NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
`
`United States Court of Appeals
`for the Federal Circuit
`______________________
`
`CHRIS JAYE,
`Plaintiff-Appellant
`
`v.
`
`UNITED STATES,
`Defendant-Appellee
`______________________
`
`2019-1458
`______________________
`
`Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
`in No. 1:18-cv-01200-LAS, Senior Judge Loren A. Smith.
`______________________
`
`Decided: August 6, 2019
`______________________
`
`CHRIS JAYE, Clinton, NJ, pro se.
`
`
` RUSSELL JAMES UPTON, Commercial Litigation Branch,
`Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
`ington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by
`JOSEPH H. HUNT, STEVEN JOHN GILLINGHAM, ROBERT
`EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR.
` ______________________
`
`
`

`

`2
`
`JAYE v. UNITED STATES
`
`Before LOURIE, PLAGER, and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.
`PER CURIAM.
`Chris Jaye (“Jaye”), proceeding pro se, appeals from a
`final decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims
`dismissing her complaint pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3) of the
`Rules of the Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”) for lack of
`jurisdiction. Because we agree that the Court of Federal
`Claims did not have jurisdiction over Jaye’s claims, we af-
`firm.
`
`BACKGROUND
` On August 8, 2018, Jaye filed the present suit in the
`Court of Federal Claims, alleging breach of an implied con-
`tract with the United States, various violations of her con-
`stitutional rights, as well as an “unlawful taking scheme
`perpetrated by the State of New Jersey.” Appellee’s App.
`5. Jaye’s allegations all seem to stem from a dispute with
`her condominium association and other litigation—both in
`state and federal court—relating to her residence in New
`Jersey. Id. at 5–8.
`
`The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the case sua
`sponte under Rule 12(h)(3) of the RCFC. The court ex-
`plained that Jaye’s “allegations do not give rise to any
`cause of action for which th[e] Court has subject-matter ju-
`risdiction.” Id. at 115–16. The court entered judgment on
`August 28, 2018. Id. at 117.
`In December 2018, Jaye filed a “Notice of Motion to Va-
`cate,” which the court construed as a motion for relief from
`a judgment or order under Rule 60 of the RCFC. The Court
`of Federal Claims denied the motion, finding “no error or
`defect that affects plaintiff’s substantial rights” and “no le-
`gitimate reason to vacate” its prior order. Id. at 119. The
`court explained that Jaye’s “claim for implied contract is
`frivolous” and her allegations of a taking stem from state
`court judgments over which the court lacks jurisdiction. Id.
`at 120–21. Additionally, the court directed the Clerk of
`
`

`

`JAYE v. UNITED STATES
`
`3
`
`Court to “accept no further filings or complaints related to
`the claims in the case at bar from Chris Ann Jaye without
`an order granting leave to file.” Id. at 121.
`Jaye timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant
`to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
`DISCUSSION
`Subject matter jurisdiction may be challenged at any
`time by the parties or by the court sua sponte. Folden v.
`United States, 379 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004). “In
`fact, a court has a duty to inquire into its jurisdiction to
`hear and decide a case.” Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc.,
`269 F.3d 1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001); View Eng’g, Inc. v.
`Robotic Vision Sys., Inc., 115 F.3d 962, 963 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
`(“[C]ourts must always look to their jurisdiction, whether
`the parties raise the issue or not.”). Pursuant to Rule
`12(h)(3) of the RCFC, “[i]f the court determines at any time
`that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dis-
`miss the action.” We review de novo a decision by the Court
`of Federal Claims to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. M.
`Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. v. United States, 609 F.3d 1323,
`1327 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
`In deciding whether there is subject matter jurisdic-
`tion, “the allegations stated in the complaint are taken as
`true and jurisdiction is decided on the face of the plead-
`ings.” Folden, 379 F.3d at 1354. Pro se parties are entitled
`to liberal construction of their pleadings and are generally
`held to “less stringent standards.” Haines v. Kerner, 404
`U.S. 519, 520–22 (1972) (requiring that allegations con-
`tained in a pro se complaint be held to “less stringent
`standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”). De-
`spite this leniency, a court may not “take a liberal view of .
`. . jurisdictional requirement[s] and set a different rule for
`pro se litigants only.” Kelley v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor,
`812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The plaintiff bears
`the burden of establishing the court’s jurisdiction by a
`
`

`

`4
`
`JAYE v. UNITED STATES
`
`preponderance of the evidence. Reynolds v. Army & Air
`Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
`The Court of Federal Claims is a court of limited juris-
`diction. It derives that jurisdiction from the Tucker Act,
`which gives the court “jurisdiction to render judgment upon
`any claim against the United States founded either upon
`the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation
`of an executive department, or upon any express or implied
`contract with the United States, or for liquidated or
`unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” 28
`U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). The Tucker Act does not, by itself, cre-
`ate any causes of action against the United States for
`money damages. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206,
`216 (1983); United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398
`(1976) (“The Tucker Act, of course, is itself only a jurisdic-
`tional statute; it does not create any substantive right en-
`forceable against the United States for money damages.”).
`Instead, to invoke jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, a
`plaintiff must identify a contractual relationship, constitu-
`tional provision, statute, or regulation that provides a sub-
`stantive right to money damages. LeBlanc v. United
`States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
`On appeal, Jaye argues that the Court of Federal
`Claims erred in dismissing her complaint because it had
`jurisdiction to consider her claims “involving an implied
`contract, constitutional issues and takings.” Appellant In-
`formal Br. ¶ 3. For the reasons explained below, the Court
`of Federal Claims correctly concluded that it lacked juris-
`diction to consider Jaye’s claims.
`
`First, Jaye has not pled the elements of a valid con-
`tract—either express or implied—between herself and the
`United States. Like an express contract, an implied-in-fact
`contract requires: “(1) mutuality of intent to contract;
`(2) consideration; and, (3) lack of ambiguity in offer and ac-
`ceptance.” City of Cincinnati v. United States, 153 F.3d
`1375, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “When the United States is a
`
`

`

`JAYE v. UNITED STATES
`
`5
`
`party, a fourth requirement is added: The government rep-
`resentative whose conduct is relied upon must have actual
`authority to bind the government in contract.” Id.
`In her complaint, Jaye alleges that she “has an implied
`contract with the United States upon paying court fees to
`access the court.” Appellee’s App. 2. Jaye argues that the
`United States breached that contract by “fail[ing] to pro-
`vide competent judges” and requests that certain filing fees
`be returned to her. Id. at 22, 33 (“Plaintiff requests the
`return of all court fees paid to the United States as required
`by law with the exception of the fee paid for the case of 14-
`07471.”). But the mere filing of a complaint and payment
`of a filing fee does not create a contract between the plain-
`tiff and the United States. See Garrett v. United States, 78
`Fed. Cl. 668, 671 (2007) (finding no authority supporting
`plaintiff’s proposition that filing a complaint gives rise to a
`contract with the United States); Stamps v. United States,
`73 Fed. Cl. 603, 610 (2006) (finding that the court lacked
`jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s claim alleging breach of an
`implied-in-fact contract stemming from the district court
`judge’s acceptance of the case in forma pauperis). Because
`Jaye has not alleged the elements of a contract with the
`United States, her claim is not within the jurisdiction of
`the Court of Federal Claims.
`
`As to Jaye’s allegations of constitutional violations, it
`is well established that not every claim involving, or invok-
`ing, the Constitution necessarily confers jurisdiction upon
`the Court of Federal Claims. James v. Caldera, 159 F.3d
`573, 580 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[A] Tucker Act plaintiff must
`assert a claim under a separate money-mandating consti-
`tutional provision, statute, or regulation, the violation of
`which supports a claim for damages against the United
`States.”). Although the grounds for Jaye’s constitutional
`challenges are not entirely clear, her complaint alleges vi-
`olation of the separation of powers doctrine. Appellee’s
`App. 23. The separation of powers doctrine does not “man-
`date payment of money by the government” and thus
`
`

`

`6
`
`JAYE v. UNITED STATES
`
`cannot confer jurisdiction upon the Court of Federal
`Claims. LeBlanc, 50 F.3d at 1028. To the extent Jaye is
`claiming violation of her due process rights, the Due Pro-
`cess clause of the Fifth Amendment is not a sufficient basis
`for jurisdiction because it is not money-mandating. Id.
`Next, Jaye asserts that the “United States acted a part
`in an unlawful taking scheme perpetrated by the State of
`New Jersey.” Appellee’s App. 5. The Court of Federal
`Claims found that, although Jaye claims that “takings”
`were committed against her, her complaint “lacks any fac-
`tual basis for a taking.” Id. at 115. We agree.
`As the Court of Federal Claims explained, Jaye’s tak-
`ings allegations all stem from what she believes are “void
`judgments made by state courts.” Id. at 120. The Court of
`Federal Claims has no jurisdiction to review state court
`judgments. Potter v. United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 544, 548
`(2013) (“This Court, like all lower federal courts, lacks au-
`thority to review a state court’s judgments, nor does it have
`the authority to remedy injuries that are caused by a state
`court’s order.”). And, although Jaye’s caption identifies the
`United States as the defendant in this suit, many of her
`“takings-related” factual allegations are directed at New
`Jersey state officials and “state actors.” Appellee’s App. 6.
`It is well established that the Court of Federal Claims only
`has jurisdiction to hear claims against the United States.
`See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588 (1941)
`(suits against parties other than the United States are “be-
`yond the jurisdiction” of the Claims Court). To the extent
`Jaye’s complaint seeks relief against defendants other than
`the United States, including state officials, state agencies,
`and other individuals, the Court of Federal Claims lacks
`jurisdiction over those claims. Smith v. United States, 99
`Fed. Cl. 581, 583 (2011) (“[T]he Court of Federal Claims
`does not have jurisdiction to hear claims against states, lo-
`calities, state and local government entities, or state and
`local government officials and employees.”).
`
`

`

`JAYE v. UNITED STATES
`
`7
`
`Finally, in her prayer for relief, Jaye asks the Court of
`
`Federal Claims to review several cases she filed in the
`United States District Court for New Jersey, all of which
`were dismissed. But “the Court of Federal Claims does not
`have jurisdiction to review the decisions of district courts.”
`Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
`As such, the Court of Federal Claims cannot review any of
`the district court’s decisions Jaye identifies in her com-
`plaint.1
`
`CONCLUSION
` We have considered Jaye’s remaining arguments and
`conclude that they are without merit. Because the Court
`of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over the asserted
`claims, we affirm.2
`
`
`1 Jaye filed a “Motion to Rely on Original Record and
`Expand Record to Support Relief Denied.” Motion, Jaye v.
`United States, No. 19-1458 (Fed. Cir. June 12, 2019), ECF
`No. 48. Therein, she argues that “the judges of the US Dis-
`trict Court of New Jersey, US Court of Appeals, Third Cir-
`cuit the Judicial Council of the Third Circuit had the power
`and duty to perform to uphold my rights. They did not.
`They are Government employees. They are directly in-
`volved in the taking, deprivation and seizure of my prop-
`erty.” Id. at 1. To the extent Jaye seeks relief against any
`federal judges individually, the Court of Federal Claims
`does not have jurisdiction to address those claims. See
`Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 624 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
`(“The Tucker Act grants the Court of Federal Claims juris-
`diction over suits against the United States, not against in-
`dividual federal officials.”). Jaye’s motion is denied.
`2 Jaye also filed a Motion for Court Copies, arguing
`that she has not received certain documents and request-
`ing that the court send her copies via email. Motion, Jaye
`v. United States, No. 19-1458 (Fed. Cir. June 12, 2019),
`
`

`

`8
`
`JAYE v. UNITED STATES
`
`AFFIRMED
`
`
`ECF No. 46. That motion is denied. All documents filed in
`this appeal are available electronically through the Public
`Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) system.
`
`