NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
`
`United States Court of Appeals
`for the Federal Circuit
`______________________
`
`DIANE S. BLODGETT, TOM LINGENFELTER,
`Plaintiffs-Appellants
`
`v.
`
`UNITED STATES,
`Defendant-Appellee
`______________________
`
`2018-2398
`______________________
`
`Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
`in No. 1:17-cv-02000-LAS, Senior Judge Loren A. Smith.
`______________________
`
`Decided: December 3, 2019
`______________________
`
`DIANE S. BLODGETT, St. Louis Park, MN, pro se.
`
`
` TOM LINGENFELTER, Doylestown, PA, pro se.
`
` BORISLAV KUSHNIR, Commercial Litigation Branch,
`Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
`ington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by
`JOSEPH H. HUNT, ELIZABETH MARIE HOSFORD, ROBERT
`EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR.
` ______________________
`
`
`

`

`2
`
`BLODGETT v. UNITED STATES
`
`Before NEWMAN, LOURIE, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.
`PER CURIAM.
`Diane S. Blodgett and Tom Lingenfelter are associates
`of T.G. Morgan, Inc., a rare coin dealer that was shut down
`by the Federal Trade Commission in the early 1990s for
`fraudulent and deceptive business practices. Shortly after
`the shutdown, TGM’s creditors forced the company into
`bankruptcy. More than 25 years later, Blodgett and Lin-
`genfelter, proceeding pro se, filed a lawsuit at the U.S.
`Court of Federal Claims. Their 832-page complaint alleged
`that the 1990s proceedings were part of an “egregious con-
`spiracy” perpetrated by multiple federal courts, multiple
`federal agencies, and by their own attorneys. The Claims
`Court dismissed Blodgett’s and Lingenfelter’s complaint
`for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, untimeliness, and
`failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
`[SA 1, 5] Because we agree with the Claims Court on each
`ground for dismissal, we affirm.
`BACKGROUND
`In August 1991, the Federal Trade Commission
`(“FTC”) brought fraud charges in federal district court
`against a rare coin dealer, T.G. Morgan, Inc. (“TGM”), and
`its president, Michael Blodgett. To settle the FTC action,
`TGM and its principals agreed in a signed consent order to
`transfer TGM’s assets to a “settlement estate” that would
`reimburse the victims of TGM’s fraud. TGM’s assets were
`transferred to the settlement estate “irrevocably and with-
`out the possibility of reversion to themselves or to any en-
`tity owned or controlled by them.” Fed. Trade Comm. v.
`T.G. Morgan, Inc., No. Civ. 4-91-638, 1992 WL 88162, at *4
`(D. Minn. Mar. 4, 1992). The district court explained that
`TGM and its principals had thus “waive[d] any and all
`claims that they, or entities owned or controlled by them,
`may have to the [transferred] assets.” Id. at *5.
`
`

`

`BLODGETT v. UNITED STATES
`
`3
`
`Shortly thereafter, TGM’s creditors forced the company
`into involuntary bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court ap-
`pointed a trustee to manage the bankruptcy estate. The
`trustee filed a motion to seize assets in the settlement es-
`tate and transfer those assets to the bankruptcy estate.
`Mrs. Diane S. Blodgett, a principle of TGM, and Mr.
`Thomas Lingenfelter, a business associate and third party
`beneficiary of TGM, objected to the transfer. The bank-
`ruptcy court rejected their arguments, finding that neither
`party had a legally cognizable claim against the settlement
`estate. The bankruptcy court granted the trustee’s motion.
`Over the next 25 years, Mrs. Blodgett and Mr. Lingen-
`felter (collectively, “Blodgett”) filed more than a dozen law-
`suits that claimed an interest in the assets seized by the
`trustee and challenged the scope and content of the bank-
`ruptcy estate. In each case, the court rejected Blodgett’s
`claims as meritless.
`On December 18, 2017, Blodgett filed an 832-page pro
`se complaint in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (“Claims
`Court”). Blodgett’s complaint, which gave rise to this ap-
`peal, alleges a 26-year government conspiracy that in-
`volves breach of contract, various torts, a Fifth Amendment
`taking, and violations of the Bankruptcy Code, the Internal
`Review Code (“IRC”), and the Employment Retirement In-
`come Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).
`On March 13, 2018, the Government moved to dismiss
`Blodgett’s complaint. Blodgett opposed. On July 26, 2018,
`the Claims Court granted the Government’s motion for
`three reasons. First, the Claims Court found a lack of sub-
`ject matter jurisdiction over Blodgett’s Bankruptcy Code,
`IRC, and ERISA claims. Second, the Claims Court held
`that all of Blodgett’s claims are barred by the Tucker Act’s
`six-year statute of limitations. Third, the Claims Court
`held that Blodgett failed to state a takings claim because
`Blodgett irrevocably transferred the assets-in-question to
`the settlement estate and relinquished all rights and
`
`

`

`4
`
`BLODGETT v. UNITED STATES
`
`property interests in those assets. The Claims Court in-
`structed the clerk to refuse any further filings or com-
`plaints from Blodgett without leave of court.
`Blodgett timely appealed pro se. We have jurisdiction
`under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
`DISCUSSION
` We review de novo whether the Claims Court has
`properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or for failure to
`state a claim, both of which are questions of law. Turping
`v. United States, 913 F.3d 1060, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2019). To
`survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
`which relief can be granted, a complaint must contain suf-
`ficient factual allegations that, if true, would state a claim
`to relief that is plausible on its face. Call Henry, Inc. v.
`United States, 855 F.3d 1348, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
`To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of subject mat-
`ter jurisdiction, the plaintiff must prove by a preponder-
`ance of the evidence that the court possesses jurisdiction.
`Id. When determining whether subject matter jurisdiction
`exists, we generally “accept as true all undisputed facts as-
`serted in the plaintiff’s complaint and draw all reasonable
`inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Trusted Integration,
`Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
`While pro se pleadings, like those here, are to be liberally
`construed, that does not alleviate a plaintiff’s burden to es-
`tablish jurisdiction. Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch.
`Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
`The jurisdiction of the Claims Court is limited in two
`ways: by subject matter and by timing. First, the Tucker
`Act limits the subject matter jurisdiction of the Claims
`Court to claims against the United States for money dam-
`ages other than those sounding in tort, including those
`arising from a contract, the Constitution, or a federal stat-
`ute or regulation. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). Because the
`Tucker Act itself does not create a substantive cause of
`
`

`

`BLODGETT v. UNITED STATES
`
`5
`
`action, a plaintiff must identify a separate money-mandat-
`ing source of substantive law that creates the right to
`money damages. Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167,
`1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
`Second, all claims brought before the Claims Court
`“shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within
`six years after such claim first accrues.” 28 U.S.C. § 2501.
`See Holmes v. United States, 657 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir.
`2011) (explaining that “[c]ompliance with the statute of
`limitations is a jurisdictional requirement”). A cause of ac-
`tion “first accrues” when “all the events have occurred that
`fix the alleged liability of the government and entitle the
`claimant to institute an action.” Holmes, 657 F.3d at 1317.
`For example, “[i]n the case of a breach of a contract, a cause
`of action accrues when the breach occurs.” Id.
`We begin with Blodgett’s claims that are based on vio-
`lations of the Bankruptcy Code, the IRC, and the ERISA.
`We conclude that the Claims Court properly dismissed
`each claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
`Blodgett appears to assert three bankruptcy-related
`claims, each arising under Title 11: (i) the court-appointed
`trustee failed to perform his fiduciary duties in violation of
`11 U.S.C. § 704, (ii) the bankruptcy court performed an im-
`proper offset in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7); and (iii)
`TGM’s creditors filed involuntary bankruptcy filing in bad
`faith in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 303. S.A. 126, 137, S.A.
`249; S.A. 607. We conclude that the Claims Court properly
`dismissed each of Blodgett’s bankruptcy claims for lack of
`subject matter jurisdiction because district courts—and
`not the Claims Court—have “original and exclusive juris-
`diction of all cases under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 1334.
`Blodgett’s IRC-based claim appears to assert that the
`government conducted unauthorized tax collections by vir-
`tue of the 1990s FTC proceedings and consent order. S.A.
`167, S.A. 595. We conclude that the Claims Court properly
`dismissed this claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
`
`

`

`6
`
`BLODGETT v. UNITED STATES
`
`because claims for damages based on allegedly unauthor-
`ized tax collections must be brought “exclusively before a
`district court of the United States.” Ledford v. United
`States, 297 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
`Blodgett’s ERISA-based claim appears to assert that
`the bankruptcy court violated ERISA’s anti-alienation pro-
`visions by alienating “Blodgett’s fully funded, fully vested,
`fully compliant ERISA pension” and subjecting it to a con-
`structive trust. S.A. 24. See also S.A. 14, 51, 69 (claiming
`the FTC “loot[ed] the Blodgett’s TGM fully funded ERISA
`pension fund”). We conclude that the Claims Court
`properly dismissed this claim for lack of subject matter ju-
`risdiction because the Claims Court “shall not have juris-
`diction [over] any claim for a pension.” 28 U.S.C. § 1501.
`We likewise conclude that the Claims Court lacked
`subject matter jurisdiction over Blodgett’s torts claims.
`Blodgett asserts that the government committed “hun-
`dreds of torts” and “years of unending torts,” including
`“bad faith torts,” and “torts in court filings.” S.A. 9, S.A.
`14, S.A. 18, S.A. 40, S.A. 69. As a result, Blodgett contends,
`“the United States must now pay the bill.” S.A. 107. We
`conclude that the Claims Court properly dismissed these
`claims because the Claims Court “lacks jurisdiction over
`tort actions against the United States.” Brown v. United
`States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing 28 U.S.C.
`§ 1491(a) (excluding from the Claims Court’s jurisdiction
`cases “sounding in tort”)).
`Blodgett’s remaining claims—a breach of contract
`claim and Fifth Amendment taking claim—are barred by
`the Claims Court’s six-year statute of limitations.
`Blodgett’s contract claim appears to assert that
`Blodgett entered into a “settlement contract with the FTC”
`when Mrs. Blodgett signed the FTC consent order and
`“fully funded 50% of the consent settlement on December
`31, 1991.” S.A. 8, S.A. 12. Blodgett alleges that the bank-
`ruptcy trustee’s 1992 seizure of funds from the settlement
`
`

`

`BLODGETT v. UNITED STATES
`
`7
`
`estate breached the contract “by interference with Ms.
`Blodgett’s access to untainted personal assets.” S.A. 118,
`801. The contract claim thus “first accrued” in 1992, when
`Blodgett contends the breach occurred. Holmes, 657 F.3d
`at 1317. As a result, Blodgett’s contract claim is barred
`because it was filed in 2017, more than six years after it
`first accrued. 28 U.S.C. § 2501.
`Blodgett’s Fifth Amendment taking claim appears to
`assert that the FTC’s acquisition and liquidation of assets
`in 1991 and 1992 constituted a taking of personal property
`“without just compensation.” S.A. 39, S.A. 258–259, S.A.
`392–393. A takings claim under the Fifth Amendment “ac-
`crues when the taking action occurs.” Navajo Nation v.
`United States, 631 F.3d 1268, 1273–74 (Fed. Cir. 2011);
`Nw. La. Fish & Game Pres. Comm’n v. United States, 446
`F.3d 1285, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“A taking occurs when
`governmental action deprives the owner of all or most of its
`property interest.”). Construing Blodgett’s complaint lib-
`erally, the takings claim first accrued in 1992, when the
`FTC placed TGM’s assets in the settlement estate. As a
`result, Blodgett’s Fifth Amendment takings claim is barred
`because it was filed in 2017, more than six years after it
`first accrued. 28 U.S.C. § 2501.1
`Blodgett attempts to circumvent the six-year statute of
`limitations by arguing that Blodgett “first sued under the
`Tucker Act in December 1994, thus arguably timely pre-
`serving their claims back to 1991.” S.A. 1990. See also
`
`1 We also agree with the Claims Court that Blodgett
`failed to state a Fifth Amendment takings claim upon
`which relief can be granted. Because TGM irrevocably
`transferred the assets-in-question and “waive[d] any and
`all claims” to those assets, T.G. Morgan, 1992 WL 88162,
`at *4–*5, Blodgett cannot “identify a legally cognizable
`property interest.” Am. Bankers Ass’n v. United States, 932
`F.3d 1375, 1384–85 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
`
`

`

`8
`
`BLODGETT v. UNITED STATES
`
`Appellant Br. at 13–14 (asserting that the 1994 complaint
`“tolled any statute of limitations”). As we have explained,
`the Claims Court’s six-year statute of limitations “is juris-
`dictional and may not be waived or tolled.” FloorPro, Inc.
`v. United States, 680 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (the
`six-year period “cannot be extended even in cases where
`such an extension might be
`justified on equitable
`grounds.”). Nor can Blodgett argue that the instant com-
`plaint is timely under the “relate back doctrine” of Rule
`15(c) of the Rules of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, be-
`cause Rule 15(c) expressly applies only to amended com-
`plaints, not newly filed complaints.
`Because all of Blodgett’s claims are outside the scope of
`the Tucker Act or time-barred, we conclude that the Claims
`Court properly dismissed Blodgett’s complaint.
`CONCLUSION
` We have considered Blodgett’s other arguments and
`find them unpersuasive. We conclude that the Claims
`Court properly dismissed Blodgett’s complaint for lack of
`subject matter jurisdiction, untimeliness, and failure to
`state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We affirm.
`AFFIRMED
`COSTS
`
`No costs.
`
`