throbber
Case: 20-1760 Document: 57 Page: 1 Filed: 07/12/2021
`
`Appeal Nos. 20-1760, -1803
`
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`YANBIN YU, ZHONGXUAN ZHANG,
`
`v.
`APPLE INC.
`
`Plaintiffs-Appellants,
`
`Defendant-Appellee.
`
`Appeal from the United States District Court,
`Northern District of California in Case No. 3:18-cv-06181-JD,
`Judge James Donato
`
`YANBIN YU, ZHONGXUAN ZHANG,
`
`Plaintiffs-Appellants,
`
`v.
`SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO. LTD., SAMSUNG
`ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.,
`
`Defendants-Appellees.
`
`Appeal from the United States District Court,
`Northern District of California in Case No. 3:18-cv-06339-JD,
`Judge James Donato
`
`PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC OF PLAINTIFFS-
`APPELLANTS YANBIN YU AND ZHONGXUAN ZHANG
`

`

`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`

`

`Case: 20-1760 Document: 57 Page: 2 Filed: 07/12/2021
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Dated: July 12, 2021
`
`DANIEL JOHNSON JR. (SBN 57409)
`ROBERT G. LITTS (SBN 205984)
`DAN JOHNSON LAW GROUP, LLP
`1350 Old Bayshore Highway, Suite 520
`Burlingame, CA 94010
`(415) 604-4500
`dan@danjohnsonlawgroup.com
`robert@danjohnsonlawgroup.com
`
`
`
`Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants
`

`
`
`

`
`

`

`Case: 20-1760 Document: 57 Page: 3 Filed: 07/12/2021
`

`
`CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST
`
`Counsel for Appellants Yanbin Yu and Zhongxuan Zhang certify the
`
`following:
`
`1.
`
`The full names of the parties represented by me are:
`
`Yanbin Yu and Zhongxuan Zhang
`
`2.
`
`The names of the real parties in interest represented by me are:
`
`Yanbin Yu and Zhongxuan Zhang
`
`3.
`
`All parent corporations and publicly held companies that own 10% or
`
`more of stock in the parties represented by me are:
`
`None
`
`4.
`
`The names of all law firms and the partners or associates that
`
`appeared for the party now represented by me in the trial court or agency or are
`
`expected to appear in this court (and who have not or will not enter an appearance
`
`in this case) are:
`
`Dan Johnson Law Group, LLP: Nathan W. McCutcheon, Mario
`
`Moore
`
`5.
`
`The title and number of any case known to counsel to be pending in
`
`this or any other court or agency that will directly affect or be directly affected by
`
`this court’s decision in the pending appeal:
`
`
`
`- i -
`
`

`

`Case: 20-1760 Document: 57 Page: 4 Filed: 07/12/2021
`

`
`The patent at issue in this appeal was also the subject of a pair of inter
`
`partes review proceedings before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`
`(“PTAB”) of the United States Patent and Trademark Office
`
`(“USPTO”): Apple Inc. v. Yanbin Yu, et al., IPR2019-01258; Samsung
`
`Electronics Co., Ltd., et al. v. Yanbin Yu, et al., IPR2020-00492. A
`
`decision in those proceedings was issued by the PTAB on January 5,
`
`2021, and that decision is presently on appeal to this Court in
`
`consolidate Case Nos. 2021-1723, 2021-1724, and 2021-1766.
`
`6.
`
`All information required by Fed. R. App. P. 26.1(b) and (c) that
`
`identifies organizational victims in criminal cases and debtors and trustees in
`
`/s/ Daniel Johnson Jr.
`Daniel Johnson Jr.
`
`
`
`bankruptcy cases:
`
`None
`
`
`
`Dated: July 12, 2021
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`- ii -
`
`

`

`Case: 20-1760 Document: 57 Page: 5 Filed: 07/12/2021
`

`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page(s)
`
`STATEMENT OF COUNSEL .................................................................................. 1 
`
`PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ............................................................................... 3 
`
`ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 9 
`
`I. 
`
`II. 
`
`THE MAJORITY FAILED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE SPECIFIC
`REQUIREMENTS OF CLAIM 1 WHEN ARTICULATING THE
`“FOCUS” OF THE CLAIM ................................................................ 11 
`
`THE MAJORITY IMPROPERLY DISCOUNTED THE CLAIMED
`COMBINATION OF LIMITATIONS ............................................... 12 
`
`III.  THE MAJORITY IMPROPERLY MADE NEW AND ERRONEOUS
`FINDINGS OF FACT AGAINST APPELLANTS ............................ 16 
`
`IV.  THE MAJORITY FAILED TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF
`PREEMPTION .................................................................................... 18 
`
`CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT ............................... 19 
`
`ADDENDUM
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`- iii -
`
`

`

`Case: 20-1760 Document: 57 Page: 6 Filed: 07/12/2021
`

`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
`573 U.S. 208 (2014) .............................................................................. 1, 9, 10, 18
`Amdocs (Israel) Limited v. Openet Telecom, Inc.,
`841 F.3d 1288 (2016) ...................................................................................... 2, 18
`Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
`827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ................................................................ 2, 13, 17
`Diamond v. Diehr,
`450 U.S. 175 (1981) ........................................................................................ 2, 13
`Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
`566 U.S. 66 (2012) ............................................................................................ 2, 9
`McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc.,
`837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ...................................................................... 2, 11
`SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC,
`898 F.3d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2018) .......................................................................... 15
`Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States,
`850 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ...................................................................... 2, 12
`Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC,
`874 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017) .......................................................................... 15
`Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp.,
`867 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ...................................................................... 2, 17
`Statutes
`35 U.S.C. § 101 .................................................................................................passim
`
`
`
`
`- iv -
`
`

`

`Case: 20-1760 Document: 57 Page: 7 Filed: 07/12/2021
`

`
`STATEMENT OF COUNSEL
`
`Based on my professional judgment, I believe this appeal requires an answer
`
`to one or more precedent-setting questions of exceptional importance:
`
`1) Whether the specific requirements recited in the language of a claim
`
`can be disregarded in determining the “focus” of the claim under step
`
`one of the Alice/Mayo test for patent-eligibility.
`
`2) Whether a claimed combination of non-abstract (e.g., structural)
`
`limitations that has not been shown to exist in the prior art can be
`
`found to be “generic” and “conventional.”
`
`3) Whether a court can make adverse findings of fact against the non-
`
`moving party at the pleadings stage that are inconsistent with the
`
`patent specification, the file history, and/or plausible allegations in the
`
`complaint.
`
`4) Whether a claim that presents no danger of preempting an “abstract
`
`idea,” either generally or in a particular field of use or technological
`
`environment, can be found ineligible for patent protection under 35
`
`U.S.C. § 101.
`
`Based on my professional judgment, I believe the decision of the panel is contrary
`
`to at least the following decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and
`
`precedents of this Court: Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014);
`
`1
`
`

`

`Case: 20-1760 Document: 57 Page: 8 Filed: 07/12/2021
`

`
`Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012); McRO,
`
`Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Visual
`
`Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Thales Visionix
`
`Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
`
`175 (1981); Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d
`
`1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016); and, Amdocs (Israel) Limited v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841
`
`F.3d 1288 (2016).
`
`
`
`Dated: July 12, 2021
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`/s/ Daniel Johnson Jr.
`Daniel Johnson Jr.
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case: 20-1760 Document: 57 Page: 9 Filed: 07/12/2021
`

`
`PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
`
`The panel majority upheld the district court’s dismissals—at the pleadings
`
`stage—of the two cases in this consolidated appeal on the ground that the
`
`following claim is ineligible for patent protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101:
`
`1. An improved digital camera comprising:
`
` a
`
` first and a second image sensor closely positioned with respect to
`a common plane, said second image sensor sensitive to a full
`region of visible color spectrum;
`
`two lenses, each being mounted in front of one of said two image
`sensors;
`
`said first image sensor producing a first image and said second
`image sensor producing a second image;
`
`an analog-to-digital converting circuitry coupled to said first and
`said second image sensor and digitizing said first and said second
`intensity images to produce correspondingly a first digital image
`and a second digital image;
`
`an image memory, coupled to said analog-to-digital converting
`circuitry, for storing said first digital image and said second digital
`image; and
`
` a
`
` digital image processor, coupled to said image memory and
`receiving said first digital image and said second digital image,
`producing a resultant digital image from said first digital image
`enhanced with said second digital image.
`
`Majority at 3-4. It is unprecedented for a claim drawn with to a machine of such
`
`precisely defined structure to be invalidated under Section 101. As Judge Newman
`
`correctly stated in her dissent, “[t]his camera is a mechanical and electronic device
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case: 20-1760 Document: 57 Page: 10 Filed: 07/12/2021
`

`
`of defined structure and mechanism; it is not an ‘abstract idea.’ ” Dissent at 2.
`
`This claim plainly recites patent-eligible subject matter.
`
`The patent at issue in this appeal, U.S. Patent No. 6,611,289 (“’289 Patent”),
`
`was filed on January 15, 1999, more than twenty years ago.1 Appx14. Existing
`
`digital cameras at that time typically used a single image sensor to capture a scene.
`
`Appx24[1:26-30]. An image sensor is a photosensitive device that can react to
`
`light reflected from the scene and translate the strength of that reaction into a
`
`numerical equivalent. Appx24[1:30-32]. If a mosaic of filters (e.g., red, green,
`
`and blue filters) is superimposed over the image sensor, the reaction of the image
`
`sensor can be measured for those different regions of the color spectrum, and those
`
`measurements can be combined and evaluated by software to determine the
`
`specific color at each location in the picture, thus creating a full color image.
`
`Appx15[Fig.1]; Appx24[1:32-36; 1:50-57].
`
`Although less prevalent, cameras having multiple image sensors also existed
`
`at the time of the ’289 Patent’s filing. Appx25[4:47-61]. Instead of using just a
`
`single image sensor with a superimposed mosaic filter, these multi-sensor cameras
`
`used three separate image sensors and a prism that split the light reflected from a
`
`scene into three distinct bands (e.g., red, green, and blue bands), such that each
`

`1 For context, the first Apple accused product, the iPhone 7 Plus, became available in September
`2016 (Appx251[¶24]), and the first Samsung accused product, the Galaxy Note 8, became
`available in September 2017 (Appx282[¶27]).
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case: 20-1760 Document: 57 Page: 11 Filed: 07/12/2021
`

`
`image sensor would react to light from only one band to create a component image.
`
`Appx25[4:53-61]. The three component images, each being from one of the three
`
`image sensors, could then be combined to reproduce the original colors of the
`
`scene. Appx16[Fig.2]; Appx25[4:34-53].
`
`Both single-sensor and multi-sensor digital cameras that were available at
`
`the time of the ’289 Patent’s filing suffered from problems associated with the
`
`technological limitations of then-existing image sensors. Appx24[1:40-49; 1:66-
`
`2:3; 2:8-22]. These problems included low image resolution, low dynamic range,
`
`low signal-to-noise ratio (“SNR”), inaccurate color reproduction, and low image
`
`quality. Appx24[1:40-49; 1:66-2:3; 2:8-22]. The ’289 Patent solved these
`
`problems by adding an additional image sensor that is “sensitive to a full region of
`
`visible color spectrum” and using that additional sensor to capture information that
`
`is used to enhance the image(s) captured by the other sensor(s). Appx25-26[4:62-
`
`5:40]; Appx27[7:36-46]; Appx28[9:4-40]. The ’289 patent also made the image
`
`sensors “closely positioned with respect to a common plane” so that they could
`
`capture images of the same scene without the use of the prism of prior multi-sensor
`
`cameras. Appx26[5:58-6:26]; Appx27[8:30-32].
`
`Thus, the ’289 Patent did not merely state the concept of image enhancement
`
`and add the words “apply it,” nor did it merely apply image enhancement to an
`
`existing digital camera architecture. Rather, it created a completely new digital
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case: 20-1760 Document: 57 Page: 12 Filed: 07/12/2021
`

`
`camera architecture that could be used in a specific way to provide a technological
`
`solution to technological problems associated with prior digital cameras. The
`
`improved digital camera of the ’289 Patent could produce higher-quality images
`
`while using both smaller image sensors (having higher yield, higher sensitivity,
`
`less cross-talking, and lower clocking rate) and smaller optical lenses compared
`
`with prior digital cameras. Appx24[2:36-65]; Appx27[7:3-7]; Appx28[10:13-16].
`
`The ’289 Patent discloses both a two-sensor embodiment and a four-sensor
`
`embodiment of its improved digital camera. The four-sensor embodiment
`
`operates by: (1) capturing four separate images (e.g., red, green, blue, and black-
`
`and-white (“B/W”) images) of the same scene using four separate image sensors,
`
`three of which have color filters (e.g., fully red, fully green, and fully blue filters),
`
`and an additional fourth sensor that does not have a color filter; (2) enhancing the
`
`red image using the B/W image; (3) enhancing the green image using the B/W
`
`image; (4) enhancing the blue image using the B/W image; and (5) combining the
`
`enhanced red, enhanced green, and enhanced blue images to create a full color
`
`image. Appx22[Fig.7]; Appx23[Fig.8]; Appx28[9:4-40; 10:7-17]. Importantly,
`
`image combination (which was performed in prior multi-sensor cameras) is not
`
`image enhancement; these are separate steps, with image enhancement being
`
`performed before image combination in the disclosed four-sensor embodiment.
`
`The image enhancement described in the patent with respect to Fig. 7 is dynamic
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case: 20-1760 Document: 57 Page: 13 Filed: 07/12/2021
`

`
`range expansion, and the patent also identifies noise removal and color correction
`
`as other examples of image enhancement that can be performed in accordance with
`
`the invention. Appx22[Fig.7]; Appx28[9:4-40; 10:7-16].
`
`The two-sensor embodiment replaces the three image sensors having color
`
`filters of the four-sensor embodiment with a single image sensor that is used to
`
`capture a B/W image of the scene, but retains the additional sensor that does not
`
`have a color filter. Appx27[7:36-46]. The two-sensor embodiment operates by:
`
`(1) capturing two separate images (e.g., first and second B/W images) of the same
`
`scene using the two separate image sensors; and (2) enhancing the first B/W image
`
`using the second B/W image. Appx27[7:40-43]. Thus, whereas the four-sensor
`
`embodiment performs three image enhancement steps to form component images
`
`(e.g., enhanced red, enhanced green, and enhanced blue images) followed by an
`
`image combination step, the two-sensor embodiment performs one image
`
`enhancement step and eliminates the image combination step. But otherwise, the
`
`patent teaches that two-sensor embodiment functions the same as the four-sensor
`
`embodiment, stating that while “[t]he following description is based on the [four-
`
`sensor] embodiment illustrated in FIG. 3, those skilled in the art can appreciate that
`
`the description is equally applied to the [two-sensor] black-and-white digital
`
`cameras.” Appx27[7:43-46].
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case: 20-1760 Document: 57 Page: 14 Filed: 07/12/2021
`

`
`Both the two-sensor embodiment and the four-sensor embodiment disclosed
`
`in the ’289 Patent are implementations of claim 1, since the claim only specifies
`
`that the second image sensor must be “sensitive to a full region of visible color
`
`spectrum,” but does not include any restrictions on the first image sensor. Thus,
`
`the first image sensor of claim 1 can be a B/W image sensor of the two-sensor
`
`embodiment, a color image sensor (e.g., a red sensor, a green sensor, or a blue
`
`sensor) of the four-sensor embodiment, or any other type of image sensor.
`
`Essentially, the two-sensor embodiment practices claim 1 once, whereas the four-
`
`sensor embodiment practices claim 1 three times (once for each of its three image
`
`enhancement steps). Since the advantages of the invention disclosed in the patent
`
`specification arise from the image enhancement step, and not the image
`
`combination step, those advantages apply equally to both the four-sensor
`
`embodiment and the two-sensor embodiment. Appx28[10:13-16].
`
`The advances of the claimed invention over the prior art include: (1) the
`
`inclusion of an additional image sensor (i.e., the “second image sensor”) that is
`
`“sensitive to a full region of visible color spectrum”; (2) the positioning of multiple
`
`image sensors (i.e., the “first image sensor” and the “second image sensor”) so that
`
`they are “closely positioned with respect to a common plane”, allowing them to
`
`capture images of the same scene (without using the prism of prior multi-sensor
`
`cameras); and (3) the use of the second image sensor to capture a digital image that
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case: 20-1760 Document: 57 Page: 15 Filed: 07/12/2021
`

`
`is used to enhance a digital image captured by the first image sensor. Neither the
`
`claimed digital camera architecture using an additional image sensor that is
`
`“sensitive to a full region of visible color spectrum,” nor the claimed use of that
`
`digital camera architecture to produce a resultant digital image, has been shown to
`
`exist in the prior art, regardless of whether the invention is implemented in a four-
`
`sensor or a two-sensor configuration.
`
`The majority’s decision would not only invalidate the claims at issue here,
`
`which are plainly drawn to a patent-eligible improved digital camera, but also
`
`drastically expand the exclusionary principle under Section 101 for laws of nature,
`
`natural phenomena, and abstract ideas far beyond any prior decisions of either this
`
`Court or the Supreme Court. As Judge Newman warned in her dissent, “[t]he fresh
`
`uncertainties engendered by the majority’s revision of Section 101 are contrary to
`
`the statute and the weight of precedent, and contrary to the public’s interest in a
`
`stable and effective patent incentive.”
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`In its decisions in Alice Corp. Pty., 573 U.S. 208 and Mayo Collaborative
`
`Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), the Supreme Court set forth
`
`“a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural
`
`phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of
`
`those concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. At step one of this two-step framework—
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case: 20-1760 Document: 57 Page: 16 Filed: 07/12/2021
`

`
`referred to herein as the Alice/Mayo test—the court must “determine whether the
`
`claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Alice, 573
`
`U.S. at 217. If yes, the court must proceed to step two, which requires the court to
`
`“search for an ‘ ‘inventive concept’ ’—i.e., an element or combination of elements
`
`that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more
`
`than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’ ” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18
`
`(quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
`
`In finding claim 1 of the ’289 Patent ineligible for patent protection under
`
`Section 101, the majority improperly turned the Alice/Mayo test for patent-
`
`eligibility on its head. They took a claim that recites a patent-eligible machine (the
`
`claimed digital camera architecture) and improperly searched for “something
`
`more” (the “enhanced with” limitation) to transform that machine into an “abstract
`
`idea.” The majority’s approach is manifestly wrong, but was particularly improper
`
`in this case since the claimed machine here has not been shown to exist in the prior
`
`art and therefore, based upon the record on appeal, could stand on its own as a
`
`patentable invention.
`
`To reach their erroneous conclusion of patent-ineligibility, the majority
`
`committed errors at every stage of the Alice/Mayo test. They compounded these
`
`errors by impermissibly ignoring plausible allegations in the pleadings supporting
`
`patent-eligibility, and improperly making new findings of fact—at the pleadings
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case: 20-1760 Document: 57 Page: 17 Filed: 07/12/2021
`

`
`stage—that are not only adverse to Appellants, but also plainly incorrect in view of
`
`the evidence of record. When the Alice/Mayo test is applied properly in
`
`accordance with the precedent of this Court and the Supreme Court, and in view of
`
`both the pleadings and a proper understanding the full evidence of record, it is
`
`apparent that the claims at issue here are patent-eligible under Section 101.
`
`I.
`
`THE MAJORITY FAILED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE SPECIFIC
`REQUIREMENTS OF CLAIM 1 WHEN ARTICULATING THE
`“FOCUS” OF THE CLAIM
`
`This Court has repeatedly warned that when articulating the “focus” of
`
`claims at step one of the Alice/Mayo test, “courts ‘must be careful to avoid
`
`oversimplifying the claims’ by looking at them generally and failing to account for
`
`the specific requirements of the claims.” McRO, Inc., 837 F.3d at 1313 (quoting In
`
`re TLI Commc’ns LLC Pat. Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Despite
`
`this warning, the majority “agree[d] with the district court that claim 1 is directed
`
`to the abstract idea of taking two pictures (which may be at different exposures)
`
`and using one picture to enhance the other in some way.” This characterization of
`
`claim 1 is completely untethered from the language of the claim, as it not only
`
`excludes all of the first five limitations in their entirely, but also rewrites the
`
`“enhanced with” language to sound as broad as possible.
`
`Claim 1 requires that the images must be digital images (not film images). It
`
`requires that the digital images must be captured by different image sensors (not by
`
`11
`
`

`

`Case: 20-1760 Document: 57 Page: 18 Filed: 07/12/2021
`

`
`the same image sensor). It requires that the digital image which is used to enhance
`
`the other digital image must be captured by an image sensor that is “sensitive to a
`
`full region of visible color spectrum” (and not one that is sensitive to only a portion
`
`of the visible color spectrum, as was the case with prior multi-sensor cameras).
`
`And it requires that the images must be captured by image sensors that are “closely
`
`positioned with respect to a common plane” (so that they capture images of the
`
`same scene in the absence of the prism of prior multi-sensor cameras).
`
`The majority included none of these specific requirements from the claim
`
`language in their characterization of the “focus” of the claim. Instead, the majority
`
`improperly added the superfluous phrases “which may be at different exposures”
`
`and “in some way” to their characterization. Neither of these phrases is included—
`
`or even suggested—in the language of claim 1 itself.
`
`Because the majority adopted a characterization of the “focus” of claim 1
`
`that is improperly overbroad, ignoring the specific requirements of the claim, their
`
`step one inquiry was rendered meaningless. See Thales Visionix Inc., 850 F.3d at
`
`1347 (“We must therefore ensure at step one that we articulate what the claims are
`
`directed to with enough specificity to ensure the step one inquiry is meaningful.”)
`
`II. THE MAJORITY IMPROPERLY DISCOUNTED THE CLAIMED
`COMBINATION OF LIMITATIONS
`
`It has long been established that “a new combination … may be patentable
`
`even though all the constituents of the combination were well known and in
`
`12
`
`

`

`Case: 20-1760 Document: 57 Page: 19 Filed: 07/12/2021
`

`
`common use before the combination was made.” Diamond, 450 U.S. at 188; see
`
`also Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc., 827 F.3d at 1350 (“an inventive concept
`
`can be found in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known,
`
`conventional pieces.”). The majority improperly disregarded this fundamental
`
`principle of patent law by relying heavily on the purported lack of novelty of the
`
`individual claim elements, but then improperly discounting the claimed
`
`combination of limitations.
`
`The majority relied heavily on the lack of novelty of the individual digital
`
`camera components recited in claim 1 for purposes of their analyses under both
`
`step one and step two of the Alice/Mayo test. For example, in concluding that
`
`claim 1 is “directed to” an “abstract idea” under step one, the majority found that:
`
`Given the claim language and the specification, we conclude
`that claim 1 is “directed to a result or effect that itself is the
`abstract idea and merely invoke[s] generic processes and
`machinery” rather than “a specific means or method that
`improves the relevant technology.”
`
`Majority at 5. Also under step one, the majority found that:
`
`Only conventional camera components are recited to effectuate
`the resulting “enhanced” image—two image sensors, two
`lenses, an analog-to-digital converting circuitry, an image
`memory, and a digital image processor. Indeed, it is undisputed
`that these components were well-known and conventional.
`
`
`13
`
`

`

`Case: 20-1760 Document: 57 Page: 20 Filed: 07/12/2021
`

`
`Majority at 6. Based in these findings, the majority concluded that “[w]hat is
`
`claimed is simply a generic environment in which to carry out the abstract idea.”
`
`Id.
`
`that:
`
`Similarly, under step two of the Alice/Mayo test, the majority concluded
`
`Because claim 1 is recited at a high level of generality and
`merely invokes well-understood, routine, conventional
`components to apply the abstract idea identified above, …
`claim 1 fails at step two ….
`
`Majority at 9. Thus, the lack of novelty of the individual components was the
`
`linchpin of the majority’s conclusions that the claims merely provide a “generic
`
`environment” to carry out an “abstract idea” under step one, and do not include an
`
`“inventive concept” under claim two.
`
`But when addressing the claimed combination of limitations that define the
`
`digital camera architecture, the majority changed their tune, dismissively stating:
`
`But even if claim 1 recites novel subject matter, that fact is
`insufficient by itself to confer eligibility.
`
`Majority at 9. Thus, the majority took that position that the lack of novelty of the
`
`individual digital camera components recited in the limitations can invalidate the
`
`claims under Section 101, but the novelty of the claimed combination of those
`
`components, which together form the digital camera architecture, cannot save
`
`them. The majority cannot have it both ways; either novelty matters, or it does not.
`
`14
`
`

`

`Case: 20-1760 Document: 57 Page: 21 Filed: 07/12/2021
`

`
`Moreover, the majority’s statement that “even if claim 1 recites novel
`
`subject matter, that fact is insufficient to confer eligibility” cannot be true if that
`
`novel subject matter is a combination of structural limitations (i.e., a machine) and
`
`therefore patent-eligible in its own right under the express language of Section 101.
`
`As Judge Newman stated in her dissent, “[a] statement of purpose or advantage
`
`does not convert a device into an abstract idea.” Dissent at 3. The cases relied on
`
`by the majority do not suggest otherwise, as those cases simply held that the
`
`novelty of ineligible subject matter (i.e., laws of nature, natural phenomena, or
`
`abstract ideas), or matter that does not appear in the claim, cannot confer patent-
`
`eligibility; those cases say nothing as to the novelty of a combination of structural
`
`limitations (i.e., a machine) that actually are recited in the claim. See SAP Am.,
`
`Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“The claims here are
`
`ineligible because their innovation is an innovation in ineligible subject matter.”);
`
`Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2017) (“While the specification may describe a purported innovative
`
`‘scalable architecture,’ claim 1 of the '187 patent does not.”).
`
`To the extent that there is a difference in meaning between the terms
`
`“unconventional” and “novel,” that difference must favor patent-eligibility, since
`
`something can be unconventional and yet not novel, but the opposite cannot be
`
`true; something that is novel will always be unconventional.
`
`15
`
`

`

`Case: 20-1760 Document: 57 Page: 22 Filed: 07/12/2021
`

`
`III. THE MAJORITY IMPROPERLY MADE NEW AND ERRONEOUS
`FINDINGS OF FACT AGAINST APPELLANTS
`
`The majority rejected Appellants’ argument that claim 1 is “directed to a
`
`patent-eligible improvement in digital camera functionality” under step one of the
`
`Alice/Mayo test based on a purported “mismatch between the specification … and
`
`the breath of claim 1 ….” Majority at 8. Specifically, the majority found that:
`
`Each time the specification of the ’289 patent suggests that a
`particular configuration is the asserted advance over the prior
`art, it does so in a four-lens, four-image-sensor configuration in
`which three of the sensors are color-specific while the fourth is
`a black-and-white sensor.
`
` …
`
`
`
`
`Yet representative claim 1 requires only a two-lens, two-image
`sensor configuration in which none of the image sensors must
`be color.
`
`Majority at 8. The majority used this as an additional basis for finding that claim 1
`
`does not include an “inventive concept” under step two, concluding that “[i]n other
`
`words, ‘[t]he main problem that [Yu] cannot overcome is that the claim—as
`
`opposed to something purportedly described in the specification—is missing an
`
`inventive concept.” Majority at 10 (emphasis in original) (quoting Two-Way
`
`Media, 874 F.3d at 1338.). Moreover, the majority also used this finding as a basis
`
`for rejecting the plausible allegations in the pleadings, stating that “a court need
`
`not accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial
`
`16
`
`

`

`Case: 20-1760 Document: 57 Page: 23 Filed: 07/12/2021
`

`
`notice or by exhibit, such as the claims and the patent specification.” Majority at
`
`11.
`
`This new finding against Appellants, made at the pleadings stage where all
`
`factual inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party, was
`
`impermissible. See Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253, 1261
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Such an assumption is improper when reviewing a dismissal
`
`under Rule 12(b)(6), where all factual inferences must be drawn in favor of the
`
`non-moving party.”); Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1352 (“As explained above, construed
`
`in favor of BASCOM as they must be in this procedural posture, the claims of the
`
`’606 patent do not preempt the use of the abstract idea of filtering content on the
`
`Internet or on generic computer components performing conventional activities.”)
`
`Aside from the prohibition against making findings against the non-moving
`
`party at the pleadings stage, the majority’s finding is factually erroneous, and
`
`demonstrates the danger of deciding matters at the pleadings stage in patent cases
`
`involving highly complex technologies. As explained above, claim 1 covers both
`
`the two-sensor embodiment and the four-sensor embodiment described in the
`
`specification, and all of the advantages described in the specification apply equally
`
`to both embodiments, since those advantages arise from the image enhancement
`
`step that is performed by both embodiments, and not by the unclaimed image
`
`combination step that is performed o

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket