Case: 20-1852 Document: 99 Page: 1 Filed: 10/12/2021
`
`United States Court of Appeals
`for the Federal Circuit
`______________________
`
`TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
`Plaintiff-Appellant
`
`v.
`
`SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY LP,
`SPRINT SPECTRUM, LP, SPRINT SOLUTIONS,
`INC., VERIZON WIRELESS PERSONAL
`COMMUNICATIONS, LP,
`Defendants-Appellees
`
`TELENAV, INC., T-MOBILE USA, INC.,
`Defendants
`______________________
`
`2020-1852, 2020-1854
`______________________
`
`Appeals from the United States District Court for the
`Eastern District of Texas in No. 2:17-cv-00718-RWS-RSP,
`Judge Robert Schroeder, III.
`______________________
`
`Decided: October 12, 2021
`______________________
`
`WILLIAM PETERSON RAMEY, III, Ramey & Schwaller,
`LLP, Houston, TX, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also rep-
`resented by JOHN PIERRE LAHAD, Susman Godfrey LLP,
`Houston, TX.
`
` BRIAN DAVID SCHMALZBACH, McGuireWoods LLP,
`
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`TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v.
`SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY
`
`Richmond, VA, argued for defendants-appellees Sprint
`Communications Company LP, Sprint Spectrum, LP,
`Sprint Solutions, Inc. Also represented by DAVID EVAN
`FINKELSON; TYLER VANHOUTAN, Houston, TX.
`
` JOSHUA C. KRUMHOLZ, Holland & Knight, LLP, Boston,
`MA, argued for defendant-appellee Verizon Wireless Per-
`sonal Communications, LP. Also represented by JACOB
`KEVIN BARON; KEVIN PAUL ANDERSON, Duane Morris LLP,
`Washington, DC.
` ______________________
`
`
`
`Before PROST, O’MALLEY, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
`PROST, Circuit Judge.
`Traxcell1 sued Sprint2 and Verizon3 for infringement of
`four patents related to self-optimizing wireless networks
`and to navigation technology. After claim construction and
`discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for
`Sprint and Verizon. Traxcell appeals. For the reasons be-
`low, we agree with the district court’s claim construction.
`We also agree that under that construction, Traxcell failed
`to show a genuine issue of material fact as to infringement
`and that several of Traxcell’s claims are indefinite. We
`therefore affirm.
`
`BACKGROUND
`I
`This case involves four patents in the same family: U.S.
`Patent Nos. 8,977,284 (“the ’284 patent”), 9,510,320 (“the
`’320 patent”), 9,642,024 (“the ’024 patent”), and 9,549,388
`
`
`1 Traxcell Technologies, LLC.
`2 Sprint Communications Company LP; Sprint Spec-
`trum, LP; and Sprint Solutions, Inc.
`3 Verizon Wireless Personal Communications, LP.
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`(“the ’388 patent”). All share a specification and a 2001
`priority date.
`
`A
`The claims of three of the patents—the ’284, ’320, and
`’024 patents—are related to self-optimizing network
`(“SON”) technology for making “corrective actions” to im-
`prove communications between a wireless device (for in-
`stance, a phone) and a network. The parties call these the
`“SON patents.” Claim 1 of the ’024 patent is representative
`(relevant limitations emphasized):
`1. A system including:
`one or more radio-frequency transceivers and an
`associated one or more antennas to which the ra-
`dio-frequency transceiver is coupled, wherein the
`one or more radio-frequency transceivers config-
`ured for radio-frequency communication with at
`least one mobile wireless communications device;
`and
`a computer coupled to the one or more radio-fre-
`quency transceivers programmed to locate the one
`or more mobile wireless communications devices
`and generate an indication of a location of the one
`or more mobile wireless communications devices,
`wherein the computer further receives and stores
`performance data of connections between the one
`or more mobile wireless communications devices
`and the radio-frequency transceiver along with the
`indication of location, wherein the computer refer-
`ences the performance data to expected perfor-
`mance data, wherein the computer determines at
`least one suggested corrective action in conformity
`with differences between the performance data and
`expected performance data in conjunction with the
`indication of location, wherein the computer fur-
`ther receives an error code from the radio-
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`TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v.
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`frequency transceiver, determines whether the er-
`ror code indicates a performance issue with respect
`to the connection between the one or more mobile
`wireless communications devices and the radio-fre-
`quency transceiver, and wherein the computer de-
`termines the at least one suggested corrective
`action in response to the error code.
`Claim 1 of the ’284 patent is similar but also includes a
`means-plus-function limitation that was disputed in this
`case (further emphasized):
`1. A wireless network comprising:
`a) at least two wireless devices, each said wireless
`device communicating via radio frequency signals;
`b) a first computer programmed to perform the
`steps of:
`1) locating at least one said wireless device
`on said wireless network and referencing
`performance of said at least one wireless
`device with wireless network known pa-
`rameters,
`2) routinely storing performance data and
`a corresponding location for said at least
`one wireless device in a memory;
`c) a radio tower adapted to receive radio frequency
`signals from, and transmit radio frequency signals
`to said at least one wireless device; wherein said
`first computer further includes means for receiving
`said performance data and suggest corrective ac-
`tions obtained from a list of possible causes for said
`radio tower based upon the performance data and
`the corresponding location associated with said at
`least one wireless device;
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`d) wherein said radio tower generates an error code
`based upon operation of said at least one wireless
`device; and
`e) wherein said first computer is further pro-
`grammed to,
`1) receive said error code from said radio
`tower, and,
`2) selectively suggest a corrective action of
`said radio frequency signals of said radio
`tower in order to restrict processing of ra-
`dio frequency signals from at least one of
`said at least two wireless devices based
`upon said error code, and, whereby said
`first computer suggests said corrective ac-
`tion in order to improve communication
`with at least one said wireless device.
`B
`Unlike the SON patents, the claims of the ’388 patent
`are directed to network-based navigation—namely, having
`the network, rather than a wireless device itself, determine
`the device’s location. The parties call the ’388 patent the
`“navigation patent.” Claim 1 is representative:
`1. A wireless communications system including:
`a first radio-frequency transceiver within a wire-
`less mobile communications device and an associ-
`ated first antenna to which the first radio-
`frequency transceiver is coupled, wherein the first
`radio-frequency transceiver is configured for radio-
`frequency communication with a wireless commu-
`nications network;
`a first processor within the wireless mobile commu-
`nications device coupled to the at least one first ra-
`dio-frequency transceiver programmed to receive a
`location of the wireless mobile communications
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`TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v.
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`device from the wireless communications network
`and generate an indication of a location of the wire-
`less mobile communications device with respect to
`geographic features according to mapping infor-
`mation stored within the wireless mobile commu-
`nications device, and wherein the processor
`displays to the user navigation information accord-
`ing to the location of the wireless mobile communi-
`cations device with respect to the geographic
`features and a destination specified by the user at
`the wireless mobile communications device;
`at least one second radio-frequency transceiver and
`an associated at least one second antenna of the
`wireless communications network to which the sec-
`ond radio-frequency transceiver is coupled; and
`a second processor coupled to the at least one sec-
`ond radio-frequency transceiver programmed to de-
`termine the
`location of the wireless mobile
`communications device, wherein the second proces-
`sor selectively determines the location of the wire-
`less mobile communications device dependent on
`the setting of preference flags, wherein the second
`processor determines the location of the wireless
`mobile communications device if the preference
`flags are set to a state that permits tracking of the
`user of the wireless mobile communications device
`and communicates the location of the wireless mo-
`bile communications device to the first processor
`via the second radio-frequency transmitter, and
`wherein the second processor does not determine
`and communicate the location of the wireless mo-
`bile communications device if the preference flags
`are set to a state that prohibits tracking of the wire-
`less mobile communications device.
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`SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY
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`II
`Traxcell asserted against Verizon the ’284, ’024, and
`’388 patents.4 For the ’284 and ’024 SON patents, Trax-
`cell’s allegations involve Verizon’s implementation of Er-
`icsson’s self-organizing network technology—the so-called
`Ericsson C-SON. And for the ’388 patent, Traxcell points
`to Verizon mobile devices using VZ Navigator or Google
`Maps (made by Comtech and Google, respectively).
`Traxcell also asserted these same patents, plus the
`’320 patent, against Sprint.5 For the asserted SON claims
`of the ’284, ’024, and ’320 patents, Traxcell’s infringement
`allegations involve Sprint’s use of Samsung’s distributed
`self-optimizing network technology—the so-called Sam-
`sung dSON. And for the ’388 patent, Traxcell’s infringe-
`ment allegations concern Sprint mobile devices loaded with
`Google Maps.
`
`III
`The magistrate judge entered a claim-construction or-
`der on April 15, 2019, under which claims 1–11 of the
`’284 patent were indefinite. After claim construction,
`Sprint and Verizon separately moved for summary judg-
`ment of noninfringement on the remaining claims.
`
`
`to
`related
`4 Traxcell appeals determinations
`claims 1–10 of the ’284 patent; claims 1, 6–11, and 17–22
`of the ’024 patent; and claims 1–11 and 21 of the ’388 pa-
`tent.
`to
`related
`5 Traxcell appeals determinations
`claims 1–12 of the ’284 patent; claims 1, 6–11, and 17–22
`of the ’024 patent; claims 1–6 of the ’320 patent; and
`claims 1–11 and 21 of the ’388 patent.
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`TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v.
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`Adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendations, the dis-
`trict court granted both motions.6
`Traxcell appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
`§ 1295(a)(1).
`
`DISCUSSION
`The district court granted summary judgment for de-
`fendants Sprint and Verizon in light of its construction of
`several claim terms. Traxcell appeals both the claim con-
`structions and the noninfringement determinations that
`flow from them.
`“We review claim construction based on intrinsic evi-
`dence de novo and review any findings of fact regarding ex-
`trinsic evidence for clear error.”
` SpeedTrack, Inc.
`v. Amazon.com, 998 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2021). And
`we review the district court’s summary judgment de novo
`under the law of the regional circuit—here the Fifth Cir-
`cuit. Ericsson Inc. v. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings Ltd.,
`955 F.3d 1317, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Summary judg-
`ment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genu-
`ine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
`entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
`P. 56(a). We “view[] all evidence in the light most favorable
`to the nonmoving party and draw[] all reasonable infer-
`ences in that party’s favor.” Kariuki v. Tarango, 709 F.3d
`495, 501 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Pierce v. Dep’t of the Air
`Force, 512 F.3d 184, 185 (5th Cir. 2007)). But “the non-
`movant can’t defeat summary judgment with conclusory al-
`legations, unsupported assertions, or only a scintilla of
`
`6 For simplicity, and because the district judge
`adopted the magistrate judge’s orders and recommenda-
`tions as the opinion of the court, we refer to “the district
`court”
`in discussing the underlying determinations,
`whether first made by the magistrate judge or the district
`judge.
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`evidence.” Batiste v. Lewis, 976 F.3d 493, 500 (5th Cir.
`2020).
`Summary judgment was based on several grounds.
`First, claim 12 of the ’284 patent was not infringed because
`Traxcell hadn’t met the “way” prong of the function-way-
`result test in asserting an infringing structural equivalent
`to a means-plus-function limitation. Second, Traxcell
`hadn’t shown a genuine dispute about either the “location”
`limitation (present in every asserted SON patent claim) or
`the “first computer” and “computer” limitations (present in
`most asserted SON patent claims). As to claim 1 of the
`’284 patent, the district court held it indefinite for failure
`to disclose sufficient structure for a means-plus-function
`limitation. And as to the ’388 patent, Traxcell couldn’t
`show that the accused technology determined a wireless
`device’s location on the network itself, as claimed, rather
`than on the device. Traxcell appeals this all. We address
`each issue in turn.
`
`I
`As to claim 12 of the ’284 patent, the district court
`granted summary judgment of noninfringement because
`there was no genuine dispute that Sprint’s accused system
`did not meet that claim’s means-plus-function limitation.7
`That is, Traxcell asserted an infringing structural equiva-
`lent but fell short under the “way” prong of the function-
`way-result test. We agree with the district court.
`A
`First, we address claim construction. The parties
`agreed that claim 12 includes a means-plus-function limi-
`tation: a “means for receiving said performance data and
`corresponding locations from said radio tower and correct-
`ing radio frequency signals of said radio tower.” J.A. 37.
`
`
`7 Traxcell did not assert claim 12 against Verizon.
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`The corresponding function is “receiving said performance
`data and corresponding locations from said radio tower and
`correcting radio frequency signals of said radio tower.”
`J.A. 37. And the corresponding structure is an algorithm
`that Traxcell identified from the specification. J.A. 37 (cit-
`ing ’284 patent Figs. 38-A, 38-B, 38-C; id. at col. 54 l. 21–
`col. 55 l. 41). This construction is undisputed on appeal.
`B
`Next, we address infringement. Traxcell argues that
`Sprint’s accused technology includes a structural equiva-
`lent to the disclosed structure under the function-way-re-
`sult test. The district court disagreed, reasoning that
`Traxcell failed to establish that the accused technology op-
`erates in substantially the same “way.”
`Under the function-way-result test, “[l]iteral infringe-
`ment of a means-plus-function claim limitation requires
`that the relevant structure in the accused device perform
`the identical function recited in the claim and be identical
`or equivalent to the corresponding structure in the specifi-
`cation.” Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.,
`448 F.3d 1324, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006). “Once the relevant
`structure in the accused device has been identified, a party
`may prove it is equivalent to the disclosed structure by
`showing that the two perform the identical function in sub-
`stantially the same way, with substantially the same re-
`sult.” Id.
`The district court held that Traxcell had not offered
`sufficient evidence that Sprint’s system contained the
`structure required for the means-plus-function element.
`J.A. 109, 119–23. As it observed, the identified structure
`from the specification is a “very detailed” algorithm.
`J.A. 120. That algorithm includes numerous steps neces-
`sary for its function. J.A. 122. But Traxcell neglected to
`address a significant fraction of that structure. Indeed,
`Traxcell’s infringement expert instead discussed the ac-
`cused technology at only a generalized level and didn’t at
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`all discuss at least nine entire steps of the algorithm—fo-
`cusing on function and results but eliding the way those
`results are achieved. J.A. 121–22. Accordingly, Traxcell
`didn’t provide enough evidence for a reasonable jury to con-
`clude that the accused structure performs the claimed
`function in “substantially the same way” as the disclosed
`structure. See Kemco Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co., Inc.,
`208 F.3d 1352, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming sum-
`mary judgment of noninfringement, both literally and un-
`der doctrine of equivalents, where “way” and “result” were
`not substantially the same as claimed means-plus-function
`structure).
`We agree with the district court’s thorough analysis.
`Showing identical function is not enough for literal in-
`fringement of a means-plus-function claim—Traxcell must
`also provide evidence of identical or equivalent structure.
`Here it did not, and so summary judgment was proper.
`II
`We move next to the “location” limitation. All asserted
`claims of the ’284 and ’320 patents include the term “loca-
`tion.” The parties stipulated that the term meant a “loca-
`tion that is not merely a position in a grid pattern.” The
`court granted summary judgment of noninfringement un-
`der that construction to Sprint and Verizon. For the rea-
`sons below, we agree.
`
`A
`First, we address claim construction. In the related
`Nokia case, the construction of “location” in these claims
`was disputed at the district court. See Traxcell Techs., LLC
`v. Nokia Sols. & Networks Oy, No. 20-1440, slip op. at 6–7
`(Fed. Cir. Oct. 12, 2021) (“Nokia”). Not so here. Instead,
`the parties agreed that “location” means “location that is
`not merely a position in a grid pattern.” J.A. 12–13, 68,
`101. The district court accepted that construction; the
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`parties proceeded through discovery and briefing accord-
`ingly. And under that construction, Traxcell lost.
`Now Traxcell insists in retrospect that this construc-
`tion was wrong. But having stipulated to it, Traxcell can-
`not pull an about-face. Traxcell suggests that it preserved
`the issue because it contested the term in the related Nokia
`case and claim construction “should be applied consistently
`between related cases.” Reply Br. 15 (capitalization nor-
`malized). We are unconvinced. At any rate, for the reasons
`we explained in the Nokia appeal, the stipulated-to con-
`struction is correct. See Nokia, slip op. at 6–7.
`B
`Next, we address infringement. The independent
`claims of the SON patents all require sending, receiving,
`generating, storing, or using the “location” of a wireless de-
`vice. The district court concluded that Traxcell hadn’t
`shown that the accused technologies use a “location” as
`construed by the court, such that summary judgment was
`proper. See J.A. 117–19, 173–74, 176 (Sprint), 73–77,
`163–64, 165 (Verizon). For the reasons below, we agree.
`1
`The district court found that Traxcell had failed to cre-
`ate a genuine issue about whether Sprint’s accused tech-
`nology (i.e., the Sprint LTE Service Manager, or “LSM”)
`sends, receives, generates, stores, or uses “location” as con-
`strued.
`First, Traxcell had argued that the LSM used location
`in the form of a device’s cell or sector to make adjustments.
`But the district court concluded that using information
`about a device’s “cell or sector” amounted to using merely
`a position in a grid pattern. See J.A. 173–74; see also
`J.A. 117. We agree.
`Traxcell also insisted that the LSM generates a device’s
`location through an alphabet soup of approaches, including
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`“(1) receiving and collecting UE-referenced network and
`device performance measurements from the Minimization
`of Drive Tests (‘MDT’) Reports and UE Measurement Re-
`ports[,] (2) Observed Time Distance of Arrival (‘OTDOA’),
`(3) call trace analysis, (4) the GUI in the NV 4.0 Release,
`(5) the collection of Cell ID, (6) throughput, and through
`(7) Received Signal Strength Indication (‘RSSI’), Received
`Signal Received Power (‘RSRP’), dropped calls, and the
`like.” J.A. 118. The district court concluded, and we agree,
`that Traxcell’s arguments on this front amounted to “con-
`clusory statement[s] . . . without any analysis to support”
`them. E.g., J.A. 118. That is, Traxcell didn’t explain how
`any of these approaches match up to the court’s claim con-
`struction, how the approaches are actually used in the ac-
`cused technology, and how the approaches would meet
`other limitations of the claims. See Novartis Corp. v. Ben
`Venue Labs., Inc., 271 F.3d 1043, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (af-
`firming summary judgment of noninfringement because
`patentee did not meet “obligation to set forth the detailed
`basis of its evidence such that the district court could eval-
`uate whether it could support a finding of infringement”)
`(citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
`475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). The same is true of Traxcell on
`appeal. Traxcell’s unexplained listing of accused elements
`that purportedly send, receive, generate, store, or use a
`wireless device’s location is insufficient to create a genuine
`issue of material fact.
`
`2
`The district court also found that Traxcell had failed to
`create a genuine issue of material fact about whether Ver-
`izon’s accused technology (i.e., the Ericsson C-SON) uses
`“location” as construed.
`First, the court rejected Traxcell’s argument that the
`accused technology uses “location” because it collects “in-
`formation regarding the distance of devices from a base sta-
`tion.” That is, according to Verizon’s unrebutted evidence,
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`the Ericsson C-SON “doesn’t get location data,” but rather
`simply gets information “to calculate distance” to base sta-
`tions. E.g., J.A. 5572; see also J.A. 5560–61, 5571, 5577.
`And location and distance from a point are different, the
`court concluded. J.A. 73–74, 163–64. We agree.
`Second, the court rejected Traxcell’s arguments that
`the accused technology determines which sector or cell a
`device falls within, thereby constituting a “location.” The
`court found that the evidence only shows that the accused
`technology determines a device’s position within a grid.
`J.A. 164. And Verizon’s unrebutted evidence confirms
`this—as the district court explained, the accused technol-
`ogy “does not provide a specific location for any individual
`device, but only places the device into a pre-defined area
`and then makes decisions based on the area that the device
`falls into.” J.A. 76. This was consistent with Traxcell’s ex-
`pert’s statements, which likened the sector-and-cell “bins”
`to a grid. See J.A. 5537.8 Again, we agree with the district
`court. See Profectus Tech. LLC v. Huawei Techs. Co.,
`823 F.3d 1375, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (affirming sum-
`mary judgment of noninfringement in light of unrebutted
`evidence). Sectors and cells, as the parties use them, are
`“merely a position within a grid pattern.” See J.A. 73–75.
`And even if a “sector” (i.e., an angle-plus-distance subset of
`a cell) were more than a grid-pattern position, the district
`court observed that there is no evidence that the Ericsson
`C-SON actually uses sector data in this way. See J.A. 76.
`
`
`8 Traxcell points to other contrary statements by the
`same expert, but, as Verizon points out, that evidence
`seems to be from another case entirely (one not even involv-
`ing the Ericsson C-SON). See Appellant’s Br. 60 & nn.242–
`43; Verizon Br. 21–22. We agree with Verizon that it is
`puzzling how it could be error for the district court not to
`account for this evidence.
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`Beyond all this, the court also rejected Traxcell’s reci-
`tation of a “long list of various types of data that the ac-
`cused products allegedly use without explaining how using
`that . . . data would satisfy the claim construction.”
`J.A. 164. That is, Traxcell didn’t link its citations to the
`claims and left its evidence unexplained. Traxcell has done
`the same on appeal—insisting in a conclusory fashion that
`the district court overlooked various pieces of evidence but
`not explaining the role of that evidence in its infringement
`theory as to the Ericsson C-SON. Again, that is not enough
`to meet Traxcell’s burden.
`We agree with the district court. Traxcell did not cre-
`ate a genuine dispute of material fact that Verizon’s ac-
`cused technology uses “location.”
`III
`Next we move to the “first computer” and “computer”
`limitations, which are in all the asserted claims of the SON
`patents except claim 6 of the ’024 patent and those depend-
`ing from it. These terms are paired throughout with vari-
`ous functions. Construing those terms to require that a
`single computer be capable of performing the recited func-
`tions, the district court concluded that Traxcell hadn’t
`shown that the accused technology met those limitations,
`and that summary judgment for the defendants was
`proper. For the reasons below, we agree.
`A
`First, we address claim construction. In short, we
`agree with the district court. This construction was also at
`issue in the parallel Nokia case. See Nokia, slip op. at 10–
`13. And as we explained in that case, a “first computer” or
`a “computer” means a single computer. Id. So too here.
`B
`Next, we turn to infringement. As explained above, the
`“first computer” and “computer” terms are paired with
`
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`Case: 20-1852 Document: 99 Page: 16 Filed: 10/12/2021
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`16
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`TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v.
`SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY
`
`various functions. For example, claim 1 of the ’024 patent
`requires that “a computer” not only be “programmed to lo-
`cate” one or more mobile devices but also to “further re-
`ceive[] and store[] performance data,” to “reference[] the
`performance data,” to “further receive[] an error code,” and
`to “determine[]” “at least one suggested corrective action in
`response to the error code.”
`For both Sprint and Verizon, the district court deter-
`mined that Traxcell hadn’t shown a genuine issue of mate-
`rial fact that these limitations were met. For the reasons
`below, we agree.
`
`1
`As to Sprint, the court concluded that Traxcell had
`failed to show a genuine dispute of material fact that the
`accused technology uses a single computer capable of meet-
`ing each of the claim limitations. J.A. 110–14.
`The accused Samsung dSON system operates with
`Sprint’s wireless network across Sprint’s LSM, Operating
`Support Systems (“OSSs”), and various base stations (or
`“eNodeBs”). The LSM configures and manages network el-
`ements—such as the eNodeBs—and works with other sys-
`tems like the OSS to manage network functionality. The
`OSSs are operating systems that interact with the
`eNodeBs and work with both the LSM and the eNodeB to
`execute the SON functionality. The Samsung dSON is
`“distributed”: that is, its functions are spread among many
`computers in the LSM, OSSs, and eNodeBs.
`Traxcell didn’t generally dispute those facts. Instead,
`Traxcell argued broadly that the LSM server and every
`computer at an eNodeB each also constitutes a single com-
`puter that would be able to meet all the limitations of the
`claims. See J.A. 110. But Traxcell didn’t particularize
`those conclusory assertions with specific evidence and ar-
`guments. The district court concluded that Traxcell had
`failed to show how either the LSM or the computer at the
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`Case: 20-1852 Document: 99 Page: 17 Filed: 10/12/2021
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`TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v.
`SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY
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`17
`
`eNodeB could independently perform each of the claimed
`functions. J.A. 110–11. To the contrary, the only reasona-
`ble conclusion from the evidence was that the LSM and
`eNodeBs must work together to conduct most operations,
`requiring multiple computers. J.A. 110–11.
`Traxcell argues that it “presented substantial evidence
`that the LSM was capable of performing the required func-
`tions.” See Appellant’s Br. 48. On appeal, it reproduces
`four pages from its district-court briefing that it says
`weren’t addressed on this point. See Appellant’s Br. 48
`(quoting J.A. 8313–16); see also Reply Br. 18–21. To be
`sure, those pages include an army of citation footnotes
`crouching in a field of jargon. What they lack is explana-
`tion. As an initial matter, we disagree that the district
`court ignored this evidence. To the contrary, the district
`court spent five pages discussing Traxcell’s evidence. See
`J.A. 110–14. And Traxcell’s showing is simply too unex-
`plained and too conclusory to meet the summary-judgment
`standard.
`
`2
`As to Verizon, the district court again concluded that
`Traxcell had failed to show a genuine dispute of material
`fact about the “first computer” or “computer” limitation.
`J.A. 71–72, 162–63.
`The accused Ericsson C-SON system is, like the Sam-
`sung dSON, distributed across many computers. Traxcell
`doesn’t dispute this fundamental point. Instead, it points
`to a part of the system—the so-called SON Portal—and ar-
`gues that it is a single computer that satisfies the limita-
`tions. See Appellant’s Br. 55–56.
`But the SON Portal is only an interface. It doesn’t per-
`form all the functions itself—rather, it collects their output
`from other computers for the convenience of the user. Ver-
`izon provided unrebutted evidence that the accused func-
`tionalities were carried out by other computers within the
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`TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v.
`SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY
`
`Ericsson-CSON, being spread across the SON Data Gate-
`way, the SON Application Server, and the SON Implemen-
`tation Server. Traxcell argued to the district court that the
`SON Portal “controls and displays the individual services”
`of the other servers, and that through it a “user can control
`and execute all SON functions.” See J.A. 72. But that isn’t
`enough. That a user can execute all the functions through
`the SON Portal doesn’t mean that the SON Portal itself is
`capable of performing the claimed functions. What’s miss-
`ing is a showing that the SON Portal is a single computer
`that is capable of performing the claimed functions.
`To be sure, Traxcell has cited swaths of documents. See
`Appellant’s Br. 54–57 (arguing that “Traxcell’s briefing
`was slammed full” of “volumes upon volumes” of evidence).
`But it failed to link those documents to the SON Portal or
`to explain how those documents support its infringement
`theory. It didn’t do so at the trial court, and it didn’t do so
`here. In conclusion, we agree that summary judgment of
`noninfringement based on this limitation was proper.
`3
`Traxcell’s remaining infringement arguments on ap-
`peal rely on the doctrine of equivalents. But as we con-
`cluded in the Nokia case, Traxcell surrendered multiple-
`computer equivalents during prosecution of these patents.
`See Nokia, slip op. at 11–16. Accordingly, we agree with
`the district court that the doctrine of equivalents is una-
`vailable for Traxcell to assert infringement by the use of
`multiple computers to meet the “first computer” or “com-
`puter” limitations.
`
`IV
`Next, we turn to indefiniteness.