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`In the
`United States Court of Appeals
`For the Eleventh Circuit
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`____________________
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`No. 21-11428
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`MICHAEL BAXTER,
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`versus
`LOUIS ROBERTS, III,
`TREVOR LEE,
`Deputy,
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` Plaintiff-Appellant,
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` Defendants-Appellees.
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`____________________
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`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Northern District of Florida
`D.C. Docket No. 5:19-cv-00216-MCR-MJF
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`In the
`United States Court of Appeals
`For the Eleventh Circuit
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`____________________
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`No. 21-11428
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`MICHAEL BAXTER,
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`versus
`LOUIS ROBERTS, III,
`TREVOR LEE,
`Deputy,
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` Plaintiff-Appellant,
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` Defendants-Appellees.
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`____________________
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`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Northern District of Florida
`D.C. Docket No. 5:19-cv-00216-MCR-MJF
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`Opinion of the Court
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`21-11428
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`Before WILSON, BRANCH, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
`BRANCH, Circuit Judge:
`This is an appeal from summary judgment in a civil rights
`case arising from a traffic stop and arrest that took place in
`Northwest Florida on December 24, 2017. On that day, Michael
`Baxter was pulled over by Deputy Trevor Lee of the Jackson
`County Sheriff’s Office for erratic driving. During the stop, Deputy
`Lee noticed an open container of beer and decided to issue a
`warning citation. Deputy Lee wrote—but never delivered—the
`ticket. Instead, a few minutes into the stop, he ordered Baxter out
`of the truck so he could walk his drug-sniffing dog around the
`vehicle. The encounter escalated. Baxter resisted Deputy Lee’s
`commands verbally and then physically. Once Baxter exited the
`truck, Deputy Lee arrested him for obstruction. Baxter suffered
`minor injuries. His truck was searched, but no drugs were found.
`The obstruction charge was later dismissed.
`
`A couple years after this encounter, Baxter filed claims
`against Deputy Lee and the Jackson County Sheriff under 42 U.S.C.
`§ 1983 and Florida common law. In his § 1983 claims against
`Deputy Lee, Baxter asserted that Deputy Lee violated his Fourth
`Amendment rights in four ways. Baxter alleged that Deputy Lee
`(1) initiated the traffic stop without justification; (2) unlawfully
`prolonged the stop to conduct a dog sniff for the presence of drugs;
`(3) arrested him for obstruction without probable cause; and (4)
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`used excessive force in arresting him. Under a Monell1 theory of
`liability, Baxter asserted that the Jackson County Sheriff was also
`responsible for the constitutional violations he endured. In his
`state law claims, Baxter asserted false imprisonment and battery
`against Deputy Lee personally and the sheriff vicariously.
`The district court granted the defendants summary
`judgment. It held that Deputy Lee was entitled to qualified
`immunity on the § 1983 claims and otherwise found that Baxter’s
`claims lacked merit. The district court got it mostly right—but not
`entirely. One aspect of Baxter’s § 1983 claims—whether Deputy
`Lee unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop—presents triable issues
`that preclude qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage.
`The same is true for two aspects of Baxter’s false imprisonment
`claim. In all other respects, the district court was correct.
`
`Accordingly, after careful review and with the benefit of oral
`argument, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
`
`I. Background
`
`A. Facts2
`On December 24, 2017, Michael Baxter stopped at a
`convenience store in Northwest Florida to buy gas and a beer.
`
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`1 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
`2 At summary judgment, we recite the facts in the light most favorable to
`Baxter. See Stryker v. City of Homewood, 978 F.3d 769, 773 (11th Cir. 2020).
`However, we credit objective record evidence over Baxter’s account when the
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`After leaving the store, Baxter cracked open the beer, placed it in
`the cupholder, and kept driving. Around that time, Jackson
`County Sheriff’s Deputy Trevor Lee—who was on patrol in his K9
`unit squad car—noticed Baxter’s truck. Baxter’s driving caught
`Deputy Lee’s attention because he was swerving and weaving
`within his lane of traffic.3 Deputy Lee followed Baxter and pulled
`him over after he continued to swerve and weave.
`After Baxter pulled over, Deputy Lee exited his squad car
`and approached the passenger side of Baxter’s truck.4 Deputy Lee
`informed Baxter that he had been “all over the road” and asked if
`he was okay. Baxter responded that he had been “trying to make
`a phone call.” Deputy Lee asked Baxter for his license, insurance,
`and registration. Baxter told Deputy Lee he “didn’t know” he had
`been “all over the road.”
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`At this point, Deputy Lee noticed the cracked beer can in the
`cupholder and told Baxter he could not have the open container in
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`two are squarely contradictory. See Shaw v. City of Selma, 884 F.3d 1093,
`1098 (11th Cir. 2018).
`3 Baxter claims that he was driving slowly and carefully when Deputy Lee
`pulled him over. Baxter’s description, however, is in direct conflict with
`objective record evidence that confirms he was distracted and driving
`erratically.
`4 Deputy Lee’s bodycam depicts the visual and auditory events of the stop
`from this point forward in clear detail.
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`the vehicle.5 Meanwhile, Baxter handed over his license, but was
`struggling to find his insurance and registration. Deputy Lee told
`Baxter that he would let him “work on that,” and returned to his
`squad car. He called dispatch to run a records check.
`Deputy Lee then returned to the passenger side of Baxter’s
`truck. Baxter handed over his insurance card. He kept searching
`for his registration, but said he “d[idn’t] know where [he] could see
`it.” Deputy Lee told Baxter to “hang tight” as he was going to write
`a warning ticket and then “walk my dog around the car.” Deputy
`Lee went back to his car and typed up what appeared to be a
`warning ticket for Baxter’s open container violation.
`Leaving the warning ticket up on his computer—but
`without printing or delivering it—Deputy Lee walked to the
`driver’s side of Baxter’s truck. He instructed Baxter to “turn the
`truck off and step back here to me.” Baxter asked why he needed
`to exit the vehicle, and Deputy Lee explained that he planned to
`“walk[] the dog around the car” to sniff for drugs. Baxter
`questioned Deputy Lee’s “probable cause” to do so. Deputy Lee
`asserted that he needed none. For the next minute or so, Deputy
`Lee repeatedly asked Baxter to step out of the truck while Baxter
`repeatedly claimed that Deputy Lee had no justification for
`walking the dog around his vehicle. Baxter eventually complied.
`He turned the truck off, took the key out, and stepped out. Deputy
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`5 In Florida, having an open container in a vehicle is a noncriminal traffic
`infraction. See Fla. Stat. §§ 316.655, 316.1936(2)(a), 318.13(3).
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`Lee asked Baxter to hand over his keys, but Baxter said “they’re my
`keys” and clutched them to his chest.
`At that point, Deputy Lee decided to arrest Baxter for
`nonviolent obstruction.6 In conducting the arrest, Deputy Lee
`grabbed Baxter’s arm, forced him to the ground, twisted his arm
`around, and placed him in handcuffs. Baxter suffered a chipped
`tooth and facial abrasions.
`
`Shortly after the arrest, a sergeant with the Jackson County
`Sheriff’s Office arrived. Baxter claims to have heard Deputy Lee
`tell the sergeant that he had to “charge [Baxter] with something”
`because he had “roughed him up.” A few minutes later, Deputy
`Lee walked his K9 around Baxter’s truck. The dog alerted, but
`Deputy Lee found no drugs inside Baxter’s truck.
`
`Baxter was charged with nonviolent obstruction and
`ticketed for the open container. The obstruction charge was later
`dismissed. According to Baxter, after the December 24, 2017
`incident, Deputy Lee twice pulled his squad car up behind Baxter,
`turned his lights on as if to pull Baxter over, but then just “cruis[ed]
`on by.”
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`6 Fla. Stat. § 843.02 provides:
`Whoever shall resist, obstruct, or oppose any officer . . . in the
`lawful execution of any legal duty, without offering or doing
`violence to the person of the officer, shall be guilty of a
`misdemeanor of the first degree.
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`B. Procedural History
`In July 2019, Baxter filed a civil rights complaint against
`Deputy Lee and the Jackson County Sheriff in which he asserted
`claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Florida common law. In his
`§ 1983 claims against Deputy Lee, Baxter alleged that Deputy Lee
`violated his Fourth Amendment rights in four distinct ways: by (1)
`unlawfully initiating the traffic stop; (2) unlawfully prolonging the
`traffic stop; (3) arresting him without probable cause; and (4) using
`excessive force during the arrest. Baxter also asserted Monell
`claims against the Jackson County Sheriff in which he alleged that
`the sheriff was responsible for the constitutional injuries he
`allegedly suffered.7 Finally, Baxter asserted common law tort
`claims for false imprisonment and battery against both Deputy Lee
`personally and the sheriff vicariously.
`
`Following discovery, the defendants filed motions for
`summary judgment. In their respective motions, the defendants
`argued that all of Baxter’s claims lacked merit. Deputy Lee also
`asserted immunity defenses—qualified immunity with respect to
`the § 1983 claims and statutory immunity under Florida law with
`respect to the state law claims.
`
`
`7 Baxter’s claims against the Jackson County Sheriff in his official capacity were
`“effectively an action against the governmental entity [the sheriff] represents,”
`i.e., the Jackson County Sheriff’s Office. Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v.
`Sheriff of Monroe Cnty., 402 F.3d 1092, 1115 (11th Cir. 2005).
`
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`After the defendants moved for summary judgment, but
`before Baxter responded, Baxter took the witness statement of a
`former Jackson County Sheriff’s Deputy. In that statement, Cory
`Finch—who was Deputy Lee’s former supervisor—testified that he
`raised concerns about Deputy Lee conducting traffic stops without
`probable cause, but that, to his knowledge, no remedial action was
`taken by the sheriff’s office. Baxter attached Finch’s witness
`statement to his response to the defendants’ motions for summary
`judgment. The defendants moved to strike Finch’s statement from
`the summary judgment record because Baxter had not disclosed
`Finch as a potential witness prior to the close of discovery.
`The district court granted the defendants’ motions for
`summary judgment and their motion to strike Finch’s statement.
`In granting the motion to strike, the district court found that Baxter
`had failed to timely disclose Finch as a potential witness and that
`the failure was neither justified nor harmless. In granting summary
`judgment, the district court found that Baxter failed to raise a
`genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Deputy Lee violated
`his constitutional rights during the December 2017 traffic stop and
`arrest. As such, Deputy Lee was entitled to qualified immunity as
`to the § 1983 claims against him. Because it found that Baxter had
`failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
`Deputy Lee violated his constitutional rights, the district court
`found that Baxter’s state law tort claims against both Deputy Lee
`and the Jackson County Sheriff also lacked merit. Finally, the
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`district court granted summary judgment in the sheriff’s favor on
`the Monell claims.
`The district court entered judgment and Baxter timely
`appealed.
`
`II. Standard of Review
`We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
`de novo. Simmons v. Bradshaw, 879 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir.
`2018). Summary judgment is proper where the evidence “shows
`that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
`movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
`56(a). “If no reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the
`nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and
`summary judgment will be granted.” Beal v. Paramount Pictures
`Corp., 20 F.3d 454, 459 (11th Cir. 1994). To defeat summary
`judgment, “a mere scintilla of evidence supporting the opposing
`party’s position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing
`that the jury could reasonably find for that party.” Gogel v. Kia
`Motors Mfg. of Ga., Inc., 967 F.3d 1121, 1134 (11th Cir. 2020) (en
`banc) (quotation omitted and alteration adopted).
`
`At the summary judgment stage, “we view the evidence,
`draw all reasonable factual inferences, and resolve all reasonable
`doubts in favor of the non-movant.” Stryker v. City of
`Homewood, 978 F.3d 769, 773 (11th Cir. 2020). But we do so only
`“to the extent supportable by the record.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.
`372, 381 n.8 (2007) (emphasis omitted). “When opposing parties
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`tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by
`the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court
`should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on
`a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 380. Thus, “in cases
`where a video in evidence obviously contradicts the nonmovant’s
`version of the facts, we accept the video’s depiction instead of the
`nonmovant’s account and view the facts in the light depicted by
`the videotape.” Shaw v. City of Selma, 884 F.3d 1093, 1098 (11th
`Cir. 2018) (citations and quotations omitted and alterations
`adopted).
`
`III. Discussion
`In this appeal from summary judgment, Baxter raises
`numerous challenges pertaining to both his federal and state law
`claims. We agree with the district court’s decision to grant
`summary judgment as to most—but not all—of Baxter’s claims.
`Accordingly, we affirm in part and vacate in part.
`
`We proceed as follows. First, we address a threshold
`evidentiary issue: the exclusion of Cory Finch’s witness statement.
`We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion.
`
`Second, we evaluate Baxter’s § 1983 claims against Deputy
`Lee, which relate to four distinct aspects of Baxter’s encounter with
`Deputy Lee: (1) Deputy Lee’s decision to pull Baxter over; (2) the
`stop’s duration; (3) Deputy Lee’s decision to arrest Baxter; and (4)
`Deputy Lee’s use of force during the arrest. We conclude that
`Deputy Lee is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the
`
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`first, third, and fourth issues. The second issue, however—relating
`to the permissible duration of the traffic stop—raises a triable issue
`for which qualified immunity is not justified at this stage.
`Third, we consider Baxter’s Monell claims against the
`Jackson County Sheriff. We conclude that the district court
`correctly granted summary judgment.
`Finally, we address Baxter’s state law claims against Deputy
`Lee and the sheriff for false imprisonment and battery. We
`conclude that one of Baxter’s state law claims raises triable issues
`that preclude summary
`judgment—in particular, the
`false
`imprisonment claim relating to the traffic stop’s duration and
`Deputy Lee’s decision to arrest Baxter. The remainder of the state
`law claims were correctly dismissed at summary judgment.
`
`A. Exclusion of Cory Finch’s Witness Statement
`Baxter argues that the district court erred in excluding Cory
`Finch’s witness statement from the summary judgment record.
`The district court struck his statement because Finch was not
`disclosed as a potential witness during discovery and Baxter
`obtained his statement after the close of discovery. For the reasons
`below, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion.
`We start with the discovery rules. Federal Rule of Civil
`Procedure 26 prescribes when and how parties must disclose
`potential witnesses.
` Rule 26(a) requires initial disclosures,
`including the names of “individual[s] likely to have discoverable
`information” that the disclosing party may use to support its case.
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`See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i). Rule 26(e) directs parties to
`supplement their initial disclosures if they learn that material
`information was left out. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e). Failure to
`comply is penalized:
`If a party fails to provide information or identify a
`witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is
`not allowed to use that information or witness to
`supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial,
`unless the failure was substantially justified or is
`harmless.
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1).
`In this case, Baxter included several potential witnesses in
`his initial disclosures—but not Finch. When discovery closed,
`Baxter still had not disclosed Finch as a potential witness.
`Nonetheless, Baxter’s counsel took Finch’s witness statement a few
`weeks later and included the statement as an exhibit at summary
`judgment. The defendants moved to strike, and following Rule 37,
`the district court excluded Finch’s statement.
`We review the district court’s decision to strike the witness
`statement for abuse of discretion. See Evans v. Books-A-Million,
`762 F.3d 1288, 1295 (11th Cir. 2014). Three factors inform our
`review: “[1] the explanation for the failure to disclose the witness,
`[2] the importance of the testimony, and [3] the prejudice to the
`opposing party if the witness had been allowed to testify.” Romero
`v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1321 (11th Cir. 2008) (alteration
`adopted) (quoting Fabrica Italiana Lavorazione Materie Organiche,
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`S.A.S. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 684 F.2d 776, 780 (11th
`Cir. 1982)). Each factor supports the district court’s decision.
`First, we consider the explanation for the failure to disclose.
`Id. Baxter asserts that his failure to disclose was excusable because,
`while Finch was not disclosed in this case, he was disclosed in a
`series of other § 1983 suits—brought by different plaintiffs and
`involving claims against a different deputy (Zach Wester)—in the
`same district court. We are not convinced. To state the obvious,
`disclosing a witness in one case does not provide notice that the
`witness might be used in a different case.
`
`Baxter claims this is a special notice situation because his
`case was “consolidated” with the Wester cases. The record,
`however, shows that when the district court suggested such
`consolidation, Baxter and Deputy Lee jointly represented that the
`“underlying facts alleged by [Baxter] are unrelated and separate”
`from those other matters. Simply put, Baxter’s explanation is
`contradicted by the record.
`Second, we consider “the importance of the testimony.” Id.
`Our assessment is that Finch’s statement would not have had
`much, if any, relevance at summary judgment. In the excluded
`statement, Finch—who formerly supervised Deputy Lee—testified
`that he had raised concerns to his boss about Deputy Lee
`conducting traffic stops without probable cause and requested that
`a dashcam be placed in Deputy Lee’s squad car, but that, to his
`knowledge, the sheriff’s office never investigated the traffic stops
`nor installed the dashcams. Notably, however, Finch’s testimony
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`did not address the December 2017 encounter between Baxter and
`Deputy Lee and would have had no bearing on the analysis of
`whether Deputy Lee violated Baxter’s constitutional rights during
`that incident.8
`Third, we consider “the prejudice to the opposing party if
`the witness had been allowed to testify.” Id. The prejudice is clear.
`The defendants should have had the opportunity to depose Finch
`with fair notice that Baxter might use him as a witness and to
`develop other record evidence to rebut his assertions. Baxter’s
`failure to follow Rule 26 robbed the defendants of that chance.
`Exclusion was the appropriate remedy. See, e.g., R.M.R. ex rel.
`P.A.L. v. Muscogee Cnty. Sch. Dist., 165 F.3d 812, 813, 818–19
`(11th Cir. 1999) (affirming exclusion of “last-minute witness” at
`trial where allowing witness to testify would have “den[ied]
`
`
`8 Finch’s testimony could have potentially had some significance for Baxter’s
`Monell claim in which he asserted that the sheriff “exhibit[ed] deliberate
`indifference to constitutional deprivations caused by [Deputy Lee].” But even
`if we assume that Finch’s testimony would have strengthened Baxter’s
`showing at summary judgment on the Monell claim, we would still affirm the
`district court’s decision to exclude the statement given the lack of justification
`for failing to disclose Finch as a witness and the prejudice allowing the
`statement would have caused the defendants. See Bearint ex rel. Bearint v.
`Dorell Juv. Grp., Inc., 389 F.3d 1339, 1353 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Regardless of the
`importance of [the] testimony, the reasons for the delay in the . . . disclosure
`and the consequent prejudice that [the] testimony would have caused [the
`defendants] require us to affirm the district court’s ruling.”).
`
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`[defendant] the opportunity to depose him and prepare cross-
`examination” and resulted in “extreme prejudice”).
`The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
`Finch’s witness statement from the summary judgment record.
`We affirm that determination.
`
`B. Section 1983 Claims Against Deputy Lee
`In his § 1983 claims, Baxter asserted that Deputy Lee
`violated his Fourth Amendment rights in four distinct ways during
`the December 2017 traffic stop: (1) Deputy Lee’s decision to initiate
`the traffic stop; (2) the stop’s duration; (3) Deputy Lee’s decision to
`arrest Baxter; and (4) Deputy Lee’s use of force during the arrest.
`The district court found that Deputy Lee was entitled to qualified
`immunity on each issue and granted summary judgment. Baxter
`challenges those determinations on appeal.
`
`We begin with the standard for qualified immunity: “The
`doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from
`liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
`clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
`reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555
`U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
`818 (1982)). This is a two-part test. First, we consider whether the
`plaintiff can “establish a constitutional violation.” Grider v. City of
`Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1254 (11th Cir. 2010). Then, “[i]f the facts,
`construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that a
`constitutional right has been violated,” we consider “whether the
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`right violated was ‘clearly established.’” Id. The plaintiff bears the
`burden at both steps. Spencer v. Benison, 5 F.4th 1222, 1230 (11th
`Cir. 2021). Finally, “[e]ntitlement to qualified immunity is for the
`court to decide as a matter of law.” Simmons, 879 F.3d at 1163.
`But if, “at the summary judgment stage, the evidence construed in
`the light most favorable to the plaintiff shows that there are facts
`inconsistent with granting qualified immunity, then the case and
`the qualified immunity defense proceed to trial.” Stryker, 978 F.3d
`at 773.
`As we will explain, we affirm the district court’s grant of
`summary judgment as to Deputy Lee’s decisions to initiate the
`traffic stop, arrest Baxter, and use permissible force. Deputy Lee
`was entitled to qualified immunity on these issues. However, we
`vacate the grant of summary judgment as to Deputy Lee’s
`extension of the traffic stop. There are genuine disputes of material
`fact about whether Deputy Lee unlawfully prolonged the traffic
`stop that preclude qualified immunity on that issue at this stage.
`
`Initial Traffic Stop
`
`1.
`Baxter argues that the December 2017 traffic stop was
`unlawful under the Fourth Amendment. We disagree.
`The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable
`searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A traffic stop
`“constitute[s] a ‘seizure’ within the meaning” of the Fourth
`Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). A
`traffic stop is constitutional if the officer had reasonable suspicion
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`to believe that criminal activity has occurred, is occurring, or is
`about to occur. United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 880 (11th
`Cir. 2022) (en banc). “In other words, an officer making a stop must
`have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person
`stopped of criminal activity.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Even
`minor traffic violations qualify as criminal activity.”9 Id.
`We must determine whether there is a genuine dispute of
`material fact concerning Baxter’s driving on the evening of
`December 24, 2017, and whether it gave Deputy Lee reason to
`suspect that Baxter committed a traffic violation which would
`justify the traffic stop. The relevant traffic regulation is supplied by
`Florida law:
`
`A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable
`entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved
`
`
`9 We have sometimes indicated that probable cause, rather than reasonable
`suspicion, is necessary to justify a traffic stop in which the reason for the stop
`is a potential traffic violation rather than suspicion of other criminal activity.
`See, e.g., United States v. Gibbs, 917 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2019) (stating
`that “a police officer generally may lawfully detain an individual without a
`warrant if (1) there is probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has
`occurred (a traffic stop), or (2) there is reasonable suspicion to believe the
`individual has engaged or is about to engage in criminal activity (an
`investigative or Terry stop)”). But in our recent en banc opinion in Campbell,
`we clarified that “reasonable suspicion is all that is required” to justify any type
`of traffic stop. 26 F.4th at 880 n.15 (citing Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S.
`54, 60 (2014)).
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 21-11428 Date Filed: 11/30/2022 Page: 18 of 58
`
`18
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`21-11428
`
`from such lane until the driver has first ascertained
`that such movement can be made with safety.
`
`Id. § 316.089(1). Florida courts have made clear that a careless,
`unusual, or erratic driving pattern within a single lane of traffic may
`violate this provision. See, e.g., Yanes v. State, 877 So. 2d 25, 26–
`27 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (stating that “deviat[ing] from [one’s] lane
`by more than what [is] practicable
`. . .
`is a violation of
`[§ 316.089(1)], irrespective of whether anyone is endangered”);
`Roberts v. State, 732 So. 2d 1127, 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (holding
`that a driver’s “continuous weaving, even if only within her lane”
`justified a traffic stop under § 316.089(1)). On the other hand, “[t]he
`failure to maintain a single lane alone” is not unlawful in Florida
`“when the action is done safely.” Hurd v. State, 958 So. 2d 600, 603
`(Fla. 4th DCA 2007).
`
`We begin with Deputy Lee’s incident report—prepared
`shortly after the stop—in which he memorialized what he
`observed before pulling Baxter over. In the incident report,
`Deputy Lee stated that he initially “observed [Baxter’s] blue in
`color pickup truck . . . swerving from left to right striking the white
`fog line and yellow center line multiple times while traveling
`northbound on [the highway].” “After observing the vehicle strike
`both the yellow line and white fog line several more times,”
`Deputy Lee “conducted [the] traffic stop.” Baxter’s erratic driving
`justified the traffic stop because swerving and weaving is
`prohibited by Florida law. See Fla. Stat. § 316.089(1); Roberts, 732
`So. 2d at 1128.
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 21-11428 Date Filed: 11/30/2022 Page: 19 of 58
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`21-11428
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`19
`
`Seeking to raise a genuine dispute of material fact about
`whether he was in fact driving carelessly when Deputy Lee pulled
`him over, Baxter points to two pieces of record evidence—(1) his
`deposition testimony and (2) a declaration he submitted with his
`summary judgment response—in which he provided descriptions
`of his driving that differ from Deputy Lee’s account in the incident
`report. At his deposition, Baxter testified that, in the moments
`before Deputy Lee pulled him over, he “wasn’t swerving and
`crossing lines,” but had simply passed a slower-moving car while
`Deputy Lee was following him. In his declaration, Baxter similarly
`testified that Deputy Lee pulled him over after he “signaled and
`changed lanes to pass a vehicle traveling well below the speed
`limit” and then “signaled again and returned to [his] correct lane.”
`
`The testimony Baxter cites directly conflicts with Deputy
`Lee’s description of his driving. Were this all the evidence we had
`to go on in the record—i.e., the incident report on the one hand
`and the deposition and declaration testimony on the other—we
`might very well have a genuine dispute of material fact about
`whether Baxter was driving carelessly. In that situation, the record
`would present a swearing match that could not be resolved at
`summary judgment. See, e.g., Stryker, 978 F.3d at 775 n.2, 776–77
`(reversing grant of summary judgment where parties testified to
`“competing versions” of defendant officer’s use of force during
`arrest and there was no video recording of the incident).
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 21-11428 Date Filed: 11/30/2022 Page: 20 of 58
`
`20
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`21-11428
`
`In this case, however, we also have the footage from Deputy
`Lee’s bodycam,10 which at summary judgment we preference to
`the extent
`it squarely conflicts with Baxter’s testimonial
`descriptions. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 380 (noting that “a court should
`not adopt” a party’s description of the facts at summary judgment
`if it “is blatantly contracted” by objective evidence in the record,
`such as a video recording). On the video, we observe Deputy Lee
`approach the passenger side of Baxter’s truck and tell Baxter that
`he was “just all over the road.” Without hesitation, Baxter
`responds: “I was trying to make a phone call.” A few seconds later,
`Deputy Lee goes on to describe the length of time he had observed
`Baxter driving erratically—“from Highway 90 at 71 North near
`CVS all the way to here”—to which Baxter’s response is simply
`“Okay.”11 The meaning of this dialogue is plain: confronted with a
`description of his careless driving, Baxter accepted that description
`
`
`10 The video does not show Baxter driving, but it does depict a critical
`exchange between Baxter and Deputy Lee immediately after the traffic stop.
`11 The bodycam video also shows Baxter telling Deputy Lee that he “didn’t
`know [he] was all over the road.” In context, we do not think this challenge
`to Deputy Lee’s account of Baxter’s driving gives rise to a genuine dispute of
`material fact because Baxter’s assertion that he “didn’t know [he] was all over
`the road” does not mean that he was not, in fact, all over the road. Further,
`Baxter offered an excuse (“trying to make a phone call”) which is a tacit
`admission that he knew he was driving erratically. See Bailey v. Metro
`Ambulance Servs. Inc., 992 F.3d 1265, 1279 (11th Cir. 2021) (“When a party
`later contradicts his own statements of record without any valid explanation
`for that contradiction, that party fails to raise a genuine dispute of fact.”).
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 21-11428 Date Filed: 11/30/2022 Page: 21 of 58
`
`21
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