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`In the
`United States Court of Appeals
`For the Eleventh Circuit
`
`____________________
`
`No. 20-12547
`____________________
`
`
`In Re: Mosaic Management Group, Inc.,
`
`___________________________________________________
`
`UNITED STATES TRUSTEE REGION 21,
`
`Debtor.
`
`versus
`BAST AMRON LLP,
`
`
`Plaintiff-Appellee
`Cross-Appellant,
`
`Defendant-Appellant
`Cross-Appellee.
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`
`

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`Opinion of the Court
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`20-12547
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`____________________
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`Appeals from the United States District Court
`for the Southern District of Florida
`D.C. Docket No. 16-bk-20833-EPK
`____________________
`
`
`Before JORDAN, BRASHER, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
`ANDERSON, Circuit Judge:
`Quarterly fees are collected pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1930 in
`each quarter of a chapter 11 bankruptcy based on the amount of
`disbursements made. The United States Trustee collects the fees
`in most districts in the country, while an arm of the Judicial Con-
`ference does so in six. This case is a challenge to the 2017 legislation
`that increased the quarterly fee chargeable for the largest chapter
`11 bankruptcies, those distributing $1 million or more in a given
`quarter. We must determine whether this increase applied to dis-
`bursements in a case pending at the time the law was enacted,
`whether the law violated due process rights, and whether the law
`is one on the subject of bankruptcies or is a tax such that a consti-
`tutional uniformity requirement applies, which in turn requires us
`to consider whether the law is nonuniform. The bankruptcy court
`determined that the increased fees applied to the instant case and
`that the only constitutional violation was a partial uniformity issue.
`After thorough review and with the benefit of oral argument, we
`conclude that the 2017 legislation applied to this pending
`
`

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`Opinion of the Court
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`bankruptcy case without a due process violation and without of-
`fending a uniformity requirement, the only source of which is the
`Bankruptcy Uniformity Clause.
`I. BACKGROUND
`Debtors Mosaic Management Group, Inc., Mosaic Alterna-
`tive Assets, Ltd., and Paladin Settlements, Inc. operated in the life
`settlement industry, buying life insurance policies from insureds,
`and then selling interests in those policies to investors. In 2008, the
`debtors filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in the Southern District of
`Florida, a “UST district” in which the U.S. Trustee program oper-
`ates. “The six federal judicial districts in Alabama and North Caro-
`lina are the only districts in the country that have a Bankruptcy Ad-
`ministrator” (“BA districts”) and are not a part of the U.S. Trustee
`program, though the Administrator (part of the judicial branch)
`performs similar tasks as the U.S. Trustee (part of the executive
`branch). L. Sols. of Chi. LLC v. Corbett, 971 F.3d 1299, 1307 n.3
`(11th Cir. 2020).
`
`On June 6, 2017, the bankruptcy court entered an order con-
`firming a joint chapter 11 plan. Under the plan, virtually all the
`debtors’ assets were transferred to an “Investment Trust” to which
`Margaret J. Smith, predecessor to Appellant in this case, was ap-
`pointed as “Investment Trustee.” Smith, as Investment Trustee,
`managed the Mosaic Investment Trust for the benefit of investors
`and creditors with allowed claims. Pursuant to the bankruptcy
`plan and confirmation order, the debtors were required to “pay the
`United States Trustee the appropriate sum required pursuant to 28
`
`

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`Opinion of the Court
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`U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6) for post-confirmation periods within the time
`period set forth in 28 U.S.C. §1930(a)(6), based upon all post-confir-
`mation disbursements.” Such payments would be required until
`the earlier of the closing of the case or the entry of an order dis-
`missing the case or converting it to another chapter under the
`Bankruptcy Code.
`At the time the bankruptcy plan was confirmed in June 2017,
`Section 1930(a)(6) provided,
`In addition to the filing fee paid to the clerk, a quar-
`terly fee shall be paid to the United States trustee, for
`deposit in the Treasury, in each case under chapter 11
`of title 11 for each quarter (including any fraction
`thereof) until the case is converted or dismissed,
`whichever occurs first. . . . The fee shall be payable
`on the last day of the calendar month following the
`calendar quarter for which the fee is owed.
`28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6) (2012). The minimum fee set by the statute
`was “$325 for each quarter in which disbursements total less than
`$15,000,” and gradually increased based on the larger the amount
`of disbursements up to “$30,000 for each quarter in which disburse-
`ments total more than $30,000,000.”1 Id. Section 1930(a)(7) stated
`
`
`
`1 The remainder of the fee schedule in § 1930(a)(6) was as follows:
`$650 for each quarter in which disbursements total $15,000 or
`more but less than $75,000; $975 for each quarter in which dis-
`bursements total $75,000 or more but less than $150,000;
`$1,625 for each quarter in which disbursements total $150,000
`
`

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`Opinion of the Court
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`that “[i]n districts that are not part of a United States trustee re-
`gion,” i.e., BA districts, “the Judicial Conference of the United
`States may require the debtor in a case under chapter 11 of title 11
`to pay fees equal to those imposed by paragraph (6) of this subsec-
`tion.” 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(7) (2012).
`A few months later, on October 26, 2017, Congress enacted
`the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017 (the “2017 Amendment”),
`which temporarily increased fees for the largest debtors in chapter
`11 cases to address a dwindling U.S. Trustee program budget re-
`sulting from declining bankruptcy filings and to fund bankruptcy
`judgeships. Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-72,
`
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`or more but less than $225,000; $1,950 for each quarter in
`which disbursements total $225,000 or more but less than
`$300,000; $4,875 for each quarter in which disbursements total
`$300,000 or more but less than $1,000,000; $6,500 for each
`quarter in which disbursements total $1,000,000 or more but
`less than $2,000,000; $9,750 for each quarter in which disburse-
`ments total $2,000,000 or more but less than $3,000,000;
`$10,400 for each quarter in which disbursements total
`$3,000,000 or more but less than $5,000,000; $13,000 for each
`quarter in which disbursements total $5,000,000 or more but
`less than $15,000,000; $20,000 for each quarter in which dis-
`bursements total $15,000,000 or more but
`less
`than
`$30,000,000 . . . .
`28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6) (2012). This fee schedule was established by legislation
`enacted in 2007, when Congress increased fees from the amounts previously
`set in 1996. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, sec.
`213(b), § 1930, 121 Stat. 1844, 1914.
`
`

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`sec. 1004(a), § 1930(a)(6), 131 Stat. 1224, 1232; H.R. Rep. No. 115-
`130, at 7–9 (2017). From 2018 through 2022, if the U.S. Trustee
`System Fund had a balance of less than $200 million in the prior
`fiscal year, the 2017 Amendment provided that the “quarterly fee
`payable for a quarter in which disbursements equal or exceed
`$1,000,000 shall be the lesser of 1 percent of such disbursements or
`$250,000.” Pub. L. No. 115-72, sec. 1004(a), § 1930(a)(6), 131 Stat.
`at 1232. Otherwise, the existing fee schedule remained.
`
`In BA districts, where the Judicial Conference was author-
`ized to “require the debtor in a case under chapter 11 of title 11 to
`pay fees equal to those imposed by paragraph (6),” 28 U.S.C.
`§ 1930(a)(7) (2012), the 2017 Amendment’s fee increase was not im-
`mediately implemented. In September 2018, the Conference ap-
`proved the new quarterly fee provision “for cases filed on or after
`October 1, 2018 for any fiscal year in which the U.S. Trustee Pro-
`gram exercises its authority under that statute, and pursuant to any
`future extensions of that or similar authority.” Judicial Conference
`of the U.S., Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of
`the United States 11–12 (Sept. 2018).
`
`The Investment Trust paid the increased fees imposed by
`the 2017 Amendment, having distributed between $750,000 and
`$10,000,000 for each of the quarters in fiscal year 2018 and the first
`two quarters of 2019. The increased fees resulted in $125,816.69 or
`3.5 times more in fees paid than would have been required pursu-
`ant to § 1930(a)(6) prior to the 2017 Amendment.
`
`

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`Opinion of the Court
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`In September 2019, Smith filed a motion requesting a deter-
`mination of the Investment Trust’s quarterly fee liability under
`§ 1930(a)(6) and reimbursement of already paid fees that exceeded
`the amount that would have been owed prior to the 2017 Amend-
`ment. Smith argued that the Amendment did not apply to cases
`that had been filed or had their plans confirmed before the Amend-
`ment took effect, that it violated the Due Process Clause of the
`Fifth Amendment, and that it violated the constitutional tax and
`bankruptcy uniformity requirements because the increased fees
`had only been imposed in UST districts and not in BA districts.
`Nancy J. Gargula, the United States Trustee for Region 21,2 op-
`posed the motion.
`The bankruptcy court largely denied Smith’s motion but
`granted it in part. The court held that § 1930(a)(6) as amended was
`mostly uniform—whether either the tax or bankruptcy constitu-
`tional requirement applied—because the overarching purpose of
`the 2017 Amendment was to eliminate a funding shortfall in the
`UST system and develop a reasonable reserve, and it did so by only
`effecting a fee increase in UST districts. The court explained that
`the Amendment created a partial uniformity problem, however,
`because 2% of the fees collected in UST districts were to be paid to
`
`
`
`2 Region 21 encompasses the district from which this case originated, the
`Southern District of Florida, as well as the rest of the districts in Florida and
`the districts in Georgia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. 28 U.S.C.
`§ 581(a)(21).
`
`

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`the general U.S. Treasury fund (hereinafter the “2% allocation”),
`which offset the cost of a temporary bankruptcy judgeship in a BA
`district. As a remedy, the court ordered the U.S. Trustee to credit
`Smith as Investment Trustee a sum equal to 2% of the quarterly
`fees paid since January 1, 2018. Otherwise, the court rejected
`Smith’s other challenges to the increased quarterly fees, holding
`that the 2017 Amendment applied prospectively to disbursements
`made after the effective date of the Amendment regardless of when
`the case had been filed or if a plan had been confirmed and that
`there was no due process violation.
`On May 20, 2020, the parties filed a joint certification for di-
`rect appeal in the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A)
`and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8006(c). This Court au-
`thorized direct appeal of the matter on July 10, 2020.
`
`During the pendency of this appeal, Smith, the Trustee of
`the Mosaic Investment Trust (pursuant to the order of the bank-
`ruptcy court), has assigned all of the Investment Trust’s rights, title,
`and interests in the current appeal to an investment group, Bast
`Amron, LLP. See D.E. 68. Pursuant to an order in this court, Bast
`Amron, LLP, has been substituted as the Appellant-Cross Appellee
`in this appeal. See D.E. 69. Accordingly, in this opinion, we will
`hereinafter refer to this party as Appellant-Cross Appellee (or
`simply as Appellant) or as Bast Amron. Similarly, Gargula, the
`United States Trustee for Region 21, has now been succeeded in
`office and her successor, Mary Ida Townson, has become the Ap-
`pellee-Cross Appellant in this appeal. See D.E. 63; see also Fed. R.
`
`

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`Opinion of the Court
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`App. P. 43(c)(2). In this opinion, we will hereinafter refer to this
`party as Appellee-Cross Appellant (or simply as Appellee) or as Re-
`gion 21 United States Trustee.
`II. DISCUSSION
`Each of the two parties challenges the bankruptcy court’s
`decision regarding the quarterly fees owed to the U.S. Trustee by
`the Investment Trust. These appeals require us to address the fol-
`lowing: (a) whether the quarterly fee increase provision in the 2017
`Amendment was properly applied to Bast Amron’s case as one that
`was pending at the time of, and had its plan confirmed prior to, the
`law’s enactment; (b) whether the Amendment violated the sub-
`stantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
`ment; (c) whether it was a valid exercise of Congress’ power “[t]o
`lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises” that “shall be
`uniform throughout the United States,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1;
`and (d) whether it was a valid exercise of Congress’ power “[t]o
`establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies through-
`out the United States,” id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. We address in turn each
`of these purely legal questions de novo. See In re Barrett, 543 F.3d
`1239, 1241 (11th Cir. 2008) (“In considering this appeal, because the
`facts are undisputed, we will review the bankruptcy court’s conclu-
`sions of law de novo.”).
`A. The 2017 Amendment was Properly Applied to this Case
`Bast Amron argues that the bankruptcy court erred in hold-
`ing that the 2017 Amendment raised fees in the Investment Trust’s
`
`

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`case. It argues that the Amendment did not explicitly state that the
`fee increase for the largest chapter 11 bankruptcies applied retroac-
`tively and that the increased fees affected the Investment Trust’s
`and its creditors’ vested rights and expectations, and thus the pre-
`sumption against retroactivity requires that the Amendment not
`apply. Because Congress clearly expressed the statute’s proper
`temporal reach, and because the Trust made disbursements within
`that reach, we hold that the bankruptcy court correctly held that
`the increased fees imposed by the 2017 Amendment apply in this
`case.
`
`1. The initial inquiry is whether Congress expressly pre-
`scribed a statute’s temporal reach and, if so, the presump-
`tion against retroactivity does not apply, and we must ap-
`ply the statute as written.
`The Supreme Court has outlined a clear framework for anal-
`ysis “when an objection is made to applying a particular statute said
`to affect a vested right or to impose some burden on the basis of an
`act or event preceding the statute’s enactment.” Fernandez-Vargas
`v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 37, 126 S. Ct. 2422, 2428, 165 L. Ed. 2d 323
`(2006). “We first look to ‘whether Congress has expressly pre-
`scribed the statute’s proper reach,’ and in the absence of language
`as helpful as that we try to draw a comparably firm conclusion
`about the temporal reach specifically intended by applying ‘our
`normal rules of construction.’” Id. (citations omitted) (first quoting
`Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280, 114 S. Ct. 1483,
`1505, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1994); then quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521
`
`

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`U.S. 320, 326, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 2063, 138 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1997)). Only
`if we cannot ascertain the proper temporal reach of a statute do
`“we ask whether applying the statute to the person objecting
`would have a retroactive consequence in the disfavored sense of
`‘affecting substantive rights, liabilities, or duties [on the basis of]
`conduct arising before [its] enactment,’” and if so, the presumption
`against retroactivity applies to construe the statute as inapplicable.
`Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 278, 114
`S. Ct. at 1504).
`
`The question in the first instance is not simply whether Con-
`gress explicitly used the word “retroactive” or “pending,” and if
`neither was used, then we must analyze the retroactive conse-
`quences. Instead, “even absent explicit statutory language mandat-
`ing retroactivity, laws may be applied retroactively if courts are
`able to discern ‘clear congressional intent favoring such a result.’”
`United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1512–13 (11th Cir. 1997)
`(quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S. Ct. at 1505). Nor is the
`initial question guided by the presumption against retroactivity. “It
`is not until a statute is shown to have no firm provision about tem-
`poral reach but to produce a retroactive effect when straightfor-
`wardly applied that the presumption has its work to do.” Fernan-
`dez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 40, 126 S. Ct. at 2430 (citing Landgraf, 511
`U.S. at 280, 114 S. Ct. at 1505). This structured analysis “allocates
`to Congress responsibility for fundamental policy judgments con-
`cerning the proper temporal reach of statutes, and has the addi-
`tional virtue of giving legislators a predictable background rule
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`

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`against which to legislate.” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 273, 114 S. Ct. at
`1501.
`2. Congress expressly prescribed the temporal reach of the
`2017 Amendment’s provision that increased quarterly
`fees, and that reach included the Investment Trust’s dis-
`bursements in 2018 and the first quarters of 2019.
`Bast Amron’s challenge fails at the first step of this Landgraf
`analysis. The 2017 Amendment clearly provides for the temporal
`reach of the quarterly fee amendments it makes in a section entitled
`“Application of Amendments”:
`The amendments made by this section shall apply to
`quarterly fees payable under section 1930(a)(6) of title
`28, United States Code, as amended by this section,
`for disbursements made in any calendar quarter that
`begins on or after the date of enactment of this Act.
`Pub. L. No. 115-72, sec. 1004(c), § 1930, 131 Stat. at 1232. The trig-
`ger is thus future disbursements made in the quarters after the date
`of enactment. Because the 2017 Amendment was enacted on Oc-
`tober 26, 2017, disbursements made in the first quarter after enact-
`ment, the quarter starting on January 1, 2018, triggered the higher
`fees. Nothing states that fees are increased based on when the
`bankruptcy case was filed or whether a plan has been confirmed.
`Instead, Congress clearly indicated its intent to have the 2017
`Amendment and the increased fee provision apply to “disburse-
`ments made in any calendar quarter that begins on or after the date
`of enactment.” Id.; see In re Cir. City Stores, Inc., 996 F.3d 156, 168
`
`

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`(4th Cir. 2021) (“The [2017] Amendment thus makes clear that
`Congress intended for the increase to apply to all Chapter 11 quar-
`terly fees due in January 2018 or thereafter, without regard to the
`case’s filing date.”), cert. granted sub nom., Siegel v. Fitzgerald, No.
`21-441, 2022 WL 89272 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2022).
`The fee increase provision itself also indicates Congress’ in-
`tent and provides for additional temporal language, stating the fee
`increase applies “[d]uring each of fiscal years 2018 through 2022” if
`certain conditions are met. Those conditions are whether “the bal-
`ance in the United States Trustee System Fund as of September 30
`of the most recent full fiscal year is less than $200,000,000,” and, for
`the individual debtor, whether “disbursements equal or exceed
`$1,000,000” for the quarter in question. Pub. L. No. 115-72, sec.
`1004(a)(2), § 1930(a)(6), 131 Stat. at 1232. This further supports that
`it is disbursements made in the first quarter after enactment and
`thereafter that trigger the statute.
`
`The clear reliance of the 2017 Amendment’s application on
`future disbursements is bolstered by § 1930(a)(6)’s existing lan-
`guage, which tied the payment of fees to “in each case under chap-
`ter 11 . . . for each quarter . . . until the case is converted or dis-
`missed.”3 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6) (2012). There was nothing in the
`
`
`
`3 The 2017 Amendment split § 1930(a)(6) into (a)(6)(A) and (a)(6)(B). Section
`1930(a)(6)(A) retained the existing language, including that quoted in the text,
`and the fee schedule but had added to it “Except as provided in subparagraph
`(B).” Pub. L. No. 115-72, sec. 1004(a)(1), § 1930, 131 Stat. at 1232. Section
`
`

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`Opinion of the Court
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`language of § 1930(a)(6) or the 2017 Amendment that considered
`when a particular case was filed or when a plan was confirmed.4 If
`disbursements were made in any chapter 11 case in the quarter
`
`1930(a)(6)(B) included the fee increase provision at issue in this case that de-
`fined the fee as 1% of disbursements or $250,000 for quarterly disbursements
`of $1,000,000 or more if the conditions described above were met. Pub. L. No.
`115-72, sec. 1004(a)(2), § 1930, 131 Stat. at 1232.
`4 We reject the argument raised at oral argument that the 2017 Amendment
`does not apply to pending cases because the introductory phrase in § 1930(a)
`read and continues to read, “The parties commencing a case under title 11
`shall pay . . . the following filing fees,” implying that “commencing a case” is
`the trigger for quarterly fees, including the increased fees. Smith did not raise
`this argument in her briefing and thus waived it. See Walker v. City of Cal-
`houn, GA, 901 F.3d 1245, 1280 n.10 (11th Cir. 2018) (Martin, J., concurring in
`part and dissenting in part) (“[T]his Court’s longstanding rule is that argu-
`ments not briefed to the court and raised for the first time at oral argu-
`ment are deemed abandoned.”). Even so, nothing in the introductory clause
`negates the 2017 Amendment’s application to “disbursements made in any cal-
`endar quarter that begins on or after the date of enactment.” And § 1930(a)(6)
`had its own, separate introductory phrase, which stated, “In addition to the
`filing fee paid to the clerk, a quarterly fee shall be paid to the United States
`trustee.” This introductory phrase indicates that quarterly fees are separate
`from filing fees since they are “[i]n addition to” filing fees and paid to a differ-
`ent entity. Finally, the only authority offered at oral argument was the district
`court decision in USA Sales, Inc. v. Office of the United States Trustee, which
`only used the “commencing a case” language to analyze which conduct was
`affected by retroactive application after the court concluded that Congress did
`not prescribe the reach of the 2017 Amendment in the first step of the Landgraf
`analysis. 532 F. Supp. 3d 921, 934, 936–37 (C.D. Cal. 2021). We conclude the
`opposite on the first step of the analysis for the reasons stated above and thus
`do not need to reach the subsequent question in the Landgraf analysis regard-
`ing retroactive effects. But see infra note 9.
`
`

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`starting January 1, 2018, the increased fees applied. The language
`of the “Application of Amendments” provision, the increased fee
`provision, and the existing language of § 1930(a)(6) are clear, and
`there is no plausible construction of that language which would in-
`dicate a congressional intent that the 2017 Amendment should ap-
`ply only to bankruptcy cases which were initially filed after the date
`of enactment.5
`
`
`
`5 When asked about this clear language during oral argument, counsel for Ap-
`pellant argued that the Supreme Court in Landgraf held that the effective date
`of the statute does not determine this issue. But the Supreme Court did not
`go so far. When analyzing the only provision that spoke directly to the ques-
`tion regarding retroactive application of 1991 amendments to Title VII—a pro-
`vision that stated, “Except as otherwise specifically provided, this Act and the
`amendments made by this Act shall take effect upon enactment”—the Land-
`graf Court explained that “[t]hat language does not, by itself, resolve the ques-
`tion” because “[a] statement that a statute will become effective on a certain
`date does not even arguably suggest that it has any application to conduct that
`occurred at an earlier date.” 511 U.S. at 257, 114 S. Ct. at 1493 (footnote omit-
`ted). The Court proceeded to analyze specific effectiveness language particu-
`lar to certain substantive provisions of the statute. Id. at 258, 114 S. Ct. at 1493.
`It concluded that Congress did not prescribe the reach of the amendments. Id.
`at 280, 114 S. Ct. at 1505. What the Supreme Court did not do, however, was
`announce a rule that would require us to bypass relevant temporal language
`in a statute. Indeed, it emphasized just the opposite, that we must “respon[d]
`to the language of the statute” and consider that “[e]ven absent specific legis-
`lative authorization, application of new statutes passed after the events in suit
`is unquestionably proper in many situations.” Id. at 273, 114 S. Ct. at 1501.
`The Supreme Court has since further explained that “in the absence of lan-
`guage as helpful as” language that “expressly prescribed the statute’s proper
`reach,” “we try to draw a comparably firm conclusion about the temporal
`reach specifically intended by applying our normal rules of construction.”
`
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`3. Comparisons to the amendments made to chapter 12 of
`the Bankruptcy Code in the 2017 Amendment and to
`§ 1930(a)(6) in 1996 do not make the 2017 fee increase’s
`application to future disbursements any less clear.
`Despite this clear text, Bast Amron asks us to draw two neg-
`ative inferences she argues suggest the 2017 Amendment’s inap-
`plicability to pending cases: first, from another provision of the
`2017 Amendment and, second, from the 1996 amendments to
`§ 1930(a)(6). Neither inference is warranted.
`
`First, the 2017 Amendment, in addition to the fee increase in
`chapter 11 cases, made amendments to chapter 12 of the Bank-
`ruptcy Code—the chapter applicable to family farmers and fisher-
`man—with an “effective date” subsection stating such amend-
`ments apply in cases “pending on the date of enactment . . . in
`which the plan under chapter 12 . . . has not been confirmed on the
`date of enactment” and a discharge order has not been entered.
`Pub. L. No. 115-72, sec. 1005(c), 131 Stat. at 1234. The chapter 12
`amendments also expressly applied to bankruptcy cases com-
`menced on or after the date of enactment. Id. This plain
`
`
`Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 37, 126 S. Ct. at 2428 (internal quotation marks
`omitted) (citations omitted). The effective date provision in Landgraf was am-
`biguous and failed to indicate much about Congress’ intent. This is in clear
`contrast to the 2017 Amendment’s “Application of Amendments” section, the
`fee increase’s clear tie to disbursements on and after January 1, 2018, within a
`specific four-year window, and the existing language of § 1930(a)(6) tying
`quarterly fees to disbursements.
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`application to pending chapter 12 cases contrasts with the chapter
`11 quarterly fee amendments, says Bast Amron. But chapter 11 and
`chapter 12 and their respective amendments “address wholly dis-
`tinct subject matters”; thus, in comparing to the chapter 12 amend-
`ments, a “negative inference does not arise from the silence” of the
`chapter 11 amendments. See Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 356,
`119 S. Ct. 1998, 2005, 144 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1999) (“Because §§ 802 and
`803 address wholly distinct subject matters, the same negative in-
`ference does not arise from the silence of § 803.”); In re Buffets,
`L.L.C., 979 F.3d 366, 375 n.5 (5th Cir. 2020) (stating the court “de-
`cline[d] to draw that negative inference” regarding the application
`of the chapter 12 amendments). Furthermore, several courts have
`correctly highlighted why Congress included the plain language re-
`garding the application of chapter 12 amendments to pending
`cases: the 2017 Amendment expanded the scope of chapter 12 dis-
`charge and thus Congress needed to express its intent to preserve
`preexisting discharge orders that established vested rights. See Buf-
`fets, 979 F.3d at 375 n.5. Moreover, the changes to chapter 12 did
`not involve an increase in fees, and thus Congress could not express
`its clear intention, as here, by simply saying that the increased fees
`applied to disbursements made in quarters beginning after the ef-
`fective date. See Pub. L. No. 115-72, sec. 1005(a), (b), §§ 1232,
`1222(a), 1228, 1229, 131 Stat. at 1232–34. Thus, this negative infer-
`ence is unwarranted.
`Second, Bast Amron argues that amendments to § 1930(a)(6)
`in 1996 show that Congress knew how to make the application of
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`amendments to pending cases explicit in 2017. It is true that later,
`in September 1996, Congress did expressly make the 1996 fee in-
`crease applicable to pending cases. However, the initial January
`1996 legislation which imposed the 1996 fee increase was written
`in a roundabout way that confused courts with respect to whether
`it applied to pending cases. By all accounts the January 1996
`amendments created confusion in the courts regarding whether
`the expansion of quarterly fees beyond the confirmation of a plan
`applied to cases then pending.6 Congress thus had to fix the prob-
`lem, which it did later in September 1996, with clear language.7 By
`
`
`
`6 See In re Huff, 207 B.R. 539, 541 nn.4–5 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1997) (citing five-
`to-four split of decisions in favor of first 1996 amendment not applying to
`pending cases); see also In re Junior Food Mart of Ark., Inc., 201 B.R. 522, 524
`(Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1996) (applying statute to pending cases); In re Flatbush As-
`socs., 198 B.R. 75, 77 n.1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same).
`7 The second amendment, enacted on September 30, 1996, amended the same
`public law as the prior 1996 law. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act,
`1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, sec. 109(d), § 1930, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-19. The
`September 1996 amendment clarified that “the fees under 28 U.S.C. 1930(a)(6)
`shall accrue and be payable from and after January 27, 1996, in all cases (in-
`cluding, without limitation, any cases pending as of that date), regardless of
`confirmation status of their plans.” Id. sec. 109(d), § 1930, 110 Stat. at 3009-19.
`It also amended the quarterly fee schedule in § 1930(a)(6), partially replacing
`the one established in 1991; the minimum fee remained ($500 for $15,000 in
`disbursements or less) but the maximum fee increased to $10,000 for disburse-
`ments of $5 million or more and seven graduated fee levels based on disburse-
`ments between the minimum and maximum were defined (replacing the ex-
`isting three). Id. sec. 109(a), § 1930(a), 110 Stat. at 3009-18. This schedule re-
`mained until it was amended in 2007. See supra note 1.
`
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`contrast, in 2017, Congress used clear language right away—i.e.,
`the clear language regarding its application analyzed above—and
`thus there was no need for further amendment. See Cir. City
`Stores, 996 F.3d at 168 (“Unlike the 1996 amendment, the 2017
`Amendment plainly applies to all disbursements made after its ef-
`fective date.”). We conclude that a negative inference is not war-
`ranted from the 1996 amendment.
`
`Rather than draw a negative inference from the 1996 legisla-
`tion, we believe that the more recent amendment in 2007 imposing
`fee increases indicates that Congress understood in 2017 that it
`could increase fees with immediate effect without using the word