Case: 22-2079 Document: 43 Page: 1 Filed: 04/08/2024
`
`United States Court of Appeals
`for the Federal Circuit
`______________________
`
`RIMCO INC.,
`Plaintiff-Appellant
`
`v.
`
`UNITED STATES,
`Defendant-Appellee
`______________________
`
`2022-2079
`______________________
`
`Appeal from the United States Court of International
`Trade in No. 1:21-cv-00537-MAB, Chief Judge Mark A.
`Barnett.
`
`______________________
`
`Decided: April 8, 2024
`______________________
`
`JOHN M. PETERSON, Neville Peterson LLP, New York,
`NY, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by
`PATRICK KLEIN; RICHARD F. O'NEILL, Seattle, WA.
`
` BEVERLY A. FARRELL, Commercial Litigation Branch,
`Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, New
`York, NY, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented
`by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, CLAUDIA BURKE, PATRICIA M.
`MCCARTHY, JUSTIN REINHART MILLER; FARIHA KABIR,
`YELENA SLEPAK, Office of Assistant Chief Counsel, Bureau
`of Customs and Border Protection, United States Depart-
`ment of Homeland Security, New York, NY; IAN ANDREW
`
`

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`2
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`RIMCO INC. v. US
`
`MCINERNEY, Office of the Chief Counsel for Trade Enforce-
`ment and Compliance, United States Department of Com-
`merce, Washington, DC.
`______________________
`
`Before PROST, TARANTO, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.
`HUGHES, Circuit Judge.
`Importer Rimco Inc., appeals the United States Court
`of International Trade’s dismissal for lack of subject matter
`jurisdiction over an action seeking judicial review of a de-
`nied protest. Rimco asserts the Court of International
`Trade’s exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction to review de-
`nial of protests pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a), or alterna-
`tively, residual jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).
`Because Customs and Border Protection’s assessment of
`countervailing and antidumping duties is not a protestable
`decision, and because
`jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
`§ 1581(c) would have been available if Rimco had not failed
`to exhaust the appropriate administrative remedies, we af-
`firm the CIT’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
`tion.
`
`I
`A
`Antidumping duties (AD) and countervailing duties
`(CVD) work to remedy domestic injuries caused by goods
`imported at unfair prices or receiving countervailable sub-
`sidies from foreign governments. Guangdong Wireking
`Housewares & Hardware Co. v. United States, 745 F.3d
`1194, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The U.S. Department of Com-
`merce and the U.S. International Trade Commission are
`the agencies charged with conducting CVD and AD inves-
`tigations. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1673. During these investiga-
`tions, Commerce determines whether, and to what extent,
`merchandise imported into the United States is being sold
`
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`RIMCO INC. v. US
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`3
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`at prices below fair value, or benefits from countervailable
`foreign subsidiaries. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d, 1673d.
`After concluding an investigation, Commerce deter-
`mines the appropriate AD and CVD rates required to ad-
`dress any domestic injuries or unfair practices related to
`certain foreign exporters, producers, or governments. 19
`U.S.C. §§ 1671d(c)(1), 1673d(c)(1). These rates can be es-
`tablished for specific entities or on a country-wide basis de-
`pending on the source and extent of the harm. 19 U.S.C.
`§§ 1671d(c)(1)(B), 1673d(c)(1)(B). Congress has supplied
`Commerce with a statutory scheme that provides methods
`for establishing AD and CVD rates for individually and
`non-individually investigated entities, as well as an “all-
`others” rate based on multiple considerations, including
`facts available. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(c)(5), 1673d(c)(5),
`1677e.
`This court has recognized that Commerce has “broad
`authority to interpret . . . and carry out th[is] statutory
`mandate.” Sigma Corp. v. United States, 117 F.3d 1401,
`1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997). However, its methodology must nev-
`ertheless be reasonable. See Yangzhou Bestpak Gifts &
`Crafts Co. v. United States, 716 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
`2013) (quoting “reasonable method” requirement contained
`in 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(5)(B)).
`After Commerce makes final AD and CVD determina-
`tions, it publishes the rates in a final order. In accordance
`with rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act
`(APA) § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 553, Commerce then provides notice
`of opportunity for interested parties, such as importers, to
`request and/or participate in administrative review of the
`final orders. At the close of the notice of opportunity period,
`Commerce issues liquidation instructions, directing the
`U.S. Customs and Border Protection (Customs) to assess
`entries subject to the orders at the final published respec-
`tive rates.
`
`

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`4
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`RIMCO INC. v. US
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`B
`On March 28, 2019, after completing CVD and AD in-
`vestigations, Commerce published final CVD and AD de-
`terminations on certain steel wheels from China. See
`generally Certain Steel Wheels From the People’s Republic
`of China: Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determi-
`nation, 84 Fed. Reg. 11,744 (Dep’t Commerce Mar. 28,
`2019) (Final CVD Determination); Certain Steel Wheels
`From the People’s Republic of China: Final Determination
`of Sales At Less-Than-Fair-Value, 84 Fed. Reg. 11,746
`(Dep’t Commerce Mar. 28, 2019) (Final AD Determination).
`In its Final CVD Determination, Commerce established an
`entity rate of 457.10 % for two mandatory respondents
`based on total adverse facts available, as authorized under
`19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b), and an all-others rate of 457.10 %, as
`authorized under 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(5)(A). See Certain
`Steel Wheels From the People’s Republic of China: Final Af-
`firmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 84 Fed. Reg.
`at 11,745. Because no companies participated in the AD in-
`vestigation, Commerce established a China-wide entity
`rate of 231.08 % for the Final AD Determination. See Cer-
`tain Steel Wheels From the People’s Republic of China: Fi-
`nal Determination of Sales At Less-Than-Fair-Value, 84
`Fed. Reg. at 11,747.
`On May 24, 2019, Commerce issued the AD and CVD
`orders in a single publication. Certain Steel Wheels From
`the People’s Republic of China; Antidumping and Counter-
`vailing Duty Orders, 84 Fed. Reg. 24,098–24,100 (Dep’t
`Commerce May 24, 2019).
`On May 1, 2020, Commerce published a notice of op-
`portunity to allow requests for administrative review of the
`AD order and CVD order for the periods August 31, 2018,
`through December 31, 2019, and October 30, 2018, through
`April 30, 2020, respectively. See Antidumping or Counter-
`vailing Duty Order, Finding, or Suspended Investigation;
`Opportunity to Request Administrative Review, 85 Fed.
`
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`RIMCO INC. v. US
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`Reg. 25,394, 25,396 (Dep’t of Commerce May 1, 2020). This
`notice provided interested parties, with an opportunity to
`participate in the administrative review process to ensure
`that their entries from the reviewable time periods were
`assessed at the proper rates during liquidation. As is rele-
`vant to this appeal, Rimco, a North Dakota-based importer
`and reseller of wheels subject to the orders, is an interested
`party to which the notice applied. See 19 U.S.C. 1677(9)(A)
`(defining “interested party” to include “the United States
`importer[] of subject merchandise”). Yet, neither Rimco,
`nor any other interested party, requested administrative
`review of any transactions covered by the respective peri-
`ods of review.
`Because no interested party requested administrative
`review of the AD or CVD orders, Commerce issued liquida-
`tion instructions directing Customs to assess entries sub-
`ject to the orders at the final published rates. During
`liquidation, Customs then applied the instructed rates
`when assessing goods subject to the respective orders.
`Rimco made various consumption entries of goods subject
`to liquidation in accordance with the AD and CVD orders.
`On March 16, 2021, Rimco filed a protest challenging
`Customs’ assessment of AD and CVD on its imported goods
`as “‘excessive fines’ in contravention of the Eighth Amend-
`ment.” Appellant’s Br. at 5. On March 30, 2021, Customs
`denied the protest on the basis that “19 U.S.C. [§] 1514
`does not authorize protests or petitions against Commerce
`calculations or findings.” Appellee’s Br. at 8. Rimco then
`filed an action before the U.S. Court of International Trade
`(CIT), seeking judicial review of Customs’ denial of protest.
`Rimco asserted the CIT’s exclusive jurisdiction under 28
`U.S.C. § 1581(a), or alternatively, 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).
`The Government moved to dismiss Rimco’s action for
`lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a
`claim. On July 8, 2022, the CIT granted the Government’s
`motion on jurisdictional grounds and dismissed the action
`
`

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`RIMCO INC. v. US
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`with prejudice.1 J.A. 1. The CIT held that it lacked juris-
`diction under § 1581(a) because Customs’ ministerial ap-
`plication of AD and CVD rates, pursuant to Commerce’s
`liquidation instructions, was not a protestable decision.
`J.A. 10–12. Instead, the CIT found that the true nature of
`Rimco’s action was “a challenge to the countervailing and
`antidumping duty rates set by Commerce in the respective
`orders . . . .” J.A. 19. Therefore, the CIT concluded that it
`lacked jurisdiction under § 1581(i) “because jurisdiction
`pursuant to section 1581(c) was available and would not
`have been manifestly inadequate” had Rimco sought ad-
`ministrative review of Commerce’s AD and CVD determi-
`nations. J.A. 13.
`Rimco appeals the CIT’s dismissal. We have jurisdic-
`tion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).
`II
`We review a dismissal granted by the CIT for lack of
`subject-matter jurisdiction de novo as a question of law.
`Hutchinson Quality Furniture, Inc. v. United States, 827
`F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
`The burden of establishing jurisdiction is on the party
`invoking it. Norsk Hydro Can., Inc. v. United States, 472
`F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The well-pleaded factual
`allegations of the complaint are accepted as true, and all
`reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the claimant.
`Hutchinson, 827 F.3d at 1359.
`III
`The CIT’s general jurisdiction is statutorily defined un-
`der 28 U.S.C. § 1581. Norcal/Crosetti Foods, Inc. v. United
`States, 963 F.2d 356, 358 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The “particular
`
`1 Because the CIT dismissed the action for lack of sub-
`ject-matter jurisdiction, it did not reach the motion to dis-
`miss for failure to state a claim. J.A. 3 n.1.
`
`

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`RIMCO INC. v. US
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`7
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`laws over which the Court of International Trade may as-
`sert jurisdiction” are further specified in each subsection of
`§ 1581. Nat’l Corn Growers Ass’n v. Baker, 840 F.2d 1547,
`1555 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Relevant to this appeal are subsec-
`tions (a), (c), and (i).
`Section 1581(a) of title 28 grants the CIT “exclusive ju-
`risdiction [over] any civil action commenced to contest the
`denial of a protest, in whole or in part, under [19 U.S.C.
`§ 1515].” Section 1515 of title 19 governs Customs’ review
`of “a protest . . . filed in accordance with section 1514 of
`this title.” Importantly, § 1514 provides a limited list of
`seven circumstances in which a party may file a “protest
`against decisions of Customs.” 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(1)–(7).
`Because “[s]ection 1514(a) applies exclusively to Customs
`decisions . . . [it] does not embrace decisions by other agen-
`cies.” See Mitsubishi Elec. Am., Inc. v. United States, 44
`F.3d 973, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (emphasis added and inter-
`nal quotations omitted).
`Section 1581(c) provides the CIT with “exclusive juris-
`diction [over] civil actions commenced under [19 U.S.C.
`§ 1516a].” Section 1516a specifically governs judicial re-
`view of Commerce’s determinations in antidumping and
`countervailing duty proceedings.
`Section 1581(i), commonly referred to as the CIT’s “re-
`sidual” grant of jurisdiction, “may not be invoked when ju-
`risdiction under another subsection of § 1581 is or could
`have been available, unless the remedy provided under
`that other subsection would be manifestly inadequate.”
`Sunpreme Inc. v. United States, 892 F.3d 1186, 1191 (Fed.
`Cir. 2018) (citing Fujitsu Gen. Am., Inc. v. United States,
`283 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). The party asserting
`§ 1581(i) jurisdiction has the burden to show that such al-
`ternative remedy would be manifestly inadequate. Id.
`Claimants seeking judicial review by the CIT may not
`“ignore the precepts of subsection 1581 and attempt[] to
`circumvent” Congress’ clear statutory procedures and
`
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`8
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`RIMCO INC. v. US
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`safeguards. Nat’l Corn Growers, 840 F.2d at 1556. Simi-
`larly, claimants are prohibited from using creative plead-
`ing to expand the CIT’s statutory jurisdiction. Norsk Hydro
`Can., 472 F.3d at 1355. Thus, when asserting § 1581 juris-
`diction, “mere recitation of a basis for jurisdiction, by either
`a party or a court, cannot be controlling.” Id. Instead, we
`must look at the facts asserted in the pleadings and deter-
`mine the true nature of the action. See Hutchinson, 827
`F.3d at 1360. This factual inquiry requires our court to
`identify the particular agency action underlying the
`claimed harm, so that we may determine which subsection
`of § 1581 provides the CIT with proper jurisdiction. Id.
`A
`Rimco asserts that the CIT has exclusive jurisdiction
`
`under § 1581(a), and argues the CIT erred in finding “that
`there was no ‘decision’ by [Customs] against which a pro-
`test would lie.” Appellant’s Br. at 29. In support of its posi-
`tion, Rimco alleges that Customs’ “liquidation decision is
`protestable, even if it [is] . . . carried out ministerially.” Ap-
`pellant’s Br. at 29. We disagree.
`Contrary to Rimco’s assertion, when Customs’ role is
`purely ministerial, liquidation of entries subject to AD and
`CVD orders
`is “not a
`‘decision’ under § 1514(a).”
`Thyssenkrupp Steel N. Am., Inc. v. United States, 886 F.3d
`1215, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (internal citation omitted). A
`protestable decision under § 1514(a) requires Customs to
`have “engage[d] in some sort of decision-making process.”
`Indus. Chems., Inc. v. United States, 941 F.3d 1368, 1371
`(Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting U.S. Shoe Corp. v. United States,
`114 F.3d 1564, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1997), aff’d, 523 U.S. 360
`(1998)). Conversely, this court has consistently held that
`“‘merely ministerial’ actions are not protestable under
`[§] 1514.” Id. (quoting Mitsubishi, 44 F.3d at 977). This is
`because unlike typical § 1514(a) decisions that involve sub-
`stantive determinations, Customs lacks discretion when
`“merely follow[ing] Commerce’s [liquidation] instructions.”
`
`

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`RIMCO INC. v. US
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`9
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`Mitsubishi, 44 F.3d at 977; see also ARP Materials, Inc. v.
`United States, 520 F. Supp. 3d 1341, 1358 (Ct. Int’l Trade
`2021), aff’d, 47 F.4th 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“Customs’ role
`in collecting those duties was ministerial rather than a de-
`cision under section 1514(a).” (internal quotations omit-
`ted)). Because Customs cannot “modify . . . [Commerce’s]
`determinations, their underlying facts, or their enforce-
`ment,” its liquidation of entries subject to AD and CVD or-
`ders cannot be protested. Mitsubishi, 44 F.3d at 977
`(cleaned up).
`While this court has recognized a limited range of cir-
`cumstances in which Customs’ underlying liquidation pur-
`suant to AD or CVD orders may be subject to protest, we
`find no such circumstance here. See, e.g., Koyo Corp. of
`U.S.A. v. United States, 497 F.3d 1231, 1239 (Fed. Cir.
`2007) (holding that deemed liquidation under 19 U.S.C.
`§ 1504(d) is subject to protest when Customs fails to exe-
`cute liquidation instructions); Cemex, S.A. v. United States,
`384 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (concluding that Cus-
`toms made a particular “decision” when it erroneously rec-
`ognized a deemed liquidation at an “as entered” rate
`instead of applying the final rate). Rimco has not alleged
`that Customs made any substantive determinations or un-
`dertook any discretionary actions that would constitute
`§ 1514(a) decisions. Instead, Rimco asserts that Customs
`was “required by law to go through the liquidation process”
`and simply acted on Commerce’s liquidation instructions
`that it was “bound by statute to carry out.” Appellant’s Br.
`at 29.
`Accordingly, because Customs’ role in liquidating en-
`tries subject to the AD and CVD orders was merely minis-
`terial and required no substantive determinations, the CIT
`properly determined that there was no protestable decision
`under § 1514(a). Therefore, the CIT lacks § 1581(a) juris-
`diction over Rimco’s action.
`
`B
`
`

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`RIMCO INC. v. US
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`Rimco alternatively argues that the CIT erred in find-
`ing that it lacked residual jurisdiction under § 1581(i).
`Whether a party may properly invoke § 1581(i) is a two-
`step inquiry. See Erwin Hymer Grp. N. Am., Inc. v. United
`States, 930 F.3d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019). First, we de-
`termine whether jurisdiction under a different subsection
`of § 1581 could have been available, and second, if such ju-
`risdiction was available, we ask whether the provided rem-
`edy would have been manifestly inadequate. Id.
` Because the availability of jurisdiction under other
`subsections of § 1581 depends on the particular type of
`agency action challenged, we must first determine the true
`nature of an action. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. United
`States, 544 F.3d 1289, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (affirming the
`trial court’s decision to look to the true nature of the action
`in determining jurisdiction). The CIT concluded that the
`true nature of Rimco’s action was to challenge Commerce’s
`AD and CVD rate determinations. We agree.
`Although Rimco contends that this suit “is not a chal-
`lenge to . . . any Commerce determination,” Appellant’s Br.
`at 30, this conclusory statement directly contradicts
`Rimco’s own argument. Rimco’s opening brief explicitly
`states that “[its] claims that the CVD and AD[] rates as-
`sessed against it are unconstitutional ‘excessive fines’ re-
`sults from Commerce’s decision to base the rates on
`[adverse facts available].” Appellant’s Br. at 10–11 (empha-
`sis added). Rimco also posits that some of Commerce’s final
`determinations were not based on “lawful calculated
`rate[s].” Id. at 14. Further, most of Rimco’s factual allega-
`tions relate to Commerce’s AD and CVD investigations and
`subsequent final rate determinations. Thus, in view of the
`totality of Rimco’s allegations, the true nature of its action
`is to challenge Commerce’s AD and CVD rate determina-
`tions.
`Interested parties are directed to raise challenges to
`Commerce’s AD
`and CVD
`determinations
`via
`
`

`

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`RIMCO INC. v. US
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`11
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`administrative review proceedings governed by § 1516a of
`title 19. Subsequent judicial review of such proceedings is
`available under the CIT’s § 1581(c) exclusive jurisdiction.
`Rimco alleges that it would have lacked standing to pursue
`§ 1581(c) jurisdiction because it was not a party to Com-
`merce’s earlier AD and CVD investigations. Appellant’s
`Br. at 14–15. But this argument provides no explanation
`as to why, in light of Commerce’s notice of opportunity,
`Rimco failed to seek administrative review of the orders.
`Because Rimco, as an interested party, had the opportunity
`to seek administrative review of Commerce’s AD and CVD
`determinations, jurisdiction under § 1581(c) would have
`been available but for Rimco’s own failure to pursue the
`proper administrative remedy.
`C
`Because jurisdiction was available under § 1581(c), the
`
`CIT’s residual jurisdiction under § 1581(i) is unavailable
`unless Rimco can show that the remedy afforded by subsec-
`tion (c) would be manifestly inadequate. A remedy is not
`inadequate simply because a party believes such remedy is
`unavailable. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. 544 F.3d at 1294. Ra-
`ther, a manifestly inadequate remedy requires “an exercise
`in futility, or ‘incapable of producing any result; failing ut-
`terly of the desired end through intrinsic defect; useless,
`ineffectual, vain.’” Id. (quoting Oxford English Dictionary
`(2d ed. 1989).
`
`Rimco contends that the CIT’s proposed administrative
`pathway is not a workable option for importers to raise con-
`stitutional claims. Appellant’s Br. at 10. In an attempt to
`frame the § 1581(c) remedy as inadequate, Rimco alleges
`that Commerce “lacks institutional competence to judge
`the constitutionality of its own determinations” and there-
`fore argues that it was not required to exhaust its admin-
`istrative remedies. Appellant’s Br. at 16. We disagree with
`this argument for two reasons.
`
`

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`12
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`RIMCO INC. v. US
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`First, Commerce is required to review the statutory ap-
`propriateness of its AD and CVD rates, including those
`based on adverse facts available. During the administra-
`tive review process, Commerce would have considered facts
`to determine whether its rates were proportional to the
`harm they were intended to address and “necessary to
`serve the purpose of deterrence.” See BMW of N. Am. LLC
`v. United States, 926 F.3d 1291, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (not-
`ing that because rates based on adverse facts available
`(AFA) work to incentivize cooperation, “an unusually high
`rate is permissible when it is ‘necessary to serve the pur-
`pose of deterrence”). Furthermore, because the test for ex-
`cessiveness turns on a proportionality determination, see
`United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998)
`(“[t]he touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the
`Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality”),
`Commerce could typically dispose of the constitutional is-
`sue by reviewing the rates for statutory compliance (i.e.,
`finding the rates not excessive). See KYD, Inc. v. United
`States, 607 F.3d 760, 768 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[A]n AFA
`[anti]dumping margin determined in accordance with the
`statutory requirements is not a punitive measure, and the
`limitations applicable to punitive damages assessments
`therefore have no pertinence to duties imposed based on
`lawfully derived margins such as the margin at issue in
`this case.”). Rimco itself concedes “that a correctly calcu-
`lated CVD or AD[] rate would not be susceptible to consti-
`tutional challenges under the Eighth Amendment.”
`Appellant’s Br. at 14 n.10. And when “an administrative
`proceeding might leave no remnant of the constitutional
`question, the administrative remedy plainly should be pur-
`sued.” Pub. Utils. Comm’n of State of Cal. v. United States,
`355 U.S. 534, 539–40 (1958). Therefore, because Commerce
`could have removed the constitutional issue by addressing
`the statutory appropriateness of its rate determinations,
`administrative review was the proper remedy.
`
`

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`RIMCO INC. v. US
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`Second, this court has rejected the argument that it
`would necessarily be futile to seek administrative remedies
`when an agency is unable to make constitutional findings.
`See Bowling v. McDonough, 38 F.4th 1051, 1057–59 (Fed.
`Cir. 2022) (holding that it would not have been futile to
`raise constitutional challenges before an agency, even if the
`agency could not address the constitutional issue). As we
`explained in Bowling, this is because the agency will nev-
`ertheless serve its immensely useful record-development
`and fact-finding functions. See Bowling, 38 F.4th at 1059;
`see also Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37 (1972) (“The
`basic purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is to allow an ad-
`ministrative agency to perform functions within its special
`competence—to make a factual record, to apply its exper-
`tise, and to correct its own errors so as to moot judicial con-
`troversies.”). So even if there were a scenario, however
`unlikely, where a calculated rate might comply with statu-
`tory reasonableness but nonetheless violate the excessive
`fines component of the Eighth Amendment, administrative
`exhaustion would still be required. Because administrative
`review could have established an invaluable record as to
`the factual basis for Commerce’s AD and CVD determina-
`tions, irrespective of the constitutionality issue, it would
`not have been futile for Rimco to seek such remedy.
`Rimco could have sought § 1516a administrative re-
`view to sufficiently challenge Commerce’s AD and CVD de-
`terminations. Had Rimco been dissatisfied with
`Commerce’s administrative review determination, it could
`have rightfully sought judicial review on the record under
`the CIT’s exclusive jurisdiction. This is the exact statutory
`process outlined by Congress in § 1581(c). As discussed
`above, it is neither unworkable, nor futile.
`Because Rimco has failed show that the available rem-
`edy provided by § 1581(c) would have been manifestly in-
`adequate, § 1581(i) jurisdiction is improper. As noted by
`the CIT, “Rimco failed to pursue the administrative avenue
`available to it and thereby missed its opportunity to
`
`

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`14
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`RIMCO INC. v. US
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`challenge the rates set by Commerce. It cannot avoid the
`consequences of that failure through the exercise of the
`court’s section 1581(i) jurisdiction.” J.A. 19.
`IV
`Because Customs’ ministerial assessment of antidump-
`ing and countervailing duties is not a protestable decision,
`and because jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) would
`have been available and not manifestly inadequate if
`Rimco had not failed to exhaust administrative remedies,
`we affirm the Court of International Trade’s dismissal for
`lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
`AFFIRMED
`
`