`
`
`
`[DO NOT PUBLISH]
`
`In the
`United States Court of Appeals
`For the Eleventh Circuit
`
`
`
`
`
`____________________
`
`No. 22-14074
`
`____________________
`
`
`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
`
`versus
`
`PETER TARANTINO,
`TODD CHRISLEY,
`a.k.a. Michael Todd Chrisley,
`JULIE CHRISLEY,
`
`
` Plaintiff-Appellee,
`
` Defendants-Appellants.
`
`
`____________________
`
`Appeals from the United States District Court
`for the Northern District of Georgia
`
`
`
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`Opinion of the Court
`
`22-14074
`
`D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cr-00297-ELR-JSA-3
`____________________
`
`Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
`
`PER CURIAM:
`
`This criminal appeal revolves around three defendants and
`two schemes: tax evasion and bank fraud.
`
`The tax-evasion scheme involved all three defendants. De-
`fendant Michael Todd Chrisley1 (“Todd”) owed back taxes. Rather
`than directing his income payments into a personal account, which
`the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) could have found and used to
`satisfy his back taxes, the Chrisleys hid Todd’s income payments in
`an account that Defendant Julie Chrisley owned. And as soon as
`the IRS started looking into accounts Julie owned, the Chrisleys
`transferred that account to yet another family member. Mean-
`while, the Chrisleys’ accountant, Defendant Peter Tarantino, made
`false statements to federal agents to keep the IRS off the trail. This
`conduct, and more described below, resulted in convictions for tax
`evasion and conspiracy to defraud the IRS.
`
`As for the bank-fraud scheme, the Chrisleys and Todd’s prior
`business partner sent fabricated financial documents to banks when
`they applied for loans, loan renewals, and lines of credit. These
`
`
`1 Because this case involves several people whose last name is Chrisley, to
`avoid confusion, we use these individuals’ first names when we speak of one
`of them. We refer collectively to Todd and Julie as “the Chrisleys.”
`
`
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`false financial statements grossly overrepresented the Chrisleys’ as-
`sets to make the applications more attractive to banks.
`
`After a joint trial, the jury convicted all three defendants on
`all counts, and the district court sentenced them. The defendants
`now raise several issues on appeal. First, the Chrisleys argue that
`the district court erred in denying their motion to suppress certain
`electronic evidence. Second, the Chrisleys assert their convictions
`for bank fraud, tax evasion, and conspiracy to defraud the IRS were
`based on insufficient evidence. Third, all three defendants seek a
`new trial or evidentiary hearing based on the prosecution’s failure
`to correct allegedly false testimony. Fourth, Julie asserts that the
`district court erred in sentencing her by holding her accountable
`for the loss amount of the entire bank-fraud scheme. Fifth, the
`Chrisleys challenge the restitution and forfeiture money judgments
`against them. And sixth, Tarantino argues that the district court
`abused its discretion in declining to sever his case from the Chris-
`leys’.
`
`After careful consideration, and with the benefit of oral ar-
`gument, we affirm the district court on all issues except for the loss
`amount attributed to Julie. The district court did not identify the
`evidence it relied on to hold Julie accountable for losses incurred
`before 2007, and we cannot independently find it in the record. So
`we vacate Julie’s sentence and remand solely for the district court
`to make the factual findings and calculations necessary to deter-
`mine loss, restitution, and forfeiture as to Julie and to resentence
`her accordingly.
`
`
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`22-14074
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`I.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`A grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging the
`
`Chrisleys with bank fraud, tax evasion, and various conspiracy
`counts. Julie was also charged with wire fraud and obstruction of
`justice. As for Tarantino, the indictment charged him with aiding
`the filing of false tax returns, as well as conspiring to defraud the
`IRS with the Chrisleys.
`
`After nearly three weeks of trial and three days of delibera-
`tions, the jury found the three defendants guilty on all counts. The
`district court sentenced Todd to 144 months’ imprisonment, Julie
`to 84 months’ imprisonment, and Tarantino to 36 months’ impris-
`onment. The court also ordered the Chrisleys, jointly and sever-
`ally, to pay $17,270,741.57 in restitution and the same amount in
`forfeiture. The court ordered Tarantino to pay a $35,000 fine.
`
`A. The Trial Evidence
`
`We summarize the relevant trial evidence, in the light most
`favorable to the government. United States v. Duenas, 891 F.3d
`1330, 1333 (11th Cir. 2018).
`
`i. Evidence Related to Tax-evasion Counts
`
`Todd (but not Julie) owed over $500,000 in taxes for the 2009
`tax year. That year, Todd had filed a married-filing-separately tax
`return, which meant the IRS could (generally) collect against only
`Todd and not against Julie as to that amount.
`
`
`
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`While that tax debt was still due and owing, in 2013, the
`Chrisleys were hired to make a reality television show called Chris-
`ley Knows Best. The Chrisleys’ attorney testified that the show’s
`production company required the Chrisleys to set up a loan-out
`company to receive payments on the Chrisleys’ behalf. Successful
`artists and entertainers use loan-out corporations for the financial
`benefits their structure allows. Bozzio v. EMI Grp. Ltd., 811 F.3d
`1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2016). More specifically, a loan-out corpora-
`tion “is a duly organized corporation, typically wholly owned by
`an artist, the sole function of which is to ‘loan out’ the services of
`the artist-owner to producers and other potential employers. The
`form offers limited personal liability and beneficial tax treatment.”
`Id. (quoting Aaron J. Moss & Kenneth Basin, Copyright Termination
`and Loan-Out Corporations: Reconciling Practice and Policy, 3 Harv. J.
`Sports & Ent. L. 55, 72 (2012)) (cleaned up).
`
`The Chrisleys created a loan-out company called 7C’s Pro-
`ductions (“7C’s”), in the form of a Subchapter S corporation. The
`IRS describes Subchapter S corporations as “corporations that elect
`to pass corporate income, losses, deductions, and credits through
`to their shareholders for federal tax purposes. Shareholders of S
`corporations report the flow-through of income and losses on their
`personal tax returns and are assessed tax at their individual income
`tax rates. This allows S corporations to avoid double taxation on
`the
`corporate
`income.”
`
`corporations,
`IRS,
`S
`https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-em-
`ployed/s-corporations [https://perma.cc/FKS3-95MW].
`
`
`
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`The Chrisleys set up 7C’s in Julie’s name. Julie had sole sig-
`nature authority over the 7C’s bank account. The production com-
`pany paid the Chrisleys for their performances on the television
`show by sending checks for each recipient to 7C’s, care of the indi-
`vidual who rendered the services. Once the money was in the 7C’s
`account, Todd and Julie controlled payment to the other family
`members who appeared on the show.
`
`To be clear, even though the 7C’s account was in Julie’s
`name, the government presented testimony that Todd had access
`to the account. Evidence also showed that Todd shared control
`over the account. For example, Todd emailed someone associated
`with production and said, “[W]e . . . need to make sure that the
`payments for this second season are paid directly to 7C’s and not
`to the individual so as to give us the control to deal with [my kids]
`when they don’t want to work[.]” A mortgage broker who inter-
`acted with the Chrisleys even testified that Todd told him that “his
`wife owned” 7C’s but Todd “controlled the business.”
`
`The prosecution argued that the defendants used the 7C’s
`account to hide Todd’s income from the IRS because the account
`was in Julie’s name, and Todd’s tax liabilities from 2009 were
`against him alone as an individual filer. To show the 7C’s bank
`account hid Todd’s income, the prosecution presented evidence of
`personal expenses that were paid out of the account, including pay-
`ments for Chick-fil-A, utility bills, shopping, and vacations. And
`FBI Special Agent Steve Ryskoski testified that the bank statements
`gave the appearance that Todd and Julie were using the 7C’s
`
`
`
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`account as a personal account. IRS Officer Betty Carter also testi-
`fied that, based on the 7C’s bank statements, she deduced that the
`Chrisleys were living off the 7C’s account. She testified that she
`saw a lot of personal expenses paid through the 7C’s account and
`“very little activity through the personal accounts.”
`
`During this same period, the Chrisleys did not file their
`2013–2016 tax returns or pay taxes for those tax years, even though
`the government sent the Chrisleys and Tarantino publications ex-
`plaining the importance of paying tax liabilities. It wasn’t until Feb-
`ruary 2018—only after the Chrisleys became aware they were un-
`der criminal investigation by the IRS—that they filed and began
`paying taxes for those years.
`
`In the meantime, in September 2016, Tarantino spoke with
`IRS revenue officer Agnes Jagiella to discuss Todd’s outstanding tax
`liabilities. Officer Jagiella testified that Tarantino falsely told her
`that Julie had no interest in 7C’s, but rather, the Chrisleys’ daughter
`owned 100% of the company. And then, Officer Jagiella testified,
`Tarantino refused to tell her which daughter. After this conversa-
`tion between Officer Jagiella and Tarantino, Tarantino emailed
`Todd and Julie a summary of the call and said that Officer Jagiella
`“asked some questions about your current living arrangements,
`etc. I avoided answering them.”
`
`On another occasion, Tarantino told Officer Carter he did
`not know where the Chrisleys banked, even though he had their
`Bank of America log-in information.
`
`
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`Officer Carter and Tarantino also discussed the Chrisleys on
`March 1, 2017. During that conversation, Officer Carter requested
`bank statements and canceled checks for all bank accounts on
`which Todd had signature authority. Tarantino complied.
`
`Then, five days later, on March 6, Tarantino told the Chris-
`leys that the IRS sent a follow-up request seeking bank statements
`and canceled checks for all accounts on which Todd or Julie had
`signature authority. Todd responded by telling Julie, “Get this
`taken care of asap.”
`
`The next day, Julie transferred ownership of the 7C’s bank
`account to Elizabeth Faye Chrisley (“Faye”), Todd’s mother. A
`new 7C’s bank account was also opened in Faye’s name. Faye tes-
`tified that she never ran 7C’s and did not even know a company
`was associated with the 7C’s bank account. The same day Julie
`transferred ownership of the bank account to Faye, Todd emailed
`his talent agent—copying Julie—and said, “Please refrain from
`sending any deposits to the account you have on file as that account
`has been compromised, we will be sending you another NEW ac-
`count number tomorrow or Thursday morning.” With these ar-
`rangements taken care of, Tarantino then sent the account infor-
`mation for the first 7C’s bank account to the IRS, but he did not
`mention that the account changed owners or that the Chrisleys’
`future payments would all be to a new account.
`
`More than ten months passed before January 18, 2018, when
`Tarantino emailed draft tax returns to the Chrisleys for 2013–2016.
`In doing so, Tarantino explained that he would be forwarding the
`
`
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`draft returns to a Bentley dealership and a bank the following day.
`The next day, as promised, Tarantino sent the draft returns to
`those third parties. But his email to those companies did not ex-
`plain that the documents were drafts that hadn’t been filed. In-
`stead, it simply said, “I have attached the last three years of personal
`and business tax filings.” After that, on January 23, Tarantino sent
`a reminder to the Chrisleys to sign off on the draft returns so he
`could officially file them.
`
`On February 2, 2018, FBI and IRS-Criminal Investigation
`special agents interviewed Tarantino. Tarantino did not tell the
`agents he had recently sent draft tax returns to third parties. And
`it wasn’t until after this interview that the Chrisleys finally filed
`their late returns for 2013–2016.
`
`Separately, Tarantino also filed 7C’s corporate tax returns
`for 2015 and 2016, falsely claiming that the company earned zero
`dollars and made zero distributions during that period. In reality,
`7C’s earned revenue in 2015 and 2016.
`
`ii. Evidence Related to Bank-fraud Counts
`
`From the mid-2000s through 2012, Todd owned a company
`called Chrisley Asset Management (“CAM”). His CAM business
`partner, Mark Braddock, testified at trial with immunity, explaining
`how the bank-fraud scheme worked.
`
`Braddock helped the Chrisleys obtain loans and lines of
`credit for CAM from financial institutions by submitting applica-
`tions with false information about the Chrisleys’ income and assets.
`
`
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`For example, evidence showed that in 2007, when Todd tried to
`obtain unsecured lines of credit from a bank, the bank requested
`personal account statements for Todd as a guarantor. So Braddock
`sent Todd a document titled, “Your Merrill Lynch Report,” show-
`ing that Todd and Julie had $776,509.52 deposited at Merrill Lynch.
`In fact, though, the Chrisleys never had more than $17,000 at Mer-
`rill Lynch during the relevant period. Todd responded to Brad-
`dock’s doctored document with, “you are a f[]ing genious!!!! just
`make it show 4 mil+.” This interaction set the stage for the addi-
`tional bank fraud that followed.
`
`The government introduced emails and documents Brad-
`dock sent to banks on the Chrisleys’ behalf. These communica-
`tions contained misrepresentations like the one above: for instance,
`that the Chrisleys had $3.6–$4 million in assets at Merrill Lynch.
`But Merrill Lynch’s records show no member of the Chrisley fam-
`ily had even close to $4 million in an account.
`
`The government also presented an email chain where a
`bank requested financial information. Braddock emailed Todd, “I
`don’t have financials on any of these.” And Todd responded, “stop
`telling me this shit, create them like you always have, if I don’t get
`her these then they [won’t] renew the loans.”
`
`During Braddock’s testimony, the prosecution asked Brad-
`dock directly, “[D]id you commit fraud from 2007 onward just on
`your own? In other words, was it just you committing fraud?”
`Braddock answered, “No. Mr. and Mrs. Chrisley and myself were
`all three involved.”
`
`
`
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`The government also introduced other evidence against Ju-
`lie with respect to the bank-fraud scheme. Braddock testified that
`in 2012, Julie emailed a scanned image of a check and bank state-
`ment to Braddock and Todd, and wrote, “Post date is the only
`thing that needs to be changed.” Braddock made that edit and sub-
`mitted it to the bank, with Julie’s awareness. Braddock also testi-
`fied that Julie’s nickname was “ass[] [is] on fire” because she drove
`all over town paying off late-due loan amounts. He said that he
`and Julie “talked about the personal financial statements” and
`about “scrapbooking,” which was their term for editing documents
`with false information. Evidence also showed two fraudulently ob-
`tained loans from 2007 and 2008 were issued to Julie’s own com-
`pany, Select Real Estate Holdings.
`
`Besides the conviction for conspiracy to commit bank fraud,
`the jury convicted the Chrisleys of five counts of substantive bank
`fraud involving Midtown Bank (Count 2), GulfSouth Private Bank
`(Count 3), United Community Bank (Count 4), RBC Bank USA
`(Count 5), and Wells Fargo (Count 6).
`
`For Counts 2 and 4 (Midtown and United Community
`Banks), the government produced witnesses from the victim
`banks, who testified that “[i]t was very important” for Todd’s per-
`sonal financial statement to include accurate information because
`it affected “the strategy in how we dealt with [the applied-for] loan
`and the other loans that the borrower had”; false financial infor-
`mation would “influence decision making on whether or not to re-
`new certain loans”; it was “pretty important” to receive accurate
`
`
`
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`information on personal financial statements because “that’s how
`[they] assess the risk on whether to approve a loan or not”; and one
`of the banks required updated financial statements every twelve
`months to decide whether to continue the credit facility and be-
`cause it was required to evaluate the risk level of each loan.
`
`Besides the testimony from the employees of two of the vic-
`tim banks, the government offered evidence from a former vice
`president of Buckhead Community Bank, who said “a bank does
`rely on” personal finance statements “to see what your debt to in-
`come ratio is. So it’s very important to make a loan decision.” The
`former president and CEO of Embassy National Bank also testified
`that he would have wanted to know if Todd didn’t actually have
`the amount in marketable securities that he represented.
`
`Unlike for the banks in Counts 2 and 4, no employee-wit-
`nesses testified from GulfSouth, RBC Bank USA, or Wells Fargo.
`To support the three substantive bank-fraud counts involving
`those banks (Counts 3, 5, and 6), the government relied on evi-
`dence that Braddock emailed a personal financial statement reflect-
`ing inflated assets to GulfSouth and WellsFargo on behalf of Todd,
`copying Todd. And Braddock emailed a false document to RBC
`Bank on an accountant’s letterhead representing that the account-
`ant had audited financial information for CAM when in fact the ac-
`countant had not.
`
`
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`B. Procedural History
`
`Before trial, and relevant to this appeal, the Chrisleys timely
`filed two motions to suppress evidence. The first, filed in Decem-
`ber 2019, sought to suppress the evidence that federal agents seized
`from the Georgia Department of Revenue (“Georgia DOR”). The
`second relevant motion to suppress, which the Chrisleys filed a
`couple months later in February 2020, sought to “suppress evi-
`dence seized pursuant to the search warrants for emails and elec-
`tronically stored information.” Unlike the first motion, this second
`motion did not mention the Georgia DOR search.
`
`The district court granted the first motion to suppress and
`denied the second. So the evidence from the warehouse search was
`suppressed, but the evidence from the electronically stored infor-
`mation (“ESI”) searches was not.
`
`More than two years later—and ten days after the deadline
`for filing motions in limine had passed—the Chrisleys filed a “Mo-
`tion to Require the United States to Establish Admissibility of Sup-
`pressed Evidence” as to the evidence the government collected
`through the ESI warrants and all evidence the FBI and IRS col-
`lected. The district court denied that motion as untimely, stating
`that it had already decided the issue of whether the evidence col-
`lected through the ESI warrants was admissible when it denied the
`motion to suppress electronic evidence.
`
`The parties proceeded to trial. The Chrisleys contend that
`they had paid off all taxes by the time of trial. While the prosecu-
`tion filed a declaration from Officer Carter stating that the
`
`
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`Chrisleys continued to make tax payments even after trial ended,
`the parties do not now dispute that, at the time of trial, the Chris-
`leys owed nothing for tax years 2014 and 2015.2 Even so, Officer
`Carter testified at trial that the Chrisleys still owed money for 2010,
`2011, 2014, 2015, and 2016.
`
`Almost two weeks after Officer Carter’s testimony, but still
`during trial, the Chrisleys produced documents to the government
`reflecting payments the Chrisleys had made to the IRS. In re-
`sponse, that same day, IRS Agent Brock Kinsler emailed Officer
`Carter asking about one of the payments described in the Chrisleys’
`document production. The two of them discovered that a pay-
`ment the Chrisleys made in January 2022 towards 2016 taxes had
`not been applied to the couple’s outstanding balance. Apparently,
`Agent Kinsler recalled telling the prosecutors about this email ex-
`change on the morning of June 1, 2022. Conversations between
`the Chrisleys’ accountant and Officer Carter from three weeks after
`trial show further payments that the Chrisleys made to the IRS but
`that the IRS database had not yet applied to the Chrisleys’ balance
`at the time Officer Carter testified that they still had outstanding
`liabilities. In the end, then, it turned out that at the time of Officer
`Carter’s testimony, the Chrisleys did not owe any taxes for at least
`2014 or 2015. In other words, Officer Carter’s testimony that the
`
`2 Defendants argue that, at the time of trial, the Chrisleys did not owe taxes
`for any tax year before 2017. But the district court pointed out that the Chris-
`leys were still making payments for tax years 2010, 2011, and 2016 several
`months after trial ended. No matter. We will assume the Chrisleys’ versions
`of the facts because it does not alter the analysis or its result.
`
`
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`Chrisleys still owed money for at least those two tax years was in-
`correct.
`
`At the end of the trial, the jury found all three defendants
`guilty on all counts in which they were charged. The Chrisleys had
`a joint sentencing hearing, where the district court accepted the
`government’s loss calculations. Those loss calculations supported
`the Chrisleys’ base offense levels, restitution amounts, and forfei-
`ture amounts. The district court allowed defense counsel two
`weeks after the final restitution and forfeiture orders were dock-
`eted to file any motions to amend those orders. Defense counsel
`did not file any motion to amend either order.
`
`Each defendant filed a motion for a new trial. The Chrisleys
`argued that certain evidence should have been excluded and that
`the government unlawfully failed to correct Officer Carter’s testi-
`mony that the Chrisleys still owed back taxes as of the time of trial.
`Tarantino moved for a new trial on the ground that he allegedly
`suffered compelling prejudice because of the district court’s deci-
`sion not to sever his case. Tarantino had previously filed a pre-trial
`motion to sever, which was denied.
`
`The district court denied each motion in a short order before
`the sentencing hearing and then issued its full opinion about six
`weeks after defendants timely filed this appeal.
`
`II. DISCUSSION
`
`We divide our discussion into six parts. First, we address
`whether the district court erred by denying the Chrisleys’ motion
`
`
`
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`to suppress electronic evidence. Second, we consider whether suf-
`ficient evidence supported the Chrisleys’ convictions on multiple
`counts. Third, we assess whether the district court abused its dis-
`cretion in declining to grant a new trial or hold a hearing on the
`prosecution’s failure to correct Officer Carter’s testimony. Fourth,
`we discuss whether the district court erred in holding Julie account-
`able for the loss amount of the entire bank-fraud conspiracy. Fifth,
`we address whether the district court committed procedural error
`when ordering restitution and forfeiture as to the Chrisleys. And
`sixth, we consider whether the district court abused its discretion
`in declining to sever Tarantino’s case.
`
`A. The district court did not abuse its discretion in hold-
`ing that the motion to suppress electronic evidence was
`untimely.
`
`The Chrisleys argue that the district court abused its discre-
`tion when it denied their “Motion to Require the United States to
`Establish Admissibility of Suppressed Evidence.” We disagree.
`
`As an initial matter, even though the Chrisleys styled their
`filing as a “Motion to Require the United States to Establish Admis-
`sibility of Suppressed Evidence,” it was, in reality, a motion to sup-
`press. That’s so because it argued that the government’s acquisi-
`tion of the challenged evidence violated the Chrisleys’ Fourth
`Amendment rights, and it sought to prevent the government from
`using that evidence, even though that evidence had not been sup-
`pressed. For these reasons, the law governing motions to suppress
`controls our review.
`
`
`
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`When a district court denies a motion to suppress evidence
`because it is untimely, we review for abuse of discretion. United
`States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1501, 1509 (11th Cir. 1990).
`
`A defendant who wishes to move to suppress evidence must
`do so before trial. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(C). A district court has
`authority to set a deadline for motions to suppress under Federal
`Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(c). A motion to suppress is consid-
`ered untimely if the defendant files it after the deadline, but courts
`may consider the motion “if the party shows good cause.” Fed. R.
`Crim. P. 12(c)(3).
`
`In this case, the district court gave the Chrisleys until De-
`cember 20, 2019, to file motions to suppress. Given the timing of
`the government’s ESI search warrants, the court separately al-
`lowed the Chrisleys until February 28, 2020, to file any motions to
`suppress evidence from those searches. As we’ve noted, the Chris-
`leys timely filed two motions to suppress that are relevant to this
`appeal.
`
`The first motion related to a search of Todd’s warehouses.
`Back in March 2017, the Georgia DOR improperly seized hard-
`copy documents from one of Todd’s warehouses without a war-
`rant. Federal agents later obtained a federal search warrant allow-
`ing them to seize those documents from the Georgia DOR. This
`first motion to suppress sought to exclude evidence that federal
`agents seized from the Georgia DOR that the Georgia DOR, in
`turn, had originally obtained through the warrantless warehouse
`search.
`
`
`
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`The second motion sought to exclude evidence collected un-
`der ESI search warrants. The motion argued that the ESI search
`warrants were overbroad.
`
`Neither motion asserted that evidence the government ob-
`tained through the ESI warrants was derived from the warehouse
`search. And more specifically, at no point did the motion to sup-
`press ESI evidence suggest that the federal government wouldn’t
`have investigated the Chrisleys’ emails but for the suppressed
`Georgia DOR documents or that the government based its ESI
`warrant applications on tainted information that the agents had
`only because of the documents that the Georgia DOR illegally ob-
`tained (the “fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree argument”). Instead, over
`two years later and ten days after the deadline for motions in
`limine, the Chrisleys filed a new motion seeking to exclude ESI ev-
`idence as fruit of the poisonous tree.
`
`The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying this
`motion as untimely. The Chrisleys’ motion violated the district
`court’s deadlines for both suppression motions and motions in
`limine.
`
`We are not persuaded by the Chrisleys’ argument that the
`
`order granting the motion to suppress evidence collected from the
`warehouse warrants and any evidence derived from the warehouse war-
`rants covered the evidence the government collected through the
`ESI warrants so that they didn’t need to file a motion to suppress
`the ESI evidence. Motions to suppress “must in every critical re-
`spect be sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural
`
`
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`19
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`to enable the court to conclude that a substantial claim is pre-
`sented.” United States v. Richardson, 764 F.2d 1514, 1527 (11th Cir.
`1985). And here, the motion to suppress evidence from the ware-
`house warrant, which was titled, “[Defendants’] Motion to Sup-
`press Evidence Seized Pursuant to Search Warrants Executed at
`4125 Welcome All Road and 1800 Century Boulevard NE,” never
`mentioned the ESI warrants or electronic evidence at all.
`
`What’s more, the Chrisleys filed an entirely separate motion
`to suppress the evidence from the ESI warrants, implicitly drawing
`a distinction between the two types of evidence. So the district
`court did not abuse its discretion in construing its own order grant-
`ing the motion to suppress evidence from the warehouse warrants
`as not covering evidence collected through the ESI warrants.
`
`B. Sufficient evidence supports the Chrisleys’ convictions.
`
`The Chrisleys raise several challenges to the sufficiency of
`the evidence supporting their convictions. This section takes each
`in turn. First, we consider whether sufficient evidence supported
`the Chrisleys’ tax-evasion convictions. Second, we address
`whether sufficient evidence supported the Chrisleys’ convictions
`for conspiracy to defraud the IRS. Third, we discuss whether suffi-
`cient evidence underlies the three substantive bank-fraud convic-
`tions where no employee from the victim banks testified. And
`fourth, we assess whether sufficient evidence supports Julie’s con-
`victions on the substantive bank-fraud counts.
`
`
`
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`Opinion of the Court
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`22-14074
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`We review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence, “taking
`the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and
`drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury’s verdict.”
`Duenas, 891 F.3d at 1333. We won’t set aside a jury verdict “if there
`is ‘any reasonable construction of the evidence [that] would have
`allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
`doubt.’” United States v. Martin, 803 F.3d 581, 587 (11th Cir. 2015)
`(quoting United States v. Friske, 640 F.3d 1288, 1291) (11th Cir.
`2011)).
`
`i. Tax Evasion
`The elements of federal tax evasion under 26 U.S.C. § 7201
`include “(1) willfulness; (2) existence of a tax deficiency; and (3) an
`affirmative act constituting an evasion or attempted evasion of
`tax.” United States v. Kaiser, 893 F.2d 1300, 1305 (11th Cir. 1990).
`“An affirmative act of attempted evasion may consist of ‘any con-
`duct, the likely effect of which would be to mislead’ the Govern-
`ment or conceal funds to avoid payment of a valid tax defi-
`ciency.” United States v. Hesser, 800 F.3d 1310, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015)
`(citation omitted).
`
`The Chrisleys argue that the government failed to prove an
`affirmative act amounting to tax evasion. As the Chrisleys see
`things, the prosecution’s entire theory was that the Chrisleys used
`7C’s bank accounts to conceal Todd’s income, but the money in
`7C’s bank accoun



