Case: 25-112 Document: 12 Page: 1 Filed: 12/30/2024
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`No. 25-112
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`IN THE
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
`_______________________
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`IN RE LENOVO GROUP LIMITED,
`Petitioner
`
`_______________________
`
`On Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to the
`United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas,
`Case No. 2:24-cv-00239
`Chief Judge J. Rodney Gilstrap
`____________________
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`REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS
`___________________
`
`JACOB SCHROEDER
`FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW,
`GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP
`3300 HILLVIEW AVENUE
`PALO ALTO, CA 94304-1203
`(650) 849-6600
`
`LI ZHANG
`FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW,
`GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP
`TWO SEAPORT LANE
`BOSTON, MA 02210-2001
`(617) 646-1600
`
`Counsel for Petitioner,
`Lenovo Group Limited
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`
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`December 30, 2024
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`

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`Case: 25-112 Document: 12 Page: 2 Filed: 12/30/2024
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`CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST
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`Case Number 25-112
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` Short Case Caption In re Lenovo Group Limited
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` Filing Party/Entity Lenovo Group Limited
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`Instructions:
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`1. Complete each section of the form and select none or N/A if appropriate.
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`2. Please enter only one item per box; attach additional pages as needed, and
`check the box to indicate such pages are attached.
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`3. In answering Sections 2 and 3, be specific as to which represented entities
`the answers apply; lack of specificity may result in non-compliance.
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`4. Please do not duplicate entries within Section 5.
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`5. Counsel must file an amended Certificate of Interest within seven days after
`any information on this form changes. Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(c).
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` I
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` certify the following information and any attached sheets are accurate and
`complete to the best of my knowledge.
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`Date: December 30, 2024
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`Signature:
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` /s/ Jacob A. Schroeder
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`Name:
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`Jacob A. Schroeder
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`Case: 25-112 Document: 12 Page: 3 Filed: 12/30/2024
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`1. Represented
`Entities.
`Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(1).
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`2. Real Party in
`Interest.
`Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(2).
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`3. Parent Corporations
`and Stockholders.
`Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(3).
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`Provide the full names of
`all entities represented by
`undersigned counsel in
`this case.
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`Provide the full names of
`all real parties in interest
`for the entities. Do not
`list the real parties if they
`are the same as the
`entities.
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`Provide the full names of
`all parent corporations
`for the entities and all
`publicly held companies
`that own 10% or more
`stock in the entities.
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` None/Not Applicable
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` None/Not Applicable
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` None/Not Applicable
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`Lenovo Group Limited
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`Legend Holdings
`Corporation
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` Additional pages attached
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`ii
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`Case: 25-112 Document: 12 Page: 4 Filed: 12/30/2024
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`4. Legal Representatives. List all law firms, partners, and associates that (a)
`appeared for the entities in the originating court or agency or (b) are expected to
`appear in this court for the entities. Do not include those who have already
`entered an appearance in this court. Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(4).
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` None/Not Applicable
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` Additional pages attached
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`David Michael Hoffman
`Fish & Richardson P.C.
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`Erin P Gibson
`DLA Piper LLP US
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`Ahimsa Endelea Hodari
`DLA Piper LLP US
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`Claire Schuster
`DLA Piper LLP US
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`Aaron P Pirouznia
`Fish & Richardson P.C.
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`Dominic E Massa
`Wilmer Cutler Pickering
`Hale & Dorr LLP
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`Helena D Kiepura
`DLA Piper LLP US
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`Jason H Liss
`Wilmer Cutler Pickering
`Hale & Dorr LLP
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`Jeffrey Allen Shneidman
`Fish & Richardson P.C.
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`Joseph J Mueller
`Wilmer Cutler Pickering
`Hale & Dorr LLP
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`Louis W Tompros
`Wilmer Cutler Pickering
`Hale & Dorr LLP
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`Melissa Richards Smith
`Gillam & Smith, LLP
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`Salvatore P Tamburo
`DLA Piper LLP US
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`Sarah R. Frazier
`Wilmer Cutler Pickering
`Hale & Dorr LLP
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`Sharchun Dennis Wang
`Wilmer Cutler Pickering
`Hale and Dorr LLP
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`5. Related Cases. Other than the originating case(s) for this case, are there
`related or prior cases that meet the criteria under Fed. Cir. R. 47.5(a)?
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` Yes (file separate notice; see below)
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` No
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` N/A (amicus/movant)
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`If yes, concurrently file a separate Notice of Related Case Information that
`complies with Fed. Cir. R. 47.5(b). Please do not duplicate information. This
`separate Notice must only be filed with the first Certificate of Interest or,
`subsequently, if information changes during the pendency of the appeal. Fed.
`Cir. R. 47.5(b).
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`Case: 25-112 Document: 12 Page: 5 Filed: 12/30/2024
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`6. Organizational Victims and Bankruptcy Cases. Provide any information
`required under Fed. R. App. P. 26.1(b) (organizational victims in criminal cases)
`and 26.1(c) (bankruptcy case debtors and trustees). Fed. Cir. R. 47.4(a)(6).
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` None/Not Applicable
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` Additional pages attached
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`Case: 25-112 Document: 12 Page: 6 Filed: 12/30/2024
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1
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`I.
`
`LGL’s petition is proper because it raises basic, fundamental, and
`recurring legal questions concerning judicial administration.......................... 2
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`A.
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`B.
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`LGL is not seeking mandamus under Cheney, so Eireog’s
`argument about the Cheney requirements is irrelevant. ........................ 2
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`Eireog misunderstood the legal question concerning judicial
`administration presented in LGL’s petition, which is whether
`the stream of commerce theory of personal jurisdiction extends
`to defendants that do not place any products into any stream. ............. 3
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`C. District courts are split on how to apply the law to similar facts,
`satisfying the “administration of justice” standard for
`mandamus. ............................................................................................. 5
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`D.
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`Resolution of this basic, fundamental, and recurring legal
`question will prevent forum shopping. ................................................10
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`II.
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`LGL has not purposefully availed itself of the Eastern District of
`Texas or the United States. ............................................................................11
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`A. Mandamus relief is warranted under the “administration of
`justice” standard to resolve a conflict among the district courts
`concerning the scope and effect of the law. ........................................11
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`B.
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`C.
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`The district court’s legal error was in a misunderstanding of the
`“scope and effect” of the “stream of commerce” precedent. ..............12
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`The material, undisputed facts presented by LGL defeat
`Eireog’s unsupported and conclusory allegations, warranting a
`determination in LGL’s favor. ............................................................14
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`D. No precedent from this, or any other, Circuit has found personal
`jurisdiction under the stream of commerce theory on these
`undisputed facts. ..................................................................................15
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`CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................15
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`v
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`Case: 25-112 Document: 12 Page: 7 Filed: 12/30/2024
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`
`3G Licensing, S.A. v. Lenovo Grp. Ltd.,
`No. 17-84-LPS, 2019 WL 3974539 (D. Del. Aug. 22, 2019), report and
`recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 7635823 (D. Del. Sept. 19, 2019) ..... 6, 8, 9
`
`Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal.,
`480 U.S. 102 (1987) ..................................................................................... 1, 3, 6
`
`Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp.,
`21 F.3d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ............................................................. 3, 4, 10, 13
`
`Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C.,
`542 U.S. 367 (2004) ................................................................................... 1, 2, 11
`
`Daimler AG v. Bauman,
`571 U.S. 117 (2014) ............................................................................................15
`
`In re Cray Inc.,
`871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ............................................................... 5, 12, 13
`
`In re Google LLC,
`949 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ................................................................... 5, 6, 8
`
`In re Oath Holdings Inc.,
`908 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ..........................................................................12
`
`In re Stingray IP Sols., LLC,
`56 F.4th 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023) ............................................................ 2, 9, 10, 12
`
`J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro,
`564 U.S. 873 (2011) .............................................................................................. 1
`
`Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com de Equip. Medico,
`563 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ..........................................................................12
`
`TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC,
`581 U.S. 258 (2017) ........................................................................................4, 10
`
`Theta IP, LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC,
`No. 22C3441, 2024 WL 1283706 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2024) ....................... 6, 7, 8
`
`vi
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`

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`Case: 25-112 Document: 12 Page: 8 Filed: 12/30/2024
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`World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
`444 U.S. 286 (1980) .............................................................................................. 4
`
`Statutes
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`28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) .................................................................................................10
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`Rules
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) ..............................................................................................10
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`
`
`vii
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`Case: 25-112 Document: 12 Page: 9 Filed: 12/30/2024
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`
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Eireog’s arguments in response here are substantively identical to those in
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`UCT’s response in In re Lenovo Group Limited, No. 25-111 (Fed. Cir.), even though
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`LGL’s reply there identified the shortcomings in those arguments last week.1 Eireog
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`devotes the first thirteen pages of its brief responding to an issue not presented in
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`LGL’s petition (whether mandamus is appropriate under the Cheney standard).
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`Eireog devotes the remainder of its brief contending that mandamus relief is not
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`warranted because LGL’s petition presents a factual, rather than a legal, issue.
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`But, contrary to Eireog’s assertion, LGL’s petition presents the basic legal
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`issue of whether, in the absence of any veil piercing, a foreign holding company
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`which neither places products into nor carries products through any stream of
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`commerce purposefully avails itself of every judicial district where the products of
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`its subsidiaries may be found. Eireog cites no decision from this Court stretching
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`the “stream of commerce” theory of personal jurisdiction that far. Nor could Eireog
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`point to any statement from the opinions in Asahi or J. McIntyre to support such a
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`stretch. Yet, the district courts are deeply split on this issue even when presented
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`with identical material facts. And a divide on an issue so fundamental as personal
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`jurisdiction encourages forum shopping, the elimination of which is “an important
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`role” of the Federal Circuit. LGL’s petition presents the epitome of a “basic,
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`1 Accordingly, LGL’s reply here is substantively identical to its reply there.
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`1
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`

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`Case: 25-112 Document: 12 Page: 10 Filed: 12/30/2024
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`undecided” legal issue and, respectfully, LGL asks this Court to resolve the growing
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`conflict among its district courts and to fulfill this Court’s mandate to create a
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`uniform body of Federal Circuit law in this area.
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`I.
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`LGL’s petition is proper because it raises basic, fundamental, and
`recurring legal questions concerning judicial administration.
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`A. LGL is not seeking mandamus under Cheney, so Eireog’s
`argument about the Cheney requirements is irrelevant.
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`Eireog first contends that LGL does not qualify for mandamus relief under the
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`standard established in Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of
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`Columbia, 542 U.S. 367 (2004). Opp’n 1–14. But that is a strawman, because
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`LGL’s petition did not seek relief under the Cheney standard. According to Eireog,
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`LGL cannot meet the requirement of having “no other adequate means to attain the
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`relief [it] desires” because it can seek review on appeal. Opp’n 2, 4, 8, 11–14.
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`However, whether LGL satisfies that Cheney requirement is not dispositive because
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`mandamus is appropriate where, as here, the petition raises “an important issue
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`relating to proper judicial administration on which district courts have been divided.”
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`In re Stingray IP Sols., LLC, 56 F.4th 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2023). Under this
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`alternative “administration of justice” standard, the Court has not “separately
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`required petitioners to show satisfaction of Cheney’s three requirements.” Id. at
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`1382.
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`2
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`

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`Case: 25-112 Document: 12 Page: 11 Filed: 12/30/2024
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`
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`B.
`
`Eireog misunderstood the legal question concerning judicial
`administration presented in LGL’s petition, which is whether the
`stream of commerce theory of personal jurisdiction extends to
`defendants that do not place any products into any stream.
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`Eireog then argues that LGL’s petition fails to raise an unsettled legal question
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`because LGL does not ask the Court to modify Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal
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`Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1994) or to take a side in Asahi Metal
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`Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). Opp’n 9–10, 14–
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`16. But Eireog is misguided: LGL is not asking the Court to modify its precedent or
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`pick a side presented in Asahi because neither supports exercising jurisdiction over
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`defendants like LGL.
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`The basic, unsettled legal question raised in LGL’s petition is whether the
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`“stream of commerce” theory of personal jurisdiction can be applied to defendants
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`who do not make, sell, offer for sale, import, or distribute the accused products
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`anywhere. Pet. 1–5. Resolving this question requires a legal determination as to
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`what it means to “place” a product into the “stream of commerce.” Specifically,
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`when a defendant does not itself make, sell, offer for sale, import, or distribute the
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`accused products anywhere, does it “place” those products into the stream of
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`commerce based on the actions of its subsidiaries, absent veil-piercing?
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`This Court’s mandate compels the creation of a uniform body of law
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`concerning personal jurisdiction over defendants under the “stream of commerce”
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`theory to reduce “conflict and confusion at the district court level.” Beverly Hills
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`3
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`

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`Case: 25-112 Document: 12 Page: 12 Filed: 12/30/2024
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`Fan, 21 F.3d at 1564–65. And “consistency in this area” advances the “important
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`role of the Federal Circuit . . . to eliminate forum shopping.” Id. at 1565 n.13.
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`However, the district courts’ inconsistent application of the “stream of commerce”
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`theory of personal jurisdiction, an important issue relating to “orderly administration
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`of the laws,” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)
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`(internal quotations omitted), has led to widespread forum shopping in the wake of
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`TC Heartland.
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`Eireog dismisses the divide between the courts over this legal question as
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`merely a “factual determination” based on “different factual records.” Opp’n 16–
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`17. But this ignores that LGL was a defendant in multiple cases reaching
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`contradictory results based on identical material facts. Pet. 14–18. Moreover, the
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`nature of LGL’s business has not materially changed—LGL has never made nor sold
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`any products anywhere. Id.; see also Pet. 5–7.
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`And Eireog’s contention that a conflict over the application of law to a given
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`set of facts cannot present a basic, unsettled legal question improperly narrows the
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`scope of relief under the “administration of justice” standard. Contrary to Eireog’s
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`contention, this Court has held that mandamus relief is appropriate under the
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`“administration of justice” standard where the application of the same legal standard
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`to similar case-specific facts produced disparate results.
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`4
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`Case: 25-112 Document: 12 Page: 13 Filed: 12/30/2024
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`For example, in In re Google LLC, this Court concluded that “mandamus is
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`an available remedy” to resolve conflicting district court decisions on two issues:
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`“(1) whether a server rack, a shelf, or analogous space can be a ‘place of business’
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`and (2) whether a ‘regular and established place of business’ requires the regular
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`presence of an employee or agent of the defendant conducting the business.” 949
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`F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Although the courts applied the legal standard
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`established in In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017)—which requires
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`“(1) there must be a physical place in the district; (2) it must be a regular and
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`established place of business; and (3) it must be the place of the defendant”— the
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`conflicting decisions on these fact-specific issues warranted mandamus relief
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`because they presented a “fundamental and recurring issue of patent law.” Google,
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`949 F.3d at 1343.
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`Similarly, here, the conflicting outcomes produced by district courts applying
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`the “stream of commerce” theory to the same material facts involving the same
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`defendant highlight a “fundamental and recurring issue of patent law” that merits
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`mandamus relief. Id.
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`C. District courts are split on how to apply the law to similar facts,
`satisfying the “administration of justice” standard for mandamus.
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`This Court has not addressed a case with facts that fall between the two Asahi
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`approaches and, therefore, has not decided between them. Pet. 13. However, the
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`Court need not decide that issue here as neither supports exercising jurisdiction over
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`5
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`
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`defendants like LGL. As a threshold issue, personal jurisdiction requires, as it
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`always has, that the defendant “has placed goods in the stream of commerce.” Asahi,
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`480 U.S. at 117. LGL does not meet this requirement, as it does not place any
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`product into any stream of commerce.
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`Applying the same precedent governing the “stream of commerce” theory to
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`nearly identical material facts, the courts in Delaware and Illinois determined that
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`they could not exercise personal jurisdiction over LGL, whereas the courts in Texas
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`have reached the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., 3G Licensing, S.A. v. Lenovo Grp.
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`Ltd., No. 17-84-LPS, 2019 WL 3974539 (D. Del. Aug. 22, 2019), report and
`
`recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 7635823 (D. Del. Sept. 19, 2019); Theta IP,
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`LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC, No. 22C3441, 2024 WL 1283706 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25,
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`2024); see also Pet. 14–18. As in Google, these disparate outcomes present a
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`“fundamental and recurring issue of patent law” that warrants mandamus relief
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`under the “administration of justice” standard. 949 F.3d at 1343.
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`Eireog contends that “different district courts have reached different
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`conclusions in applying the stream of commerce theory depending on the evidence
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`presented to the district court.” Opp’n 26. However, in each court, LGL presented
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`the same unrebutted evidence: it is merely a holding company that does not make,
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`sell, offer for sale, import, or distribute the accused products anywhere. See, e.g.,
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`3G Licensing, 2019 WL 3974539, at *1 (citing declarations from Kurt Cranor);
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`6
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`Theta IP, 2024 WL 1283706, at *2 (citing affidavit from Adrian Chim); Appx41–
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`45 (declaration from Adrian Chim). Additionally, each court applied the same legal
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`standard governing the “stream of commerce” theory. The divergence arose because
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`some courts, but not others, held that LGL “placed” the accused products into the
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`stream of commerce not based on any affirmative act by LGL relating to those
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`products, but rather by attributing the actions of LGL’s domestic subsidiaries to LGL
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`without piercing the corporate veil. See, e.g., Appx8–11. This discrepancy
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`underscores the basic, unsettled legal question raised in LGL’s petition.
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`Eireog seeks to minimize the conflict between the district courts as a product
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`of different factual records, but that is untrue. Eireog argues that the 3G Licensing
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`and Theta IP cases “involved different facts and neither analyzed LGL’s contacts
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`with Texas.” Opp’n 28. None of the evidence considered by the 3G Licensing and
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`Theta IP courts is different from the jurisdictional facts associated with Texas. The
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`truth is that multiple courts considered the same material facts yet reached opposing
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`conclusions, hence why LGL is seeking this Court’s guidance.
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`For example, Eireog incorrectly asserts that “in Theta IP, the plaintiff failed
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`to come forth with evidence that rebutted the facts set forth in the affidavit relied on
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`by” LGL. Opp’n 28. Like the alleged LGL employees in the United States identified
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`by Eireog here, “Theta also identifi[ed] two officers, Laura Quatela and Sergio
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`Buniac, whom LGL lists as part of its leadership team on its website but also
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`7
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`Case: 25-112 Document: 12 Page: 16 Filed: 12/30/2024
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`
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`identified in its interrogatory responses as only Lenovo US, and not LGL,
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`employees.” Theta IP, 2024 WL 1283706, at *5. The Eastern District of Texas
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`relied on this evidence, without finding that any alleged LGL employees in the
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`United States play any role relating to the accused products, to assert personal
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`jurisdiction over LGL under the “stream of commerce” theory. Appx9. By contrast,
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`the Northern District of Illinois concluded that even if these individuals were
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`executives for both LGL and Lenovo US, “the existence of two overlapping
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`executives does not establish LGL’s control over the sales of the Accused Products
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`by its subsidiaries, particularly given the lack of other evidence of LGL’s
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`participation in the staffing, marketing, sales, and pricing decisions of its
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`subsidiaries.” Theta IP, 2024 WL 1283706, at *5. The conflicting treatment of
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`identical evidence between the district courts led to disparate results and reveals the
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`need for resolution of a “fundamental and recurring issue of patent law.” Google,
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`949 F.3d at 1343.
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`Eireog’s arguments regarding 3G Licensing are equally misleading. In 3G
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`Licensing, the Delaware court found that the plaintiff’s reliance on the LGL annual
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`report was misplaced because the report ambiguously referred to the “Group,” a term
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`encompassing LGL and its subsidiaries collectively. 2019 WL 3974539, at *5.
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`Since the activities of the “Group” were not clearly attributable only to LGL, and
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`declarations expressly stated that LGL was “simply a holding company” that “does
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`8
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`Case: 25-112 Document: 12 Page: 17 Filed: 12/30/2024
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`
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`not import or ship any products into the United States,” the Delaware court
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`determined that LGL “could not be subject to personal jurisdiction based on the
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`stream of commerce theory.” Id. at *6 (internal quotations omitted). Eireog argues
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`that, unlike in 3G Licensing, the annual report here refers to LGL as the “Company,”
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`and therefore constitutes “good evidence” for applying the “stream of commerce”
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`theory. Opp’n 29–30. Eireog fails to acknowledge, however, that the annual report
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`in 3G Licensing also referred to LGL as the “Company,” while distinguishing it from
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`the “Group.” 2019 WL 3974539, at *5. Moreover, like in 3G Licensing, the
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`excerpted annual report Eireog relied on here also described the activities of LGL
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`and its subsidiaries collectively as the activities of the “Group,” not of LGL itself.
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`Appx84. Thus, the evidence considered by the Delaware court in 3G Licensing
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`parallels that considered by the Eastern District of Texas here: ambiguous references
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`to the activities of the collective “Group” in the annual reports, along with
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`declarations expressly denying LGL’s involvement in placing products in the stream
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`of commerce. The conflicting conclusions reached by the District of Delaware and
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`the Eastern District of Texas highlight the “important issue relating to proper judicial
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`administration on which district courts have been divided.” Stingray, 56 F.4th at
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`1383.
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`9
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`Case: 25-112 Document: 12 Page: 18 Filed: 12/30/2024
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`D. Resolution of this basic, fundamental, and recurring legal
`question will prevent forum shopping.
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`Eireog’s proclaimed entitlement to forum shop (Opp’n 31–32) underscores
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`LGL’s warning about the exploitation of the inconsistent application of the “stream
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`of commerce” theory to circumvent the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
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`Pet. 21–23. “Since an important role of the Federal Circuit is to eliminate forum
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`shopping on either substantive or procedural grounds, consistency in this area would
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`advance that role.” Beverly Hills Fan, 21 F.3d at 1565 n.13; see also Stingray, 56
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`F.4th at 1383, 1386 & n.2 (considering “the effects of forum shopping” in resolving
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`a personal jurisdiction issue on which “district courts have been deeply split”). As
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`a result of forum shopping, even after TC Heartland, many of the nation’s patent
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`infringement actions continue to be filed in Marshall, Texas based on invocations of
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`the “stream of commerce” theory of personal jurisdiction. Pet. 23 n.11; see also
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`Dani Kass, EDTX Eclipses WDTX As Top Patent Venue, LAW360 (Feb. 7, 2024),
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`https://www.law360.com/articles/1794801/edtx-eclipses-wdtx-as-top-patent-venue.
`
`Eireog’s contention that “there is nothing wrong about a patentee filing suit
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`against a foreign parent corporation” is belied by its own conduct. Opp’n 31.
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`Despite alleging that LGL and its U.S.-based subsidiaries acted “in consort” to place
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`the accused products into the stream of commerce that reached the United States,
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`Eireog chose not to sue LGL’s U.S.-based subsidiaries, the entities responsible for
`
`10
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`placing the accused products into the stream of commerce by marketing, importing,
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`and selling them here.
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`Eireog’s additional argument that personal jurisdiction over foreign
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`defendants acts as a “check” on forum shopping (Opp’n 32 n.11) rings hollow and
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`places a bullseye on the issue presented in LGL’s petition. In practice, the Eastern
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`District of Texas routinely extends personal jurisdiction over foreign holding
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`companies based on tenuous “stream of commerce” allegations that would not
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`withstand scrutiny in other districts. Plaintiffs have exploited the inconsistent
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`application of this Court’s “stream of commerce” precedent to gain an unjustified
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`advantage in discovery, trial, and even settlement. The resolution of the basic,
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`fundamental, and recurring legal question raised in LGL’s petition is essential to
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`safeguard against this improper forum shopping.
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`II. LGL has not purposefully availed itself of the Eastern District of Texas
`or the United States.
`
`A. Mandamus relief is warranted under the “administration of
`justice” standard to resolve a conflict among the district courts
`concerning the scope and effect of the law.
`
`Eireog contends that the standard of review for this petition requires a “clear
`
`abuse of discretion.” Opp’n 17. This is incorrect. While the “clear abuse of
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`discretion” standard is applied when determining whether mandamus relief is
`
`appropriate under Cheney, this Court has granted mandamus relief under the
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`“administration of justice” standard without finding that there was a “clear abuse of
`
`11
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`discretion.” See, e.g., Stingray, 56 F.4th at 1384–85; In re Oath Holdings Inc., 908
`
`F.3d 1301, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2018). When called upon to correct a district court’s
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`answers to basic legal questions concerning judicial administration matters,
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`especially where decisions of the district courts are in conflict, this Court can decide
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`that issue de novo and without deference to the particular district court order that
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`prompted the mandamus petition. See, e.g., Stingray, 56 F.4th at 1383 (resolving
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`disagreement between district courts to reduce widespread disparities in rulings).
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`Moreover, whether a district court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant is
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`reviewed de novo applying Federal Circuit law. Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis
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`Jr. Ind. Com de Equip. Medico, 563 F.3d 1285, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Regardless,
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`it is nonetheless a clear abuse of discretion when the district court misunderstands
`
`the scope and effect of the law or when it applies an incorrect legal standard. Cray,
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`871 F.3d at 1359–60. In sum, mandamus is warranted under the “administration of
`
`justice” standard when the Court is called upon to resolve a basic, unsettled legal
`
`question such as the one presented here.
`
`B.
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`The district court’s legal error was in a misunderstanding of the
`“scope and effect” of the “stream of commerce” precedent.
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`Mandamus is appropriate when there is a “need for greater uniformity” on an
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`important issue relating to proper judicial administration on which district courts
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`have been divided, especially where a district court “has acted on wrong legal
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`principles” or “appl[ied] an incorrect legal standard.” Stingray, 56 F.4th at 1384;
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`12
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`Cray, 871 F.3d at 1359–60. Thus, when a district court misinterprets “the scope and
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`effect” of this Court’s precedent on an “unsettled and important” issue, mandamus
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`is warranted. Cray, 871 F.3d at 1357–60.
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`Here, the district court misunderstood the “scope and effect” of this Court’s,
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`and the Supreme Court’s, “stream of commerce” precedent. Eireog contends the
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`court simply applied Beverly Hills Fan that “defendants fall under the stream of
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`commerce theory . . . where ‘defendants, acting in consort, placed the accused
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`[product] in the stream of commerce.’” Opp’n 6. But this Court’s precedent has
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`uniformly found personal jurisdiction absent over defendants (like LGL) who do not
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`make, ship, or distribute the accused products. Pet. 13. And it has uniformly found
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`personal jurisdiction present over those defendants that do. Id. at 13–14. Eireog’s
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`response cites not a single case to the contrary. Beverly Hills Fan itself is instructive.
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`In that case, there were two defendants—Royal Sovereign Corporation and Ultec
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`Enterprises. Beverly Hills Fan, 21 F.3d at 1560. Ultec was a Chinese company that
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`manufactured the accused ceiling fan in Taiwan. Id. Royal was a New Jersey
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`company that imported the fan and sold it in the United States. Id. The accused
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`products passed through both defendants’ “hands” from the products’ creation
`
`through their importation and sale within the United States. Here, by contrast, the
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`accused products have never passed through the hands of LGL.
`
`13
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`Case: 25-112 Document: 12 Page: 22 Filed: 12/30/2024
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`C. The material, undisputed facts presented by LGL defeat Eireog’s
`unsupported and conclusory allegations, warranting a
`determination in LGL’s favor.
`
`The district court here did not (nor could it) pierce the corporate veil between
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`LGL and its subsidiaries. Appx8–11. Thus, the only relevant facts concern the
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`actions of LGL as opposed to those of its subsidiaries. And the only factual evidence
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`regarding the material actions of LGL is undisputed: LGL places no product in any
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`stream, nor does it carry any product through it. Pet. 5–7. Indeed, Eireog’s response
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`identifies no products made, sold, offered for sale, or imported by LGL because there
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`are none. On identical material facts, the courts in Delaware and Illinois have held
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`that LGL has not purposefully availed itself of those districts or of the United States.
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`Pet. 14–16. And on identical material facts, this Court has held defendants are not
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`subject to personal jurisdiction under a stream of commerce theory in other domestic
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`venues. Pet. 18–21.
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`Eireog’s response points to its broad, sweeping, and conclusory allegations in
`
`its Complaint lumping multiple entities together (Opp’n 19–24), ambiguous
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`statements directed towards investors and stakeholders (Opp’n 19–22), and
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`disconnected facts about LGL’s em