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` [PUBLISH]
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`IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`
`FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
`________________________
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`No. 20-11995
`________________________
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`D.C. Docket No. 8:17-cv-1753-MSS-AEP
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`
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`JOSE RAMIREZ,
`JOEL SANTANA,
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`versus
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` Plaintiffs-Appellees,
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`STATEWIDE HARVESTING & HAULING, LLC,
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` Defendant-Appellant.
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`________________________
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`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Middle District of Florida
`_______________________
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`(May 21, 2021)
`
`Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, LUCK, Circuit Judge, and MARKS,*
`District Judge.
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`WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:
`
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`* Honorable Emily Coody Marks, Chief United States District Judge for the Middle
`District of Alabama, sitting by designation.
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`
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`USCA11 Case: 20-11995 Date Filed: 05/21/2021 Page: 2 of 14
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`This appeal involves the agriculture exemption from the overtime-
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`compensation requirements in the Fair Labor Standards Act. 29 U.S.C.
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`§ 213(b)(12). A fruit-harvesting company required its crew leaders to transport
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`field workers between company-provided housing and a grocery store, laundromat,
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`and bank every week. Two crew leaders sued the company for failure to pay them
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`overtime compensation for the trips. Because we agree with the district court that
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`these activities do not fall within the agriculture exemption, we affirm the
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`judgment in favor of the crew leaders.
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`I. BACKGROUND
`Statewide Harvesting & Hauling, LLC, harvests fruit from about 1,500 fields
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`for multiple farmers in Florida and hauls that fruit to various packinghouses or
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`processing plants. It does not own any of the land it harvests. For the harvest
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`seasons between 2014 and 2017, Statewide employed mostly temporary foreign
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`guest workers as its seasonal harvest workers, through the federal H-2A program.
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`See 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.100 et seq.
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`The H-2A program requires a labor contractor to provide workers with
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`housing. Id. § 655.122(d)(1). It also requires a labor contractor to provide harvest
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`workers with either three meals a day or “free and convenient cooking and kitchen
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`facilities.” Id. § 655.122(g). And the contractor must provide access to other basic
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`housing amenities including laundry facilities. Id. § 655.122(d)(1)(i).
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`Statewide housed its harvest workers in three cities. The traveling distance
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`from the accommodations to the fields varied: some fields were across the street
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`from the accommodations, and others were up to two hours away. It chose to
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`provide its harvest workers with cooking facilities instead of meals and with
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`transportation from the accommodations to a grocery store, laundromat, and bank.
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`Statewide also contractually agreed to provide the grocery store and bank
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`transportation to the harvest workers.
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`Statewide employed Jose Ramirez and Joel Santana as crew leaders
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`responsible for supervising the field workers during the harvest seasons. Ramirez
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`and Santana also drove the workers to and from the accommodations and the
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`grocery store, laundromat, and bank. These weekly trips lasted approximately four
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`hours. Between 2014 and 2017, Ramirez and Santana worked anywhere from
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`three-and-a-half to over 80 hours a week. Neither crew leader received any
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`overtime compensation when he worked over 40 hours a week.
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`In 2017, Ramirez and Santana sued Statewide under the Fair Labor
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`Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., for unpaid overtime compensation for the
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`basic-necessities driving trips. They alleged that Statewide willfully refused to pay
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`them overtime wages as required under the Act and sought damages. Statewide did
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`not deny that Ramirez and Santana were covered by the Act, but it maintained that
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`3
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`USCA11 Case: 20-11995 Date Filed: 05/21/2021 Page: 4 of 14
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`all of their employment activities fell under the exemption from the overtime
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`requirements for agricultural work. Id. § 213(b)(12).
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`Both sides moved for summary judgment. The district court referred the
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`motions to a magistrate judge, who concluded that Statewide was not a farmer, the
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`driving trips were not actually performed on a farm, and the trips were not a minor
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`part of their work—all reasons why the exemption would not apply. But the
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`magistrate judge decided that the agriculture exemption includes “work activities
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`performed neither by a farmer nor on a farm when those work activities are
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`incidental to primary agricultural activities performed on a farm.” Because
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`Statewide provided the transportation to comply with H-2A requirements for its
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`harvest workers, the magistrate judge recommended concluding that the
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`transportation fell under the exemption.
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`The district court rejected the magistrate judge’s recommendation. It
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`explained that the activities must be performed by a farmer or on a farm to fall
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`under the exemption. Because Statewide did not object to the magistrate judge’s
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`conclusion that it is not a farmer or that the work was minor, and the activities at
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`issue occurred wholly off a farm, the exemption did not apply. It denied
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`Statewide’s motion and it granted in part Ramirez and Santana’s motion; it denied
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`summary judgment for Ramirez and Santana on the issue of willfulness. The
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`4
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`USCA11 Case: 20-11995 Date Filed: 05/21/2021 Page: 5 of 14
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`parties resolved the remaining issues by stipulating that Statewide’s conduct was
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`not willful and agreeing to the amount of damages.
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`II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
`We review summary judgment de novo. Buckner v. Fla. Habilitation
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`Network, Inc., 489 F.3d 1151, 1154 (11th Cir. 2007). “Whether an employee meets
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`the criteria for” an exemption under the Fair Labor Standards Act, “although based
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`on the underlying facts, is ultimately a legal question.” Pioch v. IBEX Eng’g
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`Servs., Inc., 825 F.3d 1264, 1268 (11th Cir. 2016). And we review legal questions
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`de novo. Buckner, 489 F.3d at 1154.
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`III. DISCUSSION
`The Fair Labor Standards Act requires employers to pay overtime to covered
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`employees for all hours worked in excess of forty hours a week, 29 U.S.C.
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`§ 207(a)(1), but it exempts from this requirement “any employee employed in
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`agriculture,” id. § 213(b)(12). The Act includes primary and secondary definitions
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`of “agriculture.” Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755,
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`762–63 (1949). The primary definition is “farming in all its branches . . .
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`includ[ing] the cultivation and tillage of the soil, dairying, the production,
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`cultivation, growing, and harvesting of any agricultural or horticultural
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`commodities . . . , [and] the raising of livestock, bees, fur-bearing animals, or
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`poultry[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 203(f). And the secondary definition is “any practices
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`USCA11 Case: 20-11995 Date Filed: 05/21/2021 Page: 6 of 14
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`(including any forestry or lumbering operations) performed by a farmer or on a
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`farm as an incident to or in conjunction with [primary] farming operations,
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`including preparation for market[ and] delivery to storage or to market or to
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`carriers for transportation to market.” Id.
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`The employer bears the burden of establishing that an employee is exempt.
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`Pioch, 825 F.3d at 1268. The Supreme Court previously held that the Act’s
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`exemptions “must . . . be narrowly construed” because of its “humanitarian and
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`remedial” purpose. A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945). But it
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`recently corrected course and held that the exemptions from the Act should be
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`interpreted fairly, not narrowly. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct.
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`1134, 1142 (2018); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
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`Interpretation of Legal Texts § 63, at 363 (2012) (“Without some textual
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`indication, there is no reason to give statutory exceptions anything other than a fair
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`(rather than a ‘narrow’) interpretation.”). So we too must give the agriculture
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`exemption its fair meaning. See Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 33 (describing
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`“fair reading” as “how a reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, would
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`have understood the text at the time it was issued.”).
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`For Statewide to bear its burden, it must establish that the basic-necessities
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`trips fall under the “on a farm” clause of the secondary “agriculture” definition.
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`The primary definition plainly does not include transportation of workers, which is
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`USCA11 Case: 20-11995 Date Filed: 05/21/2021 Page: 7 of 14
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`not “farming.” And the text of the secondary definition is clear: non-primary
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`activities must be “performed by a farmer or on a farm” to be considered
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`“agriculture.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(f); see also 29 C.F.R. § 780.129; Farmers
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`Reservoir, 337 U.S. at 766; Ares v. Manuel Diaz Farms, Inc., 318 F.3d 1054, 1056
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`(11th Cir. 2003). Statewide does not challenge the conclusion that it is not a farmer
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`because it “did not own, lease, or control the farms or crops harvested.” See 29
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`C.F.R. § 780.131 (“As a general rule, a farmer performs his farming operations on
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`land owned, leased, or controlled by him and devoted to his own use.”). Nor does it
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`challenge the conclusion that the driving trips were not a minor part of Ramirez’s
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`and Santana’s work. See id. § 780.136 (explaining that an employee who works
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`“on a farm” is exempted even if “a minor and incidental part of the work of such
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`an employee occurs off the farm”). So to be exempt from the overtime
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`requirements, the driving trips must have been “performed . . . on a farm.”
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`Activities that are “performed . . . on a farm” are activities performed within
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`the geographical area that constitutes a farm. See id. § 780.135 (defining “farm” as
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`“a tract of land devoted to the actual farming activities included in” the primary
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`definition of “agriculture” and explaining that the “total area of a tract operated as
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`a unit for farming purposes is included in the ‘farm’”). For example, “building
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`terraces or threshing wheat and other grain,” “erect[ing] . . . silos and granaries,”
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`and “digging wells or building dams for farm ponds” are activities “performed ‘on
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`USCA11 Case: 20-11995 Date Filed: 05/21/2021 Page: 8 of 14
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`a farm.’” Id. § 780.136. By contrast, activities “performed away from the farms
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`being serviced,” such as the repairing of equipment off a farm, are excluded.
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`Hodgson v. Ewing, 451 F.2d 526, 527, 529 (5th Cir. 1971); see also Boyls v. Wirtz,
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`352 F.2d 63, 63 (5th Cir. 1965). In Farmers Reservoir, for example, the Supreme
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`Court concluded that “the physical operation, control and maintenance” of “canals,
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`reservoirs, and headgates” for a company that stored water and distributed it to
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`farms through the company’s canals were activities “[c]learly . . . not done on a
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`farm.” 337 U.S. at 757, 767.
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`Ordinarily, “[a]ny practice which cannot be performed on a farm”—like
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`transportation-related activities on public roads—falls outside the secondary
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`definition “when performed by someone other than a farmer.” 29 C.F.R.
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`§ 780.134. In Wirtz v. Osceola Farms Co., the former Fifth Circuit held that the
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`activities of flagmen who stopped traffic on public roads so that truck drivers
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`taking sugar cane from a farm to a sugar mill could pass safely were “clearly
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`outside the [agriculture] exemption.” 372 F.2d 584, 588–90 (5th Cir. 1967). And
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`the truck drivers were not exempted either. Id. at 588–89. So even work that begins
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`on a farm but is mostly performed away from a farm ordinarily falls outside the
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`exemption. See also Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 395–96, 401
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`(1996) (employer conceded that truck drivers who transported chickens and crews
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`between farms and processing plant did not perform activities “on a farm”);
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`8
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`USCA11 Case: 20-11995 Date Filed: 05/21/2021 Page: 9 of 14
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`Chapman v. Durkin, 214 F.2d 360, 363 (5th Cir. 1954) (holding that hauling fruit
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`away from a farm “cannot be said to be work performed . . . on a farm” (internal
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`quotation marks omitted)).
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`In limited circumstances, our precedents have held that work performed
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`neither by a farmer nor on a farm can be swept into the secondary definition of
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`“agriculture.” Osceola Farms concluded that activities that were performed off a
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`farm but that had “significance and purpose only in making it possible for the
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`[farming] activity to take place” fell within the agriculture exemption. 372 F.2d at
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`589 n.4. But it made clear that those activities were physically tied to a farm. It
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`held that transporting workers to and from a farm for harvesting was a secondary
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`agriculture activity. Id. at 589. And where an employer provided field workers with
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`meals while they were harvesting on a farm, transporting the food to that farm also
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`fell within the secondary definition. Id. Our predecessor court explained that “[t]he
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`feeding of [harvest] workers at their places of work” was a practice “performed . . .
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`on a farm . . . as an incident to or in connection with [the primary] farming
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`operation,” and “[t]he transportation of necessary food to the on-the-farm site
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`[was] incident to, or a part of, the on-the-job feeding arrangement and itself
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`terminate[d] on the farm.” Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
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`omitted). It contrasted these two transportation activities with driving cane to the
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`USCA11 Case: 20-11995 Date Filed: 05/21/2021 Page: 10 of 14
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`mill on the ground that the latter did not enable the harvesting activities—at that
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`point, the harvesting was done. Id. at 589 n.4.
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`Our predecessor court also held that the work of cooks and attendants at
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`labor camps in close proximity to fields worked by laborers for whom they cooked
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`and cleaned fell within the meaning of “on a farm.” Brennan v. Sugar Cane
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`Growers Coop of Fla., 486 F.2d 1006, 1011 (5th Cir. 1973). Brennan explained
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`that it would “not be physically possible” to place the “labor camps right in the
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`middle of the cane fields” and emphasized that the camps were “adjacent to and
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`near the farmland being harvested,” not at “some remote location.” Id. Because
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`“[t]he drafters of the section could not anticipate every conceivable factual
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`situation arising in the future under the agricultural exemption,” Brennan
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`concluded that this cooking and cleaning work fell within the definition of
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`activities performed “on a farm.” Id.
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`We have doubts about whether Brennan was correctly decided. After all, the
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`Supreme Court recently rejected its mode of reasoning when interpreting the same
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`Act. See Encino Motorcars, 138 S. Ct. at 1143 (“Even if Congress did not foresee
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`all of the applications of the statute, that is no reason not to give the statutory text a
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`fair reading.”). But we need not decide that question here.
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`Santana’s and Ramirez’s driving trips were not agricultural activities within
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`the fair meaning of the Act. They occurred off a farm. Hodgson, 451 F.2d at 529.
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`10
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`USCA11 Case: 20-11995 Date Filed: 05/21/2021 Page: 11 of 14
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`And they neither directly enabled harvesting or on-the-farm secondary activities
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`nor were physically tied to a farm. Osceola Farms, 372 F.2d at 589. This type of
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`transportation is not bound up with an on-the-farm activity like feeding workers on
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`a farm, and it is a few steps removed from harvesting. And it is wholly divorced
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`from physical contact with a farm. These driving trips were like the activities of the
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`flagmen in Osceola Farms, whose “work . . . was done off the farm at public
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`roads” and fell outside the definition of “agriculture,” not like those of the drivers
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`who took workers or food to the farm. Id. at 590.
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`Brennan is distinguishable. In Brennan, the activities occurred at camps
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`adjacent to farmland. 486 F.2d at 1011. The activities here began and ended offsite
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`at the accommodations. And with some farms up to two hours away from their
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`accommodations, we cannot treat the accommodations—and the grocery store,
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`laundromat, and bank—as part of a constructive farm. The cooking and cleaning
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`work in Brennan represents the “outer limits of activities that might be said to
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`qualify under [the] secondary meaning” of “agriculture.” Skipper v. Superior
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`Dairies, Inc., 512 F.2d 409, 413 (5th Cir. 1975). Extending the secondary
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`definition of “agriculture” any further would empty the “on a farm” requirement of
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`any meaning. See Scalia & Garner, Reading Law § 26, at 174 (“If possible, every
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`word and every provision is to be given effect[.]”). We will not do so.
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`11
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`USCA11 Case: 20-11995 Date Filed: 05/21/2021 Page: 12 of 14
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`For the same reason, we decline Statewide’s invitation to follow the Fifth
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`Circuit’s expansive interpretation of Osceola Farms in Reich v. Tiller Helicopter
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`Services, Inc., 8 F.3d 1018 (5th Cir. 1993). Reich interpreted Osceola Farms to
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`mean that off-the-farm work performed by non-farmer employees is exempt so
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`long as the “work was incidental to the primary agricultural task” performed on a
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`farm. Id. at 1027–28. By interpreting Osceola Farms so broadly, Reich read “by a
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`farmer or on a farm” out of the statute. That reading is not a “fair” one, as Encino
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`Motorcars requires. 138 S. Ct. at 1142.
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`Even if we were to follow Reich, Statewide could not overcome a second
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`hurdle. These driving trips were not “incidental to or in conjunction with [primary]
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`farming operation[s]” because they were not connected to a single farming
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`operation. Farmers Reservoir, 337 U.S. at 766 n.15. For work “performed . . . on a
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`farm” to qualify as “agriculture,” it must be connected and subordinate to primary
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`agricultural operations on that same farm. 29 C.F.R. §§ 780.136, 780.141; accord
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`Sariol v. Fla. Crystals Corp., 490 F.3d 1277, 1280 (11th Cir. 2007); cf. Maneja v.
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`Waialua Agric. Co., 349 U.S. 254, 263–64 (1955) (workers employed by a farmer
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`who repaired farming equipment on the farm fell under exemption because they
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`worked on only that farmer’s equipment). After all, the work must be performed
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`“on a farm.” The use of the indefinite article “a” before the word “farm” means
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`that the phrase refers to a single farm. See Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474,
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`12
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`USCA11 Case: 20-11995 Date Filed: 05/21/2021 Page: 13 of 14
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`No. 19-863, slip op. at 5–9, 15–16 (Apr. 29, 2021) (concluding that information to
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`be provided in “a notice” must be contained in a single document). This
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`requirement distinguishes secondary agricultural work that is part of a farm’s (or a
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`farmer’s) primary operations from work that is “separately organized as an
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`independent productive activity.” Farmers Reservoir, 337 U.S. at 761. When
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`farming-related work pertains to multiple farms’ operations, it falls in the latter
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`category. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Huntsville Wholesale Nurseries, Inc., 267 F.2d 286,
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`290–91 (5th Cir. 1959) (concluding that processing nursery stock received from
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`both the employer-farmer’s farm and other farms on an off-the-farm warehouse
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`was not exempted).
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`That secondary agricultural activities must be connected to a single farm’s
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`primary farming operations underscores why they must be physically connected to
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`the farm itself. When activities are physically tied to a farm, we can tell whether
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`those activities are part of that farm’s primary agricultural activities. So, for
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`example, driving workers to a farm for harvesting is connected to harvesting on
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`that particular farm. But when activities—like the basic-necessities driving trips—
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`occur completely off a farm and are tied to harvesting services for many different
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`farms, we cannot match the off-the-farm activity to the operations of any one farm.
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`This type of work is separate from the agricultural activities themselves, akin to a
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`non-farmer’s operation of an off-the-farm irrigation system servicing multiple
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`USCA11 Case: 20-11995 Date Filed: 05/21/2021 Page: 14 of 14
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`farms. Cf. Farmers Reservoir, 337 U.S. at 763, 767; see also Holly Farms, 517
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`U.S. at 411 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
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`part) (explaining that the “on a farm” clause is concerned with the nature of the
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`work performed by the worker).
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`Finally, Statewide argues that the basic-necessities transportation is
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`“agriculture” because the transportation was “indispensable for the H-2A workers”
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`and it provided this transportation only to comply with the requirements of the H-
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`2A program. But even assuming that this transportation was necessary for
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`harvesting, the Supreme Court has explained that “whether a particular type of
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`activity is agricultural is not determined by the necessity of the activity to
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`agriculture.” Farmers Reservoir, 337 U.S. at 761; see also Fort Mason Fruit Co. v.
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`Durkin, 214 F.2d 363, 364 (5th Cir. 1954) (rejecting argument that employees who
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`worked off a farm were agricultural workers because their work was “necessary to
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`the maintenance and operation” of employer’s business that gathered fruit from
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`farms (internal quotation marks omitted)). Simply put, “[n]o matter how closely
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`related it may be to farming operations, a practice performed neither by a farmer
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`nor on a farm is not within the scope of the ‘secondary’ meaning of ‘agriculture.’”
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`29 C.F.R. § 780.129. The agriculture exemption does not apply.
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`IV. CONCLUSION
`We AFFIRM the judgment in favor of Ramirez and Santana.
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`14
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