USCA11 Case: 21-11769 Document: 64-1 Date Filed: 08/30/2023 Page: 1 of 77
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`In the
`United States Court of Appeals
`For the Eleventh Circuit
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`____________________
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`No. 21-11769
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`____________________
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`ANTHONY SOS,
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`versus
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` Plaintiff-Appellee,
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`STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COM-
`PANY,
`a
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`insurance
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`company,
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`foreign
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` Defendant-Appellant.
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`____________________
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`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Middle District of Florida
`D.C. Docket No. 6:17-cv-00890-PGB-LRH
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`[DO NOT PUBLISH]
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`In the
`United States Court of Appeals
`For the Eleventh Circuit
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`
`
`____________________
`
`No. 21-11769
`
`____________________
`
`
`ANTHONY SOS,
`
`versus
`
` Plaintiff-Appellee,
`
`STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COM-
`PANY,
`a
`
`
`insurance
`
`company,
`
`foreign
`
` Defendant-Appellant.
`
`
`____________________
`
`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Middle District of Florida
`D.C. Docket No. 6:17-cv-00890-PGB-LRH
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`USCA11 Case: 21-11769 Document: 64-1 Date Filed: 08/30/2023 Page: 2 of 77
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`Opinion of the Court
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`21-11769
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`____________________
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`Before LUCK, BRASHER, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
`
`BRASHER, Circuit Judge:
`
`We have twice held that a defendant cannot moot a class
`action lawsuit by buying off the individual claims of the named
`plaintiff. See Zeidman v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 651 F.2d 1030 (5th
`Cir. 1981); Stein v. Buccaneers Ltd., 772 F.3d 698 (11th Cir. 2014). The
`Supreme Court, too, has reasoned that allowing a class’s claims to
`“be ‘picked off’ by a defendant’s tender of judgment before an af-
`firmative ruling on class certification could be obtained, obviously
`would frustrate the objectives of class actions.” Deposit Guar. Nat’l
`Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980). We have explained that a
`contrary rule would give defendants “the option to preclude a via-
`ble class action from ever reaching the certification stage,” which
`is “precisely what the [Supreme Court] condemns.” Zeidman, 651
`F.2d at 1050.
`
`In this class action lawsuit, Anthony Sos, the named plaintiff,
`timely filed a motion to certify a class of State Farm policy holders
`who had been shortchanged when State Farm failed to pay sales
`taxes and title transfer fees under a standard automobile insurance
`contract. While that class certification motion was pending, State
`Farm tried many times to moot Sos’s claims so that a class could
`not be certified. Just hours after Sos filed his class certification mo-
`tion, State Farm sent Sos’s attorneys a check to resolve his individ-
`ual claims, which his attorneys rejected. Later, State Farm offered
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`3
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`to pay Sos double its earlier offer if Sos would dismiss his putative
`class suit. After settlement talks failed, State Farm began to send
`voluntary payments to other members of the putative class, whom
`State Farm had identified through internal documents, in an ex-
`press attempt to moot the class claims. Lastly, in one final effort,
`State Farm sent Sos another check. Sos had filed a motion for sum-
`mary judgment on behalf of the putative class on the deadline set
`by the district court. The district court granted Sos’s motion for
`summary judgment on only his individual claims for damages and
`prejudgment interest, without addressing his claim for statutory at-
`torney’s fees under Florida law and without ruling on class certifi-
`cation. The day before a hearing on Sos’s long-pending class certi-
`fication motion, State Farm paid Sos for his individual damages and
`prejudgment interest as reflected in the district court’s summary
`judgment.
`
`The district court rejected State Farm’s repeated argument
`that its payments to Sos and other members of the class mooted
`the case. Shortly after the class certification hearing, the district
`court certified a class of Florida insureds and granted summary
`judgment in its favor, entitling the class to damages, prejudgment
`interest, and statutory attorney’s fees.
`
`State Farm’s appeal requires us to resolve five questions.
`First, under established precedent and the unique circumstances
`here, we conclude that State Farm did not moot this case by mak-
`ing unsupervised partial payments to the putative class members
`or by paying some of Sos’s individual claims. Second, we conclude
`
`
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`that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the
`class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
`Third, we conclude that State Farm’s failure to pay the class mem-
`bers the complete costs of their sales taxes and title transfer fees
`was a breach of contract under Florida law. Fourth, we conclude
`that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the
`plaintiffs prejudgment interest. Fifth, we conclude that the district
`court’s attorney’s fee award was an abuse of its discretion because
`the court used the wrong standard to calculate the applicable
`hourly rate and added a too-generous 2.5 multiplier. Accordingly,
`we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this case for the dis-
`trict court to recalculate attorney’s fees in light of this opinion.
`I.
`
`
`“This case has a lengthy, and heavily litigated, history.” Sos
`
`v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 617CV890ORL40LRH, 2021
`WL 1185685, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2021), report and recommenda-
`tion adopted in part, rejected in part, No. 6:17-CV-890-PGB-LRH,
`2021 WL 1186811 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2021). Because this factual
`history is critical to our decision, we describe it in some detail.
`
`Anthony Sos and unnamed class members each leased a ve-
`hicle covered by a State Farm form insurance policy with identical
`essential terms. The policy provides that, in the event of a “total
`loss,” State Farm will pay the insured the “actual cash value” of his
`vehicle. But the policy does not define “actual cash value” or ex-
`plain whether it includes the cost of sales tax or title transfer fees.
`
`
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`State Farm engages in a multi-step procedure for handling
`
`total loss claims. After determining that a State Farm insured vehi-
`cle is a total loss, a claims specialist calculates the vehicle’s actual
`cash value by entering agreed-upon values into State Farm’s Total
`Loss Settlement Tool (“TLST”), a graphical user interface. State
`Farm then sends the insured a settlement check equal to the actual
`cash value calculated by the TLST. From 2012 to 2017, State Farm
`employed a “business rule” in the State of Florida that set the tax
`field in the TLST to zero dollars if the total loss claim was for a
`leased vehicle, rather than an owned one.
`
`In 2016, Sos was in a car accident involving his leased, Flor-
`
`ida-registered Lexus, which State Farm declared a total loss. State
`Farm issued a settlement payment to Sos that, consistent with its
`business rule, did not include sales tax and included less than the
`full amount for title transfer fees—$58.75 instead of $75.25.
`
`Sos filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of himself and all
`others similarly situated, claiming State Farm’s failure to pay ap-
`propriate sales tax and title fees on leased vehicle total loss claims
`in Florida breached its auto insurance policy. According to Sos, the
`policy required State Farm to pay all total loss claimants Florida’s
`six percent state sales tax, applicable local sales tax, and $75.25 in
`title transfer fees. Sos also alleged that the putative class action sat-
`isfied all applicable class certification requirements under Rule 23.
`The operative class complaint sought compensatory damages, pre-
`judgment interest, attorney’s fees, and costs for both Sos and the
`putative class members.
`
`
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`Sos filed a motion for class certification concurrently with
`his second amended class complaint. Although the parties had not
`yet conducted any discovery on the class-wide issues at this early
`stage, Sos’s certification motion stated that Sos “is aware of cases .
`. . where defendants have attempted to have named Plaintiffs[’]
`claims ‘picked off’ by offering individual relief in order to render
`proposed class actions moot and deny relief to the class.” Sos be-
`lieved “the proper way to ensure that a proposed class action is not
`mooted from the outset is to file a motion for class certification
`concurrently with the complaint and ask the court to stay ruling on
`the motion until some discovery is allowed to take place.”
`
`Just hours after Sos filed his class certification motion, State
`Farm sent Sos’s attorneys a check for $12,151 purporting to cover
`“the full value” of Sos’s individual claim for taxes, title fees, pre-
`judgment interest, and attorney’s fees. The breakdown of the
`$12,151 check was $2,500 in taxes, $400 in fees, $251 in prejudg-
`ment interest, and $9,000 in attorney’s fees. In an accompanying
`letter, State Farm stated that it “expect[ed]” Sos to “accept” this set-
`tlement “as full payment of his claim and dismiss his suit.” Sos
`quickly rejected the settlement offer. Not only was it “insufficient
`to fully compensate [him] for the full extent of his damages,” but
`Sos viewed the offer as an improper “attempt to pick off [his] claims
`. . . and deny justice to the thousands of State Farm insureds in the
`putative class.” Sos added, however, that he was “more than will-
`ing to discuss amicable settlement on a class-wide basis.” State
`Farm did not respond to this proposal.
`
`
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`Having failed to reach a settlement, the parties fashioned a
`joint case management report “to re-set class certification deadlines
`to provide time for the parties to engage in discovery and fully brief
`class certification.” The joint report asked the district court to set
`an October 1, 2018 deadline for briefing on Sos’s renewed motion
`for class certification; a March 1, 2019 discovery deadline; an April
`1, 2019 filing deadline for dispositive motions; and a trial start date
`of September 1, 2019. The district court entered a scheduling order
`that tracked the sequence set forth in the parties’ joint report: the
`court set a May 1, 2018 deadline for class certification briefing; an
`August 1, 2018 discovery deadline; a September 4, 2018 deadline
`for dispositive motions; and a trial start date of January 2, 2019. The
`district court explained that “[t]his order controls the subsequent
`course of proceedings,” that “[c]ounsel and all parties . . . shall com-
`ply with this order,” and that “[t]he Court may impose sanctions
`on any party or attorney . . . who . . . fails to comply with this or-
`der.” The scheduling order also informed the parties that
`“[m]otions to extend the dispositive motions deadline . . . are gen-
`erally denied,” and that “at least 4 months are required before trial”
`for the court to resolve a motion for summary judgment. And the
`order explained that the court will consider a summary judgment
`motion “no earlier than thirty (30) days from the date it is” filed.
`
`The district court referred this case to mediation, but the
`
`parties failed to reach an agreement. Outside the mediation pro-
`cess, State Farm made Sos a second settlement offer with the ex-
`plicit goal of “resolv[ing] this case on a non-class basis,” while still
`
`
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`compensating other underpaid insureds. The settlement offer pro-
`posed that, if Sos agreed to voluntarily dismiss his lawsuit, see Fed.
`R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i), State Farm would (1) send a check for taxes
`and title fees to the “approximately 2,600” underpaid Florida in-
`sureds who State Farm said it had identified by “review[ing] its
`files”; (2) “pay Mr. Sos an additional $1,500.00 in addition to the
`amounts being paid under his insurance claim”; and (3) pay Sos
`$75,000 in attorney’s fees. Sos responded to State Farm’s settlement
`offer by (1) requesting “confirmatory discovery” to verify that the
`number of underpaid insureds identified by State Farm and
`amounts owed are accurate; (2) asking to either negotiate attor-
`ney’s fees after agreeing upon substantive settlement terms or to
`submit the question of fees to a mediator; and (3) suggesting that
`attorney’s fees in a “common fund-type case[]” like this one must
`be calculated using a “percentage of recovery, rather than any lode-
`star method.” After the parties held a telephone conference to con-
`tinue negotiating potential settlement terms, State Farm offered to
`“double” its prior offer and pay Sos $150,000.00 in attorney’s fees.
`Sos did not respond.
`
`Around one month later, State Farm began engaging in uni-
`lateral “remediations,” through which it sought to identify putative
`class members and send them checks for underpaid taxes and title
`transfer fees. Around two weeks after it began sending its first
`round of payments, State Farm wrote Sos to notify him of this pro-
`cess. State Farm told Sos that his “unreasonable demands for attor-
`ney’s fees” caused a “break down” in settlement negotiations, so
`“State Farm was going to remediate these claims with or without
`
`
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`[his] cooperation.” Accordingly, State Farm completed a round of
`unsupervised remediation payments in 2017, sending a total of
`$3,411,110.70 to 2,555 insureds. These payments did not include
`amounts for attorney’s fees or prejudgment interest.
`
`Sos responded to this notification by filing an “attorneys’
`
`charging lien for attorneys’ fees and costs” upon any recovery Sos
`or the putative class members obtain in this case. Sos’s counsel then
`wrote State Farm’s counsel, asserting that State Farm’s remedia-
`tion payments were incomplete because they “disregard[ed] our
`entitlement to attorney’s fees.” State Farm responded that (1) Sos’s
`fee request and charging lien have no “legal basis” because “no class
`has been certified,” and (2) “even if there were a basis for [Sos] to
`claim fees at this time,” the amount requested was “unreasonable.”
`
`On March 1, 2018—in compliance with the court’s schedul-
`
`ing order—Sos filed his renewed motion for class certification, ask-
`ing the district court to certify a class of leased vehicle insureds in
`Florida “whose total loss claim payment did not include full state
`and local sales tax and tag and title fees” within the past five years.
`The motion described State Farm’s attempted remediation process
`but argued that the payments were incomplete and omitted some
`putative class members.
`
`State Farm then identified an additional 704 underpaid in-
`
`sureds it had left out of its first round of payments. Thus, before
`responding to Sos’s class certification motion, State Farm quickly
`conducted a second round of remediations to pay off these in-
`
`
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`sureds, sending them payments totaling $906,727.71. These reme-
`diation payments again did not include attorney’s fees or prejudg-
`ment interest. Only after completing this second round of pay-
`ments did State Farm respond to Sos’s motion for class certifica-
`tion, arguing that the case was moot because its remediations “fully
`compensated all putative class members.” Sos’s reply in support of
`class certification argued that State Farm’s “repeated efforts to
`moot Sos’s individual claim and the claims of the putative class
`members” have been ineffective because State Farm’s remedia-
`tions (1) “at a minimum, . . . did not include prejudgment interest”
`and (2) still left out some putative class members altogether. Sos
`filed supplemental authorities in support of his motion for class cer-
`tification six days later.
`
`Pursuant to the district court’s scheduling order, State Farm
`
`filed a motion for summary judgment on September 4, 2018. A few
`hours later, Sos filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. At this
`time, the district court had not yet ruled on Sos’s March 1, 2018
`renewed motion for class certification. Still, both parties treated
`their summary judgment motions as though they were on behalf
`of—or, in State Farm’s case, against—a class. State Farm, for its
`part, argued not only that Sos’s individual claim became moot
`when State Farm sent him a check, but also that the putative class
`claims were moot “because State Farm has similarly compensated
`everyone in the proposed class.” State Farm’s summary judgment
`motion describes its attempted remediations to the putative class
`members, explaining in detail its efforts to identify and pay each of
`them. The motion also explores mootness law “in the class action
`
`
`
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`context,” arguing that a named plaintiff who no longer has an indi-
`vidual claim for damages also has no interest in pursuing class re-
`lief. Sos’s summary judgment motion similarly purports to assert
`liability on behalf of a class, specifically requesting “summary judg-
`ment in favor of Mr. Sos” and “in favor of the putative class.” Sos
`requested, for both himself and the class, damages equal to six per-
`cent of the value of each class member’s leased vehicle plus any
`applicable local surtax, $75.25 in title transfer fees (offset by any
`amounts State Farm already paid), prejudgment interest, injunctive
`relief, and—importantly here—attorney’s fees.
`
`The parties submitted the remainder of their pretrial filings
`
`in compliance with the district court’s scheduling order. Then, on
`March 13, 2019, with Sos’s March 1, 2018 renewed motion for class
`certification still pending, the district court granted in part and de-
`nied in part both parties’ motions for summary judgment—but
`only with respect to Sos individually. The court began by rejecting
`State Farm’s argument that Sos’s claims were mooted by State
`Farm tendering him a check. Sos never cashed the check, and “[a]n
`unaccepted settlement offer . . . does not moot a plaintiff’s case.”
`Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 165 (2016). Then, the
`court granted summary judgment for Sos on his breach of contract
`claim. The court ruled that “actual cash value” under State Farm’s
`insurance policy means “replacement cost minus depreciation,”
`which includes sales tax and title transfer fees equal to that of an
`owned vehicle. But the court rejected Sos’s claims for injunctive
`and declaratory relief as duplicable of his breach of contract claim.
`Accordingly, it granted State Farm summary judgment on those
`
`
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`claims. Finally, although it acknowledged that “[b]oth parties
`move[d] for summary judgment as to the class,” the district court
`expressly “disregarded” their class-wide arguments because the
`court “ha[d] yet to rule on class certification.” The court also did
`not address Sos’s claim for attorney’s fees in his complaint and sum-
`mary judgment motion.
`
`A day later, the district court entered judgment for Sos, en-
`titling him “to damages in the amount of $2,239.12 in sales tax, . . .
`plus applicable local tax; the amount of $75.25 in title tran[s]fer fees
`(offset by $58.75 already paid by State Farm) . . . ; and prejudgment
`interest.” The same day, the district court scheduled a status con-
`ference on the motion for class certification to occur twelve days
`later.
`
`The day before the status conference on class certification
`was scheduled to occur, State Farm sent a check to Sos’s counsel
`for $2,706.65 and filed a “Notice of Satisfaction of Judgment” in-
`forming the district court of the payment. Then, during the status
`conference, State Farm argued that the court’s judgment for Sos
`and State Farm’s payment the day prior mooted Sos’s claims and
`the putative class claims. The district judge responded that he did
`not “understand why entry of summary judgment” before certifi-
`cation “is relevant” to either mootness or Rule 23. The judge noted
`that “it’s not uncommon for summary judgment to precede certi-
`fication,” in part because summary judgment “could be issue-de-
`terminative, which helps the parties understand their risk in resolv-
`ing the class.” The district judge also raised concerns about State
`
`
`
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`Farm’s ability to “continuously . . . knock[] off” successive named
`plaintiffs from the case by satisfying their individual claims before
`class certification. The court scheduled a hearing on Sos’s renewed
`class certification motion for the following month.
`
`State Farm moved for leave to file supplemental briefing on
`class certification in advance of the class certification hearing “to
`address whether the Court’s [March 14, 2019] entry of judgment
`and State Farm’s subsequent [March 15, 2019] satisfaction of that
`judgment extinguish[ed] Plaintiff’s standing to act as a class repre-
`sentative or otherwise make him an inadequate class representa-
`tive.” The district court granted State Farm’s request, and both par-
`ties filed supplemental briefs on class certification the day before
`the court’s scheduled hearing on the issue. During the hearing, Sos
`criticized State Farm’s efforts to “pick off” the claims of Sos and the
`putative class members and “bypass the certification process.” The
`district judge agreed that ratifying State Farm’s efforts to make “the
`lawsuit go away” would be “[in]consistent with the principles be-
`hind class action[s].”
`
`On May 2, 2019—around six weeks after granting summary
`judgment for Sos—the district court granted in part Sos’s renewed
`motion for class certification. The court certified a Rule 23(b)(3)
`class of all Florida persons who insured a leased vehicle with State
`Farm and, within the prior five years, sustained a total loss to the
`vehicle but did not receive payment for the full amount of sales tax
`or title transfer fees on their claims.
`
`
`
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`The district court began its analysis by rejecting State Farm’s
`argument that its remediation process fully compensated the puta-
`tive class members. The court could not “confirm[]” that State
`Farm had paid all potential class members because “[t]here was no
`judicial oversight over the remediation process.” But “even assum-
`ing State Farm paid the appropriate amount of sales tax and fees to
`all putative class members, the members are still not made whole
`because State Farm did not pay them prejudgment interest or attorneys’
`fees in accordance with the [applicable] fee-shifting statute.” (Em-
`phasis added). The court was critical of this “unusual [remediation]
`practice,” which it viewed as an attempt “to circumvent the normal
`class action mechanisms.” The court also rejected State Farm’s ar-
`gument that the entry of judgment in Sos’s favor destroyed his
`standing and mooted the remaining class claims.
`
`Next, the court held that the class satisfied all applicable Rule
`23 requirements. The numerosity requirement was satisfied be-
`cause (1) the 3,269 “remediated” insureds were still owed prejudg-
`ment interest, and (2) the remediations omitted insureds who re-
`ceived greater than zero but less than the full six percent of sales
`tax. The commonality requirement was satisfied because “[t]he
`question of whether State Farm breached its contractual obliga-
`tions to insureds by not paying full sales tax and fees is common to
`all putative class members.” The typicality requirement was satis-
`fied because “[t]he putative class members’ claims and named
`Plaintiff’s claim involve the alleged breach of identical contractual
`provisions pursuant to State Farm’s standard practice,” so “proving
`
`
`
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`the named Plaintiff’s claim would necessarily prove claims class-
`wide.” The adequacy of representation requirement was satisfied
`by both Sos and his counsel. Sos “diligently pursued” the class
`claims, including by “participat[ing] in depositions and attend[ing]
`mediations.” And his attorneys’ charging lien did not create “a con-
`flict of interest between counsel and the class.” The sole function
`of the lien was to notify State Farm that if it paid off the putative
`class members outside of court, “it would nonetheless be bound to
`make payment to the attorneys.” The court also noted that “coun-
`sel is experienced in litigating class actions and has recently enjoyed
`success in class actions nearly identical to this case.” Finally, the
`court held State Farm waived its “one-way intervention” argument
`by moving for summary judgment before the court ruled on class
`certification.
`
`Following class certification, the parties engaged in a court-
`ordered notice process that identified four additional Florida in-
`sureds State Farm underpaid as part of their leased vehicle total loss
`claims. State Farm moved to decertify the class based in part on the
`inclusion of these insureds. State Farm reiterated its earlier moot-
`ness and Rule 23 arguments and added that these four additional
`insureds destroyed Rule 23 commonality. Unlike the other class
`members, who were paid no taxes as part of their total loss settle-
`ment, these four class members were paid some taxes, just not the
`full six percent required by Florida law. Sos responded in opposi-
`tion to State Farm’s decertification motion and moved for sum-
`mary judgment on the class claims.
`
`
`
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`The district court denied State Farm’s motion to decertify
`the class. The court again rejected State Farm’s mootness argu-
`ments, reasoning that the remediations had not fully compensated
`the class members because (1) they were not paid prejudgment in-
`terest and (2) Florida law is clear that prejudgment interest is a nec-
`essary element of compensatory damages. And commonality was
`satisfied because all class members—including those paid between
`zero and six percent in taxes—“suffered the same injury (i.e., un-
`derpayment) and a violation of the same provision of law (i.e.,
`breach of contract).”
`
`And the court granted Sos’s motion for summary judgment
`on the class claims. The court rejected, for the third time, State
`Farm’s mootness arguments. Then, the district court held that
`State Farm breached its contract with the class members. State
`Farm thus owed each class member damages for six percent of the
`value of his or her total loss vehicle, applicable local tax, $75.25 in
`title transfer fees, and prejudgment interest—offset by any
`amounts already paid. The court also held that Sos and the class
`were entitled to attorney’s fees under Fla. Stat. § 627.428(1). The
`court referred the calculation of attorney’s fees to a magistrate
`judge.
`
`Sos moved for attorney’s fees, requesting $4,415,351.00 in
`fees on behalf of himself and the class under section 627.428. After
`holding a hearing and receiving briefing on the issue, the magis-
`trate judge issued a scrupulous Report and Recommendation on
`Sos’s fee request. The R&R advised the district court to grant Sos’s
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 21-11769 Document: 64-1 Date Filed: 08/30/2023 Page: 17 of 77
`
`21-11769
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`17
`
`motion in part, but to reduce his requested hourly rates, resulting
`in fees totaling $2,983,500.00. The district court adopted the R&R
`in part but rejected the extent of the magistrate judge’s rate reduc-
`tion and applied a “national market” standard. The district court
`awarded Sos and the class $4,198,566.50 in attorney’s fees,
`$11,235.43 in taxable costs, and prejudgment interest.
`
`The court entered final judgment for Sos and the class. State
`Farm appealed.
`
`II.
`
`
`
`Five standards govern our review. First, we review a district
`
`court’s Article III mootness conclusions de novo. United States v.
`Askins & Miller Orthopaedics, P.A., 924 F.3d 1348, 1355 (11th Cir.
`2019). Second, we review a district court’s Rule 23 class certifica-
`tion rulings for abuse of discretion. In re Equifax Inc. Customer Data
`Sec. Breach Litig., 999 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2021). Third, we
`review de novo a district court’s interpretation of an insurance con-
`tract under state law. See Caradigm USA LLC v. PruittHealth, Inc., 964
`F.3d 1259, 1267 n.4 (11th Cir. 2020). Fourth, we review a district
`court’s award of prejudgment interest for abuse of discretion. Cox
`Enters., Inc. v. News-J. Corp., 510 F.3d 1350, 1360 (11th Cir. 2007).
`Fifth, we review a district court’s award of attorney’s fees for abuse
`of discretion. Johnson v. NPAS Sols., LLC, 975 F.3d 1244, 1251 n.2
`(11th Cir. 2020). But “that standard of review allows us to closely
`scrutinize questions of law decided by the district court in reaching
`the fee award.” Id. (quoting Camden I Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Dunkle,
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 21-11769 Document: 64-1 Date Filed: 08/30/2023 Page: 18 of 77
`
`18
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`21-11769
`
`946 F.2d 768, 770 (11th Cir. 1991)). “A district court abuses its dis-
`cretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper
`procedures in reaching its decision, or makes findings of fact that
`are clearly erroneous.” Id. (cleaned up).
`III.
`
`
`We begin our analysis, as we must, with our jurisdiction. Vi-
`tal Pharms., Inc. v. Alfieri, 23 F.4th 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2022). Article
`III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the
`federal courts to “Cases” and “Controversies.” “If an intervening
`circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a ‘personal stake in the out-
`come of the lawsuit,’ at any point during litigation,” a case or con-
`troversy ceases to exist, and “the action . . . must be dismissed as
`moot.” Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 72 (2013)
`(quoting Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477–78 (1990)). But
`“[a] case becomes moot,” the Supreme Court has made clear, “only
`when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief what-
`ever to the prevailing party.” Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Loc.
`1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012) (cleaned up); see Keister v. Bell, 29 F.4th
`1239, 1250 (11th Cir. 2022) (“A case . . . become[s] moot . . . if an
`event occurs that . . . makes redressability by the court an impossi-
`bility.”), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 1020 (2023). The court retains juris-
`diction “[a]s long as the parties have a concrete interest, however
`small, in the outcome of the litigation.” Knox, 567 U.S. at 307–08
`(quoting Ellis v. Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 442 (1984)). “The party
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 21-11769 Document: 64-1 Date Filed: 08/30/2023 Page: 19 of 77
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`Opinion of the Court
`
`19
`
`seeking dismissal bears the heavy burden of establishing moot-
`ness.” Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings Ltd v. State Surgeon Gen., 55
`F.4th 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up).
`
`On appeal, State Farm advances two independent argu-
`
`ments that this suit became moot before class certification. First,
`State Farm argues that its pre-certification remediation payments
`to the putative class members provided them complete relief,
`mooting the class claims. Second, it argues that the district court’s
`pre-certification judgment for Sos, and State Farm’s pre-certifica-
`tion satisfaction of that judgment, mooted Sos’s claims and thereby
`mooted the class claims as well. We address these arguments in
`turn.
`
`A.
`
`
`
`We can easily dispose of State Farm’s first mootness argu-
`
`ment. State Farm gives two reasons why its remediation payments
`mooted the class claims despite omitting prejudgment interest and
`attorney’s fees. First, State Farm contends the class members are
`not entitled to prejudgment interest under Florida law. Second, it
`asserts that an interest in attorney’s fees does not suffice to keep an
`otherwise moot claim live.
`
`We agree with State Farm’s second contention, as far as it
`
`goes. A mere interest in attorney’s fees cannot save an otherwise
`moot case. See, e.g., Lewis, 494 U.S. at 480. But this rule does noth-
`ing to advance State Fa
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