging immunity determination [of the
`self-defense issue] . . . will be the best that we can do.” Id. (empha-
`sis added).
`Some of the most volatile circumstances that officers face
`and some of the most difficult decisions that they must make are
`on the scene in domestic violence cases. Probable cause determi-
`nations in that context often present special challenges coupled
`with the need for quick action to sort things out, to get the
`wounded medical treatment, and to protect everyone’s safety.
`The First Circuit explained it well: Deference to on-the-
`spot, reasonable judgments made by officers “may be particularly
`warranted in domestic disputes” because they “require police to
`make particularly delicate and difficult judgments quickly” and
`
`
`
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`19
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`“violence may be lurking and explode with little warning.”
`Fletcher v. Town of Clinton, 196 F.3d 41, 50 (1st Cir. 1999); see also
`Terrell v. Larson, 396 F.3d 975, 979 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Domestic dis-
`turbances are notoriously volatile and unpredictable . . . .”) (quota-
`tion marks omitted); see generally Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct.
`1715, 1725 (2019) (“Police officers conduct approximately 29,000
`arrests every day — a dangerous task that requires making quick
`decisions in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly
`evolving.”) (quotation marks omitted); Lozman v. City of Riviera
`Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1945, 1953 (2018) (“There are on average about
`29,000 arrests per day in this country. Dept. of Justice–FBI, Uni-
`form Crime Report, Crime in the United States, 2016 (Fall 2017)).
`In deciding whether to arrest, police officers often make split-sec-
`ond judgments.”).
`
`The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonable-
`ness, Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006), and we have
`stressed that in assessing whether officers acted reasonably “it’s not
`our role to armchair quarterback the officers’ decision,” United
`States v. Cooks, 920 F.3d 735, 742 (11th Cir. 2019); cf. Dempsey v.
`Bucknell Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 469 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[I]n reviewing
`probable cause determinations . . . the role of the courts is not that
`of the much-maligned ‘Monday morning quarterback’ . . . .”). In
`this area, “we cannot indulge ‘the 20/20 vision of hindsight.’”
`Cooks, 920 F.3d at 742 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
`396 (1989)); see also Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (explaining that the
`“reasonableness at the moment” standard applies in several Fourth
`
`
`
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`Amendment
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