Case: 22-1462 Document: 57 Page: 1 Filed: 03/01/2024
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`United States Court of Appeals
`for the Federal Circuit
`______________________
`
`TONIA TIPPINS, DERRIK MAGNUSON, GEORGE
`HOLLOWAY, JENNIFER REHBERG, GLENDA
`SMITHLEETH, M. ALLEN BUMGARDNER, FOR
`THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF A
`CLASS OF SIMILARLY SITUATED PERSONS,
`Plaintiffs-Appellees
`
`v.
`
`UNITED STATES,
`Defendant-Appellant
`______________________
`
`2022-1462
`______________________
`
`Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
`in No. 1:18-cv-00923-DAT, Judge David A. Tapp.
`______________________
`
`Decided: March 1, 2024
`______________________
`
`NATHAN S. MAMMEN, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Washing-
`ton, DC, argued for plaintiffs-appellees. Also represented
`by GRACE BRIER.
`
` DOUGLAS GLENN EDELSCHICK, Commercial Litigation
`Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Jus-
`tice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellant.
`Also represented by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, MARTIN F.
`HOCKEY, JR., PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY; JARED HOOD, JUSTIN
`
`

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`2
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`TIPPINS v. US
`
`RAND JOLLEY, Office of Claims and Litigation, United
`States Coast Guard, Washington, DC.
`______________________
`
`Before REYNA, TARANTO, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
`TARANTO, Circuit Judge.
`Between 2010 and 2014, the United States Coast
`Guard convened Active Duty Enlisted Career Retention
`Screening Panels (CRSPs) to select enlisted service mem-
`bers for involuntary retirement. This process did not follow
`the procedures and standards of then-applicable 14 U.S.C.
`§ 357(a)–(h), which (before those provisions were repealed
`in 2016) addressed involuntary retirement of certain Coast
`Guard service members with specified seniority. Several
`former Coast Guard service members, after being involun-
`tarily retired through the CRSP process, brought this ac-
`tion on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated
`against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims
`(Claims Court) under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, as-
`serting that their retirements were contrary to law because
`the Coast Guard proceeded without following § 357(a)–(h).
`The government responded by invoking § 357(j), which
`stated that § 357(a)–(h) did not apply to a “reduction in
`force.” The applicability of that exception to the CRSPs is
`the issue on appeal.
`The Claims Court held, on the parties’ cross-motions
`for summary judgment, that the involuntary retirements
`were unlawful because the CRSPs were not part of a “re-
`duction in force.” Tippins v. United States, 154 Fed. Cl.
`373, 375, 378–83 (2021) (Tippins I). On the government’s
`motion for reconsideration, the Claims Court reiterated its
`conclusion and entered partial final judgment for the six
`named plaintiffs. Tippins v. United States, 157 Fed. Cl.
`284, 292 (2021) (Tippins II). The government appeals. We
`affirm.
`
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`TIPPINS v. US
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`3
`
`I
`Plaintiffs Tonia Tippins, Derrik Magnuson, George
`Holloway, Jennifer Rehberg, Glenda Smithleeth, and M.
`Allen Bumgardner are Coast Guard veterans who each
`honorably served twenty years or more and reached senior
`enlisted ranks. Between 2012 and 2014, the Coast Guard
`selected plaintiffs for involuntary retirement through
`CRSPs created as part of a program for clearing spots to
`make room for the promotion of less senior service mem-
`bers.
`The CRSPs were first authorized in 2010, when the
`Coast Guard became concerned about high retention
`among retirement-eligible enlisted personnel and the re-
`sulting lack of advancement opportunities for high-per-
`forming junior enlisted personnel. See Tippins I, 154 Fed.
`Cl. at 375–76. To address the perceived “‘workforce flow’”
`issue, the Commandant of the Coast Guard sought and re-
`ceived approval from the Secretary of Homeland Security
`to conduct a CRSP in the fall of 2010 to select service mem-
`bers for involuntary retirement. Id. (quoting J.A. 74). Be-
`tween 2010 and 2014 the Coast Guard received approval
`for, and conducted, five separate CRSPs, one each year. Id.
`at 376–77.
`Each memorandum authorizing the CRSPs at issue
`cites two statutes, 10 U.S.C. § 1169 and 14 U.S.C. § 357(j),
`as the sources of the “legal authority to conduct a CRSP
`panel.” J.A. 39, 41, 43. In relevant part, 10 U.S.C. § 1169
`provides (as it did in 2010–14) that “[n]o regular enlisted
`member of an armed force may be discharged before his
`term of service expires, except . . . as prescribed by the Sec-
`retary concerned.” At the time relevant to this case, 14
`U.S.C. § 357 authorized the Commandant of the Coast
`Guard to involuntarily retire enlisted personnel with 20 or
`more years of service and outlined procedures and stand-
`ards for selecting those service members based on recom-
`mendations of an “Enlisted Personnel Board[].” 14 U.S.C.
`
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`TIPPINS v. US
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`§ 357(a)–(h).1 But § 357(j) stated an exception: “When the
`Secretary orders a reduction in force, enlisted personnel
`may be involuntarily separated from the service without
`the Board’s action.” It is undisputed that the relevant
`CRSPs were not enlisted personnel boards and did not pro-
`ceed under the standards and procedures of § 357(a)–(h).
`As the case is presented to us, plaintiffs’ involuntary retire-
`ments were lawful if and only if they were part of a “reduc-
`tion in force” ordered by the Secretary under § 357(j).
`In the CRSPs, the Coast Guard involuntarily retired
`several hundred enlisted members, including the six
`named plaintiffs. J.A. 123. In 2018, three of the plaintiffs
`brought this action under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491.
`J.A. 27–28. Several months later, an amended complaint
`was filed adding three additional named plaintiffs. J.A. 28.
`Of relevance to this appeal, all six named plaintiffs served
`in positions at pay grade E-7 or higher at the time of their
`involuntary separation. J.A. 291–94 ¶¶ 7–12. The plain-
`tiffs asserted wrongful-discharge claims and sought con-
`structive service credit, back pay, allowances, and
`reinstatement to active duty pursuant to the Military Pay
`Act, 37 U.S.C. § 204(a). J.A. 291; Amended Complaint, Tip-
`pins v. United States, No. 18-cv-00923 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 16,
`2018), ECF No. 8.
`In July 2021, the Claims Court granted the plaintiffs’
`motion for summary judgment and denied the govern-
`ment’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Tippins I, 154
`Fed. Cl. at 375. The court explained that the dipositive
`
`1 Congress enacted the relevant provisions of § 357 in
`1991. Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
`102-241, § 6, 105 Stat. 2208, 2210–12. The relevant sub-
`sections were repealed in 2016. Coast Guard Authoriza-
`tion Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-120, § 215, 130 Stat. 27,
`45–46 (2016) (repealing § 357(a)–(h), (j)). We cite the stat-
`ute as it existed during 2010–14, without including a date.
`
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`issue in the litigation is whether the CRSPs were lawfully
`convened as part of a “reduction in force” pursuant to 14
`U.S.C. § 357(j). Id. at 379. That is, no other statutory ar-
`gument was advanced by the government to defend the re-
`tirements. The court then concluded that the language of
`the statute is unambiguous and held that a “‘reduction in
`force’ is the elimination of positions or jobs, not merely the
`separation of personnel.” Id. at 378–83.2
`The government does not dispute that, after the named
`plaintiffs were involuntarily retired, their specific billets
`(i.e., positions)3 were not eliminated. J.A. 102–03. Nor
`does the government allege that the relevant CRSPs were
`used to eliminate any billets in pay grade E-7 and above.
`J.A. 124 (“The Coast Guard generally did not eliminate the
`billets that were occupied by the enlisted service members
`in higher grades (E-7 and above) who were selected for in-
`voluntary retirement.”). Rather, the authorization memo-
`randa stated the purpose of these CRSPs in the following
`terms: to “strategically rebalance the enlisted force toward
`a more upwardly mobile, performance based demographic.”
`J.A. 39, 41, 43. While the Coast Guard did reduce the num-
`ber of total authorized enlisted billets service-wide during
`the period at issue, Tippins I, 154 Fed. Cl. at 377, the
`
`
`2 The Claims Court also held, in the alternative, that
`if the statute were to be deemed ambiguous, the Coast
`Guard’s current interpretation of the term “reduction in
`force” would not be entitled to deference under Chevron,
`U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
`U.S. 837 (1984). Tippins I, 154 Fed. Cl. at 383–86; see also
`Tippins II, 157 Fed. Cl. at 286–88, 288 n.4. The govern-
`ment does not argue for Chevron deference on appeal.
`3 Both parties agree that, in this context, Coast Guard
`billets can be understood as analogous to positions in the
`civilian context. See Oral Arg. at 14:51–15:24, 31:49–31:56.
`
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`TIPPINS v. US
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`government admits that the CRSPs at issue here were not
`“necessitated by either (1) a reduction in the Congressional
`authorization for total force strength in the Coast Guard,
`or (2) a reduction in the authorized number of enlisted bil-
`lets in higher grades (E-7 and above),” J.A. 99–101.4 On
`these facts, the Claims Court held that § 357(j) was inap-
`plicable to the CRSPs at issue, so the Coast Guard had un-
`lawfully forced the plaintiffs to retire when it did so
`without complying with § 357(a)–(h). See Tippins I, 154
`Fed. Cl. at 375, 379.
`The government sought reconsideration, but the
`Claims Court again rejected the government’s position. See
`Tippins II, 157 Fed. Cl. at 286, 292. It concluded that the
`named plaintiffs were entitled to a final judgment under
`Rule 54(b) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims, and
`it ordered the government to correct the named plaintiffs’
`military records and provide associated relief. Id. at 292.
`The Claims Court entered its Rule 54(b) judgment on De-
`cember 9, 2021, and the government timely appealed. We
`have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).5
`II
`The sole issue raised by the government on appeal is
`whether the Claims Court erred in holding that the
`
`
`4 Our decision proceeds on the premise of the govern-
`ment’s admission quoted in text above. We do not rule on
`limits on “reduction in force” where that premise is absent.
`5 After the appeal was filed, the Claims Court granted
`an unopposed motion to certify a class of similarly situated
`plaintiffs. Tippins, No. 18-cv-00923 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 14,
`2022) (order certifying class action), ECF No. 101. The
`Claims Court stayed further proceedings related to the cer-
`tified class pending this appeal. Id. (Aug. 17, 2022) (order
`staying case).
`
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`involuntary retirements of the enlisted service members
`without the elimination of their positions did not constitute
`a “reduction in force” within the meaning of 14 U.S.C.
`§ 357(j). Government’s Opening Br. at 1. This question is
`one of statutory interpretation—a legal issue we decide de
`novo. Dixon v. United States, 67 F.4th 1156, 1165 (Fed.
`Cir. 2023); Ampersand Chowchilla Biomass, LLC v. United
`States, 26 F.4th 1306, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2022). We agree with
`the Claims Court.
`
`A
`No definition of the term “reduction in force” is pro-
`vided in 14 U.S.C. § 357 or elsewhere in Title 14. See 14
`U.S.C. § 357; Tippins I, 154 Fed. Cl. at 376–77 (noting that
`the memoranda authorizing the CRSPs state that neither
`§ 357 nor Title 14 defines, directly or by reference, the term
`“reduction in force”). Nor have we been pointed to any dis-
`cussion of what constitutes a “reduction in force” in the leg-
`islative history of § 357. See S. Rep. No. 102-169, at 9
`(1991) (stating only that the board review procedures
`“would not be required during mandated reductions in
`force”); H.R. Rep. No. 102-132, at 29 (1991) (stating only
`that “[w]hen the Secretary orders a reduction in force, en-
`listed personnel may be involuntarily retired without
`Board action”). Because “reduction in force” has not been
`given a definition in § 357, it should be construed “in ac-
`cordance with its ordinary or natural meaning.” Federal
`Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994).
`The Claims Court held that a “reduction in force,” in its
`ordinary meaning, does not cover the mere separation of
`personnel from positions with the intent to refill those po-
`sitions. Tippins I, 154 Fed. Cl. at 378, 382; Tippins II, 157
`Fed. Cl. at 290. The government argues that the term has
`a broad enough meaning to cover such separations. In de-
`termining the meaning of the term, our “proper starting
`point lies in a careful examination of the ordinary meaning
`and structure of the law itself.” Food Marketing Institute
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`TIPPINS v. US
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`v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2364 (2019) (citing
`Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 563
`U.S. 401, 407 (2011)). We conclude that a “reduction in
`force” as used in § 357(j) does not include actions to sepa-
`rate current occupants from their positions simply to make
`room for others to be installed in the positions instead.
`1
`We begin with the statutory text. In the absence of a
`statutory definition of the term “reduction in force,” we con-
`sider its use and interpretation in other statutory contexts.
`See Azar v. Allina Health Services, 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1812
`(2019) (“This Court does not lightly assume that Congress
`silently attaches different meanings to the same term in
`the same or related statutes.”); Federal Aviation Admin-
`istration v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 291–92 (2012) (“[W]hen
`Congress employs a term of art, ‘it presumably knows and
`adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each bor-
`rowed word in the body of learning from which it was
`taken.’” (quoting Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 307
`(1992))); Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 866 F.3d
`1330, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“‘[W]hen Congress uses the
`same language in two statutes having similar purposes, . . .
`it is appropriate to presume that Congress intended that
`text to have the same meaning in both statutes.’” (quoting
`Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005))).
`The term “reduction in force” is used in provisions re-
`lated to federal civilian employment. For example, 5
`U.S.C. § 3502 directs the Office of Personnel Management
`to prescribe regulations “for the release of competing em-
`ployees in a reduction in force.” While neither the statute
`nor regulations promulgated under its authority specifi-
`cally define the term, see 5 U.S.C. § 3502; 5 C.F.R.
`§ 351.203 (providing definitions for 5 C.F.R. pt. 351), this
`court has repeatedly addressed the phrase in cases ap-
`pealed from the Merit Systems Protection Board interpret-
`ing the term in that setting. We have consistently defined
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`a “reduction in force” as an “administrative procedure by
`which agencies eliminate jobs and reassign or separate
`employees who occupied the abolished positions.” Welch
`v. Department of the Army, 323 F.3d 1042, 1046 (Fed. Cir.
`2003); James v. Von Zemenszky, 284 F.3d 1310, 1314 (Fed.
`Cir. 2002); see also Huber v. Merit Systems Protection
`Board, 793 F.2d 284, 286 (Fed. Cir. 1986). We have clari-
`fied that a reduction in force “is not an adverse action
`against a particular employee, but is directed solely at a
`position within an agency.” Welch, 323 F.3d at 1046;
`James, 284 F.3d at 1314; Huber, 793 F.2d at 286; see also
`Gandola v. Federal Trade Commission, 773 F.2d 308, 312
`(Fed. Cir. 1985) (“A reduction in force may not be used as
`a disguised adverse action to remove or demote a particu-
`lar employee.”); Schall v. U.S. Postal Service, 73 F.3d 341,
`344 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
`Moreover, in 5 U.S.C. § 3595(d), which involves reduc-
`tions in force in the Senior Executive Service, the term is
`explicitly defined as “includ[ing] the elimination or modifi-
`cation of a position due to a reorganization, due to a lack of
`funds or curtailment of work, or due to any other factor.”
`(emphasis added). The language of the provision starts
`with the premise that a reduction in force must be focused
`on the position, not just its current occupant, and serves to
`affirm, for that context, both that the term extends to
`“elimination or modification” and that the range of covered
`reasons for such action is broad. In that way, the provision,
`while limited to “purposes of this section,” 5 U.S.C.
`§ 3595(d), confirms the core focus on the position, not just
`its current occupant, when the phrase is used in other fed-
`eral employment provisions.
`In several decisions, other circuits have expressed a
`materially similar understanding when addressing “re-
`duction in force” or similar terms in the private employ-
`ment context. While there are important differences
`between private employment, federal employment, and
`military service, those decisions are highly relevant to our
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`understanding of the commonly understood meaning of
`“reduction in force.”
`In Sanders v. Kohler Co., the Eighth Circuit consid-
`ered the phrase “reduction in force” in the Worker Adjust-
`ment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act, 29 U.S.C.
`§ 2101. 641 F.3d 290, 292, 294–95 (8th Cir. 2011). In
`Sanders, employees who were hired as replacement work-
`ers during a union strike brought an action under the
`WARN Act, which requires that covered employers give
`employees sixty days’ notice of a “mass layoff.” Id. at 292–
`93. A “mass layoff” is defined in the statute as a “reduction
`in force” that results in an employment loss of at least
`33%. Id. at 293. The court in Sanders considered whether
`enough workers had been laid off (i.e., were part of the “re-
`duction in force”) to meet the numerical threshold. Id.
`The court ruled that employees who were fired but then
`replaced with others were not part of the “reduction in
`force.” Id. at 294–95. The Eighth Circuit explained:
`“When a company fires one worker and replaces him with
`another, there is no net loss in the number of employees
`and no ‘reduction in force’ as the term is commonly under-
`stood.” Id. at 294 (citing Matthews v. Allis-Chalmers, 769
`F.2d 1215, 1217 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[B]y definition, when the
`employer reduces his work force he hires no one to replace
`the ones he let go.”)).
`The First and Sixth Circuits have considered the
`meaning of a similar term, “work force reduction,” in the
`Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et
`seq. LeBlanc v. Great American Insurance Co., 6 F.3d 836,
`845–46 (1st Cir. 1993); Barnes v. GenCorp Inc., 896 F.2d
`1457, 1465 (6th Cir. 1990). Both circuits explained that
`“[a] work force reduction situation occurs when business
`considerations cause an employer to eliminate one or more
`positions within the company” and that “[a]n employee is
`not eliminated as part of a work force reduction when he
`or she is replaced after his or her discharge.” LeBlanc, 6
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`F.3d at 845–46 (quoting Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1465) (empha-
`sis altered).
`Those authorities provide compelling evidence that
`the phrase “reduction in force,” as commonly understood,
`does not cover the mere separation of personnel from posi-
`tions to be refilled. In the absence of sufficiently clear con-
`trary indications, this established meaning must apply in
`14 U.S.C. § 357(j).
`
`2
`There are no contrary indications that warrant adop-
`tion of a different meaning here. Had Congress intended
`a different meaning, it could have provided a statute-spe-
`cific definition, chosen different language, or added an ad-
`ditional clause to exempt from § 357(a)–(h) specified
`actions that involve the separation of personnel without
`elimination of their positions. For example, Congress
`could have omitted the words “a reduction in force” and
`said, instead: “When the Secretary orders, enlisted person-
`nel may be involuntarily separated from the service with-
`out the Board’s action.” Congress did not say that. It
`restricted the actions of “the Secretary” that were exempt
`from the § 357(a)–(h) provisions to ordering “a reduction
`in force.”
`Moreover, the structure of 14 U.S.C. § 357 supports
`adoption of the common meaning of “reduction in force,” as
`we have described it, rather than the government’s view.
`Unlike 10 U.S.C. § 1169, which broadly authorizes the
`Secretary to discharge an enlisted member of an armed
`force before his or her term of service expires, § 357 out-
`lined only two mechanisms for discharging an enlisted
`Coast Guard member with twenty or more years of service:
`by recommendation of an enlisted personnel board or pur-
`suant to a “reduction in force” ordered by the Secretary.
`14 U.S.C. § 357(a)–(b), (j).
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`As to the first mechanism, enlisted members could be
`involuntarily retired on the Board’s recommendation for
`two reasons: substandard performance or professional der-
`eliction. 14 U.S.C. § 357(b). Section 357 also afforded ser-
`vice members procedural protections, such as the right to
`counsel, written notification of the reasons for involuntary
`retirement, access to the full record, an opportunity to pre-
`sent rebuttal and appear before the Board, and an oppor-
`tunity to appeal. 14 U.S.C. § 357(c), (f).
`The second mechanism for involuntary retirement,
`pursuant to a “reduction in force,” must be understood in
`this statutory context. The government urges us to adopt
`an understanding of “reduction in force” that is broad
`enough to encompass the discharge of any individual ser-
`vice member. See Oral Arg. at 29:41–30:46 (asserting that
`firing an employee would be included in the government’s
`definition of a “reduction in force”). But to adopt this inter-
`pretation of a “reduction in force” would allow the narrow
`exception of § 357(j) to swallow the rule. To allow any in-
`voluntary retirement to be deemed a “reduction in force”
`would render the enhanced limitations on discharge im-
`posed by Congress in the remainder of § 357 a nullity. And
`it would produce a statute that effectively erases the “a re-
`duction in force” words from § 357(j).
`We conclude that the phrase used in this subsection
`should be understood in accordance with the established
`meaning the phrase has in other contexts.
`B
`We reject the government’s several arguments for a dif-
`ferent conclusion.
`
`1
`The government first argues that, given the nature of
`military enlistment, it is improper to rely on cases involv-
`ing the statutory and regulatory scheme governing federal
`civilian employment. Specifically, the government argues
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`that, whereas in the civil service employees are appointed
`to specific positions, military service members serve under
`enlistment contracts and are not enlisted to a particular
`billet. Rather, service members have a duty status and
`grade. 10 U.S.C. §§ 101(b)(6), 505(b). Thus, the govern-
`ment argues, a reduction in positions does not, by itself,
`reduce the size of the military workforce because military
`members, if not discharged from service, will remain in the
`force regardless of whether any particular position exists.
`But this military-civilian distinction does not support a
`special meaning of § 357(j) as covering the mere emptying
`of a slot, by discharging its current occupant, so that it
`may be filled with a different person—which is what oc-
`curred here.
`As explained by the government, “Congress typically
`authorizes a total force strength” and then “the Coast
`Guard separately authorizes billets (or positions) that the
`Coast Guard has determined it can afford to maintain.”
`J.A. 98. The Coast Guard can, and does, manage the num-
`ber of authorized billets by grade. See J.A. 124. Moreover,
`“every branch of the armed services has the statutory dis-
`cretion to terminate a term of enlistment early and invol-
`untarily if it is in the interest of the respective branch to
`do so and applicable procedures are followed.” Spehr v.
`United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 69, 82 (2001) (citing 10 U.S.C.
`§ 1169), aff’d, 49 F. App’x 303 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Thus, the
`Coast Guard can, if proper procedures are followed, reduce
`the size of its workforce by eliminating billets in certain
`grades and terminating service member contracts. That
`practice, though, is not the same as emptying a position
`simply to fill it with another person.
`Branches of the military regularly reduce the size of
`their workforces when Congress cuts appropriations or re-
`duces authorized end-strength by eliminating personnel
`and positions, and such programs have been referred to, if
`informally, as “reduction in force” programs. See, e.g.,
`Vierrether v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 357, 359 (1992)
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`(explaining that the Coast Guard Command “opted to
`meet [a budget] shortfall in part by reducing its personnel”
`and implementing a “involuntary reduction in force (‘RIF’)
`program”), aff’d, 6 F.3d 786 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Berkley v.
`United States, 287 F.3d 1076, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (de-
`scribing a “RIF” Board to select officers in the Air Force for
`involuntary separation in response to congressionally
`mandated reductions); Anderson v. United States, 111 Fed.
`Cl. 572, 577, 585 (2013) (describing a “reduction in force
`accomplished by [an Enlisted Retention Board] process”
`that “enable[d] the Navy to meet FY-12 end strength tar-
`gets”); Alvin v. United States, 50 Fed. Cl. 295, 296 (2001)
`(describing a “statutorily required reduction in force” that
`stemmed from “Congress mandat[ing] reductions in man-
`power throughout the military”); Baker v. United States,
`34 Fed. Cl. 645, 649 (1995) (describing “reduction in force
`requirements” related to “a congressionally-directed force
`reduction”), vacated on other grounds, 127 F.3d 1081 (Fed.
`Cir. 1997). The government argues that those cases refer
`to reductions in military personnel as “reductions in force.”
`Even if so, however, those cases do not address what oc-
`curred here—the emptying of positions simply to fill them
`with other service members. As previously noted, such ac-
`tion cannot, as a matter of law, constitute a “reduction in
`force” under § 357(j).
`
`2
`The government further argues that the term “reduc-
`tion in force” even in the civilian context does not exclude
`mere termination of personnel. We disagree.
`In support of this contention, the government argues
`that Congress has used the terms “reduction in force” and
`“reduction in personnel” interchangeably in the civilian
`context. Specifically, the government points to the large-
`scale 1966 recodification of civil-service law, in which,
`among other things, in recodifying 5 U.S.C. § 861(a) (1964)
`as 5 U.S.C. § 3502(a) (1970), Congress substituted the term
`
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`TIPPINS v. US
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`15
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`“reduction in force” for “reduction in personnel,” while a
`committee report stated that the recodification was “with-
`out substantive change.” See Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L.
`No. 89-554, § 3502, 80 Stat. 378, 428; H.R. Rep. No. 89-901,
`89th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1, 55 (1965); S. Rep. No. 89-1380,
`89th Cong., 1st Sess., at 18, 74 (1966). But the government
`fails to show that the earlier phrase “reduction in person-
`nel” covered situations where civil service employees are
`terminated simply to refill their positions. The govern-
`ment has shown nothing sufficient to supplant this court’s
`subsequent, consistent interpretation of the term “reduc-
`tion in force” in the Title 5 setting.
`Next, the government points to 5 C.F.R. pt. 351 as ev-
`idence that there are examples of “reductions in force” that
`do not involve the elimination of positions. Specifically,
`the government argues that the civil service regulations
`contemplate (1) furloughs and (2) the maintenance of “va-
`cant position[s].” But those references do not address
`what occurred here—service members were terminated
`from service simply to allow refilling of their positions—
`much less characterize these facts as a “reduction in force.”
`Such action is neither a furlough nor a maintenance of va-
`cant positions. The references to furloughs concern the
`proper placement of an employee once his or her position
`is (if only temporarily) eliminated.
` See 5 C.F.R.
`§§ 351.201(a)(2), 351.203, 351.604. And the reference to
`vacant positions states only that “[t]his part does not re-
`quire an agency to fill a vacant position.” 5 C.F.R.
`§ 351.201(b).
`The government observes that no civilian statute or
`regulation states an all-encompassing definition of “reduc-
`tion in force” as limited to elimination of positions, exclud-
`ing actions simply to empty a position to make room for
`another occupant. See also Cross v. Department of Trans-
`portation, 127 F.3d 1443, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Congress
`has not specified the circumstances under which [reduc-
`tions in force] may be appropriate.”). But the absence of
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`16
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`TIPPINS v. US
`
`such a legislative or executive pronouncement does not ne-
`gate the force of the well-established judicial interpreta-
`tion of the phrase.
`
`3
`The government directs us to definitions in two con-
`temporaneous dictionaries. But the definitions cited by the
`government do not support departing from the well-estab-
`lished meaning of “reduction in force.”
`The government cites Merriam-Webster’s dictionary
`for definitions of the term “force.” In the context of a labor
`force, Merriam-Webster defines “force” as “a body of per-
`sons or things available for a particular end.” Force, Mer-
`riam-Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (9th ed. 1990).
`In the context of military strength, Merriam-Webster de-
`fines “force” as “a body (as of troops or ships) assigned to a
`military purpose.” Id. But those definitions do not address
`the phrase as a whole, which, as we have discussed, has a
`well-established meaning. The present case is one in which
`it is not appropriate, in order to capture the meaning of a
`phrase as a unit, to break it into its parts, find definitions
`of each part, and put the definitions together. See Federal
`Communications Commission v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397,
`404–06 (2011) (rejecting an argument “treat[ing] the term
`‘personal privacy’ as simply the sum of its two words” and
`explaining that “two words together may assume a more
`particular meaning than those words in isolation”). Here,
`the phrase operates in a context (concerning employment)
`that is not the specific focus of the quoted “force” defini-
`tions, and in this context the phrase has an established
`meaning.
`The government also cites the Random House Diction-
`ary’s definitions of the noun “RIF”: (1) “a reduction in the
`personnel of an armed service or unit” in the military con-
`text, and (2) “a reduction in the number of persons em-
`ployed by a business, government department, etc., esp. for
`budgetary
`reasons.”
` Random House Unabridged
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`TIPPINS v. US
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`17
`
`Dictionary of the English Language 1655 (2d ed. 1987).
`The dictionary also defines the verb “rif” as having an “in-
`formal” meaning of “discharg[ing] (a person) from military
`or civil service, esp. as part of an economy program.” Id.
`Again, it is not clear how these definitions affirmatively
`support the government’s position that discharges of indi-
`vidual military members can constitute a “reduction in
`force.” The government fails to persuasively explain how
`the mere separation of a service member, independently of
`an elimination of his or her position or even of others’ posi-
`tions, would be properly understood as a “reduction in the
`personnel