`United States Court of Appeals
`for the Federal Circuit
`______________________
`
`SUNPREME INC.,
`Plaintiff-Appellee
`
`v.
`
`UNITED STATES, SOLARWORLD AMERICAS, INC.,
`Defendants-Appellants
`______________________
`
`2017-1338, 2017-1351
`______________________
`
`Appeals from the United States Court of International
`Trade in No. 1:15-cv-00315-CRK, Judge Claire R. Kelly.
`______________________
`
`Decided: June 14, 2018
`______________________
`
` NANCY NOONAN, Arent Fox, LLP, Washington, DC,
`argued for plaintiff-appellee. Also represented by JOHN
`M. GURLEY, DIANA DIMITRIUC QUAIA.
`
`JUSTIN REINHART MILLER, International Trade Field
`
`Office, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division,
`United States Department of Justice, New York, NY,
`argued for defendant-appellant United States. Also
`represented by CHAD A. READLER, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON,
`REGINALD T. BLADES, JR.; PAULA S. SMITH, Office of the
`Assistant Chief Counsel, United States Bureau of Cus-
`
`

`

`
`2
`
` SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES
`
`toms and Border Protection, United States Department of
`Homeland Security, New York, NY.
`
` MAUREEN E. THORSON, Wiley Rein, LLP, Washington,
`DC, argued for defendant-appellant SolarWorld Americas,
`Inc.
` Also represented by TIMOTHY C. BRIGHTBILL,
`STEPHANIE MANAKER BELL, TESSA V. CAPELOTO, LAURA
`EL-SABAAWI, DERICK HOLT, USHA NEELAKANTAN, ADAM
`MILAN TESLIK,.
`
`______________________
`
`Before NEWMAN, LOURIE, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.
`REYNA, Circuit Judge.
`SolarWorld America Inc. and the United States ap-
`peal from the judgment of the United States Court of
`International Trade in favor of Sunpreme Inc., concluding
`that the United States Customs and Border Protection
`exceeded its authority in reaching a determination that
`certain products imported by Sunpreme are covered by
`the scope of antidumping and countervailing duty orders
`on U.S. imports of solar cells from the People’s Republic of
`China. Because the Court of International Trade lacked
`jurisdiction to hear Sunpreme’s claims, we reverse.
`BACKGROUND
`I.
`U.S. trade laws provide that “American industries
`may petition for relief from imports that are sold in the
`United States at less than fair value . . . , or which benefit
`from subsidies provided by foreign governments.” Alle-
`gheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States, 287 F.3d 1365, 1368
`(Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1675b (2000)). This
`relief is sought by filing an antidumping or countervailing
`duty petition before the U.S. Department of Commerce
`(“Commerce”) and the U.S. International Trade Commis-
`sion (“Trade Commission”). Following the filing of such a
`
`

`

`SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES
`
`3
`
`petition, Commerce determines whether sales of the
`investigated merchandise have been made at less than
`fair value (“dumping”) or whether a countervailable
`subsidy has been provided. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1671(a)(1).
`The Trade Commission determines whether the imported
`merchandise materially injures or threatens to materially
`injure the relevant domestic industry. Id. §§ 1673d(b)(1),
`1671d(b)(1). If Commerce’s and the Trade Commission’s
`determinations are affirmative, Commerce issues an
`appropriate antidumping or countervailing duty order.
`Id. §§ 1673e(a), 1671e(a).
`Commerce is charged with writing antidumping and
`countervailing duty orders that “include[] a description of
`the subject merchandise, in such detail as the administer-
`ing authority deems necessary.”
` Id. §§ 1673e(a)(2),
`1671e(a)(2). The orders also provide the antidumping and
`countervailing duty margins that have been established
`in the course of the investigations. Id. §§ 1673d(c)(1)(B),
`1673e(a)(1), 1671d(c)(1)(B), 1671e(a)(1).
`Once Commerce issues an antidumping or counter-
`vailing duty order, the United States Customs and Border
`Protection (“Customs”) applies and enforces the duty
`orders through the assessment and collection of anti-
`dumping and countervailing duties on imports of the
`investigated merchandise. 19 C.F.R. §§ 159.41, 159.47,
`351.211. When Customs determines a duty order covers
`entered merchandise, it suspends liquidation and notifies
`the importer of “determined or estimated” duties. Id.
`§ 159.58(a), (b). “Liquidation” is defined as “the final
`computation or ascertainment of duties on entries for
`consumption or drawback entries.” Id. § 159.1.
`After the publication of the duty orders, if a question
`arises as to whether merchandise is encompassed by an
`order, an interested party may request a scope inquiry by
`Commerce to determine if a particular type of merchan-
`dise is within the class or kind of merchandise described
`
`

`

`
`4
`
` SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES
`
`in an existing duty order. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.225. Com-
`merce has the express authority to conduct a scope in-
`quiry and to clarify the scope of an unclear order pursuant
`to 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(a), and “should in the first instance
`decide whether an antidumping order covers particular
`products,” because “the order’s meaning and scope are
`issues particularly within the expertise of that agency.”
`Xerox Corp. v. United States, 289 F.3d 792, 795 (Fed. Cir.
`2002). Commerce’s scope rulings may be challenged
`before the Court of International Trade (“CIT”). 19 U.S.C.
`§ 1516a(a)(2)(B)(vi).
`
`II.
`On October 19, 2011, Defendant-Appellant Solar-
`World America Inc. (“SolarWorld”) filed antidumping and
`countervailing duty petitions on imports of solar cells
`from the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”). On Decem-
`ber 7, 2012, following antidumping and countervailing
`duty investigations by Commerce and the Trade Commis-
`sion, Commerce published antidumping and countervail-
`ing duty orders on certain crystalline silicon photovoltaic
`cells imported from the PRC. Crystalline Silicon Photo-
`voltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled into Modules,
`from the People’s Republic of China: Countervailing Duty
`Order, 77 Fed. Reg. 73,017, 73,017 (Dec. 7, 2012); Crystal-
`line Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled
`Into Modules, from the People’s Republic of China:
`Amended Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair
`Value, and Antidumping Duty Order, 77 Fed. Reg. 73,018,
`73,018 (Dec. 7, 2012) (collectively, “CSPV Orders”).
`Commerce established antidumping duty margins at a
`PRC-wide rate of 249.96%, and a countervailing duty at
`the “all others” rate of 15.24% ad valorem. Commerce
`instructed Customs to require cash deposits or the posting
`of a bond equal to the margins and subsidy rates in effect
`at the time of entry on products covered by the CSPV
`Orders. The scope language of the CSPV Orders is identi-
`cal, and provides, in relevant part:
`
`

`

`SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES
`
`5
`
`The merchandise covered by this order is crystal-
`line silicon photovoltaic cells, and modules, lami-
`nates, and panels, consisting of crystalline silicon
`photovoltaic cells, whether or not partially or fully
`assembled into other products, including, but not
`limited to, modules, laminates, panels and build-
`ing integrated materials.
`This order covers crystalline silicon photovoltaic
`cells of thickness equal to or greater than 20 mi-
`crometers, having a p/n junction formed by any
`means, whether or not the cell has undergone oth-
`er processing, including, but not limited to, clean-
`ing, etching, coating, and/or addition of materials
`(including, but not limited to, metallization and
`conductor patterns) to collect and forward the
`electricity that is generated by the cell.
`. . . .
`Excluded from the scope of this order are thin film
`photovoltaic products produced from amorphous
`silicon (a-Si), cadmium telluride (CdTe), or copper
`indium gallium selenide (CIGS).
`CSPV Orders, 77 Fed. Reg. at 73,017, 73,018–19. The
`CSPV Orders do not specifically define “thin film photo-
`voltaic products.”
`Plaintiff Sunpreme Inc. (“Sunpreme”) is a U.S. com-
`pany that imports solar modules produced by Jiawei
`Solarchina (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd. that are composed, in
`part, of solar cells designed, developed, and tested at
`Sunpreme’s California facility. Sunpreme’s modules are
`made of “several layers of amorphous silicon less than one
`micron in thickness, deposited on both sides of a substrate
`consisting of a crystalline silicon wafer.” Appellee’s Br. 8.
`Sunpreme’s modules are bifacial, with amorphous silicon
`being deposited on both the top and bottom sides of a
`substrate, and are certified by TUV, a third-party product
`
`

`

`
`6
`
` SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES
`
`certification body, to be in compliance with the require-
`ments of IEC 61646, i.e. a thin film terrestrial photovolta-
`ic module. J.A. 1015; 1683–84. Prior to April 2015,
`Sunpreme’s solar modules were imported into the United
`States as entry type “01,” the designation for ordinary
`consumption entries not subject to any antidumping or
`countervailing duties.
`The United States maintains that Customs began to
`investigate whether Sunpreme’s imports may be subject
`to the CSPV orders in early 2015. See Sunpreme Inc. v.
`United States, 145 F. Supp. 3d. 1271, 1279 (Ct. Int’l Trade
`2016). In April 2015, Customs requested that Sunpreme
`file its entries under type “03,” the designation for entries
`subject to antidumping or countervailing duties. Customs
`suspended liquidation on the imports and required anti-
`dumping and countervailing duty cash deposits in con-
`formance with the duty margins provided in the CSPV
`Orders. Id. at 1281 n.6.
`In response, Sunpreme disputed Customs’ decision
`and provided information supporting its position that its
`solar module products were outside the scope of the CSPV
`Orders. Id. at 1280–81. Sunpreme provided Customs
`with lab results from an independent third party identify-
`ing amorphous silicon thin film layers in Sunpreme’s
`solar modules, and invited Customs to its California
`facility to observe its production process. Sunpreme, 145
`F. Supp. 3d at 1280–81. Customs also performed its own
`laboratory testing on Sunpreme’s products. Id.
`Around April 20, 2015, Sunpreme began making anti-
`dumping and countervailing cash deposits on its solar
`modules imports. On November 16, 2015, Sunpreme filed
`a request with Commerce for a scope ruling, challenging
`Customs’ decision that its imports were covered by the
`CSPV Orders. On December 30, 2015, Commerce initiat-
`ed a formal scope inquiry.
`
`

`

`SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES
`
`7
`
`On December 8, 2015, twenty-two days before Com-
`merce initiated the formal scope inquiry, Sunpreme filed
`a complaint with the CIT, challenging Customs’ collection
`of cash deposits and suspension of liquidation and seeking
`a preliminary injunction to prevent Customs from collect-
`ing additional cash deposits. J.A. 102. In its complaint,
`Sunpreme contended that Customs “wrongly require[ed]
`[Sunpreme] to enter as subject to antidumping and coun-
`tervailing duties and pay cash deposits on, and suspend
`liquidation of, certain entries of solar modules.” J.A. 102.
`Sunpreme alleged that Customs acted ultra vires and
`exceeded its ministerial task of collecting antidumping
`and countervailing duties by interpreting the CSPV
`Orders to cover Sunpreme’s solar modules, despite that
`thin film products were expressly excluded from the
`coverage of the CSPV Orders.
`The United States concedes in its opening brief that
`Customs does not contest the presence of a thin film of
`amorphous silicon in Sunpreme’s products, but argues
`that the cells in Sunpreme’s products contained other
`characteristics described in the CSPV Orders, namely
`being a crystalline silicon composition greater than 20
`micrometers in thickness containing a p/n junction.
`United States’ Opening Br. 9, 18–19. Thus, in the gov-
`ernment’s view, “the presence of the thin film did not
`necessarily preclude the application of the orders because
`the scope of the orders provides that crystalline photovol-
`taic cells are included whether or not the cell ‘has under-
`gone
`other processing . . . and/or
`the addition
`of
`materials . . . to collect and forward the electricity that is
`generated by the cell.’” Id. at 9–10 (first citing CSPV
`Orders, 77 Fed. Reg. at 73,017–18; then citing Sunpreme
`Inc. v. United States, 190 F. Supp. 3d 1185, 1195–97 (Ct.
`Int’l Trade 2016)).
`The United States, together with intervenor Solar-
`World, moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter juris-
`diction on the grounds that Sunpreme had failed to
`
`

`

`
`8
`
` SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES
`
`exhaust its administrative remedies by not obtaining a
`scope ruling from Commerce prior to filing its complaint
`in the CIT. On December 14, 2015, the court granted
`Sunpreme’s application for a temporary restraining order,
`preventing the continued collection of estimated duty
`deposits. On January 8, 2016, the court issued a prelimi-
`nary injunction restraining Customs from collecting
`duties on future entries, finding that Sunpreme had
`shown irreparable harm from the financial hardship
`associated with paying the duties. Sunpreme, 145 F.
`Supp. 3d at 1294–98. The court also denied the motion to
`dismiss, concluding that subject matter
`jurisdiction
`existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i). Id. at 1290–91. On
`October 11, 2016, the court entered judgment for Sun-
`preme and ordered Customs to return cash deposits
`collected prior to the initiation of the scope inquiry, hold-
`ing that Customs acted outside its authority in its unilat-
`eral interpretation of the scope language of the CSPV
`Orders to include Sunpreme’s solar modules, and thus
`lacked authority to suspend liquidation and order cash
`deposits. Sunpreme, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 1194, 1202–05.
`The United States and SolarWorld appeal. We have
`jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).
`In July of 2016, before entry of the CIT’s final judg-
`ment in this case, Commerce issued its final scope deter-
`mination concluding that Sunpreme’s products fall within
`the scope of the CSPV Orders. J.A. 1433. Sunpreme
`appeals that determination separately. See Sunpreme
`Inc. v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 3d 1265 (Ct. Int’l Trade
`2017), appeal docketed, No. 18-1116 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 30,
`2017).
`
`DISCUSSION
`The primary issue on appeal is whether the CIT had
`jurisdiction over Sunpreme’s complaint. We review
`jurisdictional rulings without deference. Trs. in Bankr. of
`
`

`

`SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES
`
`9
`
`N. Am. Rubber Thread Co., Inc. v. United States, 593 F.3d
`1346, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
`The CIT’s jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C.
`§ 1581. Relevant to this case are subsections (a), (c), and
`(i). Section 1581(a) grants the CIT jurisdiction over
`Customs’ denial of protests, and “provides no jurisdiction
`for protests outside the[] exclusive categories” listed in 19
`U.S.C. § 1514(a). Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., Inc. v. United
`States, 44 F.3d 973, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Section 1581(c)
`grants the CIT jurisdiction to review Commerce’s scope
`ruling determinations. Section 1581(i) embodies a “resid-
`ual” grant of jurisdiction, and may not be invoked when
`jurisdiction under another subsection of § 1581 is or could
`have been available, unless the remedy provided under
`that other subsection would be manifestly inadequate.
`Fujitsu Gen. Am., Inc. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1364,
`1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002). “[W]hen relief is prospectively and
`realistically available under another subsection of 1581,
`invocation of subsection (i) is incorrect.” Chemsol, LLC v.
`United States, 755 F.3d 1345, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
`Where another remedy is or could have been available,
`the party asserting § 1581(i) jurisdiction has the burden
`to show that the remedy would be manifestly inadequate.
`Id. at 1349.
`The CIT concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over
`Sunpreme’s claims under § 1581(a) or (c), but that it
`possessed the residual grant of
`jurisdiction under
`§ 1581(i). Sunpreme, 145 F. Supp. 3d at 1290–92. The
`CIT’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction under
`§ 1581(a) or (c) rested primarily on its reading of Sun-
`preme’s complaint as challenging Customs’ allegedly ultra
`vires decision that Sunpreme’s modules were subject to
`the CSPV Orders. Id. at 1284 (“The court finds [Sun-
`preme] is challenging [Customs’] unilateral interpretation
`of ambiguous scope language in excess of its authority.”).
`The CIT reasoned that “[w]here factual determinations
`alone do not permit [Customs] to determine whether a
`
`

`

`
`10
`
` SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES
`
`good is within the scope or outside the scope of the Or-
`ders, goods must be considered outside of the scope until
`Commerce clarifies or interprets the Orders and clarifies
`what products should be included.” Id. at 1288. The CIT
`concluded that it lacked jurisdiction under § 1581(a)
`because such an ultra vires act by Customs does not
`qualify as a protestable decision under § 1514(a). Id. at
`1289–90. The CIT likewise found that review was una-
`vailable under § 1581(c), which only provides jurisdiction
`for scope ruling determinations by Commerce. Id. at
`1286. Having concluded that jurisdiction was unavailable
`under § 1581(a) or (c), the CIT determined that the resid-
`ual provision § 1581(i) provided jurisdiction over Sun-
`preme’s complaint that Customs “failed ‘to properly
`perform its ministerial function to apply the instructions
`Commerce issued to [Customs] relating to the Orders . . .’
`which ‘contain a specific, unqualified exclusion for thin
`film products.’” Id. at 1290 (second alteration in original).
`We disagree.
`We begin with § 1581(a). In Xerox, we held that
`where the scope of a duty order is “unambiguous and
`undisputed, and the goods clearly do not fall within the
`scope of the order,” Customs’ misapplication of the duty
`order is a protestable decision reviewable by the CIT
`under § 1581(a). 289 F.3d at 795. Here, the parties and
`the CIT recognize that since a dispute exists over the
`scope and application of the CSPV Orders, Customs’
`decision is not protestable and thus not subject to review
`under § 1581(a). See Sunpreme, 145 F. Supp. 3d at 1285;
`SolarWorld’s Opening Br. 18.
`The parties also recognize that § 1581(c) does not ap-
`ply in this case. Section 1581(c) provides jurisdiction over
`challenges to Commerce’s scope ruling determinations.
`Here, at the time Sunpreme filed its complaint in Decem-
`ber of 2015, Commerce had not yet issued a reviewable
`scope ruling determination. Since Sunpreme was not
`
`

`

`SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES
`
`11
`
`challenging a scope ruling from Commerce, § 1581(c) does
`not apply.
`The CIT determined that it possessed subject matter
`jurisdiction under § 1581(i), the residual provision. We
`disagree and hold that the CIT lacked jurisdiction under
`§ 1581(i) because there existed a remedy under another
`subsection that was not manifestly inadequate. Section
`1581(i) “may not be invoked when jurisdiction under
`another subsection of § 1581 is or could have been availa-
`ble, unless the remedy provided under that other subsec-
`tion would be manifestly inadequate.” Int’l Custom
`Prods., Inc. v. United States, 467 F.3d 1324, 1327 (Fed.
`Cir. 2006) (quoting Norcal/Crosetti Foods, Inc. v. United
`States, 963 F.2d 356, 359 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). Not only was
`jurisdiction available under another subsection of § 1581,
`namely subsection (c), Sunpreme was required to exhaust
`the administrative remedies available to it in the form of
`a scope ruling inquiry and scope ruling determination.
`The problem Sunpreme cannot overcome is that it failed
`to wait until it had a formal scope ruling in hand prior to
`filing suit.
`The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
`provides that judicial relief is not available for a supposed
`or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative
`remedy has been exhausted. Sandvik Steel Co. v. United
`States, 164 F.3d 596, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1998). When a ques-
`tion arises as to whether certain goods are within the
`scope of an antidumping duty order, importers should
`first seek a scope ruling from Commerce. Id. at 598–99.
`This is because Commerce “should in the first instance
`decide whether an antidumping order covers particular
`products,” because “the order’s meaning and scope are
`issues particularly within the expertise of that agency.”
`Id. at 600; see also JCM, Ltd. v. United States, 210 F.3d
`1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“To allow a party to elect to
`proceed under section 1581(i), without having first availed
`himself of the remedy provided by section 1581(c), would
`
`

`

`
`12
`
` SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES
`
`undermine the integrity of the clear path Congress in-
`tended a claimant to follow.”).
`When an importer disputes Customs’ application of an
`antidumping or countervailing duty order, the proper
`remedy is for the importer to seek a scope inquiry from
`Commerce, the result of which may subsequently be
`challenged before the CIT. See 19 U.S.C. § 1514(b) (stat-
`ing that Customs’ decisions on trade remedy orders are
`final and conclusive unless the importer files a complaint
`under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a, the statutory provision provid-
`ing for challenges to Commerce scope determinations). By
`filing a complaint with the CIT before obtaining a scope
`ruling, Sunpreme has circumvented the established
`administrative procedure for determining the scope of an
`antidumping or countervailing duty order. Permitting
`such circumventions would discourage importers from
`seeking scope rulings and undermine the remedial
`scheme established by Congress. See Nat’l Corn Growers
`Ass’n v. Baker, 840 F.2d 1547, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
`(holding that where Congress has prescribed a particular
`track for a claimant to follow, in administrative or judicial
`proceedings, and particularly when the claim is against
`the United States, the remedy will be exclusive).
`Sunpreme’s characterization of its appeal as challeng-
`ing Customs’ allegedly ultra vires action is unavailing.
`“[A] party may not expand a court’s jurisdiction by crea-
`tive pleading.” Norsk Hydro Can., Inc. v. United States,
`472 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Instead, “we look to
`the true nature of the action in the district court in de-
`termining jurisdiction of the appeal.” Id. (quoting Wil-
`liams v. Sec’y of Navy, 787 F.2d 552, 557 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
`Here, Sunpreme’s complaint indicates that it is seeking
`the refund of cash deposits, ceasing the suspension of
`liquidation for its entries, and preventing the collection of
`cash deposits and suspension of liquidation in the future.
`But this relief is the very relief associated with a scope
`ruling determination, which demonstrates that Sunpreme
`
`

`

`SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES
`
`13
`
`is in fact seeking a decision that its products are not
`subject to the scope of the orders. The appropriate reme-
`dy for this type of claim is to request a scope ruling from
`Commerce. Sandvik, 164 F.3d at 598–99. Once an ad-
`verse scope ruling is obtained, a complaint may be filed
`with the CIT pursuant to that court’s jurisdiction under
`§ 1581(c).
`We next consider whether that remedy was manifest-
`ly inadequate. Sunpreme argues that any remedy outside
`of § 1581(i) would cause significant financial hardship and
`therefore would be manifestly inadequate. Sunpreme’s
`Br. 42. This argument is without merit. This court’s
`cases make clear that mere allegations of financial harm
`do not render a remedy established by Congress manifest-
`ly inadequate. Int’l Custom Prods., 467 F.3d at 1327. For
`example, we have noted that to be manifestly inadequate,
`the protest must be an “exercise in futility, or ‘incapable
`of producing any result; failing utterly of the desired end
`through
`intrinsic defect; useless,
`ineffectual, vain.’”
`Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 544 F.3d 1289,
`1294 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasis omitted) (citing Int’l
`Custom Prods., 467 F.3d at 1328). Nor can delay serve as
`the basis for manifest inadequacy; “delays inherent in the
`statutory process do not render it manifestly inadequate.”
`Int’l Custom Prods., 467 F.3d at 1327.
`Sunpreme has not demonstrated that obtaining a
`scope ruling would have been an exercise in futility,
`useless or incapable of producing the result it seeks.
`Here, requiring Sunpreme to exhaust the administrative
`remedies would hardly deprive Sunpreme of the oppor-
`tunity for full relief. Had Commerce concluded that
`Sunpreme’s modules were out of scope, Customs would
`have lifted the suspension of liquidation on Sunpreme’s
`entries and refunded any cash deposits. See 19 C.F.R.
`§ 351.225(l)(3). The statute does not prohibit, and the
`
`

`

`
`14
`
` SUNPREME INC. v. UNITED STATES
`
`pertinent regulations clearly contemplate, that Customs
`can suspend liquidation pre-scope inquiry.1 In this case,
`the suspension of liquidation mitigates the long-term
`effect of any alleged financial hardship to Sunpreme by
`ensuring the return of cash deposits pending the merits of
`its scope dispute.
`
`CONCLUSION
`Jurisdiction under § 1581(i) may not be invoked when
`jurisdiction under any other subsection is or could have
`been available. Sunpreme was required to exhaust its
`administrative remedies by seeking a scope ruling from
`Commerce, which it could have subsequently challenged
`under § 1581(c) had the ruling been unfavorable. The
`remedy under § 1581(c) cannot, in this case, be said to be
`manifestly inadequate such that it provides the CIT with
`jurisdiction to hear the present action under § 1581(i).
`Accordingly, the judgment of the CIT is reversed.
`REVERSED
`COSTS
`
`No costs.
`
`1 Section 351.225(l)(1) provides that when a scope
`inquiry is initiated “and the product in question is already
`subject to suspension of liquidation, that suspension of
`liquidation will be continued” pending the results of the
`scope inquiry. 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(l)(1) (emphasis added).
`Should Commerce conclude that the product in question is
`not included within the scope of the order, suspension of
`liquidation on the product is ended and Commerce will
`order Customs to refund any cash deposits or release any
`related bonds. “If the Secretary initiates a scope inquiry,
`any prior suspension of liquidation is continued until the
`administrative proceeding is concluded.” Sandvik Steel,
`164 F.3d at 599 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(l)).
`
`