USCA11 Case: 23-13156 Document: 36 Date Filed: 02/05/2024 Page: 1 of 72
`
`NO. 23-13156
`
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
` ________________________________________________________________________________
`ATHOS OVERSEAS LIMITED CORP.,
`Plaintiff/Appellant,
`v.
`YOUTUBE, INC., YOUTUBE, LLC, and
`GOOGLE, LLC,
`Defendants/Appellees.
`________________________________________________________________________________
`On Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Southern District of Florida
`Case No. 1:21-cv-21698-DPG
`________________________________________________________________________________
`APPELLEES’ BRIEF
`________________________________________________________________________________
`
`Jenea M. Reed, Esq.
`Jay B. Shapiro, Esq.
`STEARNS WEAVER MILLER
`WEISSLER ALHADEFF &
`SITTERSON, P.A.
`150 West Flagler Street,
`Suite 2200
`Miami, Florida 33130
`Telephone: (305) 789-3229
`Facsimile: (305) 789-3395
`
`
`
`Brian M. Willen, Esq.
`WILSON SONSINI
`GOODRICH & ROSATI, P.C.
`1301 Avenue of the Americas,
`40th Floor
`New York, New York 10019
`Telephone: (212) 999-5800
`Facsimile: (212) 999-5801
`
`Thomas R. Wakefield, Esq.
`Dylan J. Byrd, Esq.
`WILSON SONSINI
`GOODRICH & ROSATI, P.C.
`One Market Plaza, 33rd Floor
`San Francisco, California 94105
`Telephone: (415) 947-2000
`Facsimile: (415) 947-2099
`___________________________________________________________________
`
`

`

`USCA11 Case: 23-13156 Document: 36 Date Filed: 02/05/2024 Page: 2 of 72
` Athos Overseas Limited Corp. v. YouTube, Inc. et al.
`Case No. 23-13156
`
`CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS AND CORPORATE
`DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
`
`Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and Eleventh Circuit
`Rule 26.1, counsel for Google LLC and YouTube, LLC hereby certifies that,
`to the best of its knowledge, information, and belief, the following is an
`alphabetical list of trial judges, attorneys, persons, associations of persons,
`firms,
`partnerships,
`and
`corporations,
`including
`subsidiaries,
`conglomerates, affiliates, parent corporations, publicly-traded companies
`that own 10% or more of a party’s stock, and all other identifiable legal
`entities related to a party known to have an actual or potential interest in
`the outcome of this appeal:
`Alphabet Inc., publicly held company (NASDAQ: GOOG, GOOGL),
`has more than 10% ownership of Google Inc. No publicly held company
`owns 10% or more of Alphabet Inc.’s stock.
`Anaba, Ariel C. Green, Counsel for Defendant-Appellees Google
`LLC and YouTube, LLC.
`Athos Overseas, Ltd., former Plaintiff-Appellant.
`Athos Overseas Limited Corp., Plaintiff-Appellant.
`Byrd, Dylan J., Counsel for Defendant-Appellees Google LLC and
`YouTube, LLC.
`Coulter, David T., Counsel for Defendant-Appellees Google LLC
`and YouTube, LLC.
`
`C-1 of 3
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`

`

`USCA11 Case: 23-13156 Document: 36 Date Filed: 02/05/2024 Page: 3 of 72
` Athos Overseas Limited Corp. v. YouTube, Inc. et al.
`Case No. 23-13156
`
`Dorta & Ortega, P.A., Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant Athos
`Overseas Limited Corp.
`Dorta, Rey J., Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant Athos Overseas
`Limited Corp.
`Ferral, Natalie A., Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant Athos Overseas
`Limited Corp.
`Gayles, Darrin P., United States District Court Judge.
`Google LLC, Defendant-Appellee. Google LLC is a wholly owned
`subsidiary of Alphabet Inc., a publicly held corporation.
`Gorman, Nathalie M., Counsel for Defendant-Appellees Google
`LLC and YouTube, LLC.
`Hartman, Catherine R., Counsel for Defendant-Appellees Google
`LLC and YouTube, LLC.
`Li, Luis, Counsel for Defendant-Appellees Google LLC and YouTube,
`
`LLC.
`
`Ortega, Omar, Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant Athos Overseas
`Limited Corp.
`Reed, Jenea M., Counsel for Defendant-Appellees Google LLC and
`YouTube, LLC.
`Rodriguez, Rosdaisy, Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant Athos
`Overseas Limited Corp.
`Shapiro, Jay B., Counsel for Defendant-Appellees Google LLC and
`
`C-2 of 3
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`USCA11 Case: 23-13156 Document: 36 Date Filed: 02/05/2024 Page: 4 of 72
` Athos Overseas Limited Corp. v. YouTube, Inc. et al.
`Case No. 23-13156
`
`
`YouTube, LLC.
`Stearns Weaver Miller Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterson, P.A.,
`Counsel for Defendant-Appellees Google LLC and YouTube, LLC.
`Templeton, Trevor, Counsel for Defendant-Appellees Google LLC
`and YouTube, LLC.
`Tuttle, Eric, Counsel for Defendant-Appellees Google LLC and
`YouTube, LLC.
`Torres, Edwin G., United States Magistrate Judge.
`Wakefield, Thomas R., Counsel for Defendant-Appellees Google
`LLC and YouTube, LLC.
`Willen, Brian M., Counsel for Defendant-Appellees Google LLC and
`YouTube, LLC.
`Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, P.C., Counsel for Defendant-
`Appellees Google LLC and YouTube, LLC.
`Yen, Lucy, Counsel for Defendant-Appellees Google LLC and
`YouTube, LLC.
`YouTube, LLC, Defendant-Appellee. YouTube, LLC is a wholly
`owned subsidiary of Google LLC.
`
`
`
`C-3 of 3
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`

`

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`
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`STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
`
`YouTube requests oral argument. Appellant’s arguments on appeal
`
`seek to upend the safe harbor provided by the Digital Millennium
`Copyright Act (“DMCA”) as the statute is written and as it has been
`uniformly interpreted by other courts of appeal. Like other platforms that
`host content created by users, YouTube’s core operations are enabled
`by—and have been structured around—the settled understanding of the
`DMCA safe harbors. Given the importance of the issues presented,
`YouTube respectfully submits that oral argument would aid this Court’s
`consideration of this appeal.
`
`
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`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`AND
`PERSONS
`INTERESTED
`CERTIFICATE OF
`CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .............................. C-1
`STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ................................... i
`TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................... ii
`TABLE OF CITATIONS ........................................................................... v
`COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ............................................ 1
`INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 1
`COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................ 4
`A. YouTube’s Online Platform For User-Generated
`Videos ...................................................................................... 4
`The DMCA Safe Harbors Foster Cooperation Between
`Rightsholders And Service Providers, While Placing
`The Burden Of Policing Infringement On Copyright
`Holders .................................................................................... 5
`C. YouTube Is A Paradigmatic DMCA Service Operating
`Under The Protections Of Established DMCA Law,
`While Going Beyond What The Statute Requires To
`Help Copyright Holders ........................................................ 10
`D. Athos’s Copyright-Infringement Claims Against
`Google .................................................................................... 15
`The District Court’s Dismissal Of Athos’s Non-
`Copyright Claims And Its Grant Of Summary
`Judgment To YouTube On The DMCA ................................. 17
`LEGAL STANDARD ............................................................................... 22
`
`B.
`
`E.
`
`- ii -
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`
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................................................................. 22
`ARGUMENT ........................................................................................... 26
`I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED
`SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO YOUTUBE UNDER THE
`DMCA’S KNOWLEDGE PROVISIONS ........................................ 26
`A.
`The DMCA Requires Athos To Show That YouTube
`Had Disqualifying Knowledge Of Specific Allegedly
`Infringing Clips ..................................................................... 27
`1.
`The DMCA Does Not Require YouTube To
`Respond To Takedown Notices By Searching For
`Unidentified Additional Instances of Potential
`Infringement ................................................................ 28
`Athos’s Argument That Content ID Gave
`YouTube Knowledge Of Infringement Fails As A
`Matter of Law ............................................................... 34
`3. No Authority Supports Athos’s Knowledge
`Arguments .................................................................... 37
`Athos’s Knowledge Theory Would Deter
`Innovation And Harm Legitimate Expression ............ 40
`There Is No Factual Basis For Athos’s Theory That
`YouTube Had Knowledge Of Specific Infringing Clips-
`In-Suit ................................................................................... 43
`C. Athos Has No Evidence That YouTube Was “Willfully
`Blind” To Any Clips-In-Suit .................................................. 48
`II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY REJECTED
`ATHOS’S EFFORT TO DISQUALIFY YOUTUBE UNDER
`THE DMCA’S CONTROL-PLUS-FINANCIAL-BENEFIT
`PROVISION ................................................................................... 50
`
`B.
`
`2.
`
`4.
`
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`
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`A.
`
`The DMCA Does Not Codify The Common Law Of
`Vicarious Infringement ......................................................... 51
`B. Athos Has No Evidence That YouTube “Influenced Or
`Participated” In The Alleged Infringement .......................... 52
`C. Athos Cannot Show That YouTube Earned A Direct
`Financial Benefit From the Clips-In-Suit ............................ 55
`CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 57
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`
`
`TABLE OF CITATIONS
`
`Page(s)
`
`CASES
`Atl. Recording Corp. v. Spinrilla, LLC,
`506 F.Supp.3d 1294 (N.D. Ga. 2020) ......................................... 9, 27
`Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R.,
`331 U.S. 519 (1947) ........................................................................ 38
`*Capitol Recs., LLC v. Vimeo, LLC,
`826 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2016) ..................................... 2, 6, 9, 12, 27, 29,
`37, 41, 46, 48, 49
`
`Capitol Recs., LLC v. Vimeo, LLC,
`972 F.Supp.2d 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ............................................... 54
`Davis v. Pinterest, Inc.,
`601 F.Supp.3d 514 (N.D. Cal. 2022) .............................................. 54
`Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. Hotfile Corporation,
`2013 WL 6336286 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2013) ........................... 38, 39
`Downs v. Oath Inc.,
`385 F.Supp.3d 298 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) ................................... 55, 56, 57
`Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB SA,
`563 U.S. 754 (2011) .................................................................. 48, 49
`McGucken v. Shutterstock, Inc.,
`2023 WL 6390530 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2023) ..................................... 32
`N.L.R.B. v. HH3 Trucking, Inc.,
`755 F.3d 468 (7th Cir. 2014) .......................................................... 40
`Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC,
`488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007) .................................................. 29, 32
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`Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc.,
`847 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2017) .......................................................... 18
`Schneider v. YouTube, LLC,
`__ F.Supp.3d __, 2023 WL 3605981
`(N.D. Cal. May 22, 2023) ................................................................ 47
`Steinmetz v. Shutterstock, Inc.,
`629 F.Supp.3d 74 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) ............................... 32, 34, 56, 57
`*UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Cap. Partners LLC,
`718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013) ........................... 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 19,
`24, 25, 27, 29, 31, 32,
`38, 41, 51, 52, 53, 55
`
`*Ventura Content, Ltd. v. Motherless, Inc.,
`885 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2018) ........................... 2, 7, 9, 10, 12, 23, 25,
`26, 27, 34, 53, 55, 56
`
`Venus Fashions, Inc. v. ContextLogic, Inc.,
`2017 WL 2901695 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 17, 2017) ................................. 39
`*Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.,
`676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012) ..................................... 3, 5, 9, 11, 12, 18,
`19, 20, 23, 25, 26, 28-31,
`33, 36, 44, 48, 51, 52
`
`*Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.,
`718 F.Supp.2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ........................................ 10, 23,
`31, 33, 34
`
`*Viacom Int’l, Inc. v YouTube, Inc.,
`940 F.Supp.2d 110 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ............. 8, 11, 25, 28, 29, 30, 34,
`36, 46, 47, 48, 50, 52, 53, 54
`
`Wiersum v. U.S. Bank, N.A.,
`785 F.3d 483 (11th Cir. 2015) ........................................................ 40
`Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, LLC,
`746 F.3d 1008 (11th Cir. 2014) ...................................................... 22
`
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`Wolk v. Kodak Imaging Network, Inc.,
`840 F.Supp.2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ......................................... 31, 32
`STATUTES
`17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) ..................................................................... 13, 26
`17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B) ........................................................................... 26
`17 U.S.C. § 512(a) ...................................................................................... 6
`17 U.S.C. § 512(b) ...................................................................................... 6
`*17 U.S.C. § 512(c) ................................................... 1, 6, 7, 11, 12, 18, 22,
`26, 29, 37, 38, 52
`17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) .................................................................................. 6
`17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) .................................................................... 9, 27
`17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) .................................................................. 9, 27
`17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) ..................................................................... 27
`17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) ............................................................... 10, 20, 50
`17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) ............................................................. 7, 8, 30, 32
`17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2) ................................................................................ 26
`17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A) ............................................................................. 7
`17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii) .......................................................... 30, 31, 33
`17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) ............................................... 7, 23, 30, 31, 33
`17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(i) .................................................................. 24, 31
`17 U.S.C. § 512(d) ...................................................................................... 6
`17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2) .................................................................................. 7
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`17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3) .................................................................................. 7
`17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B) .......................................................................... 26
`*17 U.S.C. § 512(m) ...................................................... 2, 9, 19, 23, 29, 30,
`32, 36, 37, 38, 49
`
`RULES
`11th Cir. R. 3-1 ........................................................................................ 22
`MISCELLANEOUS
`4 Nimmer on Copyright §12B.04 (2023) ................................................. 27
`H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-796 (1998) ........................................................ 52
`H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2 (1998) .................................................. 33, 55
`S. Rep. No. 105-190 (1998) ........................................................................ 5
`U.S. Copyright Office, Section 512 of Title 17 (May 2020) ..................... 37
`
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`COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
`
`Whether the District Court correctly granted summary judgment to
`YouTube under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's (“DMCA”) “safe
`harbor,” 17 U.S.C. §512(c), where Appellant Athos Overseas Limited
`Corp. (“Athos”) failed to show that YouTube had knowledge of the
`allegedly infringing video clips-in-suit or had the “right and ability to
`control” those alleged infringements while earning a “financial benefit
`directly attributable” to them.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`This case arises from Athos’s dissatisfaction with the balanced
`copyright regime that Congress created in the DMCA. Athos asks this
`Court to fundamentally transform that regime and break with
`unanimous decisions of sister Circuits. The Court should decline that
`invitation, apply established law, and affirm the District Court’s grant of
`summary judgment.
`The DMCA provides a safe harbor to online service providers like
`YouTube, shielding them from copyright-infringement liability arising
`from user-uploaded materials, so long as certain conditions are met. 17
`U.S.C. §512(c). The centerpiece of this safe-harbor regime is a notice-and-
`takedown process, which allows copyright owners to send notices that
`specifically identify allegedly infringing material to online service
`providers, who must expeditiously remove the identified content. Id. This
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`process “places the burden of policing copyright infringement on the
`copyright owner, not on the person or firm storing and hosting the
`material.” Ventura Content, Ltd. v. Motherless, Inc., 885 F.3d 597, 603
`(9th Cir. 2018). Indeed, the DMCA has an express no-monitoring
`provision, §512(m), which excuses service providers from any “obligation
`to scour matter posted on their services to ensure against copyright
`infringement.” Capitol Recs., LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78, 90 (2d Cir.
`2016). “Protecting service providers from the expense of monitoring was
`an important part of the compromise embodied in the safe harbor.” Id. at
`98.
`
`Athos seeks to renege on that compromise. Athos does not dispute
`that each time it sent a DMCA notice to YouTube identifying allegedly
`infringing video-clips, YouTube expeditiously removed the identified
`clips. Athos nevertheless argues that YouTube is not entitled to safe-
`harbor protection because YouTube has developed “Content ID,” a
`fingerprinting technology designed to give copyright owners greater
`control over how their works appear on YouTube’s service. Tools like
`Content ID are not required by the DMCA. Yet, according to Athos,
`Content ID means that YouTube is subject to additional DMCA
`obligations: any time it receives a takedown notice for one video-clip,
`YouTube is supposedly required, on pain of forfeiting its safe-harbor
`protections, to affirmatively search for, then remove or block, any other
`video on its service with similar content.
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`Athos’s theory is legally baseless: it is refuted by the clear text of
`the DMCA and is contrary to foundational decisions from the Second and
`Ninth Circuits, including a case that rejected virtually identical efforts to
`evict YouTube from the safe harbor. See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube,
`Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 41 (2d Cir. 2012) (“YouTube II”). While Athos accuses
`the District Court of blindly following decisions from sister Circuits, those
`well-reasoned decisions themselves followed the plain language of the
`statute, including by giving effect to its no-monitoring provision.
`YouTube’s voluntary efforts to create better copyright tools to assist
`rightsholders do not undermine its longstanding DMCA safe-harbor
`protection.
`Athos’s argument also faces an equally insuperable factual
`problem. Athos repeatedly asserts that YouTube used Content ID to
`identify matches of clips for which Athos submitted DMCA notices—but
`that never happened, precisely because Athos refused YouTube’s offers
`to use Content ID free of cost. Moreover, steeped in the record, the
`District Court found that Athos “failed to present any tangible evidence
`to establish that, had YouTube used its video-detection technology as it
`suggests, the software would have identified, blocked, or removed any of
`the specific clips-in-suit in dispute in this case.” Dkt. 185 (“Report and
`Recommendation” or “R&R”) at 23. Simply put, Athos did not (and still
`cannot) identify a single allegedly infringing video-clip at issue in this
`case that Content ID would have identified and blocked had YouTube
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`used it to proactively monitor for clips matching those identified in
`Athos’s DMCA notices. As the District Court found, that failure of proof
`independently entitled YouTube to summary judgment under the
`DMCA’s knowledge provisions.
`Athos’s only other argument—a half-hearted effort to rewrite the
`DMCA’s “control-plus-financial-benefit” provision in ways that would
`effectively eject any commercial enterprise from the safe harbor—is
`equally contrary to settled law and was correctly rejected by the District
`Court. This Court should affirm the District Court’s thoughtful ruling
`and ensure continued uniformity in the application of the DMCA’s vital
`protections.
`
`COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE
`
`A. YouTube’s Online Platform For User-Generated Videos
`
`For nearly two decades, YouTube has operated an online platform
`for users to upload videos and to watch videos uploaded by other users.
`Dkt. 116-2 (“Zhu Decl.”) ¶¶2-3. YouTube users may upload video-clips of
`their choosing that YouTube’s systems automatically process and store
`so that they can be seen by other users across the world. Id. ¶¶11-14.
`YouTube has grown into one of the most popular websites on the internet;
`as of February 2020, users uploaded more than 500 hours of video to
`YouTube every minute. R&R 8; Zhu Decl. ¶10. YouTube users have
`access to an extraordinarily varied library of original, creative
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`expression, while creators and content owners have a large and diverse
`audience for their works. Zhu Decl. ¶¶2-3. Whether a creator is large or
`small, well-known or up-and-coming, a documentarian or a comedian, a
`budding film auteur or a critic, YouTube provides an unparalleled
`medium for free marketing, exposure, and revenue. Id. ¶4.
`Beyond material authorized by license, YouTube’s video corpus also
`includes a rich array of fair uses of copyrighted content. For instance, just
`in the genre relevant to this case, users can find retrospectives on the
`history of Mexican cinema and video essays on contemporary Mexican
`directors, which incorporate excerpts from copyrighted works for the
`purpose of commenting on them. Id. ¶2 n.1. YouTube is also home to a
`thriving subculture of film parodies, such as fake trailers that recut and
`genre-switch beloved films: Elf as a thriller, The Silence of the Lambs as
`a comedy, and countless more. Id.
`
`B. The DMCA Safe Harbors Foster Cooperation Between
`Rightsholders And Service Providers, While Placing
`The Burden Of Policing Infringement On Copyright
`Holders
`
`Congress enacted the DMCA in 1998 “to update domestic copyright
`law for the digital age.” YouTube II, 676 F.3d at 26. Recognizing that “[i]n
`the ordinary course of their operations service providers must engage in
`all kinds of acts that expose them to potential copyright infringement
`liability,” UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Cap. Partners LLC, 718 F.3d
`1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 8 (1998)),
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`Congress worked to balance the interests of copyright owners, online
`service providers, and internet users.
`To that end, the DMCA created four discrete “safe harbors” from
`liability for copyright infringement for online service providers who
`implement and follow specified procedures. 17 U.S.C. §512(a)-(d). These
`safe harbors “strike a compromise” by which “in return for the obligation
`to take down infringing works promptly on receipt of notice of
`infringement from the owner, Internet service providers would be
`relieved of liability for user-posted infringements of which they were
`unaware, as well as of the obligation to scour matter posted on their
`services to ensure against copyright infringement.” Vimeo, 826 F.3d at
`89-90.
`The safe harbor relevant here, §512(c), provides that a service
`provider is not liable “for infringement of copyright by reason of the
`storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or
`network controlled or operated by or for the service provider.” §512(c)(1).
`There are threshold eligibility conditions for DMCA protection, which are
`not at issue here. Dkt. 116 (“YT SUF”) ¶¶3, 5-6, 8-9, 13-14, 19-21, 26-30.
`But the centerpiece of the §512(c) safe harbor is the notice-and-takedown
`regime. See Vimeo, 826 F.3d at 97 (the “purpose of § 512(c) was to give
`service providers immunity, in exchange for augmenting the arsenal of
`copyright owners by creating the notice-and-takedown mechanism”).
`Copyright owners who become aware of material infringing their
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`copyrights can send the “designated agent” of a service provider a
`“notification of claimed infringement” (often called a “DMCA notice”) that
`specifically identifies the allegedly infringing content. §512(c)(3)(A).
`Service providers must respond to a notice by “expeditiously” removing
`the identified content. §512(c)(1)(C). The statute requires that a valid
`DMCA notice must contain certain information and be under penalty of
`perjury. §512(c)(3)(A).1
`This notice-and-takedown process first requires the copyright
`owner to “identify specific infringing material to service providers.”
`UMG, 718 F.3d at 1022; accord §512(c)(3)(A)(iii)
`(requiring
`“[i]dentification of the material that is claimed to be infringing … and
`that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information
`reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the
`material”). Specificity is essential because “subsection (c) of the safe
`harbor provision aims at individual infringements, not the service as a
`whole.” Motherless, 885 F.3d at 614. Indeed, if specificity were not
`required, “then no large site would be protected by the safe harbor.” Id.
`
`
`1 The DMCA also creates a counter-notification process: if a service
`provider receives a “counter-notification” from the uploader contesting
`the DMCA notice, the copyright owner is afforded 10 business days to
`notify the provider that it has taken legal action against the uploader of
`the allegedly infringing video, after which the content may be reinstated.
`§512(g)(2)-(3).
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`In this way, “Congress made a considered policy determination that
`the DMCA notification procedures would place the burden of policing
`copyright infringement—identifying the potentially infringing material
`and adequately documenting infringement—squarely on the owners of
`the copyright.” UMG, 718 F.3d at 1022 (cleaned up). “[T]he DMCA
`recognizes that service providers who do not locate and remove infringing
`materials they do not specifically know of should not suffer the loss of
`safe harbor protection.” Id. at 1023. That makes good sense, as
`“[c]opyright holders know precisely what materials they own, and are
`thus better able to efficiently identify infringing copies than service
`providers.” Id. at 1022; accord Viacom Int’l, Inc. v YouTube, Inc., 940
`F.Supp.2d 110, 114-15 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“YouTube III”) (explaining the
`“wisdom of the legislative requirement that it be the owner of the
`copyright, or his agent, who identifies the infringement by giving the
`service provider notice”).
`When a copyright owner follows the DMCA process by identifying
`specific material as infringing in a valid notice, the service provider must
`“expeditiously” remove the identified content. §512(c)(1)(C). But that is
`all. The DMCA does not require service providers to go further by
`affirmatively
`searching
`for additional
`instances of potential
`infringement. See UMG, 718 F.3d at 1123-24. The statute could not be
`clearer on this point: it says expressly that safe-harbor protection shall
`not be conditioned on “a service provider monitoring its service or
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`affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity.” §512(m). This
`provision “relieves the service provider of obligation to monitor for
`infringements posted by users on its website.” Vimeo, 826 F.3d at 98.
`Apart from responding as the statute directs to DMCA notices,
`providers must also “expeditiously” remove other specific instances of
`allegedly infringing material of which they have actual or so-called “red-
`flag” knowledge. §512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii); see UMG, 718 F.3d at 1020. “Both
`actual and red flag knowledge relate to specific instances of copyright
`infringement.” Atl. Recording Corp. v. Spinrilla, LLC, 506 F.Supp.3d
`1294, 1317 (N.D. Ga. 2020) (citing YouTube II, 676 F.3d at 30-32).
`“[H]osting material capable of copyright protection, with the general
`knowledge that the site could be used to share infringing material, is not
`enough to impute knowledge.” Motherless, 885 F.3d at 610. These
`knowledge triggers are strict. The “statutory phrase ‘actual knowledge’
`means what it says: knowledge that is actual, not merely a possible
`inference from ambiguous circumstances.” Id. at 609. Similarly, “for red
`flag knowledge, infringement must be apparent, not merely suspicious.”
`Id. at 610. In particular, “to be disqualified from the benefits of the safe
`harbor by reason of red flag knowledge under § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii), the
`service provider must have actually known facts that would make the
`specific infringement claimed objectively obvious to a reasonable person.”
`Vimeo, 826 F.3d at 93.
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`The DMCA thus establishes a “clear and practical” rule: “if a service
`provider knows (from notice from the owner, or a ‘red flag’) of specific
`instances of infringement, the provider must promptly remove the
`infringing material. If not, the burden is on the owner to identify the
`infringement.” Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F.Supp.2d 514, 525
`(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“YouTube I”). In enacting this regime, “Congress could
`have put the burden of policing infringement in suspicious circumstances
`on the provider, but it instead put it on the copyright holder.” Motherless,
`885 F.3d at 610.
`Finally, to disqualify the service provider from safe-harbor
`protection under the DMCA’s separate control-plus-financial-benefit
`provision, the copyright owner must show both that the service had “the
`right and ability to control [the infringing] activity” and received a
`“financial benefit directly attributable” to the specific alleged
`infringements. §512(c)(1)(B). Control requires the provider to exert
`“substantial influence on the activities of users,” UMG, 718 F.3d at 1030,
`while the financial benefit must be “distinctly attributable to the
`infringing material at issue,” Motherless, 885 F.3d at 613.
`
`C. YouTube Is A Paradigmatic DMCA Service Operating
`Under The Protections Of Established DMCA Law,
`While Going Beyond What The Statute Requires To
`Help Copyright Holders
`
`Since its founding, YouTube has st