Case: 25-111 Document: 11 Page: 1 Filed: 12/20/2024
`
`No. 25-111
`
`United States Court of Appeals
`for the Federal Circuit
`
`
`
`IN RE LENOVO GROUP LIMITED,
`Petitioner.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`On Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to the United States District Court for the
`Eastern District of Texas in No. 2:23-cv-00449-JRG, Chief Judge J. Rodney
`Gilstrap
`
`
`
`UNIVERSAL CONNECTIVITY TECHNOLOGIES INC.’S
`RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
`
`
`
`
`
`December 20, 2024
`
`
`
`
`
`Brett Cooper
`BC LAW GROUP, P.C.
`200 Madison Avenue, 24th Floor
`New York, NY 10016
`Telephone: (516) 359-9668
`bcooper@bc-lawgroup.com
`
`Counsel for Universal Connectivity
`Technologies Inc.
`
`

`

`Case: 25-111 Document: 11 Page: 2 Filed: 12/20/2024
`
`FORM 9. Certificate of Interest
`
`Form 9 (p. 1)
`March 2023
`
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
`
`CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST
`
`Case Number
`Short Case Caption
`Filing Party/Entity
`
`Instructions:
`
`1. Complete each section of the form and select none or N/A if appropriate.
`
`2. Please enter only one item per box; attach additional pages as needed, and
`check the box to indicate such pages are attached.
`
`3. In answering Sections 2 and 3, be specific as to which represented entities
`the answers apply; lack of specificity may result in non-compliance.
`
`4. Please do not duplicate entries within Section 5.
`
`5. Counsel must file an amended Certificate of Interest within seven days after
`any information on this form changes. Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(c).
`
`I certify the following information and any attached sheets are accurate and
`complete to the best of my knowledge.
`
`Date: _________________
`
`Signature:
`
`Name:
`
`2025-111
`
`In re: Lenovo Group Limited
`
`Universal Connectivity Technologies Inc.
`
`/s/ Brett Cooper
`
`Brett Cooper
`
`12/20/2024
`
`

`

`Case: 25-111 Document: 11 Page: 3 Filed: 12/20/2024
`
`FORM 9. Certificate of Interest
`
`1. Represented
`Entities.
`Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(1).
`Provide the full names of
`all entities represented by
`undersigned counsel
`in
`this case.
`
`Form 9 (p. 2)
`March 2023
`
`2. Real Party in
`Interest.
`Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(2).
`Provide the full names of
`all real parties in interest
`for the entities. Do not list
`the real parties if they are
`the same as the entities.
`
`3. Parent Corporations
`and Stockholders.
`Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(3).
`Provide the full names of
`all parent corporations for
`the
`entities and all
`publicly held companies
`that own 10% or more
`stock in the entities.
`☐ None/Not Applicable ☐ None/Not Applicable
`
`☐ Additional pages attached
`
`Universal Connectivity Technologies Inc.
`
`Wi-LAN Technologies Inc.
`
`Quarterhill Inc.
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case: 25-111 Document: 11 Page: 4 Filed: 12/20/2024
`
`FORM 9. Certificate of Interest
`
`Form 9 (p. 3)
`March 2023
`
`4. Legal Representatives. List all law firms, partners, and associates that (a)
`appeared for the entities in the originating court or agency or (b) are expected to
`appear in this court for the entities. Do not include those who have already entered
`an appearance in this court. Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(4).
`☐ None/Not Applicable
`☐ Additional pages attached
`
`5. Related Cases. Other than the originating case(s) for this case, are there
`related or prior cases that meet the criteria under Fed. Cir. R. 47.5(a)?
`☐ Yes (file separate notice; see below) ☐ No ☐ N/A (amicus/movant)
`If yes, concurrently file a separate Notice of Related Case Information that complies
`with Fed. Cir. R. 47.5(b). Please do not duplicate information. This separate
`Notice must only be filed with the first Certificate of Interest or, subsequently, if
`information changes during the pendency of the appeal. Fed. Cir. R. 47.5(b).
`
`6. Organizational Victims and Bankruptcy Cases. Provide any information
`required under Fed. R. App. P. 26.1(b) (organizational victims in criminal cases)
`and 26.1(c) (bankruptcy case debtors and trustees). Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(6).
`☐ None/Not Applicable
`☐ Additional pages attached
`
`Seth Hasenour
`
`Jonathan Yim
`
`Drew Hollander
`
`Ashley Ratycz
`
`Justin Kurt Truelove
`
`Andrea Leigh Fair
`
`4
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case: 25-111 Document: 11 Page: 5 Filed: 12/20/2024
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iii
`
`STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES ..................................................................... 1
`
`INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 2
`
`FACTUAL BACKGROUND ................................................................................... 5
`
`STANDARD OF REVIEW ...................................................................................... 8
`
`REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ........................................................ 9
`
`
`I. LGL IS NOT ENTITLED TO MANDAMUS RELIEF FOR A
`ROUTINE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF
`PERSONAL JURISDICTION ................................................................... 10
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`A. Because Denial of a Motion To Dismiss for Lack of Personal
`Jurisdiction Is Reviewable After Final Judgment, LGL Cannot
`Show It Lacks Other Adequate Means for Review ............................. 11
`
`B. LGL Cannot Invoke the Narrow Exception for Cases Raising
`Basic, Unsettled Legal Questions Important
`to Judicial
`Administration .................................................................................... 14
`
`II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
`CONCLUDING LGL IS SUBJECT TO SPECIFIC PERSONAL
`JURISDICTION ........................................................................................ 17
`
`A. The District Court Applied Well-Established Law Supporting
`Personal Jurisdiction Under A Stream of Commerce Theory ............ 17
`
`B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Concluding
`LGL Is Subject To Personal Jurisdiction Under The Stream Of
`Commerce Theory .............................................................................. 18
`
`C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Concluding
`LGL Is Subject To Personal Jurisdiction Under Rule 4(k)(2) ............ 25
`
`i
`
`

`

`Case: 25-111 Document: 11 Page: 6 Filed: 12/20/2024
`
`D. LGL’s Arguments About Different Conclusions From Different
`District Courts Are Irrelevant ............................................................. 26
`
`III. LGL’S OTHER ARGUMENTS ARE IRRELEVANT .............................. 30
`
`
`
`
`
`
`CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 32
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................ 34
`
`CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ...................................................................... 35
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`

`Case: 25-111 Document: 11 Page: 7 Filed: 12/20/2024
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`Cases
`3G Licensing, S.A. v. Lenovo Group Ltd.,
`No. 12-84-LPS, 2019 WL 3974539 (D. Del. Aug. 22, 2019), report
`& recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 7635823 (D. Del. Sept. 19,
`2019) .................................................................................................. 27, 28, 29, 30
`
`
`Abelesz v. OTP Bank,
`692 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2012) ............................................................................... 13
`
`
`ACQIS LLC v. Lenovo Grp. Ltd.,
`572 F. Supp. 3d 291 (W.D. Tex. 2021) ............................................................ 7, 27
`
`
`AFTG-TG, LLC v. Nuvoton Tech. Corp.,
`689 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ........................................................................... 17
`
`
`Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, Solano
`County,
`480 U.S. 102 (1987) ........................................................................ 3, 9, 13, 14, 15
`
`
`AX Wireless LLC v. Lenovo Grp. Ltd.,
`No. 2:22-cv-280-RWS-RSP, 2023 WL 7105701 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 6,
`2023), report & recommendation adopted, No. 2:22-cv-280-RWS-
`RSP, Dkt. No. 119 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2023) ................................................. 7, 27
`
`
`Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp.,
`21 F.3d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ............................................. 3, 6, 10, 14, 15, 16, 18
`
`
`Campbell Pet Co. v. Miale,
`542 F.3d 879 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ............................................................................. 19
`
`
`Capella Photonics, Inc. v. Infinera Corp.,
`No. 2:20-cv-00077-JRG, 2021 WL 518478 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 10,
`2021) .................................................................................................................... 32
`
`
`Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Columbia,
`542 U.S. 367 (2004) .......................................................................... 2, 3, 8, 11, 13
`
`
`Colida v. LG Elecs., Inc.,
`77 F. App’x 523 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ........................................................................ 17
`
`
`
`iii
`
`

`

`Case: 25-111 Document: 11 Page: 8 Filed: 12/20/2024
`
`Dubea v. Simpson,
`277 F. App’x 458 (5th Cir. 2008) ........................................................................ 11
`
`
`Fundamental Innovation Sys. Int’l LLC v. LG Elecs., Inc.,
`No. 2:16-cv-01425-JRG-RSP, 2018 WL 279091 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 3,
`2018) .................................................................................................................... 32
`
`
`In re Amazon.com, Inc.,
`No. 2023-104, 2023 WL 126447 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 9, 2023) ................................... 21
`
`
`In re BNY ConvergEx Grp., LLC,
`404 F. App’x 484 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .................................................................. 9, 12
`
`
`In re Boon Glob. Ltd.,
`923 F.3d 643 (9th Cir. 2019) ............................................................................... 12
`
`
`In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc.,
`No. 2023-136, 2023 WL 5688812 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 5, 2023) ............................... 16
`
`
`In re Depuy Orthopaedics, Inc.,
`870 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 2017) ..................................................................... 2, 11, 13
`
`
`In re Genentech, Inc.,
`566 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ............................................................................. 8
`
`
`In re Hoffman,
`424 F. App’x 960 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ................................................................... 3, 12
`
`
`In re HTC Corp.,
`889 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ....................................................................... 8, 31
`
`
`In re Ivy,
`901 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1990) .................................................................................... 12
`
`
`In re Porauto Indus. Co., Ltd.,
`564 F. App’x 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ................................................................ 3, 12
`
`
`In re Realtek Semiconductor Corp.,
`No. 2023-132, 2023 WL 5274627 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 16, 2023) ................... 2, 12, 14
`
`
`
`
`
`iv
`
`

`

`Case: 25-111 Document: 11 Page: 9 Filed: 12/20/2024
`
`In re Roman Cath. Diocese of Albany,
`745 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 2014) ............................................................................ 13, 35
`
`
`In re Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd.,
`2 F.4th 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2021) .............................................................................. 11
`
`
`In re Stingray IP Sols., LLC,
`56 F.4th 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023) .............................................................. 3, 8, 14, 15
`
`
`In re TCT Mobile Int’l Ltd.,
`783 F. App’x 1028 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ................................................................ 3, 12
`
`
`In re Vistaprint Ltd.,
`628 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ............................................................................. 8
`
`
`In re Volkswagen of Am. Inc.,
`566 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ....................................................................... 8, 17
`
`
`J. McIntyre Machine, Ltd. v. Nicastro,
`564 U.S. 873 (2011) ........................................................................................ 3, 14
`
`
`Merial, Ltd. v. Cipla, Ltd.,
`681 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ........................................................................... 25
`
`
`M-I Drilling Fluids UK Ltd. v. Dynamic Air Ltda.,
`890 F.3d 995 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ....................................................................... 18, 25
`
`
`Morgan v. Swanson,
`659 F.3d 359 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) ................................................................ 24
`
`
`Nuance Commc’ns, Inc. v. Abbyy Software House,
`626 F.3d 1222 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ........................................................................... 19
`
`
`Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,
`454 U.S. 235 (1981) ............................................................................................ 31
`
`
`Polar Electro Oy v. Suunto Oy,
`829 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ..................................................................... 15, 24
`
`
`Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n,
`319 U.S. 21 (1943) ................................................................................................ 2
`
`
`
`v
`
`

`

`Case: 25-111 Document: 11 Page: 10 Filed: 12/20/2024
`
`
`TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC,
`581 U.S. 258 (2017) ...................................................................................... 30, 31
`
`
`Theta IP, LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC,
`No. 1:22-cv-03441, 2024 WL 1283706 (N.D. Ill. March 25, 2024) ....... 27, 28, 30
`
`
`
`Statutes
`28 U.S.C. § 1391 ..................................................................................................... 31
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1404 ..................................................................................................... 30
`
`
`Rules
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 ...................................................................... 4, 6, 10, 14, 18, 25, 26
`
`
`
`
`
`vi
`
`

`

`Case: 25-111 Document: 11 Page: 11 Filed: 12/20/2024
`
`STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES
`
`Under Fed. Cir. R. 47.5(a), counsel for Respondent certifies that no other
`
`appeal from the same proceeding is or was previously before this Court or any other
`
`appellate court, whether under the same or similar title.
`
`Under Fed. Cir. R. 47.5(b), counsel for Respondent states that the Court’s
`
`decision in this appeal may affect the following judicial matters: In re Lenovo Group
`
`Limited, 25-112 (CAFC)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`
`

`

`Case: 25-111 Document: 11 Page: 12 Filed: 12/20/2024
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Petitioner Lenovo Group Limited (“LGL”) seeks extraordinary mandamus
`
`
`
`
`relief for a run-of-the-mill denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
`
`jurisdiction. But “‘only exceptional circumstances’” can justify mandamus, and
`
`LGL does not come close to showing that such circumstances exist here. Cheney v.
`
`U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004). Under the
`
`Supreme Court’s decision in Cheney, a party seeking mandamus must show not only
`
`a “clear and indisputable” right to relief (which LGL fails to show), but also that the
`
`party has “no other adequate means to attain the relief [it] desires.” Id. at 380-81.
`
`LGL does not even try to show that it lacks other adequate means for relief. Nor
`
`could it. As the Supreme Court has explained, mandamus is not appropriate to
`
`review “jurisdictional questions” that the lower court “was competent to decide,”
`
`because those issues “are reviewable in the regular course of appeal.” Roche v.
`
`Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943).
`
`Thus, the Fifth Circuit, whose law applies here, has held that mandamus is
`
`unavailable to review issues of “personal jurisdiction,” because such challenges can
`
`be raised in an “ordinary appeal.” In re Depuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 870 F.3d 345,
`
`347, 353 (5th Cir. 2017). This Court has repeatedly applied the same rule. See, e.g.,
`
`In re Realtek Semiconductor Corp., No. 2023-132, 2023 WL 5274627, at *1 (Fed.
`
`Cir. Aug. 16, 2023); In re TCT Mobile Int’l Ltd., 783 F. App’x 1028, 1029 (Fed. Cir.
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case: 25-111 Document: 11 Page: 13 Filed: 12/20/2024
`
`2019); In re Porauto Indus. Co., Ltd., 564 F. App’x 1023, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 2014); In
`
`re Hoffman, 424 F. App’x 960, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2011). And LGL never contends that
`
`rule should not apply here. That alone forecloses mandamus under Cheney.
`
`Recognizing it cannot satisfy the traditional mandamus requirements, LGL
`
`urges that this case presents the “narrow” alternative situation where mandamus is
`
`needed to resolve “‘basic, undecided’ legal questions’” that are “important to
`
`‘proper judicial administration.’” In re Stingray IP Sols., LLC, 56 F.4th 1379, 1383
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2023); see Pet.9, 23. But that “narrow basis for mandamus” is likewise
`
`available “‘only in extreme,” “unusual and exceptional circumstances.” Stingray,
`
`56 F.4th at 1381-82. No such circumstances exist here.
`
`LGL says this case presents a “basic, undecided” legal question over the
`
`“unsettled status of the ‘stream of commerce’ theory of personal jurisdiction” under
`
`the plurality and concurring opinions in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court
`
`of California, Solano County, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), and J. McIntyre Machine, Ltd.
`
`v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011). Pet.10-12, 23. But as this Court recognized in
`
`Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1994),
`
`and later decisions, those two theories rarely, if ever, produce different results in
`
`practice. This Court thus has found it unnecessary to take a side in the Asahi debate
`
`for over 30 years. This case is no different. LGL nowhere argues this case would
`
`come out differently depending on which articulation of the “stream of commerce”
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case: 25-111 Document: 11 Page: 14 Filed: 12/20/2024
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`theory is applied. Indeed, LGL never asks this Court to decide between Asahi’s
`
`different articulations, develops any argument supporting a specific articulation, or
`
`even says what it thinks is the correct articulation. Simply put, this case does not
`
`call for resolution of any basic, unsettled legal question that could justify mandamus.
`
`Instead, LGL objects to the district court’s fact-intensive, case-specific finding
`
`that the evidence here—viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff—shows
`
`that LGL has a sufficient role in the distribution of accused products to the United
`
`States as a whole, and Texas specifically, to warrant personal jurisdiction under
`
`either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) or Texas’s long-arm statute. That
`
`garden-variety factual question does not remotely resemble the sort of basic,
`
`undecided legal questions that could warrant extraordinary mandamus relief. And
`
`because LGL does not even try to satisfy the traditional mandamus requirements—
`
`in particular, the absence of other adequate means for relief—it cannot obtain
`
`mandamus on any other theory, either.
`
`That independently warrants denial of LGL’s petition. But even if the Court
`
`were to consider the merits, LGL cannot show any error in the district court’s factual
`
`analysis—let alone the clear and indisputable error needed for mandamus. LGL
`
`largely ignores the evidence the district court relied on in finding that LGL acts in
`
`concert with its subsidiaries to manufacture the accused products and place them in
`
`the stream of commerce, knowing they will end up in the United States, including
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case: 25-111 Document: 11 Page: 15 Filed: 12/20/2024
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`Texas. Substantial evidence supports each of the district court’s findings. LGL can-
`
`not show a clear and indisputable right to mandamus. The petition should be denied.
`
`FACTUAL BACKGROUND
`
`On September 28, 2023, Universal Connectivity Technologies Inc. (“UCT”)
`
`sued LGL for infringement of eight patents. LGL moved to dismiss for lack of
`
`personal jurisdiction, alleging that it is a Hong Kong-based holding company that
`
`has no employees or operations in the United States and that it does not manufacture,
`
`import, or sell any of the Accused Products in the United States.
`
`The parties did not engage in jurisdictional discovery. In responding to LGL’s
`
`motion to dismiss, UCT relied primarily on LGL’s own public-facing documents to
`
`demonstrate the LGL is subject to personal jurisdiction under a stream of commerce
`
`theory, by acting in consort with its US-based subsidiaries to place the accused
`
`products into the stream of commerce in the United States, including Texas.
`
`In particular, UCT relied on LGL’s 2022/23 Annual Report. Appx124-145;
`
`see also Appx15-16. That report demonstrates that LGL is at the head of the Lenovo
`
`Group; that Lenovo (United States) Inc. (“Lenovo US”) and Lenovo Global
`
`Technology (United States) Inc. (“Lenovo Tech.”) are both wholly owned by LGL;
`
`and that together, LGL and its subsidiaries develop, manufacture and market
`
`technology products throughout the world, including in the United States. Appx125,
`
`134, 141-145; see also Appx81-82, Appx116-118. The report further shows that
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case: 25-111 Document: 11 Page: 16 Filed: 12/20/2024
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`LGL claims the revenues of its US-based subsidiaries as its own revenues and that
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`LGL has employees—including management level employees—in the United
`
`States, including Texas. Appx130-131, 136-140; see also Appx81-84; Appx117-
`
`118. Furthermore, LGL does not dispute that Lenovo US and Lenovo Tech. are both
`
`registered to do business in Texas or that LGL maintains authorized sellers and sales
`
`representatives that sell, or offer for sale the accused products in the United States,
`
`including Texas. Appx15; Appx81-82; Appx118.
`
`The district court denied LGL’s motion to dismiss. Appx1-12. It explained
`
`that, under this Court’s precedent, “defendants fall under the stream of commerce
`
`theory [of personal jurisdiction] where ‘defendants, acting in consort, placed the
`
`accused [product] in the stream of commerce, they knew the likely destination of the
`
`products, and their conduct and connections with the forum state were such that they
`
`should reasonably have anticipated being brought into court there.’” Appx3-4
`
`(quoting Beverly Hills Fan, 21 F.3d at 1566 (emphasis by district court)). Applying
`
`that standard, the district court found that “UCT has made a prima facie showing of
`
`specific jurisdiction in Texas” based on LGL’s role in the distribution of accused
`
`products to Texas. Appx6. And even if LGL’s contacts with Texas specifically were
`
`insufficient, the court would still have “personal jurisdiction over LGL under Rule
`
`4(k)(2)” because UCT’s claims arise under federal law and LGL has sufficient
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`“contacts directed to the United States at large.” Appx11-12.
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case: 25-111 Document: 11 Page: 17 Filed: 12/20/2024
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`In reaching its decision, the district court found, among other things, that
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`“UCT presents evidence that LGL portrays itself and its subsidiaries as a single
`
`company,” and that “UCT presents evidence that LGL has employees working and
`
`living in the United States, including in Texas.” Appx6-7 (citing Appx83-84). While
`
`LGL submitted a declaration asserting that it did not control its subsidiaries’
`
`activities, the court found “open factual disputes as to whether LGL created,
`
`controls, or directs its subsidiaries to place the [accused] products into the stream of
`
`commerce in Texas.” Appx7. Indeed, the court noted, the fact that LGL’s declaration
`
`came from “an employee of an LGL subsidiary” itself indicated “that there is some
`
`degree of lack of separateness between LGL and its subsidiaries.” Appx7.
`
`The court also cited two decisions from other Texas courts denying motions
`
`to dismiss by LGL for lack of personal jurisdiction, noting that those rulings were
`
`based on “some of the same accused products and based on similar evidence and
`
`reasoning.” Appx7-8 (citing AX Wireless LLC v. Lenovo Grp. Ltd., No. 2:22-cv-280-
`
`RWS-RSP, 2023 WL 7105701 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 2023), report & recommendation
`
`adopted, No. 2:22-cv-280-RWS-RSP, Dkt. No. 119 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2023) and
`
`ACQIS LLC v. Lenovo Grp. Ltd., 572 F. Supp. 3d 291 (W.D. Tex. 2021). Both of
`
`those decisions were issued after the benefit of jurisdictional discovery, and further
`
`supported the district court’s findings here.
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case: 25-111 Document: 11 Page: 18 Filed: 12/20/2024
`
`STANDARD OF REVIEW
`
`Mandamus is “a drastic and extraordinary remedy reserved for really
`
`extraordinary causes,” Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380 (internal quotation marks and
`
`citation omitted), such as “a clear abuse of discretion or usurpation of judicial
`
`power.” In re Volkswagen of Am. Inc., 566 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
`
`A writ of mandamus generally may issue only if the petitioner satisfies three
`
`requirements: “(1) the petitioner must have no other adequate means to attain the
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`relief desired; (2) the petitioner must demonstrate a ‘clear and indisputable’ right to
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`the issuance of the writ; and (3) ‘even if the first two prerequisites have been met,
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`the issuing court, in the exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is
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`appropriate under the circumstances.’” In re HTC Corp., 889 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed.
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`Cir. 2018) (citing Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380-81). Under that standard, mandamus
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`should be denied “[i]f the facts and circumstances are rationally capable of providing
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`reasons for what the district court has done.” In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338,
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`1347 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); In re Vistaprint Ltd., 628 F.3d 1342, 1347
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`(Fed. Cir. 2010) (mandamus inappropriate where there is “plausible support of
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`record” for district-court decision). In “rare occasion[s],” mandamus may be
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`available without showing all the Cheney factors, because it is required “to resolve
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`an important issue relating to proper judicial administration.” Stingray, 56 F.4th at
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`1382-83. But that exception applies “‘only in extreme cases.’” Id.
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`
`
`8
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`

`

`Case: 25-111 Document: 11 Page: 19 Filed: 12/20/2024
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`REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
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`“[M]andamus is reserved generally for those interlocutory orders that are
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`clearly and indisputably incorrect and then only if such error cannot be effectively
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`reviewed at the end of the case.” In re BNY ConvergEx Grp., LLC, 404 F. App’x
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`484, 485 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (emphasis added). LGL cannot meet this bar—and indeed
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`does not even try. This Court and the Fifth Circuit routinely deny mandamus
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`petitions challenging denials of “motion[s] to dismiss for lack of personal
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`jurisdiction,” because such decisions can be “effectively reviewed” on ordinary
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`“appellate review” after “final judgment has issued.” Id.; pp. 10-12, infra. LGL
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`never addresses that authority, and never argues that it cannot obtain review of the
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`district court’s personal-jurisdiction ruling after final judgment. It is thus undisputed
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`that LGL cannot satisfy the traditional requirements for mandamus.
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`Recognizing that problem, LGL tries to sidestep the traditional mandamus
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`requirements by urging that its petition presents “basic, unsettled legal questions”
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`important to judicial administration. That gambit fails. While LGL invokes the
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`historical debate between Justice O’Connor and Justice Brennan in Asahi over how
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`to articulate the “stream of commerce” basis for personal jurisdiction, see Pet.10-12,
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`it never asks this Court to resolve that debate, or to adopt a definitive test for stream-
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`of-commerce jurisdiction. To the contrary, LGL urges that the result here should be
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`the same under either articulation—exactly the approach this Court has followed for
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`
`
`9
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`

`

`Case: 25-111 Document: 11 Page: 20 Filed: 12/20/2024
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`30 years. See Beverly Hills Fan, 21 F.3d at 1566. Far from presenting a basic,
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`unsettled legal question of broad importance, LGL’s petition raises only a case-
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`specific factual question of whether the evidence here supports a finding that LGL,
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`in consort with its subsidiaries, directs accused products to the United States.
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`LGL thus cannot invoke the “basic, unsettled legal question” basis for
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`mandamus. And it does not even try to meet the traditional mandamus requirements.
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`That, on its own, requires denial of its petition, even apart from the merits.
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`Regardless, the district court’s determination that LGL is subject to personal
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`jurisdiction is correct and supported by the factual record. The district court applied
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`the well-established law of this Court in concluding—based on the evidence in this
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`case—that LGL acts in concert with its subsidiaries to place the accused products
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`into the stream of commerce, knowing that they will end up in the United States,
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`including Texas. The district court thus permissibly found personal jurisdiction
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`based on LGL’s minimum contacts with Texas and—at the very least—based on its
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`contacts with the United States as a whole under Rule 4(k)(2). LGL fails to identify
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`any clear error or abuse of discretion. The fact that LGL disagrees with the district
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`court’s conclusions is not grounds for mandamus.
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`I.
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`
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`LGL IS NOT ENTITLED TO MANDAMUS RELIEF FOR A ROUTINE
`DENIAL OF A MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL
`JURISDICTION
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`
`10
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`

`

`Case: 25-111 Document: 11 Page: 21 Filed: 12/20/2024
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`A.
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`Because Denial of a Motion To Dismiss for Lack of Personal
`Jurisdiction Is Reviewable After Final Judgment, LGL Cannot
`Show It Lacks Other Adequate Means for Review
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`Mandamus is not a proper vehicle for challenging the district court’s denial of
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`
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`LGL’s motion to dismiss on personal-jurisdiction grounds. Because mandamus is
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`an extraordinary remedy that must “not be used as a substitute for the regular appeals
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`process,” the Supreme Court has held that “‘the party seeking issuance of the writ
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`[must] have no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires.’” Cheney, 542
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`U.S. at 380-81.
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`That is not the case where, as here, a party seeks to challenge a “district court’s
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`order denying [a] motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.” Dubea v.
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`Simpson, 277 F. App’x 458, 459 (5th Cir. 2008). The Fifth Circuit (whose law
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`governs the mandamus standard here) is explicit on that point: “Because the district
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`court’s order is reviewable on appeal from a final judgment, [the petitioner] cannot
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`show that he has ‘no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires,’ which is
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`one of the prerequisites for mandamus relief.” Id.; see In re Samsung Elecs. Co.,
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`Ltd., 2 F.4th 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (regional circuit law governs mandamus
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`standard). The Fifth Circuit thus has held that mandamus is unavailable for denials
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`of motions to dismiss “for lack of personal jurisdiction,” even if the other
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`requirements for mandamus are satisfied, because “petitioners have the usual and
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`adequate remedy of ordinary appeal.” Depuy, 870 F.3d at 347, 353.
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`
`
`11
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`

`

`Case: 25-111 Document: 11 Page: 22 Filed: 12/20/2024
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`This Court follows the same rule, refusing mandamus review of denials of
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`“motion[s] to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,” because any “error” could
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`be “effectively reviewed at the end of the case.” BNY, 404 F. App’x at 484-85.
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`“‘Because a defendant can obtain meaningful review of a denial of a motion to
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`dismiss for lack of jurisdiction after final judgment, mandamus is ordinarily not
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`available.’” Realtek, 2023 WL 5274627, at *1 (quoting TCT Mobile, 783 F. App’x
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`at 1029); see Porauto, 564 F. App’x at 1024 (denying mandamus because “any
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`argument concerning a lack of jurisdiction” could be “reviewed on appeal after final
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`judgment”); Hoffman, 424 F. App’x at 961 (refusing mandamus review of motion to
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`dismiss for “lack of personal jurisdiction” because “review on appeal after final
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`judgment” was “adequate means of obtaining review”). Other circuits are in accord.
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`See In re Boon Glob. Ltd., 923 F.3d 643, 654-55 (9th Cir. 2019) (denying mandamus
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`because appellate court could “review jurisdiction on direct review,” even if district
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`court “likely erred in its assertion of [personal] jurisdiction”); In re Ivy, 901 F.2d 7,
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`10 (2d Cir. 1990) (explaining “general rule” that “appellate courts should avoid
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`determining jurisdictional issues on a petition for mandamus”).
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`LGL offers no meaningful response.
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` Despite acknowledging
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`that
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`“[m]andamus typically requires” that petitioner has “‘no other adequate means to
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`attain the relief he seeks,’” Pet.8, LGL never argues that an o