`
`
`
` [PUBLISH]
`
`In the
`United States Court of Appeals
`For the Eleventh Circuit
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`____________________
`
`No. 20-13868
`
`____________________
`
`
`RICHARD LEAKE,
`MICHAEL DEAN,
`
` Plaintiffs-Appellants,
`
`versus
`JAMES T. DRINKARD,
`In his personal capacity and official capacity as
`Assistant City Administrator of City of Alpharetta, Georgia,
`
`
` Defendant-Appellee.
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`
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`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`20-13868
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`____________________
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`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Northern District of Georgia
`D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-03463-WMR
`____________________
`
`Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, LAGOA, Circuit Judge, and
`SCHLESINGER,* District Judge.
`WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:
`In Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans,
`Inc., the Supreme Court clarified that, “[w]hen [the] government
`speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining
`the content of what it says.” 576 U.S. 200, 207 (2015). Some of the
`Sons of Confederate Veterans did not get the message. A member,
`Richard Leake, applied to participate in the Old Soldiers Day Pa-
`rade, a pro-American veterans parade funded and organized by the
`City of Alpharetta, Georgia. The City informed Leake that the Sons
`of Confederate Veterans would be allowed to participate, but only
`if it agreed not to fly the Confederate battle flag. Not content with
`this offer, Leake and Michael Dean, another Son, filed a civil-rights
`action against City officials, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the City
`violated their constitutional rights to speak freely under the First
`and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court held that the
`
`* Honorable Harvey Schlesinger, United States District Judge for the Middle
`District of Florida, sitting by designation.
`
`
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`Parade constituted government speech and entered summary judg-
`ment against the Sons. Because governments are not obliged under
`the First and Fourteenth Amendments to permit the presence of a
`rebellious army’s battle flag in the pro-veterans parades that they
`fund and organize, we affirm.
`I. BACKGROUND
`The Old Soldiers Day Parade began after the Civil War in
`the City of Alpharetta to honor veterans of that war, but the Parade
`was discontinued after a few years. The City resumed the Parade
`in 1952 after a small group of residents wanted to recognize local
`war veterans. The City has sponsored the Parade every year since
`then.
`
`The 67th Annual Old Soldiers Day Parade was held on Au-
`gust 3, 2019. On its website, the City promoted the Parade “as a
`way to celebrate and honor all war veterans, especially those from
`Alpharetta, who have defended the rights and freedoms enjoyed by
`everyone in the United States of America.” “The goal of this pa-
`rade,” according to the City’s advertisement, “is to celebrate Amer-
`ican war veterans and recognize their service to our country.” The
`City’s advertisement identified the “City of Alpharetta and Ameri-
`can Legion Post 201” as “hosts [of] the Annual Old Soldiers Day
`Parade.” Although the Legion was involved, the City was the Pa-
`rade’s primary financial sponsor and was responsible for almost all
`its costs (about $28,400). By contrast, the Legion did not financially
`contribute any significant amount.
`
`
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`This controversy arose from the process for determining
`which private organizations would be permitted to participate in
`the Parade. That process began with an application. And the appli-
`cation identified the theme of the Parade: “The American Legion -
`A Century of Service.” The application form included logos of both
`the Legion and the City. It instructed applicants to mail or fax the
`application to the “Parade Marshal” at “American Legion Post 201
`c/o City of Alpharetta Special Events” and listed government mail-
`ing and email addresses. The final decision about whether to per-
`mit an entity’s participation in the Parade was made by the City
`based on the message the Mayor and City Council wanted the Pa-
`rade to communicate. The Legion did not determine who partici-
`pated in the Parade.
`On the Monday after Independence Day in 2019, Richard
`Leake completed an application on behalf of the Roswell Mills
`Camp Sons of Confederate Veterans, of which he is a member. The
`application asked for a detailed description of the Sons of Confed-
`erate Veterans’s float. Leake wrote that there would be a “[t]ruck
`pulling trailer with participants holding unit flags.” The application
`also asked applicants to “write a description of what you would like
`to say about your group or organization as you pass the Reviewing
`Stand.” Leake wrote that they would say that the Sons of Confed-
`erate Veterans is an “organization dedicated to preserving the
`memory of our ancestors who served in the War Between the
`States and ensuring that the Southern view of that conflict is pre-
`served.” The application required that the Sons of Confederate
`
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`Veterans agree to “abide by all rules and regulations set forth by
`the event organizers[, the City of Alpharetta and the American Le-
`gion Post 201,] in the Old Soldiers Day Parade.” Leake signed the
`application.
`The following day, James Drinkard, the Assistant City Ad-
`ministrator, sent a letter to Leake in response to his application.
`The letter was sent “following approval from Mayor Gilvin.” In the
`letter, Drinkard reiterated that the purpose of the Parade is to
`“unite our community” to “celebrat[e] American war veterans,”
`and that, in the light of that purpose, “there is cause to question the
`appropriateness of participation by an organization devoted exclu-
`sively to commemorating and honoring Confederate soldiers.” (In-
`ternal quotation marks omitted.)
`
`Drinkard’s letter stated “that the Confederate Battle Flag has
`become a divisive symbol that a large portion of our citizens see as
`symbolizing oppression and slavery.” In the City’s view, that divi-
`siveness would draw “the spotlight away from the goals of the . . .
`Parade and the service of our American war veterans.” (Emphasis
`added.) The letter continued, “the City of Alpharetta will maintain
`its decision, supported unanimously by Mayor Gilvin and the City
`Council, to not allow the Confederate Battle Flag to be flown in
`the Old Soldiers Day Parade.”
`The City offered to allow the Sons of Confederate Veterans
`to participate in the Parade “absent the Confederate Battle Flag.”
`The Sons of Confederate Veterans would also have to agree not to
`do anything “that would detract from the event goal of uniting our
`
`
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`community for the purpose of celebrating American war veter-
`ans.” Drinkard informed Leake that “the City of Alpharetta [would]
`approve [his] application” if he were to agree to these conditions.
`Three days before the Parade, Leake and Dean sued
`Drinkard and other City officials, including Mayor Gilvin, for vio-
`lating their right to free speech under the First and Fourteenth
`Amendments. The Sons sought monetary damages for the viola-
`tion of their rights, as well as equitable relief in the form of a tem-
`porary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and a perma-
`nent injunction, so that they could participate with the Confeder-
`ate battle flag in the upcoming Parade and in future ones. See 42
`U.S.C. § 1983. On the day before the Parade, the district court re-
`served ruling on the motion for a temporary restraining order and
`declined to issue an injunction. The Parade went ahead as planned,
`without the participation of the Sons of Confederate Veterans,
`whose sympathizers instead flew the Confederate battle flag along
`the side of the Parade route.
`Later that year, the Mayor and City Council formally re-
`solved “that the City of Alpharetta shall no longer sponsor or finan-
`cially support future Old Soldiers Day Parades.” The City then
`moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Parade constituted
`government speech and that the claim for injunctive relief was now
`moot because of the City’s formal resolution to discontinue its
`sponsorship of the Parade in the future. The district court later
`granted summary judgment for the City on the ground that the
`Parade constituted government speech.
`
`
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`II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
`“We review a summary judgment de novo.” Mech v. Sch.
`Bd., 806 F.3d 1070, 1074 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations marks
`omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate in this case if, after
`viewing the record in the light most favorable to the Sons, id.,
`“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” such that the
`City “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” FED. R. CIV. P.
`56(a).
`
`III. DISCUSSION
`For the Sons to prevail in this civil-rights action, 42 U.S.C.
`§ 1983, they must show that they were “deprived of a federal right
`by a person acting under color of state law.” Griffin v. City of Opa-
`Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001). The City admits that it
`acted under color of state law when it prohibited the Sons from
`displaying the Confederate battle flag at the Parade. The parties
`dispute whether the City deprived the Sons of their right to speak
`freely under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The City ar-
`gues that there was no deprivation because the Parade constituted
`the City’s speech; the Sons argue the contrary. We agree with the
`City.
`
`The First Amendment provides in relevant part that “Con-
`gress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S.
`CONST. AMEND. I. This “personal” right is now protected against
`State abridgment by the Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow v. New
`
`
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`York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). But whether that personal right has
`been abridged depends crucially on whose speech is at issue.
`The First Amendment works as a shield to protect private
`persons from “encroachment[s] by the government” on their right
`to speak freely, Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp.
`of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 566 (1995), not as a sword to compel the
`government to speak for them. In other words, “[t]he Free Speech
`Clause of the First Amendment ‘restricts government regulation of
`private speech; it does not regulate government speech.’” Mech,
`806 F.3d at 1074 (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555
`U.S. 460, 467 (2009)). That is, “[a] government entity has the right
`to speak for itself,” which consists generally in the ability “to say
`what it wishes” and “to select the views that it wants to express.”
`Summum, 555 U.S. at 467–68 (internal quotation marks omitted).
`
`When the government speaks, it may refuse to endorse or
`freely remove speech of which it disapproves. Mech, 806 F.3d at
`1074. And “[p]arades are . . . a form of expression” that involve
`“marching to make a point.” Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568. It follows that,
`if the Parade was the City’s speech, the City was free to condition
`the Sons’ participation in the Parade on their not displaying the
`Confederate battle flag; the Sons’ “case could not [then] proceed
`under the Free Speech Clause.” Cambridge Christian Sch., Inc. v.
`Fla. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 942 F.3d 1215, 1230 (11th Cir. 2019).
`In a word, if the Parade was government speech, the Sons lose.
`Mech, 806 F.3d at 1074.
`
`
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`What makes speech government speech? Although we lack
`a “precise test,” id., there are three factors we use to distinguish
`government speech from private speech: history, endorsement,
`and control, Cambridge, 942 F.3d at 1230. “The first factor—his-
`tory—directs us to ask whether the type of speech under scrutiny
`has traditionally ‘communicated messages’ on behalf of the gov-
`ernment.” Id. at 1232 (quoting Walker, 576 U.S. at 211). The second
`factor—endorsement—asks whether “observers reasonably be-
`lieve the government has endorsed the message.” Mech, 806 F.3d
`at 1076. “Finally, the control factor asks whether the relevant gov-
`ernment unit ‘maintains direct control over the messages con-
`veyed’ through the speech in question.” Cambridge, 942 F.3d at
`1234 (quoting Walker, 576 U.S. at 213).
`These factors are neither individually nor jointly necessary
`for speech to constitute government speech. See Mech, 806 F.3d at
`1075–76. But a finding that all evidence government speech will al-
`most always result in a finding that the speech is that of the gov-
`ernment. See, e.g., Walker, 576 U.S. at 210–14; Dean v. Warren,
`No. 19-14674, slip op. at 33–38 (11th Cir. 2021). And all three factors
`support the City’s position that the Parade constituted its speech.
`A. History
`The history of military parades in general, and this Parade in
`particular, weighs in favor of finding that the Parade was govern-
`ment speech. Just as “[g]overnments have long used monuments
`to speak to the public” and “commemorate military victories and
`sacrifices,” Summum, 555 U.S. at 470, so too governments of all
`
`
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`kinds have from time immemorial used parades to communicate
`the same kinds of messages. Examples are legion. Take one: The
`Roman triumphs were “famous parades through the city of Rome
`that celebrated Rome’s greatest victories against its enemies.”
`MARY BEARD, THE ROMAN TRIUMPH 1 (2009). And they also in-
`volved celebrating war veterans. Id. (“To be awarded a triumph
`was the most outstanding honor a Roman general could hope
`for.”).
`
`Since then, governments, up to and including the United
`States, have used triumph parades to celebrate their militaries. For
`example, in 1899 “the victories of Admiral George Dewey in the
`Spanish-American War were celebrated with a triumphal parade in
`New York” and “a special triumphal arch was built . . . at Madison
`Square.” Id. at 2. So the particular medium of communication at
`issue here—a parade—is one that, since “ancient times,” Summum,
`555 U.S. at 470, “has traditionally ‘communicated messages’ on be-
`half of the government,” Cambridge, 942 F.3d at 1232 (quoting
`Walker, 576 U.S. at 211). And the “kind of speech” conveyed
`through that medium—celebration of the military—is one that was
`“often closely identified in the public mind with the government.”
`Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
`
`The history of this Parade especially fits within the general
`history of government-sponsored parades. The City has sponsored
`the Parade every year since 1952. The Parade’s central purpose was
`to honor and celebrate American war veterans. The 2019 Parade’s
`purpose and message were the same. And the City remained its
`
`
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`only significant financial sponsor. So history establishes both that
`the medium used here and the message conveyed through it are
`ones traditionally associated with governments. It follows that this
`factor favors the City. See Mech, 806 F.3d at 1075–76 (“A medium
`that has long communicated government messages is more likely
`to be government speech . . . .”).
`B. Endorsement
`The City expressly “endorsed the [Parade’s] message,”
`which “strongly suggests that the [Parade] [is] government
`speech.” Id. at 1076. The City publicly advertised and promoted the
`2019 Parade on its website, where it identified itself and the Legion
`as co-hosts. The City publicly identified the “goal of th[e] parade”
`as the celebration of “American war veterans” and the recognition
`of “their service to our country.” The City publicly endorsed the
`sentiment that “all war veterans, especially those from Alpharetta”
`should be “celebrate[d] and honor[ed].” And the City publicly ad-
`vertised that the Parade would open with a performance by the
`City Band. “[O]bservers [would have] reasonably believe[d] the
`government ha[d] endorsed the [Parade’s] message” because the
`City expressly and publicly did so. Mech, 806 F.3d at 1076; see also
`Dean, No. 19-14674, slip op. at 35 (concluding that “there is no
`doubt that Kennesaw State University endorses the message con-
`veyed by its cheerleading team” because of express statements on
`the athletics department’s website evidencing that cheerleaders
`“are expected to convey a message of which the university ap-
`proves”).
`
`
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`The Legion’s involvement does not undermine this conclu-
`sion. To be sure, Drinkard asserted in an email that the Parade “is
`largely viewed as the Legion’s event.” But he admitted in the same
`sentence that “the event is put on as a partnership between the
`American Legion and the City.” (Emphasis added.) That partner-
`ship was a matter of public knowledge. And a partnership “suggests
`that the [Legion] has a close relationship with the [City]—i.e., that
`the [Legion] is an ‘associate’ or is ‘engaged together in the same
`activity.’” Mech, 806 F.3d at 1076 (quoting Partner, Oxford English
`Dictionary (online ed.)). So both the City and the Legion publicly
`came together to endorse the same message. Indeed, “partnership”
`is an understatement. Although the Legion was publicly identified
`as a co-host of the Parade, it did not financially contribute to it in
`any significant amount. The City, by contrast, covered almost all
`the Parade costs, including those associated with the event space,
`public safety personnel, barricades, and vendors to service the Pa-
`rade.
`
`The Sons contend that the Parade’s being “sponsored with
`both private and public money” is sufficient to make it private
`speech and that “the City is using its position as a majority-sponsor
`of the parade to regulate private speech.” But neither the Legion’s
`involvement nor the involvement of private organizations as par-
`ticipants in the Parade itself establish that the City did not endorse
`the messages communicated by the Parade. “The fact that private
`parties take part in the design and propagation of a message does
`not extinguish the governmental nature of the message,” Walker,
`
`
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`576 U.S. at 217, especially if, as here, the government is organizing
`and funding the event through which the message is communi-
`cated. Cities “typically do not” organize and fund events that con-
`tain “messages with which they do not wish to be associated.” Id.
`at 212 (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). And
`“because [the speech] occurs at a government-organized event” in
`the form of the Parade, “we can safely assume that the organiz-
`ers . . . generally would not allow . . . messages they did[ not] want
`to be associated with.” Cambridge, 942 F.3d at 1233. It is obvious,
`then, that observers would interpret a parade promoted, orga-
`nized, and funded by the government “as conveying some message
`on [its] behalf.” Walker, 576 U.S. at 212 (internal quotation marks
`omitted).
`
`C. Control
`The final factor—control—strongly supports that the Pa-
`rade was the City’s speech. The evidence establishes that the City
`“maintains direct control over the messages conveyed” in the Pa-
`rade. Id. at 213. Participation in the Parade depended on submis-
`sion of an application to the City. The application expressly re-
`quired applicants to describe the kinds of messages they intended
`to convey at the Parade. “[F]inal approval authority” over the ap-
`plication was exercised by the City based on the message the Mayor
`and City Council wanted the Parade to communicate. Johanns v.
`Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 561 (2005); see also Mech, 806
`F.3d at 1078 (holding that the control factor “strongly suggests that
`the banners are government speech” because school principals
`
`
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`were obliged to approve every banner before they were placed on
`school fences). The Legion, by contrast, did not determine who
`participated in the Parade.
`All these facts establish that the control factor weighs in the
`City’s favor. The City “effectively controlled the messages con-
`veyed” by requiring applicants to describe the messages they in-
`tended to communicate and then by “exercising final approval au-
`thority over their selection” based on those descriptions. Walker,
`576 U.S. at 213 (alterations adopted) (internal quotation marks
`omitted). When the City exercised this control as the Parade’s or-
`ganizer by excluding organizations with whose speech the City dis-
`agreed, the City was speaking. See Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & In-
`stitutional Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 64 (2006) (“[A] parade organizer’s
`choice of parade contingents . . . is . . . inherently expressive.”).
`
`To be sure, once an applicant is admitted, it may renege on
`its express promise on the application form to “abide by all rules
`and regulations set forth by the event organizers.” But the govern-
`ment need not “control every word or aspect of speech in order for
`the control factor to lean toward government speech.” Cambridge,
`942 F.3d at 1235–36. If the reverse were true, any speech through
`private parties would involve yielding control. The government-
`speech doctrine does not require omnipotence. See id. (“[C]om-
`plete control is not required.”). And, as we have repeatedly
`stressed, the City was free “to express its views” by receiving “as-
`sistance from private sources for the purpose of delivering a gov-
`ernment-controlled message.” Summum, 555 U.S. at 468. The City
`
`
`
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`decided which private groups to admit or exclude based on the con-
`sistency of the groups’ characterizations of their intended speech
`on the City’s application form with the messages the City wanted
`to communicate through the Parade. And the City required that
`participants agree in advance to abide by “all rules and regulations”
`that the City imposed. Either exclusion or advance preconditions
`would be adequate control. Because all three factors point in the
`same direction, we conclude that the Parade was the City’s speech.
`Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017), is not to the contrary.
`In Matal, the Supreme Court held that the content of registered
`trademarks is not government speech in part because the govern-
`ment would then be “babbling prodigiously and incoherently,” ex-
`pressing at once “contradictory views.” Id. at 1758. The Sons rely
`heavily on this reasoning. They argue that, if the Parade were the
`City’s speech and the Sons participated even without displaying the
`Confederate battle flag, the City would be expressing contradictory
`views by “simultaneously endors[ing] opposing sides of the same
`wars, such as the Union and the Confederacy.”
`There is nothing to this argument. Matal’s reasoning about
`contradictory speech followed other considerations in the light of
`which the Court concluded that “it is far-fetched to suggest that the
`content of a registered mark is government speech.” Id. The Court
`explained that the government “does not edit marks submitted for
`registration”; “an examiner may not reject a mark based on the
`viewpoint that it appears to express” (save the exception at issue in
`that case); “an examiner does not inquire whether any viewpoint
`
`
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`conveyed by a mark is consistent with Government policy”; if the
`mark meets viewpoint-neutral requirements, “registration is man-
`datory”; and the placement of the mark on the principal register is
`ordinarily not reviewed by any official higher than the examiner.
`Id. The opposite facts exist in this case: The City asked for a detailed
`description of the intended speech so that it could “edit” the
`speech. The City exercised the discretion to reject any organization
`based on whether the viewpoint it intended to express was con-
`sistent with the City’s views. And the ultimate decision was made
`by the highest City authorities. This appeal is not Matal.
`In any event, “[e]ven if we agreed that the protection of the
`government-speech doctrine must be forfeited whenever there is
`inconsistency in the message, we would nonetheless accord the
`protection here” because the City’s message was consistent. Jo-
`hanns, 544 U.S. at 561 n.5. The fallacy in the Sons’ argument is the
`implicit assumption that all views associated with all participants
`would be the City’s speech if the Parade were the City’s speech.
`But that assumption is false. “By accepting” a float, the City “does
`not necessarily endorse the specific meaning that any particular do-
`nor sees in” it. Summum, 555 U.S. at 476–77.
`Consider an example on which the Sons rely: The City al-
`lowed the “Democrat Party of Fulton County [to] participate.” In
`the light of the Parade’s central message—honoring veterans—ob-
`servers could reasonably infer from their participation not that the
`City endorsed everything for which the Democrats stand, but that
`the City has brought together diverse “private parties” to
`
`
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`“propagat[e]” one common message with which all participating
`parties agreed. Walker, 576 U.S. at 217. And one could reasonably
`infer that there was nothing on the Democratic Party’s float that
`the City thought was incompatible with the values it was seeking
`to promote through the Parade. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574 (“Ra-
`ther like a composer, the [organizer] selects the expressive units of
`the parade from potential participants, and though the score may
`not produce a particularized message, each contingent’s expression
`in the [organizer’s] eyes comports with what merits celebration on
`that day.”).
`
`Far from communicating an inconsistent message, the City
`sought to keep its message consistent by excluding the Confederate
`battle flag. As Drinkard explained to Leake, the City’s view was that
`the Confederate battle flag symbolizes oppression and slavery, and
`its inclusion was inconsistent with its goal of uniting the commu-
`nity. The public purpose of the Parade was to celebrate the service
`of veterans who “defended the rights and freedoms enjoyed by eve-
`ryone.” (Emphasis added.) The City was free to exercise its right to
`exclude the Confederate battle flag from its Parade on those bases
`or any others. See Walker, 576 U.S. at 206 (upholding Texas’s deci-
`sion to exclude the Confederate battle flag from its license plates
`based on Texas’s determination that “a significant portion of the
`public associate the confederate flag with organizations advocating
`expressions of hate” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
`Finally, “[a]bsurd results would follow if the First Amend-
`ment protected” the Sons’ right to fly the Confederate battle flag in
`
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`the City-organized Parade. Dean, No. 19-14674, slip op. at 37. By
`the Sons’ logic, anytime the government seeks to organize an event
`by bringing private parties together to communicate a message the
`government wants expressed, it must allow the participation of
`other parties that will express the opposite message. For example,
`if after ratification of the Bill of Rights the federal government
`funded and organized a parade commemorating our stunning vic-
`tory over Great Britain, it would have had to allow participation of
`Union Jack-waving loyalists if it allowed participation of Gadsden
`flag-waving patriots. The Constitution does not require such an ab-
`surdity. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 480 (rejecting the proposition
`that “[e]very jurisdiction that has accepted a donated war memorial
`may be asked to provide equal treatment for a donated monument
`questioning the cause for which the veterans fought”); see also Peo-
`ple for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Gittens, 414 F.3d
`23, 30 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“No one could plausibly argue that an In-
`auguration Parade has to have balance, or that the losing Presiden-
`tial candidate must—if he requests—be allowed to have a float of
`his own.”). And with good reason: It “would lead almost inexora-
`bly to” the end of government-sponsored parades, a medium of
`communication governments have used from time immemorial.
`Summum, 555 U.S. at 480.
`The three-factor analysis establishes that, when govern-
`ments organize and sponsor a parade to communicate a message,
`the parade is their speech from which they may include or exclude
`participants at will. “Since every participating unit affects the
`
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`message conveyed by the . . . organizers” of a parade, neither the
`government nor private parties may compel them “to alter the ex-
`pressive content of their parade.” Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572–73. This
`principle applies no matter whether the organizer is the govern-
`ment or a private party. A government cannot compel a private
`parade organizer to admit groups of whose views the private or-
`ganizer disapproves. Id. at 574–75 (holding that the State could not
`compel a private parade organizer to admit a gay, lesbian, and bi-
`sexual advocacy group because the “parade’s organizers” had a
`right to choose not “to propound a particular point of view”). And
`we hold that a private organization cannot compel a government
`parade organizer to admit groups of whose views the government
`disapproves.
`
`“To the [Sons of Confederate Veterans], [the Confederate
`battle flag] is said to evoke the memory of their ancestors and other
`soldiers who fought for the South in the Civil War.” Walker, 576
`U.S. at 234 (Alito, J., dissenting). But to many others, “it symbolizes
`slavery, segregation, and hatred.” Id. That sentiment is not surpris-
`ing.
`
`Southern governments began prominently displaying the
`Confederate battle flag, not soon after their defeat by the United
`States in 1865, but in the 1950s and 1960s “in symbolic defiance of
`changing laws that threatened” state-compelled racial segregation.
`Moore v. Bryant, 205 F. Supp. 3d 834, 843 (S.D. Miss. 2016). “In
`early 1948, as President Truman pressed for Civil Rights legislation,
`some Southern Democrats called
`for an anti-Truman,
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`segregationist electoral bloc in the South.” Chris Springer, The
`Troubled Resurgence of the Confederate Flag, 43 HIST. TODAY, no.
`6, June 1993, at 7, 8. Segregationist Democrats “appropriated the
`Confederate flag as their symbol” and “[f]or their political and ra-
`cial revolt” against federal civil-rights legislation, “they mustered
`behind them all the iconography of the Confederacy.” Id. “In 1956,
`Georgia redesigned its flag to include the Confederate battle em-
`blem,” and both South Carolina and Alabama raised the flag at
`their state capitols in 1962 and 1963, respectively, at the height of
`their attempts to preserve the institution of racial segregation.
`Moore, 205 F. Supp. at 843–44. As a result, “the Dixiecrat campaign
`greatly strengthened the links between the flag and white suprem-
`acism.” Springer, supra, at 8.
`The City recognized the obvious fact that the flag “has be-
`come a divisive symbol that a large portion of our citizens see as
`symbolizing oppression and slavery.” Although Southern govern-
`ments once flew the flag to promote those unjust causes, they can-
`not now be compelled to do so by private parties when they have
`made the decision to promote just causes instead. We hold that the
`Parade was the City’s speech. It follows that the Sons of Confeder-
`ate Ve