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`[DO NOT PUBLISH]
`
`
`In the
`United States Court of Appeals
`For the Eleventh Circuit
`
`____________________
`
`No. 24-14030
`
`
`
`Non-Argument Calendar
`
`____________________
`
`
`NANCY C. SALAS,
`
`versus
`
`MONSANTO COMPANY,
`a foreign corporation,
`
`
`BAYER CORPORATION,
`a foreign corporation, et al.,
`
`
` Plaintiff-Appellee,
`
` Defendant-Appellant,
`
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 24-14030 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 03/19/2025 Page: 2 of 3
`
`2
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`24-14030
`
` Defendants.
`
`
`____________________
`
`Appeal from the United States District Court
`for the Southern District of Florida
`D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-21217-KMW
`____________________
`
`Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
`
`PER CURIAM:
`
`Monsanto Company appeals a judgment against it—
`conceding that Circuit precedent requires us to affirm. We grant
`its unopposed motion for summary affirmance.
`
`Monsanto manufactures Roundup®, a widely used
`herbicide. In Carson v. Monsanto Co., we held that the Federal
`Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136
`et seq., did not preempt a Georgia plaintiff’s state-law failure-to-
`warn claim related to Roundup®. 92 F.4th 980, 986 (11th Cir.
`2024).
`
`As relevant here, Nancy Salas sued Monsanto in Florida state
`court in 2021, alleging that she contracted non-Hodgkin lymphoma
`from her exposure to Roundup®. Salas asserted various state-law
`claims, including negligent failure to warn. Salas and Monsanto
`agreed to settle their dispute. The parties jointly stipulated that the
`district court would enter judgment against Monsanto on Salas’s
`
`
`
`USCA11 Case: 24-14030 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 03/19/2025 Page: 3 of 3
`
`24-14030
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`3
`
`failure-to-warn claim, but Monsanto reserved the right to appeal
`the judgment on federal preemption grounds. The district court
`then entered final judgment against Monsanto. Monsanto now
`appeals.
`
`Summary disposition is appropriate where “the position of
`one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can
`be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case[.]”
`Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969).1
`Carson controls here. On the merits of the preemption issue,
`the two cases are indistinguishable. Florida law, like Georgia law,
`“require[s] pesticide manufacturers to warn users of potential risks
`to health and safety” and thus parallels FIFRA. Carson, 92 F.4th at
`992. And because “the holding of the first panel to address an issue”
`remains the law in this Circuit “unless and until” the Court sitting
`en banc or the Supreme Court intervenes, Carson’s analysis
`governs. Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1300 n.8 (11th Cir.
`2001).
`
`*
`
`*
`
`*
`
`Because there is “no substantial question as to the outcome”
`of this appeal, we GRANT Monsanto’s motion for summary
`affirmance and AFFIRM the judgment below. Groendyke Transp.,
`Inc., 406 F.2d at 1162.
`
`
`1 Groendyke Transportation is binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit under
`Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
`
`